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Annual Review & Forecast Number

The 1935 ANALYST

- ★ WORLD RECOVERY PROSPECTS
- ★ THE FRUITS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING
- ★ PEACE OR WAR IN THE SPHERE OF LABOR?

The business outlook for 1935 . . . Fundamental influences favor rising stock prices . . . The money market and other guides to investment policy . . . Economic changes since 1854 . . . Climactic developments in banking . . . Agriculture's real effect on business . . . Foreign business conditions and international trade . . . World price level steady . . . Canada's persistent recovery . . . U. S. Government finance . . . Position and prospects of the transportation, public utility, steel, coal, building and other leading industries.

New York, Friday, January 18, 1935

Vol. 45, No. 1148

Fifty Cents



THE CANADIAN BANK OF COMMERCE

HEAD OFFICE: TORONTO

Established 1867

STATEMENT of Condition on November 30, 1934

| | |
|---|----------------|
| Balance of Profit and Loss Account, brought forward from last year..... | \$ 662,167.29 |
| Net Profit for the year ending 30th November, 1934, after making appropriation to Contingent Reserve Fund, out of which Fund full provision for bad and doubtful debts has been made..... | 3,413,654.54 |
| | <hr/> |
| | \$4,075,821.83 |

| | |
|---|----------------|
| These profits have been appropriated as follows: | |
| Dividends Nos. 188, 189, 190 and 191, at eight per cent. per annum..... | \$2,400,000.00 |
| Dominion and Provincial Government taxes..... | 600,000.00 |
| Transferred to Pension Fund..... | 246,837.90 |
| Written off Bank Premises..... | 150,000.00 |
| | <hr/> |
| Balance carried forward..... | \$3,396,837.90 |
| | 678,983.93 |
| | <hr/> |
| | \$4,075,821.83 |

GENERAL STATEMENT 30th NOVEMBER, 1934

LIABILITIES

| | |
|---|-------------------------|
| Notes of the Bank in circulation..... | \$ 25,972,960.07 |
| Deposits by and Balances due to Dominion Government..... | \$ 7,407,800.76 |
| Deposits by and Balances due to Provincial Governments..... | 7,160,575.56 |
| Deposits by the public not bearing interest..... | 98,976,439.29 |
| Deposits by the public bearing interest, including interest accrued to date of statement..... | 356,926,552.63 |
| Deposits by and Balances due to other Banks in Canada..... | 872,736.70 |
| Deposits by and Balances due to Banks and Banking Correspondents in the United Kingdom and Foreign Countries..... | 6,946,876.27 |
| | <hr/> |
| Advances under the Finance Act..... | 478,290,981.21 |
| Bills Payable..... | 7,000,000.00 |
| Letters of Credit outstanding..... | 49,617.15 |
| | <hr/> |
| TOTAL LIABILITIES TO THE PUBLIC. | \$524,030,508.29 |
| Dividends Unpaid..... | \$ 4,516.85 |
| Dividend No. 191, payable 1st December..... | 600,000.00 |
| Capital Paid up..... | 30,000,000.00 |
| Reserve Fund..... | 20,000,000.00 |
| Balance of Profits as per Profit and Loss Account..... | 678,983.93 |
| | <hr/> |
| TOTAL LIABILITIES TO SHAREHOLDERS. | 51,283,500.78 |
| | <hr/> |
| | \$575,314,009.07 |

ASSETS

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Gold and Coin..... | \$ 10,461,515.59 |
| Deposit in the Central Gold Reserves (gold)..... | 4,000,000.00 |
| Dominion Notes..... | 37,389,891.25 |
| Notes of other Banks..... | 1,130,095.00 |
| United States and other Foreign Currencies..... | 3,812,755.38 |
| | <hr/> |
| Cheques on other Banks..... | \$ 19,286,968.05 |
| Balances due by other Banks in Canada..... | 7,401.53 |
| Balances due by Banks and Banking Correspondents elsewhere than in Canada..... | 16,461,815.24 |
| | <hr/> |
| Dominion and Provincial Government Securities, direct and guaranteed (maturing within two years), not exceeding market value..... | 35,756,184.82 |
| Other Dominion and Provincial Government direct and guaranteed Securities, not exceeding market value..... | 81,627,153.55 |
| Canadian Municipal Securities, not exceeding market value..... | 53,477,375.30 |
| Public Securities other than Canadian, not exceeding market value..... | 12,671,170.49 |
| Other Bonds, Debentures and Stocks, not exceeding market value..... | 10,770,812.20 |
| Call and Short Loans (not exceeding 30 days) in Canada on Stocks, Debentures, Bonds and other Securities of a sufficient marketable value to cover..... | 4,951,951.33 |
| Call and Short Loans (not exceeding 30 days) elsewhere than in Canada on Stocks, Debentures, Bonds and other Securities of a sufficient marketable value to cover..... | 25,547,840.59 |
| Deposit with the Minister of Finance for the security of the Note Circulation..... | 32,349,966.79 |
| | <hr/> |
| TOTAL QUICK ASSETS. | 206,324,084.44 |
| Other Current Loans and Discounts in Canada (less rebate of interest), estimated loss provided for..... | 13,667,895.34 |
| Other Current Loans and Discounts elsewhere than in Canada (less rebate of interest), estimated loss provided for..... | 12,716,949.86 |
| Liabilities of Customers under Letters of Credit, as per contra..... | 3,450,818.40 |
| Non-current Loans, estimated loss provided for..... | 2,523,786.22 |
| Mortgages on Real Estate sold by the Bank..... | 2,416,365.67 |
| Real Estate other than Bank Premises..... | 14,705,147.04 |
| Bank Premises at not more than cost, less amounts written off..... | 3,947,833.33 |
| Shares of and loans to controlled companies..... | 364,416.48 |
| Other Assets not included under the foregoing heads..... | <hr/> |
| | \$575,314,009.07 |

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JAN 18 1

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VINCENT CULLEN, President

JAN 18 1935

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THE BUSINESS OUTLOOK

Uncertainty over the outcome of the gold cases now pending before the Supreme Court overshadows all other elements in the general business outlook. There is, however, no occasion for acute alarm, even if one or more cases should go against the government, provided Congress takes the wise and clear course.



HERE is absolutely no use in trying to figure out what the state of the nation will be one year from today when questions of such paramount and immediate importance remain to be settled as those raised by the gold cases now before the Supreme Court. America has suddenly awakened to the fact that its government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative and the judicial. Under the New Deal the executive branch has become so dominant in its relentless reaching out for power that the legislative, though much in the lime-light, has sunk to a secondary position; and the judicial has been all but completely lost to view. It is an interesting commentary on this state of affairs that in the annual financial reviews and forecasts published by leading newspapers less than three weeks ago the possibility of an upsetting decision by the Supreme Court on what is probably the most important single factor in the business and financial outlook for 1935 was given scant consideration and in some cases was not even mentioned.

Most readers are, of course, familiar by now with the most important details of these cases as brought out in the newspapers. Although there are several individual cases pending, they may be roughly grouped as follows: (1) Did Congress have power under the Constitution to seize gold and gold certificates and then to devalue the

dollar? (2) Did Congress have power to abrogate the gold clause in (a) governmental and (b) private contracts?

At this point it is convenient to note two points at issue not emphasized in current newspaper discussions. One is that the power of Congress to seize gold and gold certificates might be upheld; that its power to devalue the dollar might be upheld; but that these two acts in conjunction might well be declared unconstitutional. The reasoning is very simple and very logical. The courts have always upheld the right of the government to seize private property by right of eminent domain. They have also, in some cases, upheld its power to change the value of the dollar (the legal tender cases). When, however, in 1933, Congress seized gold and gold certificates and then devalued the dollar, it took private property, it is contended, *without just compensation*, and this is an act which the courts have never upheld. Congress, furthermore, took it upon itself, in devaluing the dollar, to fix the amount of the compensation, and the determination of what is just compensation is a function which has always been held to be judicial and not legislative.

A second argument which is going to be difficult for the Supreme Court to hurdle, assuming, as most people seem to do, that the court would like if possible to find some way of finding the acts of Congress with respect to money constitutional, is in connection with the seizure of gold cer- (Continued on Next Page)

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tificates. It is contended that gold certificates have always been regarded as trust receipts for gold deposited in the Treasury; they have, in fact, been referred to in various annual reports of the Secretary of the Treasury as trust receipts. The present Secretary of the Treasury has, however, repeatedly referred to the "profit" from devaluation. And yet it is one of the most settled and definite rules of law that a trustee shall not be entitled to any profit on the funds entrusted to his care, except as specified in the trust agreement. The taking of a "profit" by seizing gold certificates and then devaluing them constitutes, therefore, a breach of trust.

These two points are mentioned in order to emphasize the difficulties which the Supreme Court is going to have in finding the administration's monetary program constitutional, and to call attention to the necessity of formulating a new policy if the Supreme Court does actually find all or parts of it unconstitutional. What is to be done?

In the first place, a decision of unconstitutionality, especially with reference to devaluation, should be regarded as an opportunity rather than a calamity. It should be regarded as an opportunity to repair the damage done by the most futile and the most harmful part of the entire New Deal program. A so-called adverse decision by the Supreme Court is a way out for the administration, a method by which the chain of unfortunate events which began with its original mistake in refusing to support the dollar by permitting gold exports in April, 1933, can now be reversed. To quote from a recent article in this magazine by George Buchan Robinson, "What we need now, above all other steps, is a definition of the dollar and a commitment not to change it again. It is immoral for the United States to go on borrowing money, expecting to devalue the dollar of the payment date. * * * To make our government promises good, we shall have to balance the budget, and to make them *faithful*, we shall have to retreat from our repudiation. We need greatly to do both of these things." An "adverse" Supreme Court decision would

enable us to do one of them with honor and justice to all.

To facilitate a return to the 100 per cent dollar a little judicious legislation would be essential. It would upset things badly to return overnight. What would be necessary would be at least as gradual a return as the process of devaluation, which consumed in all about nine months. This could be accomplished by the passage by Congress of a law providing for a return to the old gold standard at some future date. That date might be one year or possibly two years ahead. Thus we should by an orderly process merely reverse the devaluation process. From the standpoint of orderly procedure the longer the better. From the standpoint of general business activity the shorter the better, because it has been our past experience that a return to the gold standard near the end of a long depression has been a tremendous stimulus to business.

The calamitous aspects of an "adverse" decision have been greatly exaggerated. What would actually happen in the event of an "adverse" decision and a law providing for a return to the gold standard on, say, Feb. 1, 1936? The Treasury would lose its "profit," which it would then have no legitimate use for, anyhow. Some commodity prices would fall, and there might be a general, but probably temporary, decline in market values of stocks and second-grade bonds. It is to be noted, however, that there is much assertion but not a shred of proof that the rise in commodity prices since April, 1933, has been caused solely by the depreciation of the dollar. The rise has, in fact, been brought about by many other influences, such as price-fixing under NRA, crop restriction under AAA and the circumstance that as of April, 1933, a rally in prices was overdue.

The dollar would, of course, rise gradually in terms of gold currencies, and presumably in terms of sterling. The confidence which would be engendered in this country by our prospective return to gold might cause a return of expatriated capital and be a source of temporary embarrassment to the gold bloc countries. This same confidence would, however, tend to make our efforts to stimulate credit expansion effective. This, in turn, would tend to pull our prices upward and would be beneficial in two ways. It would serve to offset the initial decline in market values. It would also tend to bring about a prompt readjustment of parities with other countries. The mere knowledge that we had seized our opportunity to abandon our currency manipulations, with their constant threat to world stability, should in itself go far toward mitigating initial effects.

Finally, if such a scheme for a return to the gold standard at a later date should be adopted by Congress with the approval of the Supreme Court, one argument which was heard so often in extenuation of devaluation would be equally valid in extenuation of a return to gold. It was frequently stated that the devaluation of the dollar would have no harmful effects, because a dollar was a dollar to most people, and the "man in the street" knew little and cared less about how many grains of gold it contained. The same would be true if the process of devaluation were to be reversed. Public and private contracts payable in gold would still be payable in current dollars, whatever they might be worth in terms of gold at any particular intervening date. And as was the case in 1879, we should, on the date set for resumption, resume—without the slightest tremor in the world of finance and business.


D. W. ELLSWORTH.

FINANCIAL MARKETS

STOCK prices have experienced a moderately sharp decline during the past week, in the course of which some issues have broken through their late December support levels. The averages, however, have as yet failed to penetrate this important support zone. The decline appears to have been due entirely to concern over the gold-law legislation which has recently been argued before the Supreme Court.

The week under review began with a sharp decline in prices, which continued with only minor interruptions until Saturday morning. A slow recovery then set in. This continued only until Tuesday morning, however, when another decline began. On Wednesday a moderate recovery in prices took place, and on Thursday prices were a trifle higher. Trading has been in moderate volume throughout the week, with a tendency to recede after the first sharp break in prices. The bond market has declined moderately during the week.

The most severe declines have been in



For the list of stocks and their weights see THE ANNALIST of March 10, 1933, page 362.

Chrysler, Bethlehem Steel, du Pont, Sears Roebuck, the tobacco stocks, the non-ferrous metals, Eastman Kodak, the tires, rails and United States Industrial Alcohol. On the whole, the electrical equipments have held up rather better than the rest of the market, as have Penney and a number of the food stocks. The public utilities and the oils have, on the whole, held fairly well.

The decline in prices is to be attributed, of course, to fears that the Supreme Court may invalidate all or some essential part of the 1933 gold legislation. Any threat of this sort is, of course, a very disturbing influence in the general market outlook. Regardless of what view one may take of either the ethical, legal or economic aspects of the departure from gold when it was taken originally, there can be no question that the upsetting of this legislation after a period of nearly two years, during which financial and business operations have adjusted themselves to new conditions, would produce a profound dislocation of economic relationships. That the raising of any serious question as to the validity of this legislation has produced a reaction in stocks is entirely natural. The only surprising feature of the situation is the fact that, if really serious doubt as to the outcome of the gold cases exists, prices have not declined much more sharply.

It appears probable that if the decision is against the government it would not invalidate all the gold legislation, but merely a part of it. The effect would depend to a large extent upon which part was invalidated. If, for example, gold clauses in private loan contracts were invalidated and those in government contracts were not, the result would be markedly different than if the situation were reversed. If only the gold clause

in government contracts were invalidated it might be that some further means of avoiding payment of the full amount might be worked out. In any case, the unfavorable effect upon private contracts would be obviated.

What effect an adverse decision would have upon the dollar is likewise problematical. Some observers believe that a situation would be produced which would force Congress to repeal the legislation changing the gold value of the dollar and force the administration to attempt to restore quotations to the former level. That any such result would occur seems at best very doubtful. In the first place, inflationary sentiment is still strong in Congress, and serious efforts would be made to get around the difficulty in some way or other. In the second place, the substantial increase in the government debt which would result from such a decision might of itself lead to a resort to printing-press inflation, ending with a further decline in the gold value of the currency.

As a result of doubt as to the status of the gold legislation and of the future course of the dollar, government bonds have advanced rather rapidly during the week on heavy trading. Other bonds have declined. The foreign exchanges have fluctuated rather more widely. Both sterling and the franc declined sharply during the early part of the week, but subsequently recovered part of their loss. There have been rumors of an impending international agreement for stabilization of currencies, or of a general revaluation and return to gold. Such reports, however, appear to be regarded in London as without serious foundation.

The chief force making for higher stock prices over the past year has been the strength in the bond market and the general oversupply of investment funds. Competition of funds for income has forced up the prices of all types of securities from which income may be obtained. This has, of course, had an effect upon preferred stocks and dividend-paying common stocks, as well as upon bonds. The movement in dividend-paying common stocks has had some sympathetic effect upon the non-dividend-paying issues. If real business recovery sets in, the character of the market is likely to change and advances in prices are more likely to be based upon increases in earning power. In such a situation, stocks of companies operating in the durable goods industries would probably advance more substantially than those in the consumers' goods industries which are normally more stable.

The gold question has affected the financial markets indirectly as well as directly, through its probable influence upon the general course of business. It has been reported that the making of future business contracts has been practically brought to a halt by the uncertainty. This is naturally expected to have an unfavorable effect upon general business activity. The possibility of labor disturbances in the motor and steel industries over the next several months, of course, contributes to the uncertainties of the outlook. Thus, in the middle of January, 1935, the chief factor in the financial and business outlook is the ill-advised and unnecessary departure from gold of the Spring of 1933. This deed of violence to financial ethics, and to all the fundamental principles upon which business contracts are based, has now created a situation which is a serious menace, not only to America, but to world business.

A. McB.

JAN 18

World Recovery Prospects: Short-Term Revival vs. Long-Term Instability



PREDICTION is always difficult, but today it is almost impossible. If there is one thing that is certain about the prospects for 1935 it is that we do not know what they are. It may be that the forces making for recovery will gather strength. It may be that even now they are being overborne. The position is so obscure that he who is definite is almost certainly a charlatan. He may be right or he may be wrong. But he is right or wrong by accident. On the basis of the available information we can only frame alternative conjectures.

Reasons for Uncertainty

The reason for this impotence is not the breakdown of any existing body of systematic knowledge. It is not true, as is often suggested, that the events of the last few years have exhibited the inadequacy of the existing generalizations of economic science. No doubt to statesmen, anxious to be free to do anything without incurring disagreeable consequences, it would be reassuring to feel that the existence of law in the economic sphere had been refuted. But it is not so. Given the forces operative and the policies which have been pursued, the economic history of our time displays a conformity with expectation based on existing knowledge which is almost disconcerting. An economist who takes his job seriously is not likely to be unaware of the manifold imperfections of his science. But this feeling is not likely to be reinforced by the contemplation of the world lacerations produced by kicking against the pricks which that science has long made obvious.

Our difficulty at the present time is not the lack of an analytical apparatus sufficiently subtle to sort out the implications of given forces or given policies, but rather the absence of knowledge of what forces are operative and what policies will be pursued. The shock of the crisis has split the world into pieces. The economic system is no longer a unity. In Great Britain and the sterling group generally there is a very considerable degree of recovery—how securely based will be the subject of later analysis. In the so-called Gold Bloc the depression continues to deepen. In the United States confidence oscillates from week to week between expectations of improvement and fears of renewed disaster. We simply do not know enough of the relative strength of the different forces at work in these different units to be able to judge of the resultant of their mutual interactions.

Moreover, at the present time, to a degree for which there is probably no precedent save in the years of confusion immediately after the Great War, the development of events is contingent upon the development of policy. It may be true—the events of the last few years afford a strong presumption that it is so—that there is little positively that policy can do for recovery. But it is equally true—and equally attested by experience—that it is within the power of those responsible for policy to delay indefinitely the coming of recovery and to plunge the world once more into the depths of depression. To predict the course of events in 1935 it is necessary to know not only many statistical series which we have not got; it is necessary also to know what will be done by those who rule over us. Now the laws of

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large numbers afford no clue either to the intentions of Mr. Roosevelt or the vagaries of the British electorate—not to mention the sinister broodings of the men of ill will, the destroyers of the European democracies. All that we can do is to distinguish the more conspicuous possibilities and their implications, leaving it to time and the coming of more exact information to show which conjecture is likely to be relevant.

Now there can be no doubt that during the past eighteen months or more, forces making for recovery have been actively in operation in many parts of the world. In Great Britain The Economist index of business activity is back to the level of the early part of 1930. In the south of England, it is no exaggeration to say that something like boom conditions have appeared. (This would probably be questioned by many Englishmen—especially by politicians of the Left—but I do not think that any one coming to these parts after traveling elsewhere would be likely to deny it.) In Scandinavia something of the same sort of thing is happening; and in many of the raw material producing centres of the world (Australia, the Argentine, South Africa, India) conditions are very much better. An Englishman will naturally write with great hesitation concerning the complex situation in the United States, but even here it seems as if, in the face of difficulties which at times must have been almost overwhelming, some advance that is not delusive has been made upon the position of two years ago.

What is questionable is how long this process can continue and whether its foundations are sound. For it is clear that it is exposed to many dangers; and it is at least arguable that some, at any rate, of the forces producing revival in the short run are not conducive to long-run stability. Let us look into this more carefully.

Immediate Dangers

So far as Europe is concerned the great danger which overshadows everything is the danger of the outbreak of war. At the moment the extreme tension which prevailed a little earlier in the Winter has relaxed and the immediate occasion of the tension has passed. But the conditions amid which it was engendered, the fundamental political disequilibria persist and are likely to persist. Only those who cannot see because they do not want to see, will deny the existence today on the European mainland of forces of an actively fissiparous nature. It may be quite true that the great armed dictatorships do not want war just at present, either on account of economic difficulties or on account of the imperfections of their military machines and their political alliances. But the whole philosophy on which they are based, the incessant *leitmotif* of their internal propaganda—presupposes war and expansion as desirable objectives of policy. In an atmosphere of this sort any accident may happen. When the gangsters are out it is not principle that prevents them from shooting.

But this danger may not mature in the immediate future. Much more probable, even in the first few months of the new year, is increasing economic

difficulty in the countries still on gold at the old rate—the so-called Gold Bloc. It is clear that monetary policies, first of Great Britain and later of the United States, whatever justification they may have in their effects on domestic affairs, have placed these countries in a position of the gravest difficulty. Exact calculation of equilibrium rates of exchange is almost impossible. But it is not open to serious question that the currencies of these countries are overvalued both in terms of sterling and of the dollar. That is to say, unless there is deflation or devaluation or unless prices in the rest of the world rise to a degree commensurate with the undervaluation of the other currencies, the position of these countries must be one of increasing difficulty. This has become very evident in the last twelve months. Month by month, while progress elsewhere has been reported, the condition of these countries has shown a persistent tendency to deteriorate.

Currency Situation Critical

Now it may be that price changes in the rest of the world will relieve the situation. But in the absence of such changes the situation is very critical. It is quite clear that even now there is a great mass of public opinion especially in France and Italy which is opposed to the abandonment of the gold standard. This attitude seems to appear perverse to certain Anglo-Saxon observers. But it is really very natural. Once bit twice shy. The French have had one big inflation in our generation. And the idea of settling all economic difficulties by letting the currency deteriorate has not for them the fascination of the unknown which it still presents in Anglo-Saxon countries. This may be thought to be stupid; but it is a very real factor in the situation. Nevertheless there are obvious limits to the extent to which deflation can be carried; and it is not certain that even now they have not been reached—at least in Belgium and Holland. The French have perhaps a greater margin of resistance. If it were only a matter of France, it might still be reasonable to anticipate no change. But be this as it may, it is fairly clear that if—what at the moment does not seem so imminent—there were a further downward revision of the dollar or if—what is by no means immediately excluded—there were further depreciation of the pound, the devaluation or abandonment of the gold standard by this group would be almost certain.

What effect this would have on the rest of the world is not easy to say. It seems unlikely that the external position of the United States would be gravely damaged directly; with the present degree of dollar depreciation, it is so immensely strong. But it is not at all unlikely that Great Britain would suffer almost at once. Much would depend on the form of the action taken by the Gold Bloc countries. If it were an orderly devaluation of say 10 or 15 per cent, then probably little would happen so far as Great Britain was concerned. It might well be that the position would be improved by reason of the cessation of uncertainty. But if it were a big devaluation, or if it were a mere abandonment of gold with the exchanges fluctu-

ating just anyhow, then a very grave situation might develop. So far as the dollar is concerned, Great Britain has already lost any of that relief from her former difficulties which she obtained by abandoning the old parity. The dollar is worth less pounds than in 1931. The rest of the sterling group have kept in step with the pound, or even slightly outstripped it. If now the currencies at present on gold at the old rate were to revert to the old parity, or even to threaten to go below it, would not a situation exist in which there would be strong pressure on the British Exchange Equalization Fund to sell sterling and re-establish competitive advantage? And if this pressure were successful, as it quite conceivably might be, would not a situation exist in which the race for competitive depreciation might become a real menace to world recovery? It is not certain that this would happen. We must assume that the authorities in London have such a possibility distinctly in mind and will do their best to avert it. But it cannot be altogether ruled out.

The American Enigma

But it may well be that the danger of an immediate collapse of this sort can be exaggerated. If it does not come quite soon, if, that is to say, the staying power of the Gold Bloc has not been sapped already, then the development of events is quite as contingent on what happens outside the countries concerned as on what happens inside. As we have remarked already, if there were to be a revival elsewhere, accompanied by some rise in prices, the difficulties of the Gold Bloc would be very greatly relieved.

But what are the chances of stable recovery elsewhere?

Once again, in tackling this question, it is impossible not to be struck by the disunity of the present tendencies of development. The situation in the United States is obviously very different from the situation in the sterling group. Yet the relative speed of their internal reactions must necessarily affect their respective developments and in turn affect the situation elsewhere.


I turn first to the United States, now as ever since the war, the main influence upon world economic conditions.

But here, it seems, we are confronted with an immense enigma. To the outside observer, at any rate, there are two great questions on the answer to which must depend all conclusions with regard to the probability of future developments.

The first question relates to the intentions of the administration. To what extent is the policy of the administration to be devoted to the restoration of business confidence, to what extent will it work against it? Hitherto, at a distance, it has been almost impossible to resist the conclusion that many of the measures adopted by the administration have had the effect of making recovery by way of spontaneous revival of business enterprise not easier, but rather more difficult. We have observed the spectacle of a colossal expansion of the basis of bank credit unaccompanied by that increase of business activity which, other things being equal, we should have expected to accompany such a movement. And it has seemed—and here I speak with great reserve, for I know only too well how easy it is to be deceived in such matters—it has seemed

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Fundamental Influences Favor Rising Stock Prices;



JUDGED by the position of fundamental economic factors which in the past have governed the course of the financial markets, the present outlook for common stocks is favorable. In a number of respects the present situation appears to be similar to that at the beginning of some of the most important upswings in stock prices which have occurred in the past. The chief unfavorable features of the situation are the uncertainties of the labor and political outlook.

Two Major Influences

In this article we shall review the present position of the important fundamental economic factors in the situation and compare their present position with that at the start of important upswings in the financial markets in the past. We shall then review briefly the nature of the non-economic forces which might possibly prevent or retard a general financial recovery.

The broader movements in common stock prices depend upon two sets of influences: (1) Interest rates and the supply of credit; (2) the rate of dividend payments, which depends upon earnings,

which in turn depend largely upon the general level of business activity and commodity prices.

In the past a decline in interest rates, or a rise in bond prices, has in most instances been followed by a rise in stock prices. Examples may be found in the following periods: 1878-79, 1884-85, 1888, 1891, 1893-94, 1896-7, 1900-01, 1904, 1911, 1920-21, 1924 and 1927. In all these instances an improvement in the bond market, and general easing of the short-term credit situation, was accompanied or followed by improvement in the general level of stock prices.

There is equally good historical evidence to support the theory that a rise in long-term and short-term money rates is likely to be followed sooner or later by a decline in the general level of common stock prices. Examples of this relationship may be found in the following periods: 1886-87, 1889-90, 1892-93, 1899, 1902, 1905-06, 1909, 1919, 1922-23, 1928-29 and 1931. In these instances the deterioration of the short-term credit situations and a decline in high-grade bond prices were followed by a decline in the general level of stock prices.¹

¹For a more detailed discussion, see "The Bond Market as a Stock Forecaster," *Annalist*, Aug. 12, 1927.

By EMERSON WIRT AXE

There is ample historical analogy, then, to support the belief that the trend of interest rates, both long-term and short-term, and the supply of credit have an important influence upon the course of stock prices. It is true that in some instances the money factor does not have an immediate influence upon common stock prices. In some cases a substantial improvement in the general level of business activity, commodity prices and corporation earnings will cause common stock prices to move in a direction opposite to that suggested by the course of interest rates. This was the case in 1930, when a rise in bond prices and decline in interest rates was followed by a further decline in stocks. In the latter half of 1920 a substantial rise in the bond market failed to produce an immediate effect upon stock prices. In these instances the trend of business and commodity prices was definitely unfavorable. It is reasonable that a severe contraction in earning power should more than offset an improvement in the money situation.


In the past a substantial improvement in general business activity has in nearly all instances been accompanied by an improvement in stock prices, unless the money situation has been definitely un-

favorable. Following is a list of important instances of upswings in business coinciding with cyclical upswings in common stock prices: 1878-81, 1885-86, 1888-89, 1891-92, 1894-95, 1896-99, 1900-02, 1904-06, 1908-09, 1911-12, 1915-16, 1919, 1921-23, 1924-25, 1928-29, 1933. These periods of improvement in general business activity have also usually been periods in which commodity prices have advanced, although commodity prices tend to lag a little behind business.

Important recessions in general business activity in the past have usually exerted an important influence upon stocks. Such a relationship is observable in the following instances: 1883-84, 1890-91, 1893, 1895-96, 1903, 1907, 1910, 1920, 1923, 1929-32. In a number of these cases declines in the stock market set in before the decline in business. In those cases, however, the start of the decline in stocks appears to have been due to deterioration in the general credit situation. There has been reason to believe that the decline in business, when it occurred, produced an unfavorable effect upon stocks. In one important instance at least, 1929-31, an unfavorable trend in general business activity and commodity prices more than offset improvement in the general financial situation.

The course of business activity and common stock prices over the past fifty

Labor and Political Situations Chief Obstacles



years, then, supports the theory that movements in general business activity and commodity prices exert an important influence upon the stock market. Over short periods there are numerous instances, of course, of a contrary movement in business and stocks. A really important movement in business or in commodity prices, however, may be counted upon to have an important effect upon the general stock market situation. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that changes in earning power will sooner or later affect the stock market.

Present Situation Unusual

The present stock market situation is an unusual one because of the abnormal severity and duration of the business depression. The situation naturally suggests comparison with the two most important business depressions since the Civil War, those of 1875-78 and 1893-96. Let us glance briefly at these depressions as possibly throwing some light upon the present general outlook.

In 1873 business, commodity prices and stock prices declined sharply. A further, although less rapid, decline in business and commodity prices took place during 1874-75. There were several short advances in stock prices during 1874 and 1875, but no general recovery occurred, and in 1876-77 there was a further severe

decline. The general trend of stock prices was downward over the entire period 1873-77. In 1875 and 1876 there were two short recoveries in general business activity, but these were followed by relapses and in the early months of 1878 business was at the lowest point of the depression. A moderate recovery in business occurred during 1878, but there was another relapse in the first quarter of 1879. From the start of the 1873 business downswing to the end of the depression in early 1879 is a period of six years.

An important upswing in bond prices set in in the latter part of 1878. General business activity began to improve rapidly in the Spring of 1879, and in the Fall commodity prices began to advance. An important upswing in stock prices set in early in 1879 and continued with only minor interruptions until late in 1881. In the course of this advance the general level of prices was carried up to a new high level.

At the beginning of the upswing in stock prices which marked the end of the depression of the 1870's the chief characteristics of the general situation were as follows: (1) Commodity prices were at a low level (about 85-88 on the Warren & Pearson index—1910-14 base); (2) stock prices were at a low level, having recovered only slightly from the long de-

cline of 1873-77; (3) short-term money rates were low; (4) bond prices were higher than they had been at any time during the preceding fourteen years; (5) large shortages of goods had undoubtedly accumulated during the five years of subnormal business activity.

The Depression of the Nineties

The 1893-96 depression was on the whole less severe than that of the 1870's. Although the business and security market decline of 1893 was a rapid one, it was followed by a brisk recovery in 1894-95. This, however, failed to carry either stocks or business back to prosperity levels, and in 1896 another severe decline occurred which carried both stock prices and business down to around the extreme lows of 1893. It seems reasonable to count the whole period 1893-96 as one of business and stock-market decline and depression.

There was a minor improvement in the closing weeks of 1896 and in the first quarter of 1897, but a definite upward movement in the stock market and business did not set in until the Summer of 1897. From the beginning of the downswing in 1893 to the start of the main recovery was a period of about four years.

The chief characteristics of the situation in the middle of 1897, when the

main upswing set in, may be summarized as follows: (1) commodity prices were at a low level (66-70 on the Warren & Pearson index—1910-14 base)—this proved to be the low point in the post-Civil War decline; (2) stock prices were at a low level, only slightly above the extreme lows of 1896; (3) short-term interest rates were low; (4) bond prices had begun to recover and were close to the best levels of 1899, the highest point reached up to that time; (5) there can be little question that large shortages of goods had accumulated during the long period of subnormal business activity in 1893-97, although probably these shortages were not so large, relatively, as in 1879.

Important Similarities

At the beginning of 1935 the general situation appears to be similar in a number of important respects to that at the close of the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s. It is now a little more than five years since the start of the downswing compared with six years at the start of the 1879 upswing and four years at the start of that of 1897. Minor business recoveries in 1932, 1933 and 1934 were followed by disappointing recessions, very much as were the minor business recoveries of 1876, 1877, 1878 and 1894-95.

Even after the advance of 1933-34 com-


modity prices are at a low level. The Warren & Pearson index is lower than it was at any time between the middle of 1916 and the close of 1930. On a gold basis this index is approximately the same as in 1896-97, the lowest point reached in the post-Civil War decline.

The lowness of the present level of commodity prices on a gold basis obviously suggests that an important advance may set in from this level. There is, moreover, the possibility of a further decline in the gold value of the dollar which would tend eventually to increase the extent of the possible advance in paper prices. Even on the basis of the present gold value of the dollar a very substantial upward readjustment of the general price level appears likely to occur over the next five or six years. Our gold supply, measured in ounces, is about the same as it was in the last period of prosperity, when business activity and prices were much higher. World gold production has been unusually heavy over the past three years. A substantial export movement of gold from India, normally an importer, has helped to increase the world's stock of monetary gold. Because of changes in our banking structure, the possibility of credit expansion in this country has been greatly increased. Because of the reduced gold content of the dollar an ounce of gold will support a much larger volume of credit today than in 1929.

Real Strength Obscured

The real strength of the world money situation is masked by the world-wide fear of further declines in gold value of currencies. Gold has been hoarded by individuals and by governments because of the uncertainties surrounding the outlook for the leading currencies. A return of leading currencies to a sound basis would make it possible for this gold to exert its normal influence upon the general credit situation. This would probably tend to produce a substantial recovery in commodity prices in relation to gold.

Stock prices are low relative to the level which prevailed over nearly all the period 1915-31. On a gold basis the present level is not far from the low point of 1932.




Short-term interest rates are extremely low not only here but in leading European countries. Bond prices have advanced very substantially over the past two and a half years. The present level is approximately equivalent to the best figures of the period 1909-17, and is only a little below the record high reached in 1902. There is reason to believe that a

large supply of investment funds has accumulated during the depression. In spite of the probability of heavy government borrowings this large accumulated investment demand must be expected to exert an important influence upon the financial markets over the next few years.

Large Shortages of Goods

There can be little question that large shortages of goods have accumulated during the depression. One of the best proofs of the existence of a very large shortage is the course of industrial production per capita over the past thirty-five years. During the three decades 1899-1929 industrial output per capita followed a fairly steady upward trend

very large shortages of goods have accumulated over this period. General observation confirms the existence of these shortages. In order to bring our stock of goods back to the level that prevailed in the last period of prosperity, without any allowance for normal upward trend, it would require a very substantial expansion in industrial activity. Even to bring our stock of goods back to the level of 1919 would require a long period of very active business. There can be no question that there is a tremendous accumulated demand which will eventually be filled. To assume otherwise would be to assert that the standard of living in this country is unlikely to return to the level prevailing during the past twenty years. Experience is all in the opposite direction.



(the chief breaks were in 1908 and 1921). In these three decades the total increase amounted to approximately 80 per cent. An increase in per capita output was, of course, to be expected in a period in which there were so many new inventions and improvements in methods of production and such a great decline in the cost of manufactured goods and services. The course of industrial production per capita over these three decades does not support the theory that the 1920s witnessed a great overexpansion of

production, that per capita production and consumption of goods in this country is likely in the next period of prosperity to rise to a level higher than that which prevailed during the last period of active general business.

Low Purchasing Power No Barrier to Recovery

It is true that purchasing power is now at a low level. But a recovery is normally a cumulative process. One moderate increase in purchasing power paves



output. In fact, production over this period appears to have followed fairly closely the general trend of the period 1899-1919.

Beginning with 1930 a very severe decline in industrial output per capita occurred and in 1932 output fell to approximately the same figure as in 1899. It was no greater than it had been thirty-three years before, when there were very few automobiles, no airplanes, no radios and a much smaller general use of such things as telephones, typewriters, tobacco, cosmetics, paper and gasoline, as well as many other things. Since 1932 there has been only a moderate recovery in per capita output. In 1934 estimated per capita output was lower than at any time since the year 1904, except for the extreme years of 1908 and 1921.

The extreme lowness of the level of per capita production during the years 1930-34 is a clear proof of the fact that

the way for another. We advance step by step and there is no question of a sudden jump from present low levels of output and purchasing power to high levels. But the existence of these large shortages certainly does indicate the probability of an eventual very substantial increase in industrial and trade activity.

In our review of the situations at the close of the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s we noted five leading characteristics. These same characteristics may be found in the present situation: (1) commodity prices are at an extremely low level, on a gold basis equivalent to the post-Civil War low record of 1896-97; (2) stock prices, although they have recovered moderately from the levels of July, 1932, are still very low; (3) short-term interest rates are very low and there is a tremendous potential supply of short-term credit; (4) yields on high-

grade bonds have been driven down to a very low level, only a short distance from the record low level of 1902; (5) large shortages have certainly accumulated during the depression. Probably these shortages are larger than those that developed either during the depression of the 70s or that of the 90s. It is evident, then, that the present situation is in a number of important respects similar to those which prevailed at the start of the business recoveries which followed these two earlier occasions.

From the above summary it is apparent that the two fundamental factors which govern the broader movement of stock prices, interest rates and the course of general business activity and commodity prices, are in a favorable position. We have already had a very substantial rise in bond prices and many characteristics of the general financial situation indicate that a plentiful supply of investment funds will continue to be available over the next several years, despite temporary fluctuations in bond prices, which may result from heavy government financing. Business activity and commodity prices are starting from a low level and there is certainly ample room for a great expansion in business profits. On the basis of these fundamental factors, therefore, the present general outlook appears to be an extremely favorable one, suggesting that some time within the next several years we may enter one of the most important business recoveries in the history of the country.

Political and Labor Situation

Unfavorable

This optimistic view is of course based upon *longer-range* considerations. The factors we have mentioned may operate slowly. It is entirely possible that unfavorable influences outside the business and financial world itself may delay the start of recovery for another two or three years or may even produce another decline.

The unfavorable influences in the present situation which receive the greatest attention are those which relate to the political and labor situations. Some of the reforms of the past two years have made the planning of future business operations more difficult and have consequently delayed the undertaking of new business enterprises. This has naturally tended to retard recovery. Uncertainty concerning the currency has also exerted a disturbing influence upon investors and business men. It should be observed, however, that a number of reforms which have been put into effect would probably have become necessary in any case within a few years. From that standpoint the general business and financial recovery, when it comes, may be judged to be upon a sounder basis than if it had occurred without these reforms. It should also be noted that when we examine the course of business, commodity prices, money rates and so on in the past we are inclined to give less weight to political and other non-business events which may have occurred during earlier depressions. At various times in the past the political situation at the time appeared very disturbing, but recovery nevertheless occurred.

It is true that the recoveries from the depressions of the 1870's and 1890's were brought about after a return to sound monetary principles. Some careful students of the current situation believe that a real recovery will be delayed until we return to a real gold basis. On the other hand it is also true that in England business has been able to recover over the past several years without a

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Business Activity Completes a Minor Cycle in Year; Other Economic Changes



THE principal economic changes in the United States in December were, after allowance for seasonal fluctuations, as follows: An increase of 6.6 per cent (estimated) in industrial production; an increase of 2.7 per cent in department store sales; an increase of 7.8 per cent in consumer expenditures; an increase of 0.4 per cent in wholesale prices; no change in the cost of living; and a decrease of 9.8 per cent in construction contracts awarded. Indices of factory employment and payrolls for the country as a whole, are not available, but the New York State index of factory employment rose 1.7 per cent, while the index of payrolls rose 4.5 per cent. The index of cash farm income declined 9.9 per cent in November.

It is notable that at the close of the year, there existed, as shown by the accompanying chart, a better relationship among the various indices. The relationship of production to retail trade has improved as has the relationship between industrial production and factory employment and payrolls. A further constructive change was the comparative stability of wholesale commodity prices and retail prices. The principal unfavorable development was the absence of a revival in the construction industry. The index closed the year 56.7 per cent below the December, 1933, level, while for the year as a whole, a gain of only 5.1 per cent was shown.

TABLE I. RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES (1923-25=100)

| | Dec. | Nov. | Oct. |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|
| Industrial production | 79.0 | 74.0 | 73.0 |
| Consumer expenditures | 95.1 | 88.2 | 89.3 |
| Department store sales | 76.0 | 74.0 | 74.9 |
| Employment | 76.6 | 76.4 | 76.3 |
| Payrolls | 59.9 | 59.3 | 59.3 |
| Wholesale prices | 76.3 | 76.0 | 76.0 |
| Cash farm income | 60.6 | 60.6 | 67.4 |
| Cost of living | 79.4 | 79.4 | 79.5 |
| Construction contracts: | | | |
| Monthly index | 27.5 | 30.5 | 32.6 |
| Moving average | 90.6 | 89.8 | |


1924-29=100; including AAA payments.

For figures back to the beginning of 1919, see page 162 of this issue.

A substantial improvement in retail trade was one of the outstanding favorable developments of last year. The Federal Reserve Board's index of department store sales fluctuated between a high of 79.0 for August and a low of 69.0 for January. The index closed the year 10.1 per cent above December, 1933. It is very noticeable that trade in agricultural regions showed the greatest gains. This is shown by the data released by the Federal Reserve Board and the International Statistical Bureau's index of consumer expenditures, which includes mail order and chain store sales, besides department store sales. The consumer expenditures index rose sharply in December, while the gain from December, 1933, amounts to 12.8 per cent.

The rise in dollar sales last year was primarily the result of an increase in unit sales, because price increases were small. While department store sales rose 10.1 per cent over December, 1933, and consumer expenditures 12.8 per cent, the cost of living increased 4.4 per cent. The Fairchild Retail Price Index, which is representative of department store prices, actually declined 0.9 per cent during this period. The rise in the cost of living last year was almost entirely due to increases in food prices and rents. The former increased 9.3 per cent, while the latter rose 6.4 per cent. It has been estimated that the physical volume of retail trade rose 10 per cent last year.

RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES
INDEX NUMBERS ADJUSTED FOR SEASONAL VARIATION ··· 1923-1925=100



The Department of Commerce in a summary of retail trade in 1933, issued last month, reported that the total retail sales for that year amounted to \$25,037,225,000. Based on an increase of 13 per cent, total sales last year amounted to \$28,382,653,000, a gain of \$3,345,428,000. The report showed that in 1929, total sales amounted to \$49,114,653,000. A portion of this decline in dollar volume of sales since 1929 is due to lower prices. Table II shows the percentage increases in department store sales for 1934 over 1933 by districts. Table III gives estimated retail sales by districts for 1934, obtained by applying the percentage gains given in Table II to the totals furnished by the Department of Commerce for 1933. It should be remembered that the number of stores covered by the Federal Reserve Board falls considerably short of the number included in the Department of Commerce census. Data on other branches of retail trade, however, show results similar to those for department stores.

TABLE II. PER CENT CHANGES IN DEPARTMENT STORE SALES

| | 1934-34 | 1932-33 |
|---------------|---------|---------|
| Boston | + 5 | - 8 |
| New York | + 6 | - 6 |
| Philadelphia | + 9 | - 6 |
| Cleveland | + 17 | - 1 |
| Richmond | + 18 | - 4 |
| Atlanta | + 26 | - 1 |
| Chicago | + 18 | - 2 |
| St. Louis | + 15 | - 5 |
| Minneapolis | + 11 | - 6 |
| Kansas City | + 7 | - 3 |
| Dallas | + 22 | 0 |
| San Francisco | + 11 | - 6 |

Employment and payrolls continued to increase last year, and the relationship of these two to industrial production has shown a further improvement. The industrial production index last month was 5.3 per cent higher than in December, 1933, while the New York State factory employment index increased 8.0 per cent during this period. Payrolls, as was to be expected, showed a greater increase than employment, the gain in payrolls amounting to 14.2 per cent. The number of unemployed, is, however, still very great. The National Industrial Conference Board estimated that in November, there were 10,094,000 persons unemployed in the United States as compared with 10,480,000 persons in November, 1933.

TABLE III. RETAIL SALES BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS

| | 1934. | 1933. | Increase. |
|---------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Boston | \$2,276 | \$2,168 | \$108.4 |
| New York | 4,503 | 4,248 | 254.9 |
| Philadelphia | 2,049 | 1,880 | 169.2 |
| Cleveland | 2,524 | 2,158 | 366.8 |
| Richmond | 2,087 | 1,777 | 319.9 |
| Atlanta | 1,755 | 1,525 | 370.7 |
| Chicago | 3,555 | 3,521 | 632.8 |
| St. Louis | 2,085 | 1,813 | 271.9 |
| Minneapolis | 1,358 | 1,224 | 134.6 |
| Kansas City | 1,476 | 1,261 | 214.5 |
| Dallas | 1,211 | 993 | 218.5 |
| San Francisco | 2,853 | 2,570 | 282.7 |

A study of indices of employment and payrolls of the various industries making up the general index of factory employment reveals many striking differences in the relationship of these indices in 1934 to their 1923-1925 averages. The need for a revival in the durable goods industries is confirmed, but striking indeed is the evidence of what the development of new industries has meant in terms of employment. We find that such comparatively new industries as aircraft, rayon and radio show very sharp gains over their 1923-25 averages, while industries supplying construction materials show very sharp decreases. In the discussion which follows, percentage increases and decreases in employment are based on averages for the first eleven months of the year. Employment in the iron and steel industry as a whole is 29.7 per cent below the 1923-25 level, while

employment in the wirework industry is 24.6 per cent above that level. Employment in the machinery industry has declined 23.2 per cent below the 1923-25 level, but the radio industry has increased its employes by 97.8 per cent. Even more striking are the figures for the transportation equipment industry, aircraft showing an increase of 231.3 per cent over the 1923-25 level, while employment in railroad car construction has declined 58.6 per cent. The lumber industry has shown the greatest decrease in employment, the index being 51.4 per cent below the average for the years 1923-25. Within the lumber industry we also find considerable variation, employment in the turpentine industry showing a decrease of only 5.6 per cent, while sawmill employment is down 65.5 per cent. A similar situation obtains in the stone, clay and glass industry. The level of employment in the glass industry is only slightly below that in 1923-25, while employment in the brick and tile industry is 70.1 per cent less. The chemical industry heads the list of gains in employment, the increase for the industry as a whole amounting to 6.9 per cent. Employment in the rayon industry showed the greatest gain within this group, being 193.9 per cent greater than in the years 1923-25.

The Business Index

The year 1934 closed with The Annalist Index of Business Activity showing a sharp rise. The preliminary index for December is 75.9, as compared with 71.2 for November and 70.5 for October. The most important factor in the rise of the combined index was a sharp increase (estimated) in the adjusted index of automobile production. Next in importance was a sharp gain in the adjusted index of steel ingot production, the increase, on a weighted basis, being almost the same as that for the automobile index. Substantial increases were also shown by the adjusted index of freight-car loadings and the preliminary index of electric power production. Smaller gains were shown by the adjusted indices of silk consumption and pig-iron production. Only two of the components of the combined index for which data are available, cotton consumption and zinc production, declined last month. The decreases in both cases were small.

Table IV gives the combined index and its components, each of which is adjusted for seasonal variation and, where necessary, for long-time trend, for the last three months. Table V gives the combined index by months back to the beginning of 1929.

The combined index last year again followed an erratic course, a sharp increase at the beginning of the year being followed by a sharp decrease and this in turn being followed by a sharp rise. The first rise, which started in December, 1933, carried the index up 11.8 points to a high of 80.2 for May. This rise was much smaller than the March-July rise of 1933, the principal factors making for these gains differing. The subsequent reaction carried the index down to 66.5 for September, a drop of 13.7 points. While this decrease in terms of points lost was not as great as the July-November decline of 1933, it was more severe from the standpoint of per cent of previous gain canceled. The combined index since September has gained 9.4 points, and on the basis of weekly statistics, the combined index of January will show a further increase. The net gain for the combined index since March, 1933, amounts to 17.5 points, or 30.0 per cent, while the declines from last year's high and from the 1933 high

amount to 5.7 per cent and 15.0 per cent, respectively.

It has been noted by many observers at the year end that the current rise in business activity appears to be based on a much firmer foundation than the

earlier ones of 1933 and 1934. That this is so is primarily the result of the passing of several of the administration's earlier theories. Price changes played a less important part in last year's upturn than in 1933. Fixing of prices has also

lost its popularity, while currency manipulations or the threat of manipulation has also been relegated to a minor position. Despite these constructive changes, it can readily be seen from a study of the various components making up the combined index that little progress has been made toward the solution of one of the most important economic problems, namely that of stimulating the durable goods industries.

TABLE IV. THE ANNALIST INDEX OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND COMPONENT GROUPS

| | Dec. | Nov. | Oct. |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|------|
| Freight car loadings | 63.1 | 58.9 | 57.6 |
| Steel ingot production | 57.3 | 42.8 | 36.1 |
| Pig iron production | 37.2 | 33.3 | 31.8 |
| Electric power production | 95.4 | 93.5 | 92.4 |
| Cotton consumption | 84.3 | 86.0 | 92.2 |
| Wool consumption | 100.7 | 76.0 | |
| Silk consumption | 74.6 | 60.8 | 75.5 |
| Boot and shoe production | 97.9 | 88.4 | |
| Automobile production | 166.9 | 43.5 | 51.6 |
| Lumber production | 42.5 | 46.7 | |
| Cement production | 42.3 | 40.8 | |
| Zinc production | 66.7 | 68.0 | 66.2 |
| Combined index | *75.9 | *71.2 | 70.5 |

TABLE V. THE COMBINED INDEX SINCE JANUARY, 1929


| | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1931. | 1930. | 1929. |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Jan. | 73.1 | 63.0 | 70.1 | 81.4 | 102.1 | 112.9 |
| Feb. | 76.7 | 61.6 | 68.1 | 83.1 | 102.5 | 112.4 |
| Mar. | 78.9 | 58.4 | 66.7 | 85.1 | 100.5 | 111.9 |
| Apr. | 80.0 | 64.0 | 63.2 | 86.4 | 101.8 | 115.0 |
| May | 80.2 | 72.4 | 60.9 | 98.5 | 115.7 | |
| June | 77.2 | 83.3 | 60.4 | 84.6 | 97.1 | 116.6 |
| July | 73.2 | 89.3 | 59.7 | 83.7 | 93.1 | 116.7 |
| Aug. | 71.1 | 83.5 | 61.3 | 78.9 | 90.8 | 115.6 |
| Sept. | 66.4 | 76.4 | 65.2 | 76.3 | 89.6 | 115.0 |
| Oct. | 70.5 | 72.3 | 65.4 | 72.6 | 86.8 | 113.4 |
| Nov. | *71.2 | 68.4 | 64.7 | 72.2 | 84.4 | 106.0 |
| Dec. | *75.9 | 69.5 | 64.8 | 72.1 | 83.9 | 101.2 |

*Subject to revision. ^aBased on an estimated output of 7,857,000,000 kilowatt-hours as against a Geological Survey total of 7,602,000,000 kilowatt-hours in November and 7,470,000,000 in December, 1933. ^bBased on an estimated output of 175,000 cars and trucks, as against Department of Commerce total of 80,112 cars and trucks in November and 87,414 cars and trucks in December, 1933.

Economists and the administration agree that in order to bring about a true cyclical upturn in business, the durable goods industry must be stimulated, but the means by which this may best be accomplished is the cause of considerable debate. Private capital naturally hesitates to flow into the durable goods industries as long as there are so many difficulties and uncertainties in its way. Any signs, however, pointing to an increased flow of private capital into the durable goods industries should be watched for, as they would certainly be indicators of better business.

The components of the combined index reflecting activity in the consumers' goods industries again fluctuated widely last year, although the ranges were not as great as in 1933. The wide fluctuations in the textile series were partly the result of the strike. The substantial improvement in retail trade last year is a favorable sign for the consumers' goods industries.

H. E. HANSEN.



Beginning in THE ANNALIST

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op

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Showing the effect of the current recovery, through 1934, on the net profits of representative groups of large manufacturing, railroad and public utility corporations.

Triumphs and Defeats of a Year of Trial and Error; Recovery Irresistible



THE task of summarizing and analyzing the economic developments of 1934 is a problem in selection. The past twelve months have been a vast economic kaleidoscope of ever-shifting multi-colored designs or, to change the figure, an economic circus, with spectacular performances in a half dozen rings and sensational acts in a dozen lesser shows outside the main tent. Merely to select the developments that most vitally affected the industrial trend taxes the intellect; to separate the merely economic from the political and the social is all but impossible. The economic events have evolved in a chaos of propaganda, class feeling, political manipulation, constitutional infraction and incredible economic heresy. Ominous social forces have been loosed, and sinister demagogues and fanatics have swayed the populace. Vivid personalities and dramatic episodes have given color to events. The temptation is strong to dramatize and personalize the course of material development.

The Real Nature of Governmental Action in 1934

The world of finance and industry has been inclined to believe that the legislative and executive measures of 1934 surpassed in importance and revolutionary character the measures of 1933. In reality, the measures of 1934 were in very large degree merely supplementary and confirmatory. They only extended and expanded the measures of the preceding year. The devaluation of the dollar in the first month of the year was merely the necessary and final step in a long journey from the embargo on gold in March, 1933. The Bankhead act was solely an enforcement measure made necessary by the failure of the cotton restriction of 1933. The expansion of the AAA to include such items as peanuts and sugar was a corollary to the grain and livestock acts of the preceding year. The securities act was merely amended, the banking act merely renewed. The Frazier-Lemke act only added the privilege of breach of contract to the privilege of loans already available to mortgaged farmers. The Stock Exchange act, the silver purchase and silver reserve measures, the tariff bargaining law and the industrial loans provision were new, but they are minor expedients in comparison with the 1933 undertakings. The most important legislative enactments of 1934 were in reality the appropriations and the enforcement acts which confirmed and implemented the earlier measures.

Results

The year 1934, was, therefore, the year of operation of the recovery program. Its earliest features had been installed six months or more before, a part of it was enjoying its second seasonal trial, and practically all of it was in full sway for the entire year. The whole program has been subjected to trial by experience, to the one just test, which is the acid test of results achieved. We have witnessed an unparalleled event, the attempt by a sovereign government, unrestrained by judicial process and without effective opposition, to force recovery from depression before its time by artificial manipulation of wages, hours, prices, credit and currency. It is our undertaking here to examine the program, to estimate its results and to

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weigh its merits as frankly, impartially and dispassionately as humanly possible.

AAA

It is not within the scope of this article to analyze by the tests of economic science even the basic recovery measures. They are all long since familiar to history and long since dissected by economics. But it is permissible to summarize their fundamental philosophy. The agricultural restriction plan rests on the theory of an equilibrium between the purchasing power of agriculture and the purchasing power of industry. The whole program has aimed at a "parity" based on an arbitrarily selected pre-war price-level year. There is nothing in economic science to support this theory.

Agriculture is an important part of our economic order, and its welfare reacts to the welfare of the whole, but the contention that the equilibrium of agriculture and the remaining pillars in our economic structure offers the one means to recovery is undemonstrable. Because of inherent conditions farm prices tend to reach extreme lows in depression. This justifies exceptional measures of relief. It does not justify any artificial restrictions based on an arbitrary parity out of the remote past. Industry suffers more from unemployment and reduced activity in depression than agriculture, and the same forces that cause extreme price declines lead to rapid recovery of farm prices with the onset of recovery. The theory of farm parity is an oversimplification of a very complex problem. It ignores the changing relationship of industry to agriculture. This country is now industrial, and recovery does not lie in a policy that raises the cost of raw materials, increases the expenditures for relief and indirectly but positively discourages the deflation of rigid industrial wages.

NRA

The NRA is based on the theory that higher wages increase the spending power of labor and thus stimulate the demand for products, while shorter hours force employers to increase the number of workers, thus augmenting employment. The two in combination, therefore, enlarge the total payroll and relieve depression.

In actuality the artificial enhancement of wages and the arbitrary reduction of hours run counter to the forces of recovery. Even in depression wages and hours tend to adjust themselves to the marginal productivity of the workers in various lines. Increased labor costs simply eliminate marginal workers and reduce employment. Only in the case of goods of extremely inelastic demand is it possible for employers to absorb these higher costs, and then it is at the expense of consumer demand for all other products. One of the most powerful causes, perhaps the most powerful cause, of slow recovery is the rigidity of wages in a period of broken prices and vanished profits. A proportional decline in wages would mitigate the tragedy of liquidation, reduce unemployment and speed the recovery process. This principle has been recognized in the recovery programs of three major countries. It has been repudiated only in the policy of the United States.

The price-raising policy rests on the vaguest of theories. It can not be demonstrated scientifically that a horizontal rise of all prices has any effect on economic relations. But an artificially induced rise is never horizontal. It tends to destroy fixed incomes of all kinds and to injure labor. It does relieve debtors, and it tends to increase the profits of capital, and each one of these results has some restorative effect. Recovery from depression has been and can be achieved on a lower price-floor than the pre-depression level. There is no demonstrable reason for believing that it is attained more rapidly by artificial price-raising.

Finally, there is the theory of pump-priming. There is economic justification for policy of public spending, but only at one stage of depression. At the onset of depression public spending is wholly undesirable. It merely delays the necessary liquidation and promotes fiscal breakdown. At the bottom pit of depression, public works may serve as a relief agency to certain individual enterprises at the last gasp, not unlike the relief provided by the RFC for distressed railroads. But at the beginning of natural recovery public spending may, if properly directed, give a genuine impetus to the recovery rate. But at best public works are a device for artificial spending, and by their nature they tend to exhaust their force with the cessation of spending. In final analysis they differ but little from public relief to the unemployed or public loans to industry, and they invariably carry with them certain grave dangers.

Results Reviewed

Thus the most cursory analysis reveals that the philosophy of the recovery program is dubious, its instruments merely a shotgun discharge at the consequences of depression. Let us look, again briefly, at the concrete results. The banking program has been successful, in so far as restoring the individual banks to activity is concerned. Some 16,000 banks are now open, and the insurance measure has definitely contributed to public confidence. Deposits have steadily grown since 1933. This result has been achieved at great cost in both concrete and intangible forms. It has given the banks an unwelcome partner in the personality of the Federal Government, it has established a guarantee of bank deposits which by its nature encourages reckless banking, and it has made the banks responsible to a multiplicity of administrative and regulative authorities. Above all it has encouraged a popular movement for government ownership of the banks that may have grievous consequences.

The material consequences of the AAA will never be known. The success or failure of the program is lost in the wreckage caused by the drought. But a consideration of those products only slightly affected by this cataclysm justifies the conclusion that the agricultural measures have materially aided the farm group. Parity has not been achieved, but farm income has increased, farm prices have risen and fallen and risen again, and the agricultural States are in better economic condition than they were a year ago. A part of this recovery is due to devaluation of the dol-

lar, a part to the drought, a part to the natural reduction of production that comes without compulsion in depression, and part to the AAA. That this betterment of agriculture has promoted recovery is quite another question. It has been gained at a large and unknown cost, in direct outlay of government funds, in the loss of business by the great processing industries, in higher prices of foodstuffs and materials, in the loss of profits to the railroads, to the dealers and to the workers who handle agricultural products, and in the loss of foreign markets for grain and cotton.

Recovery Retarded

The NRA has been a failure, foredoomed from the outset. One year after its 500 major codes became effective, it had resulted in an actual decrease of total employment in manufacturing industries. The number of employes declined 5 per cent from September, 1933, to September, 1934, while man-hours, the true measure of employment, had declined 12 per cent. The hourly wage had been greatly increased, but hours had been so reduced that total payrolls had actually declined. The price-raising influence of NRA was augmented by the introduction into the codes of provisions restraining production and competitive price reductions. The whole tendency under NRA has been to limit production, increase costs and discourage enterprise. Admittedly employment and total wages in industry at the end of 1934 are much better than they were in the abysmal depths of early 1933, but the improvement has come from natural recovery, despite the NRA.

There is reason to believe that NRA has actually retarded recovery. But its influence has been greatly exaggerated. From the standpoint of economic progress NRA has been more important outside its wage-and-hour provisions. It is in the fields of labor and of business competition that we find its more vital implications. The ambiguity of Section 7a and the vacillating policy of the administration in its interpretation have plunged industry into a war with labor. The future organization of industry depends on the clarification of this clause. The codes created employer groups with power over competitive practice, output and prices. The standardizing of wages, hours, prices and practices means a rapid concentration of business enterprise; the "little fellow" is doomed under existing regulations. This has a profound significance. It means cheaper costs and a rising standard of living; it may easily mean a rapid process of socialization of industry and a collectivist state. The more powerful units of industry, in seizing the NRA instruments of competitive advantage, have materially advanced the cause of socialism.

Money

The monetary program has been an egregious failure. After six months of deliberate beating down of the value of our currency in foreign markets the dollar was devalued 41 per cent just a year ago. More than six months ago the new standard was adulterated with an admixture of silver. In the course of the year nearly a billion dollars in gold imports was added. As a result the actual metallic reserve behind our currency and credit has been increased more than 100 per cent. The excess reserves of our banking system are nearly two billions.

Continued on Page 125

Climactic Changes in Banking: Trend Still Toward Centralization of Credit



IT seems that the proper approach to the vital factors in today's banking and credit position is derived from the realization that they did not spring up overnight, but rather represent the outgrowth of long-term tendencies. Such phenomena as the transformation of our banking mechanism from self-liquidating commercial principles into illiquid long-term investment functions, or the nationalization of banking, or centralized management of credit and artificial expansion thereof—these tendencies are not confined to the year 1934. They have been aggravated during the past year, but, in order to keep our perspective, we must start with a brief consideration of the period when they were first manifested.

Past Changes

Revolutionary changes in banking methods have occurred since the beginning of the World War. In the matter of loan practice, advances on 30-90 day commercial paper have been supplanted by "demand" loans which have been extended and re-extended. Our National Bank Act and State laws, as well as English banking practice, have sought to keep the banking structure on a short-term and convertible basis. In recent years this concept has been changed to concern—not over whether a business could liquidate its obligations out of current income, but whether the borrower could shift them elsewhere, and whether the bank could find some long-term market for them.

Throughout the years since the turn of the century the increase in loans backed by collateral as well as by real estate has been steady, especially since 1915. The use made of the Reserve System in commercial transactions has been decreasing, the banks carrying a constantly smaller percentage of loans eligible for rediscoun. Before the war, banks invested heavily in corporation and railroad securities, but in the period of war financing these were supplanted by government bonds. Since the war, the investment portion of portfolios has steadily increased, this expansion occurring in both government and corporate securities. Thus banking has been losing its commercial character and both the commercial banks and the Reserve System have assumed investment functions.

The 1928-34 Trend Into Long-Term Investment Banking

Table I shows that the diversion of bank funds from short-term "business" into non-liquid inconvertible assets—so marked during the New Era—has continued unabated throughout the ensuing readjustment period.

In 1928 approximately 31 per cent of the total loans and investments consisted of direct advances to business on commercial paper and of acceptances and bills bought in the open market; at the present time only 20 per cent is devoted to commercial loans and paper (and even of this small amount, a portion is really in the nature of capital investment, owing to the practice of renewing loans).

That this departure from the service of business has continued up to the end of 1934 is illustrated by the statements of the reporting member banks in ninety-one leading cities. During the past year holdings of securities increased 29 per

cent and comprised 58 per cent of total loans and investments, as against 49 per cent in the preceding year. Investment assets were 80 per cent of total loans and investments.

Attention should here be called to the large amount of funds which has in recent years floated into the capital investment market through increased savings bank deposits. These deposits formerly consisted to an appreciable extent of funds flowing into commercial banks, but which, owing to the difficulty of earning interest therein, have now been placed with savings institutions where

Table I. Loans and Investments, All Member Banks (Millions of Dollars)

| Date | Total Loans and Investments. | Loans on Securities. | Real Estate Loans. | Holdings of Securities. | P. C. of Invest- ment Assets. |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Oct. 3, 1928 | 34,246 | 9,092 | 3,087 | 10,603 | 69 |
| Oct. 4, 1929 | 35,913 | 10,634 | 3,152 | 9,798 | 65 |
| Sep. 24, 1930 | 35,472 | 10,626 | 3,163 | 10,733 | 70 |
| Sep. 29, 1931 | 33,073 | 8,080 | 3,147 | 12,198 | 71 |
| Sep. 30, 1932 | 28,044 | 5,870 | 2,883 | 12,100 | 74 |
| Oct. 25, 1933 | 24,952 | 4,712 | 2,363 | 11,893 | 75 |
| June 30, 1934 | 27,174 | 4,650 | 2,356 | 14,651 | 80 |

*I.e., percentage of investment assets to total loans and investments.

From U. S. Federal Reserve Board Member Bank Call Reports

they are being invested in long-term capital. This process, not showing up in commercial bank figures, represents an additional flow of actual short-term deposits into investment assets. The recent and continuing trend away from "commercial items" is further strikingly illustrated by Table II.

TABLE II. OPEN MARKET COMMERCIAL PAPER AND LOANS ELIGIBLE FOR REDISCOUNT, ALL MEMBER BANKS (Millions of Dollars)

| Date | Comm. Paper | Eligible Paper |
|---------------|----------------|-------------------|
| Oct. 3, 1928 | 456 | 4,388 |
| Oct. 4, 1929 | 227 | 4,598 |
| Sep. 24, 1930 | 523 | 3,812 |
| Sep. 29, 1931 | 296 | 2,996 |
| Sep. 30, 1932 | 114 | 2,423 |
| Oct. 24, 1933 | 155 | 2,237 |
| June 30, 1934 | 200 | 2,082 |

From F. R. Board Member Bank Call Report.

Banks Financing the Government

The banking system has gradually worked itself into a position where it is today lending to the Federal Government about 50 per cent more than it is lending

vital implications, is even more marked. In the New Era the banks became loaded with non-liquid private securities; now the process has been transferred to the carrying of Federal deficits, occasioned in part through the transference of the nation's investment banking needs from private hands to the government. In the year ended June 30 alone, bank holdings of governments increased by \$2,300,000,000, and their proportion to total securities rose to 62 per cent (compared with 37 per cent in 1927). As of the end of 1934, in the case of member banks in ninety-one leading cities, holdings of governments are 73 per cent of total securities, having increased by 33 per cent during the year.

In the case of the Federal Reserve Banks, outside of their buildings, practically their sole assets consist of government paper. Incidentally, approximately two-thirds of their total assets pay no interest, being merely open obligations to the Federal Reserve.

Table III. Security Holdings, All Member Banks (Millions of Dollars)

| Years | Total Loans and Investments. | U. S. Government Securities. | Other Securities. | Total Securities. | P. C. of Total Securi- ties. |
|-------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1920 | 24,152 | 2,941 | 3,124 | 6,065 | 24 |
| 1921 | 22,998 | 2,661 | 3,443 | 6,104 | 28 |
| 1922 | 24,333 | 2,456 | 3,815 | 7,061 | 29 |
| 1923 | 26,332 | 3,883 | 3,777 | 7,760 | 29 |
| 1924 | 29,026 | 3,902 | 4,942 | 8,844 | 30 |
| 1925 | 30,369 | 3,785 | 5,133 | 6,919 | 29 |
| 1926 | 31,070 | 3,831 | 5,232 | 9,063 | 29 |
| 1927 | 32,967 | 3,796 | 6,021 | 9,817 | 37 |
| 1928 | 34,246 | 4,385 | 6,218 | 10,603 | 31 |
| 1929 | 35,913 | 4,021 | 5,727 | 9,748 | 27 |
| 1930 | 35,472 | 4,095 | 6,638 | 10,733 | 31 |
| 1931 | 33,073 | 5,564 | 6,634 | 12,148 | 36 |
| 1932 | 28,044 | 6,366 | 5,754 | 11,120 | 43 |
| 1933 | 24,952 | 6,801 | 5,092 | 11,893 | 48 |
| 1934 | 27,174 | 9,136 | 5,515 | 14,658 | 54 |

From F. R. Board Member Bank Call Report.

directly to the business public. The commercial banks as well as the Federal Reserve Banks are being gradually transformed into huge government bond investment trusts. Table III shows the holdings of government bonds and of corporate securities, presenting their combined growth and also the recent relative growth in the holdings of government

Here we have a striking picture of

the part of the Treasury. The statement of Jan. 2, 1935, shows holdings of government securities of \$2,430,000,000 against holdings of bills bought in the open market of only \$5,600,000 and a total of bills discounted of only \$7,092,000.

The 5,466 licensed national banks at the Oct. 17 call, held U. S. Government obligations, direct and fully guaranteed, aggregating \$6,348,232,000 (an increase

of \$2,236,000,000 in a year). All member banks probably hold about \$9,800,000,000 of governments at the present time, while all banks are estimated to hold a total of 150 per cent of this figure, or approximately \$14,700,000,000. Add to this the \$2,400,000,000 in the Reserve Banks, and we have in the banking system a total of seventeen billions, or 61 per cent of the \$28,000,000,000 national debt. Incidentally, of the \$10,600,000,000 expansion in the debt which has occurred in the last five-year period, \$7,500,000,000, or 70 per cent has been put into the banks. Moreover, the Comptroller of the Currency has ruled (on Sept. 4, 1934) that all bonds guaranteed by the government may be additionally listed with United States securities in future bank-condition reports.

Inasmuch as allusions to the British per capita debt are frequently made, let us contrast our situation with that in England. Although it is true that security investments of British banks have steadily risen in proportion to their commercial advances, the Bank of England holds less than \$450,000,000 of government debt, and the clearing house banks hold less than \$2,700,000,000 of all securities.¹ A similar situation exists in Germany, where the reporting member banks hold only \$1,000,000,000 of total securities. In other countries the borrowed money has come from savings, whereas here it has largely been created by the banking system.

How Long Will Government Credit Last?

From the above it is evident that the soundness and liquidity of American banks is tied up with the government's financial policies. Banking solvency is based on government guarantee; the functions of credit extension have been transferred to the Federal Government. The banks were formerly the independent supporters of government credit; now they are almost wholly dependent on it. The banks can meet their obligations only in government credit in some form, which means that their solvency is dependent on the ability of the government to continue "dragooning" the banks with additional doses of its deficit.

Because of existing Federal Reserve machinery, because of recent legislation conferring central banking functions upon the Federal Treasury and because of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, there is no immediate possibility of an actual test of government credit or of banking solvency. Convertibility of assets which are actually not liquid has been efficiently provided. The banks are no longer called on to redeem their outstanding notes and deposits; deposit credits resulting from bond purchases can be paid off with notes that are obtained from the Reserve Banks, by means of pledging those very bonds; thus, frozen assets are shifted back and forth within the system, and new "credit" is created in the process. Of the increase in member bank deposits which occurred between Nov. 29, 1933, and Nov. 28, 1934, amounting to \$2,790,000,000, the sum of \$1,955,000,000 resulted from increased holdings of government debt.

Our monetary system today is none other than a form of circulating public debt. Bank notes and the government deficit are interchangeable.

Although there is thus an apparently endless chain of credit and solvency, ob-

¹From statistics of the 12 London Clearing House Banks, as compiled by the Bank of England.

viously there must be some limit to the process of manufacturing assets as the product of borrowing; otherwise there would be no need for taxation. How or when the ultimate test will come is impossible to predict. But, barring the advent of a totalitarian state, government credit will in some manner ultimately involve comparison with the nation's real wealth as measured by its currently realizable assets and its available surplus income. Irrespective of "confidence" or "patriotism," we cannot perpetually lift ourselves by our bootstraps.

Indications of Future Policy

What policies may we expect in the coming year? Will there be a shift back to greater liquidity and to business banking and away from long-term public financing and investment banking?

"The banks are altogether too liquid," is an answer furnished by Chairman Crowley of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in a statement made Sept. 5 last. Greater leniency in bank examinations has been advocated by President Roosevelt. In a press conference on Sept. 12, 1934, he criticized examiners for being too zealous in closing out illiquid loans, mentioning specifically the throwing out of a bank a certain New York State farm loan which had not met amortization requirements for three years.²

Another excellent indication of official banking philosophy has been recently furnished by Jesse Jones, president of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.³ He states there is no chance for small business unless our banks are ready to extend credit "of a most friendly nature"; and he pleads further, "another field of lending that banks should very properly look to is that of income-bearing real estate where the maturity does not exceed five years. * * * Reactionary bank methods will not meet the issue."

In a semi-official report just compiled for Secretary Morgenthau by J. Viner and C. O. Hardy, less stringency and care in lending is advocated. The report recommends that loans of six months' maturity with indefinite renewals be made, that rediscount eligibility rules be relaxed to include long-term loans, that bank examiners abandon the classification of loans as "slow," and that credit analysis be generally "liberalized."⁴

Investment Banking Practice

Relative to investment banking practice, let us examine the extent of control over speculative operations which has been given to the Federal Reserve Board through recent legislation. The Banking Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act provide that:

(1) The Federal Reserve Board, by a vote of six members, can limit the proportionate amount of capital and surplus of member banks which they can loan on securities.

(2) Loans "of others" are prohibited.

(3) Control of margin requirements is given to the Federal Reserve Board.

These provisions are, however, to a great extent nullified by the following countering factors:

(1) The existence of huge actual and potential excess bank reserves, which nullifies the effectiveness of possible suspension of rediscount privileges.

(2) Deposits are expanded through banks' purchase of government securities.

(3) Securities can go into channels not controlled by the Federal Reserve Board (as savings banks).

(4) Improbability of permanent independent "strong-arm" and statesmanlike

² The New York Times, Sept. 13, 1934.
³ Today, Nov. 24, 1934.
⁴ The New York Times, Dec. 18, 1934.

Continued on Page 83



Condensed Statement of Condition on December 31, 1934.

Assets

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Cash, Due from Banks and Bankers | \$189,202,301.33 |
| Exchanges for Clearing House | 55,875,115.29 |
| U. S. Government Securities | 437,811,600.00 |
| Demand Loans | 49,922,005.68 |
| Time Loans and Bills Discounted | 183,182,634.08 |
| State and Municipal Bonds | 21,726,128.38 |
| Stocks of Federal Reserve Bank and Bank for International Settlements, and N. Y. Clearing House Certificates | 2,321,696.25 |
| Other Securities and Investments | 22,769,099.79 |
| Mortgages Owned | 3,550,599.19 |
| Banking Houses Owned | 20,453,109.31 |
| Real Estate Formerly Occupied as Banking Premises | 1,402,116.08 |
| Accrued Interest and Accounts Receivable | 3,136,701.23 |
| Customers' Liability on Acceptances | 5,937,672.23 |
| Liability of Others on Acceptances, etc., Sold with Our Endorsement | 35,327.81 |
| | <u>\$997,326,106.65</u> |

Liabilities

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Capital | \$25,000,000.00 |
| Surplus Fund | 50,000,000.00 |
| Undivided Profits | 12,018,797.65 |
| Contingency Fund | \$87,018,797.65 |
| U. S. Government Deposits, Secured | 138,920,980.00 |
| State and Municipal Deposits, Secured | 878,452.66 |
| Other Deposits | 721,565,779.12 |
| Outstanding and Certified Checks | 21,622,818.82 |
| Dividend Payable January 2, 1935 | 882,988,030.60 |
| Accrued Interest Payable | 1,875,000.00 |
| Unearned Interest | 38,294.54 |
| Reserve for Taxes and Expenses | 302,116.69 |
| Outstanding Acceptances | 1,341,946.22 |
| Less Amount in Portfolio | 21,774,156.12 |
| Acceptances, etc., Sold with Our Endorsement | 14,970,272.99 |
| | <u>6,803,883.13</u> |
| | <u>35,327.81</u> |
| | <u>\$997,326,106.65</u> |

As required by law, bonds carried at \$143,325,000.00 have been deposited to secure deposits as indicated, above and for other purposes.

DIRECTORS

| | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| SEWARD PROSSER, Chairman, Managing Committee | A. A. TILNEY, Chairman of the Board |
| HENRY J. COCHRAN, Vice Chairman of the Board | S. SLOAN COLT, President |
| STEPHEN BIRCH | FRED I. KENT |
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"Trends" vs. "Cycles" in Interest Rates; Guides to Future Investment Policy

By J. W. MEADER



FOllowing the usual statistical review of the fourth quarter's money market, and a survey of the year as a whole, this article will discuss at some length the question of "trends" of interest rates, and will direct attention once more to the unstable basis of the present money market. A forecast for 1935 will then be assembled and an attempt made to indicate what changes in investment planning would naturally follow.

During the fourth quarter, the money market was entirely a one-way affair. All general changes in interest rates were decreases and of course prices of all kinds of investments rose.

Money Rates Near Zero

For the obvious reason that short-term money rates had already fallen to a point where the cash return barely covered the expense of bookkeeping, postage, &c., such rates remained unchanged. Unless the Mosaic code is to find universal application, instead of being confined to abolition of interest on demand deposits, it goes as a statement of fact rather than prediction that short-term interest rates will increase from present levels. They have simply reached the end of the road. Exactly when they will begin to increase is another question, which will be taken up later on.

As to longer term paper, Treasury bonds were active and strong. They had to be so in order to correct the illogical situation of August and September, when they were actually selling below certain prime corporation bonds. The latter continued to advance.

Prices Above Redemption Levels

The gains of higher coupon issues in both these classes of investments were carried considerably beyond prices at which many issues are redeemable, and this condition became equally noticeable among high-grade preferred stocks. In most of these instances, the market is speculating that for one reason or another the issue will not be called. The reason usually given is that the Securities Act prevents refunding by imposing on company directors a liability they do not care to assume or by requiring an exposure of carefully concealed trade secrets as to earning power, contracts, &c.

Why Bonds Are Not Called

The explanation is not altogether convincing, however, for it is difficult to imagine any serious loss to the investor, a condition precedent to a successful suit against a director, in the case of any new issue which might replace a prime security. Furthermore, the information required to be filed, while rather annoying and costly to have to prepare, is seldom read, and if read would probably not reveal much that is really secret. In any case, the listing requirements of the Securities Exchange Commission will soon throw a new light on some of these points.

The explanation that the Securities Act restricts capital issues falls completely flat in cases of railroad and municipal bonds, whose refunding issues would not have to meet any new requirements. It seems more likely that one deterrent to refunding is unwillingness of company managements to disturb permanent capital unless there is a marked advantage in doing so, especially with business ready for an upturn. Another must be the existence of some doubts

whether closely priced issues could be successfully put out.

Whatever the reasons for the slow appearance of refunding issues, the possibility of bond calls is continually overhanging the market and there is a real problem in bonds selling more than two or three points above the call price. One

casual losses of principal which every fund sooner or later runs into? Of course, many investment portfolios are restricted by custom or otherwise, so as to prevent complete freedom of action. Trusts in New York, for example, do not amortize discounts unless there is a specific requirement to do so in the trust

redemption before maturity, scored the best gains in the fourth quarter, according to the Standard Statistics average, outstripping both treasuries and prime corporation bonds. Their complete exemption from taxation was, no doubt, an important factor in their more rapid progress. Possibilities of registering tax losses through sales of securities are being steadily lessened as time goes on and the various security markets achieve some degree of stability or hold an advance. There has also been some improvement in municipal credits resulting from better tax collections. The consumption of certain refunding plans has taken the spectre of repudiation out of the market. The differential between municipal and corporation bond yields naturally widened, but was still small enough to provide an incentive to move some funds into tax-exempts.

In the lower-than-prime grades of corporation bonds, sometimes called "high grade" and "sound," prices were higher and the yield differentials between the grades a little narrower as investors combed the market for bargains. Bonds of definitely second grade, however, the so-called business man's investments, made comparatively feeble response to very favorable money market conditions, being held back by uninspiring third-quarter earnings reports, and, until very recently, lack of any evidence of an upturn in business activity.

Marked Decline in Yields

Glancing back at the year as a whole, it must first be mentioned that the money market has disarmed not a few who looked for progressive weakening of the government's credit due to overspending, and a consequent collapse of bond prices. There were times in August and September, with the elections approaching, when it appeared that such fears were on the way to fulfillment, but recovery followed immediately and the year went out with some remarkable gains. Short-term money rates receded to an almost absolute minimum, and various classes of bond yields showed the following reductions from December, 1933, based on preliminary figures for December, 1934:

| | Decrease in Yield Basis. |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| U. S. Treasury bonds | .55% |
| Municipals | .36% |
| Corporate bonds AAA | .67% |
| Corporate bonds AA | .99% |
| Corporate bonds A | 1.35% |
| Corporate bonds BBB | 1.50% |

On only two other occasions in the past fifty years (1921-22 and 1932-33) have long-term interest rates dropped so far in so short a time.

The most orderly price movements were those recorded by prime corporation bonds, which advanced almost continuously against the restraining influence of possible redemption. The lower grades ended the year at about the figures reached in April and May, when the recovery in business flattened out.

Causes of Higher Bond Prices

The anomaly of declining interest rates at a time when the national budget was becoming more and more seriously unbalanced needs little explanation to readers of these columns. It is traceable almost entirely to government policy. As a result of the dollar devaluation order last January, and subsequent indications that no further money changing would be done in the near future, large enough sums of currency were attracted from hoards to meet the needs of increases in business activity.




Table I. Money Rates

Per Cent Per Annum

| | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | May | June | July | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Call money renewals | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Time money (60-90 day) | .99 | .98 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 | .88 |
| Commercial paper (4-6 mo.) | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.28 | 1.25 | 1.18 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Acceptances (90 day) | .50 | .50 | .32 | .23 | .19 | .19 | .19 | .19 | .19 | .17 | .12 | .12 |
| Rates charged customers by banks: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| New York City | 3.58 | 3.43 | 3.31 | 3.39 | 3.42 | 3.30 | 3.23 | 3.26 | 3.28 | 3.22 | | |
| Other, North and East | 4.65 | 4.49 | 4.52 | 4.52 | 4.39 | 4.30 | 4.15 | 4.12 | 4.11 | 4.13 | 4.08 | |
| 27 South and West | 5.40 | 5.39 | 5.40 | 5.34 | 5.28 | 5.19 | 5.07 | 5.05 | 5.04 | 5.05 | 4.93 | |
| Bankers' bills—London (3 mo.) [†] | 1.00 | .94 | .92 | .97 | .93 | .95 | .89 | .80 | .74 | .76 | .45 | .56 |
| Private discount rate—Paris [†] | 2.01 | 2.57 | 2.50 | 2.82 | 2.78 | 2.29 | 1.87 | 1.76 | 1.49 | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.35 |
| Private discount rate—Berlin [†] | 4.04 | 4.04 | 3.90 | 3.92 | 3.91 | 3.79 | 3.71 | 3.73 | 3.74 | 3.69 | 3.55 | 3.38 |
| Bond yields: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| U. S. Government | 3.50 | 3.32 | 3.21 | 3.12 | 3.01 | 2.94 | 2.85 | 2.99 | 3.20 | 3.08 | 3.05 | 2.97 |
| 10 high-grade railroads | 4.54 | 4.28 | 4.21 | 4.13 | 4.08 | 4.03 | 4.00 | 4.09 | 4.17 | 4.06 | 4.00 | 3.90 |
| Municipal (15 high-grade issues) [‡] | 4.67 | 4.48 | 4.24 | 4.11 | 3.93 | 3.73 | 3.75 | 3.81 | 3.84 | 3.69 | 3.57 | 3.52 |
| Corporate (by ratings): [‡] | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AAA | 4.35 | 4.20 | 4.13 | 4.07 | 4.01 | 3.93 | 3.89 | 3.93 | 3.96 | 3.90 | 3.86 | 3.81 |
| AA | 5.00 | 4.70 | 4.55 | 4.43 | 4.37 | 4.30 | 4.28 | 4.34 | 4.42 | 4.36 | 4.28 | 4.27 |
| A | 5.72 | 5.24 | 5.12 | 4.97 | 4.96 | 4.96 | 4.93 | 5.09 | 5.17 | 5.00 | 4.93 | 4.86 |
| BAA | 7.01 | 6.27 | 6.26 | 6.01 | 6.05 | 6.06 | 6.13 | 6.49 | 6.57 | 6.40 | 6.37 | 6.23 |


[†]Preliminary. [‡]Adjusted for seasonal variation. [‡]Standard Statistics Company. Moody's Investors' Service.

large Eastern university has about 25 per cent of its entire investment portfolio in bond and stock issues quoted above the current redemption figure.

There is an element of speculation involved. If it is logical to invest with the simple expectation that the money will be returned after a period of years, it is difficult to understand an unwillingness to accept a larger amount in a shorter time. How better offset the oc-

instrument; it is almost impossible to obtain equivalent yields in low-coupon issues if high-coupon varieties are sold. Many funds hold certain bonds as a matter of fixed policy, or are required by agreement to retain them, or hold them in such large blocks that they are practically unmarketable. Nevertheless many holdings have been deliberately retained in expectation of still higher prices. Municipal bonds, usually not subject to

and prices, and probably even larger amounts of expatriated funds were recalled; net gold imports from February to December reached nearly \$1,000,000,000. The Federal Reserve banks held intact an enormous portfolio of United States securities originally acquired as an emergency measure. The Treasury utilized about \$400,000,000 of its dollar devaluation "profit," and the amount of Treasury and National Bank currency in use increased nearly \$100,000,000, decreasing the note liability of the Reserve banks by a corresponding amount.




These influences combined to swell member bank reserves far beyond their requirements; their excess reserves were maintained at about \$1,700,000,000 from mid-year. In the investment of their surplus funds, the banks had no practical alternative but to buy United States securities, and the influence of this buying carried the entire bond market with it. Short-term commercial and bankers' paper had disappeared from the money market, so far as it was of any practical importance.

The Long-Time Trend

Almost equally noticeable in the course of the 1934 money market was the credence apparently lent numerous statements to the effect that (1) the world is to experience low interest rates for many years and (2) the long-term trend of all interest rates is downward.

With the nature of the first statement, which is simply a prediction, there can be no quarrel. Any one who is content to abandon the money market to a settled existence, after witnessing its kaleidoscopic changes in the past five years, must have completely lost interest in the subject. Even if it happens that the prediction is accidentally correct, it will probably not be much comfort to those who have adjusted themselves to the present situation, unless living costs obligingly stand still or recede.



The idea of trend, however, is insidious. Every one who has the imagination necessary to deal successfully with economic matters feels the presence of unseen forces which he does not fully understand, but whose effects, he can sometimes ascertain, are of more or less lasting character. Thus, electric power consumption has at present a well-defined

tendency to increase year after year, railroad traffic has no such tendency, &c.

Two Diverse Factors in Interest Rates

However, to speak of a trend in connection with interest rates is an entirely different matter. A single series of data may have a trend; if so, it is usually a complicated affair. If it is said that a ratio has a trend, it must mean that both elements of the ratio have a discernible trend. Presumably, since only one "trend" is ever mentioned in connection with interest rates, both factors have the same trend. That would be rather remarkable in itself, for the two factors—investment and return—are not directly related, but, in a manner of speaking, sit across the table from each other. If there is a trend of the sort described and it has been properly calculated, it certainly seems that two dissimilar, complex time functions multiplied into each other could yield only a result too far removed from the raw data to retain any practical value.

If the idea of a trend of interest rates can be based on a projection of historical data, the curve needed to secure a decent correlation would be an animal of very strange appearance indeed. For example, it would have to allow call money to leap from about 2 per cent in the early Twenties to 15 per cent or more toward the end of the decade and then to drop to 1 per cent in a few years.

The Longer Long Time Trend

If a longer interval is necessary to produce a trend, one might contrast Roman times, when zero per cent was made "normal" interest by law, with the present rate of say 4 per cent. The trend would then be upward at the rate of about .002 per cent per annum, equivalent to 2 cents per \$1,000 bond.

Or, with medieval times as a starting point and some evidence that interest of 20 per cent was the basis of European mortgage business in the year 1200, it might be calculated that the trend of interest rates has been downward at the

rate of .02 per cent per annum, equivalent to 20 cents per bond.

Of course, there would be no real point in such trifling rates of change, even if they did constitute a trend. It is equally futile to base calculations on shorter intervals. A projection of changes in interest rates during the past twelve months would take all rates to zero or nearly so within five years. If it is not an obvious truth that interest rates have no trend, it is at least a good working assumption.

Cyclical Behavior More Significant

More promising than trends as a means of judging the money market is the typical behavior of interest rates in relation to the movements of the business cycle through its periods of prosperity, decline, depression and revival. Long-term interest rates tend to move more slowly and in a narrower range than short-term rates. The extremes of the past fifty years in THE ANNALIST index of high-grade bond yields were about 3.7 and 5.7

Guaranty Trust Company of New York

140 Broadway

Fifth Avenue at 44th St.

Madison Avenue at 60th St.

LONDON PARIS BRUSSELS LIVERPOOL HAVRE ANTWERP

Condensed Statement, December 31, 1934

RESOURCES

| | |
|--|---------------------------|
| Cash on Hand, in Federal Reserve Bank, and due from Banks and Bankers..... | \$ 333,576,268.85 |
| Bullion Abroad and in Transit..... | 16,142,332.00 |
| U. S. Government Securities..... | 464,507,036.13 |
| Notes of Reconstruction Finance Corporation | 20,000,000.00 |
| Public Securities..... | 62,546,154.24 |
| Stock of the Federal Reserve Bank..... | 7,800,000.00 |
| Other Securities..... | 25,706,932.66 |
| Loans and Bills Purchased..... | 579,712,917.75 |
| Items in Transit with Foreign Branches..... | 1,254,803.55 |
| Credits Granted on Acceptances..... | 34,458,356.16 |
| Bank Buildings..... | 13,821,691.39 |
| Other Real Estate..... | 205,418.44 |
| Real Estate Bonds and Mortgages..... | 2,579,302.88 |
| Accrued Interest and Accounts Receivable..... | 14,779,523.79 |
| | \$1,577,090,737.84 |

LIABILITIES

| | |
|--|---------------------------|
| Capital..... | \$ 90,000,000.00 |
| Surplus Fund..... | 170,000,000.00 |
| Undivided Profits..... | 7,294,719.63 |
| | \$ 267,294,719.63 |
| Dividend Payable January 2, 1935..... | 4,500,000.00 |
| Accrued Interest, Miscellaneous Accounts | |
| Payable, Reserve for Taxes, etc..... | 10,267,570.90 |
| Acceptances..... | \$94,908,218.55 |
| Less: Own Acceptances | |
| Held for Investment..... | 60,449,862.39 |
| Liability as Endorser on Acceptances and | |
| Foreign Bills..... | 34,458,356.16 |
| Deposits..... | 505,646.00 |
| Outstanding Checks..... | |
| | 1,260,064,445.15 |
| | \$1,577,090,737.84 |

per cent. Perhaps 4 and 5 would serve better as round numbers, and possibly 4½ per cent would be as good as any other guess at "normal" interest. Within these limits, the movement of interest rates has been highly irregular. There has been some apparent correlation with commodity prices, but not a close enough relationship to furnish a basis for forecasts. One thing is clear, however. Bond yields have usually declined sharply with the passing of a financial panic, more slowly during revival, and have reached the nadir well along in the following period of prosperity. The decline in bond yields which took place in 1934 was quite exceptional.

Short-term rates, being more sensitive as a rule to banking conditions, have tended to move over a much wider range and, on occasion, much more sharply than long-term rates. Call money seems to have ruled typically around 2 per cent, until the later stages of prosperity, when it has often run up rapidly, choked off bull markets in stocks and dropped sharply.

Interest Rates No Longer Barometric

These cyclical patterns were fairly well marked until about 1927 and permitted some very good financial forecasts. More recently, when the possibilities of turning the Federal Reserve System to political use were discovered, they failed dismally. The only basis now known for forming an intelligent view of the money market is a careful analysis of the forces at work there, checked by close observation of the markets themselves. Such an analysis deals with available indications of the supply and demand for funds. There is no known device of weighing the data mechanically to form a composite indicator. At various times in recent years first one series of data and then another became of outstanding importance, such as "money in circulation" from 1930 to 1933, a period which included five distinct financial panics. Around panic dates that one indicator was sufficient for all practical purposes.

Closely related to it and of more immediate interest is the figure of excess reserves of member banks, described in detail in *THE ANNALIST* of Oct. 19, 1934. In a sense this figure is the practical resultant of all the supply and demand factors in the money market, but for that very reason it must be used cautiously, for the figure itself is of no original significance. Regardless of its practical implications of the moment, it seems best to treat it with a certain amount of scorn; it is nothing but an adding machine total.

It does no good to say that money is easy because excess reserves are at new high-record figures. Money is easy because it has been made easy. A supply

of funds which did not exist has been created out of an act of Congress, not yet confirmed, and out of the hide of an already flayed banking system.

Probable Results of Artificial Ease

A glance at the brief enumeration above of the principal causes of money-market movements in 1934 shows that they were of man-made character, deliberately designed to serve certain purposes. One of these purposes, not the most sincere, but the most widely advertised and the most futile, was to promote business recovery. It was based, it was said, on a very simple line of reasoning, to wit: since recoveries from depression have been accompanied by low interest rates, recovery will be hastened if interest rates are lowered. There are probably four different fallacies in that one statement, but it is hardly necessary to point them out. That was done at various times by many writers, and easy-money policies since 1929 have certainly had a perfect record of failure, so far as business recovery is concerned.

It has escaped general attention, however, that artificially easy money may contain possibilities of working great harm to the country's economic and social structure. One of the direct effects, now becoming increasingly evident, is to cripple individuals dependent on savings bank interest, income from trust and endowment funds, &c. They form one of the most thrifty, intelligent and useful classes of the population. Save the unemployed, they feel the hardships of the depression most keenly. They are fully as deserving as any other class and are least capable of self-support. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the combination of low-interest rates and increased costs of living will be the Scylla and Charybdis of the New Deal's voyage.


Hoarding Encouraged

Low interest rates encouraged hoarding and expatriation of capital. Therein lies one of the reasons why an uncertain banking situation still exists, although it is held from sight temporarily by the deposit insurance scheme.

Easy money discourages all forms of saving and the most useful kinds of speculation. For psychological reasons there has to be a good deal of speculation in recovery from a depression. In most business enterprises it is very difficult to distinguish that part of the return which is interest on permanently valuable investment and that part which is compensation for business risks, but there is undoubtedly a direct connection between general rates of interest and the total yields of business enterprise. If the reward is lowered, the incentive to engage is lowered.

Furthermore, and this may be a point

of the greatest importance, there is probably a direct relationship between interest rates and wages. It is unusual to find simultaneously low interest rates and high wages or vice versa in the records of the past. Attempts to enforce artificially low money rates and high wages may be fraught with the gravest consequences in the final accounting. To date the policy has certainly intensified an unnecessary conflict of interest in what has always been a delicately balanced relationship. Impossibly high-wage scales in some instances, as in the building trades, have practically eliminated all activity and employment, except on admittedly wasteful government projects.



Lastly, it is to be considered that labor and capital are at many points in our economy interchangeable, for capital in the economic sense is nothing but cold storage labor. If interest rates are kept artificially low, and out of balance with wages, there is a strong incentive for the management of business to substitute machinery for labor, to pay gladly the low interest charges out of the savings in wages, intensifying unemployment. Normally, that is going on all the time, but if the process is speeded up, so is unemployment increased. A saving feature of the present situation is that wage scales are probably exaggerated. In some cases it is known that published rates are not actually paid.

A Check List of Important Developments to Watch in 1935

The importance of these general considerations in forming a sound view of the money market will hardly have escaped notice. What digression they involve seems excusable if they help make clear that it is necessary to deal with highly abnormal monetary conditions, subject to the possibility of great and rapid change. Following is a check list of developments to watch in 1935:

1. The decision of the Supreme Court on the question of dollar devaluation. If devaluation is upheld, probably nothing will happen to the money market; if the decision is against devaluation, the immediate effect will probably be a sharp decline in high-grade bonds.

2. The decision of the Supreme Court in the "gold clause" cases. If upheld, and if dollar devaluation is also upheld, these clauses will make bonds which contain them proportionately more valuable than other bonds in cases where the obligor can stand the strain.

3. Any change in Federal Reserve Bank holdings of United States securities, particularly any decrease.

4. Any other Treasury operations which would act to decrease the excess reserves of member banks.

5. Any political development which might influence the national credit. Notwithstanding its strong statistical posi-

tion, the government bond market was quite sensitive in August and September.

Barring such developments, interest rates may be expected to remain where they are. The rapid increases in excess bank reserves which were brought about in the early half of 1934 produced an almost unprecedented decline in interest rates, but an extraordinarily high level of excess reserves seemed to be of comparatively little use to the market in the second half. Interest rates are now extremely low, out of keeping with levels they would naturally seek if the money market were left to itself. Probably they cannot be maintained indefinitely at present figures, but on the other hand there is no sure indication of any immediate change.

New difficulties are faced in translating these views into an investment program. Obviously, it will be impossible, until the five items listed above are disposed of, to enter upon any long-term investment program with complete confidence. The natural tendency is to do just what the whole market has done—to concentrate heavily in the highest grade short-term paper, foregoing immediate income for the sake of investing for better advantage later.

Investment Policy—Should Common Stocks Be Included?

However, there are countless cases where some investment must be made or retained, where it is essential to secure some return, even at the risk of permanently curtailed income in future years. It will usually be advisable in these cases to select bonds of the shortest maturity and best quality which the barest income needs permit. Short maturities are least likely to be called, will cause the least loss if called. Most portfolios are deficient in short and medium maturities.

Since December, 1933, living costs have been increasing without interruption, judging from the movement of the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of retail food prices. During the early months of 1934, the bond investor need not have troubled himself over that tendency, because his bonds were going up even faster. Beginning with July, however, the tide seems to have set against him, and the question must be faced whether some portion of the investment fund should not now be transferred to stocks. The answer depends heavily on the circumstances of the investor. In most cases it is a decided affirmative. However, advice of that sort would usually be gratuitous because most investors, if they have anything left at all, already have too many stocks.

TABLE II. SUMMARY OF MONEY MARKET INDICATORS, FOURTH QUARTER, 1934

Supply Factors.

| ITEM. | COMMENT. |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Gold stock..... | Increased |
| Reserve ratio..... | Increased |
| Excess reserves of member banks..... | Steady at very high level |

| | |
|--|----------------------|
| New ordinary life insurance business ... | Increased somewhat |
| Savings bank deposits..... | Increased reported |
| Other bank deposits..... | Increased |
| Postal savings deposits..... | Increased |
| Circulation..... | Steady at high level |

Demand Factors.

| ITEM. | COMMENT. |
|----------------------------|--|
| Government gross debt..... | Increased to record high; further increases seen |

| | |
|--|---|
| Government agency debt..... | Reports delayed; probably increased |
| New State and municipal bond issues..... | About unchanged |
| Corporation debt outstanding..... | Decreased |
| Bank loans..... | Decreased |
| Open market paper..... | About unchanged |
| Commodity prices..... | Declined slightly |
| Business activity..... | Steady at low level; some increases late in quarter |

Municipal Bonds

have again proven to be the most stable form of investment and the first to react from the depression period prices. In fact, the recovery in this class of security during 1934 has broken all precedent and the returns now obtainable from the obligations of Municipalities which have stood the test and maintained their 100% record and have their financial "house in order," are comparable only to those prevailing at the beginning of this Century.

List of current offerings of Municipal Bonds yielding from 2.75% to 6% and also Chart, showing the net return obtainable from those TAX EXEMPT securities as compared with similar return from taxable securities sent upon request for Circular No. T-35.

Brandon & Company
MUNICIPAL BONDS
120 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

Climactic Changes in Banking; Trend Still Toward Centralization of Credit

Continued from Page 79

direction by quasi-political governing authorities.

In England, France, Germany and Italy there has been much more effective control over the flow of bank credit into securities. In Germany, for example, in 1927 Dr. Schacht stopped a securities boom by peremptory orders to all banks to reduce their loans within a few days' time.

Regarding the future course of banks' holdings of government securities, this, of course, is a problem which is tied up with the many ramifications of the government's financial, sociological and political policies. Nevertheless, irrespective of a possible diminution in the amount of the national annual deficits, it seems imperative that desperate efforts be made to get the debt out of the banks and to refund it into long-term maturities; as of Sept. 30 last, \$14,359,000,000, or 52 per cent of the total debt, was payable within five years.

Growing Nationalization

As a result of complex causes, the trend toward centralized management of money, toward Federal assumption of investment banking service and toward nationalization of the banking system and socialization of credit has been most marked during the past year. As in the portfolio situation, this is no new development. We have had "management" of credit for the past twenty years. But recent developments have introduced the political element to a marked degree.

The long-term capital needs of the community have been foisted onto the government by a changed situation in private investment banking. Investment bankers have almost completely abdicated from their erstwhile important position—the validity of the popularly ascribed contributing causes, such as distrust of the currency, the Securities Act, taxation and changes in corporate financial needs being irrelevant to this discussion. The situation is illustrated by figures covering public offerings of new capital issues in the year 1934. New private corporate issues (exclusive of refunding) totaled only \$178,257,949, as against \$1,241,206,128 of offerings of farm loan and other government agencies and of States and cities, in addition to the public sale of \$4,759,347,150 of new public debt and \$7,830,223,050 of Federal debt refunding operations.⁶

In other words, public sale of net additional government debt alone was twenty-five times as great as the amount of private capital offerings.

Contingent Liabilities

In any appraisal of Federal investment banking we must not overlook the increasing amount of bonds which are guaranteed by the government and are thus its unconditional obligations. Attorney General Cummings ruled on Sept. 25 that the government guarantee is full and ironclad, while the Comptroller of the Currency instructed the banks on Sept. 6 to list guaranteed bonds with United States Government securities in future reports of condition. Federal loans outstanding to the five principal emergency credit agencies on Nov. 25 amounted to \$6,926,069,897, the various maturities extending from six months to thirty years (with official pleading *against* prompt repayments). As security, the government holds everything from corn in cribs

to liens on Diesel engines and streamlined trains. Table IV shows the manner in which the total loans are divided.

TABLE IV. CONTINGENT LIABILITIES OF THE U. S.

| | |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| Farm Credit Administration | \$2,715,901,691 |
| Home Owners Loan Corp. | 2,000,000,000 |
| Reconstruction Finance Corp. | 1,260,168,206 |
| Public Works Administration | 750,000,000 |
| Commodity Credit Corporation | 200,000,000 |
| Total | \$6,926,069,897 |

This total includes neither relief expenditures nor money spent on employment-creating projects; it represents "banking" advances against collateral.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation since its establishment has (as of Nov. 30, 1934) disbursed \$6,527,605,820, of which \$2,325,167,374 has been repaid. Banks received \$2,666,641,880, made up of \$1,746,909,370 in loans to going institutions or to closed banks, and of \$919,732,509 in purchases of preferred stock, capital notes and debentures; of these total loans to banks \$599,397,346 is still outstanding. President Jesse Jones has estimated that \$500,000 additional will be disbursed to open and closed banks. The RFC has also entered into investment banking activities in offering large amounts of municipal bonds to the investing public. It was recently officially stated that \$50,000,000 of securities taken over from PWA have been thus sold. The RFC has even seen fit to assume the direct actual management of a railroad—the Denver & Salt Lake—to guard its loans, and through its lending activities it controls 5,000 miles of railroad line.

More Government Control Planned

The Viner and Hardy report, previously quoted, advocates government direct industrial lending operations on a grand scale, to be concentrated either in the RFC or in a new credit agency, the attitude of private bankers being viewed as "too strict." A great part of the report is taken up with suggestions that the loan policy of the RFC be completely relaxed as to both safety and volume. This in face of the recent statement by Mr. Jones that "the applications we are having are for small loans and not of a particularly desirable nature. * * * It is an everyday occurrence for bankers to recommend industrial loans to the RFC of which they are unwilling to take any part for their own institutions."⁶

Nationalization and socialization have been immeasurably furthered by deposit insurance. The banking debauch of 1932 and early 1933 was largely caused through inability to satisfy depositors' demands by realizing on long-term assets which had suffered depreciation in value. This contingency is now overcome by means of the banks' insurance of one another's assets—a "chain method" scheme of holding up the structure in case of emergency. It is boasted that in the first eleven months of 1934 only seven banks which are members of the FDIC failed, as against 1,936 failures in the corresponding period of 1931. But in view of RFC aid, in view of FDIC procedure wherein supervision and solvency are practically determined by the same interests, no real test of individual bank solvency exists. Jesse Jones, among others, is advocating that the FDIC be made the sole supervising authority. In that case, as he says, "the loss to the insurance fund would be greatly minimized."⁷ The entire structure leans and apparently will continue to lean on the

⁶ Today, Nov. 24, 1934.

Continued on Page 128

FOUNDED 1812

THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY

FOR INSURANCES ON LIVES
AND GRANTING ANNUITIES

Member of Federal Reserve System

PHILADELPHIA

— DECEMBER 31, 1934 —

RESOURCES

| | |
|---|------------------|
| Cash and Due from Banks | \$56,180,904.57 |
| U. S. Government Securities (<i>at par</i>) | 42,703,000.00 |
| State, County and Municipal Securities | 8,210,751.74 |
| Other Investment Securities | 22,867,756.95 |
| Call Loans to Brokers | 15,600,000.00 |
| Other Loans Upon Collateral | 43,410,117.72 |
| Time Loans Upon Collateral | 8,111,353.76 |
| Commercial Paper | 18,706,897.01 |
| Reserve Fund for the Protection of "Cash Balances in Trust Accounts" | 9,240,967.86 |
| Miscellaneous Assets | 4,520,815.55 |
| Interest Accrued | 883,301.51 |
| Bank Buildings, Vaults and Equipment | 1,980,871.58 |
| Customers' Liability for Letters of Credit and Acceptances | 1,096,774.30 |
| | \$233,513,512.55 |

LIABILITIES

| | |
|--|------------------|
| Capital | \$8,400,000.00 |
| Surplus | 12,000,000.00 |
| Undivided Profits | 1,668,595.69 |
| Reserved for Contingencies | 1,973,408.13 |
| Reserved for Taxes and Expenses | 320,296.22 |
| Dividend Payable January 2, 1935 | 336,000.00 |
| Interest Payable Depositors | 317,994.08 |
| Miscellaneous Liabilities | 26,688.35 |
| Letters of Credit Issued and Acceptances Executed | 1,096,774.30 |
| Deposits | 207,373,755.78 |
| | \$233,513,512.55 |

TRUST FUNDS

| | |
|-----------|--------------------|
| Personal | \$886,798,604.08 |
| Corporate | \$1,829,317,223.50 |

C. S. W. PACKARD, *Chairman of the Board*




C. S. NEWHALL, *President*

The Outlook for Labor Relations: New Problems Confronting Employers

By SUMNER H. SLICHTER
Harvard University



AGES have reached a plateau where they are likely to remain (except as they may be affected by the cost of living), until there is a fairly pronounced pick-up in business that shows signs of lasting. In September, 1934, the hourly earnings of factory workers, according to the National Industrial Conference Board, were almost precisely the same as in September, 1929, despite the fact that the prices of non-agricultural products were 15 per cent below the 1929 level. During the second six months of 1933, under the influence of the codes



and the President's Re-employment Agreement, hourly earnings advanced faster than during any six months' period in the history of our wage statistics—approximately 25 per cent. During the Spring of 1934, additional wage advances raised hourly earnings in manufacturing by another 5 per cent. These latter increases were made largely for the purpose of averting labor trouble.

With the prospect that industrial profits during the first two quarters of 1935 will be below the corresponding quarters of 1934, employers will not feel financially able to raise wages for the purpose of diverting men from joining labor organizations.

Employers are watching the cost of living very carefully and wages may be expected to be sensitive to rises in living expenses. An advance of as much as 5 per cent in the cost of living produces rather definite pressure for compensating wage increases. Employers will feel this pressure fairly promptly,

during the next year seems virtually certain. Meats have not yet shown the full effect of the drought, and rents, which are about 28 per cent below 1929, are showing a tendency to rise and would advance perceptibly with a moderate gain in employment.

The keen dissatisfaction of workers with their weekly earnings means that any substantial improvement of business must be accompanied (1) either by a substantial increase in working hours per week or (2) by prompt upward adjustment in wages and wage rates. The alternative would be labor trouble.



partly because we are in a period of labor ferment comparable to 1885-1886 and 1918-1920, and partly because, despite the high level of hourly earnings, there is keen discontent among workers with their wages. The explanation lies in the short working week. In September, 1934, the average working week in manufacturing, according to the National Industrial Conference Board, was 33.3 hours as against 48.8 in September, 1929, with the result that weekly earnings were \$19.53 as against \$28.89. Only part of this difference was offset by the 20 per cent drop in the cost of living. Some rise in living costs

In other words, during the next business revival, the lag of wages behind prices may be expected to be less than in previous booms.

A. F. of L. Wants Revised Wagner Bill

Important changes in standard working hours are not to be expected. Employers cannot afford to offset a cut in hours by raising rates and wage earners themselves are far more interested in larger earnings than in a shorter working week. Much will be heard of the demand of the American Federation of Labor for a 30-hour week without a reduction in pay, but it is to be classified as a political rather than an economic demand—that is, the federation will push the demand vigorously in Congress for the purpose of forcing concessions upon other demands.

The legislation which the federation desires more than any other is the revised Wagner bill which undertakes to safeguard freedom of association and prevent the company-dominated employee representation plan. Mr. Green recently indicated that this bill will "head the list of measures that the federation will urge Congress to enact."

Moderate Increase in Federation Membership

The membership reported by the American Federation of Labor, at the San Francisco convention, for August, 1934, was 2,824,689, an increase of 697,893 over August, 1933. The average membership for the year ended August, 1934, was 2,608,011—only 75,000 above 1932 and 300,000 less than 1930. Furthermore, it is less than the number reported for any year between 1920 and 1930.

The small increase reported by the federation elicited general astonishment.

¹Labor, December 18, 1934, p. 1.

Indeed, as John L. Lewis said at the San Francisco convention, "it is obvious to all that * * * in certain of our mass production industries, the degree of success which we had hoped for has not been attained." The reported figures, however, understate the real membership in the federation. The figures show the membership on which the affiliated unions are paying dues to the federation, but most of the unions do not pay dues upon their entire membership. In ordinary times the discrepancy runs as high as 15 per cent, but at present it is undoubtedly greater.

The four years of depression left most unions in an exceedingly unsatisfactory financial condition. In order to take advantage of the organizing opportunity afforded by the National Recovery Act, many unions strained their financial resources to the limit. Until their treasuries are in more satisfactory shape, they will be conservative in increasing their payments to the federation. Evidence of underpayment is furnished by the figures for individual unions. For example, the United Mine Workers, which have had a substantial increase in members, paid upon exactly the same membership this year as last and upon 83,000 fewer members than in 1932, and 100,000 fewer than in 1931. It is probable that the total number of dues-paying members is 500,000 above the August figure, or about 3,300,000. The number of members in good standing would be somewhat larger, because in many unions unemployed members are not required to pay dues. In estimating the strength of the federation, account should also be taken of the great drop in the membership of the building trades. Eleven building trade unions, which in 1929 paid on a membership of 878,900, in 1934 paid on only 562,600. A revival of construction would promptly result in a substantial increase in the members of these organizations.

New Membership Drive Due

The organizing drive of the federation seems to have reached a peak between April and June, 1934. Since then it has been slowing down. It will be resumed in the late Winter and Spring. How vigorously will depend in the main upon the decision of the courts in the Houde case and upon the state of business. If the Houde decision is upheld, organizing activity will receive a considerable impetus. Even more important will be the state of business. A substantial upturn will promptly precipitate a broad burst of organizing activity—more vigorous and aggressive than in any previous period of revival. If the improvement of business is slow and halting, organizing activity will be far more selective and many unions will defer their campaigns. A few which are in a strong financial condition and also in a strong strategic position, such as the teamsters and chauffeurs, may be expected to push organizing campaigns vigorously.

Labor will take advantage of the weak political position of the public utilities to push organization among their employees. At a time when the public utilities are nothing but political footballs, they might benefit greatly from making friends with organized labor. The public works program is likely to be the basis for organizing activity among the building trades. Active organization work will continue in the textile industry, where dissatisfaction seems to be intense. On the whole, however, unions will be gov-

KINGS COUNTY TRUST COMPANY

BOROUGH OF BROOKLYN

342, 344 and 346 FULTON STREET
Capital \$500,000.00
Surplus \$6,000,000.00
Undivided Profits \$53,000.00

OFFICERS
WILLIAM J. WASON, Jr., President
HOWARD D. JOOST, Vice-President
CHESTER A. ALLEN, President
ALFRED W. ABRAMS, Ass't to President
ALBERT I. TABOR, Sec'y
EUGENE L. VAN WART, Ass't Sec'y
ERNST F. MINTS, Ass't Sec'y
CARL J. MEHLDAU, Auditor

STATEMENT

at the close of business on December 31st, 1934

RESOURCES

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Cash on Hand | \$2,229,004.83 |
| Cash in Banks | 7,109,421.05 |
| U. S. Government Bonds | 8,079,306.26 |
| N. Y. State and City Bonds | 3,443,492.65 |
| Other Bonds | 3,602,372.39 |
| Stocks | 1,724,047.30 |
| Bonds and Mortgages | 2,305,491.66 |
| Loans on Collateral, Demand and Time | 7,001,546.56 |
| Bills Purchased | 1,828,399.74 |
| Real Estate | 752,077.95 |
| Other Assets | 507,290.72 |
| | \$38,582,451.11 |

LIABILITIES

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| Capital | \$500,000.00 |
| Surplus | 6,000,000.00 |
| Undivided Profits | 53,527.92 |
| Due Depositors | 30,962,511.98 |
| Checks Certified | 63,198.33 |
| Rebate on Loans and Bills Purchased | 9,493.31 |
| Reserves for Taxes, Expenses and Contingencies | 919,800.00 |
| Officers' Checks Outstanding | 72,120.47 |
| | \$38,582,451.11 |

KINGS COUNTY TRUST COMPANY

The Kings County Trust Company offers to its depositors every facility and accommodation known to modern banking. If you are not already availing yourself of the advantages offered by this institution, the Kings County Trust Company will be glad to have you open an account.

erned in their organizing activity, as they always are, by the state of business.

More Strikes Expected

Most labor leaders and personnel experts with whom I have talked during the last several months expect more strikes and labor trouble during 1935 than during 1934. An industrial relations director of national reputation says that he is looking for "much more labor trouble throughout the country" during the next year than during the past. He adds: "Industrial leaders seem to be coming out more strongly against the New Deal and 7a. In our own industry, organized labor is becoming more belligerent. The problems of technological change and wage incentives and of seniority seem to be important factors as well as the questions of discharge, wages and form of organization." On the labor side, a key man in the federation, who is classified as a conservative, says: "More strikes are definitely in the cards. Employer resistance is going to mount. Sloan's recent speech in Chicago shows this." Another important leader of the federation, speaking more cautiously says: "If I thought that the captains of industry had learned some lessons, I would discount the prophecy of widespread industrial unrest next Spring. If, in the next two or three months, there is a greater compliance with the labor section of the NRA and the codes, I doubt whether there will be any widespread disturbance."

As principal danger spots, leaders on both sides point to automobiles, steel, rubber, soap and textiles. There are some danger spots in the building trades, particularly in open-shop cities, where the public works program may be used by the unions to launch organizing campaigns. The northwest lumber industry is likely sooner or later to see a showdown between the Federation of Labor and the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen. The longshore and maritime situations on the Pacific Coast are still trouble spots, and the San Francisco waterfront is described by one who knows as "still a smoldering volcano, where almost anything can happen."

As a matter of fact, the strike record of 1934 is more favorable than is usually supposed. Although the man-days lost were substantially greater than 1933, the number of disputes was less. For the increase in man-days lost, the textile strike was mainly responsible, since it alone accounted for approximately one-fourth of the time lost. But the man-days lost were considerably less than in either 1927 or 1928 and the number of disputes was less than half the number during either 1919 or 1920. From the standpoint of the effect upon business and business plans, the expectation of strikes is almost as important as strikes themselves, and 1934 has been a year of scares and crises and of more or less narrowly averted strikes. The coming year is also likely to possess these characteristics.

Increased Belligerency on Both Sides

It is unquestionably true that, as the struggle to organize industry has gone on, bitterness and belligerency on both sides in many industries have increased. Each side accuses the other of coercion and intimidation and generally unfair tactics, and both are right. All of this makes the situation more difficult to control. Added to this is the growing belief on the part of many labor leaders that the government is incapable of compelling employers to bargain with trade unions and that the only way to achieve the end of collective bargaining, namely a trade agreement, is to strike. Most

employers are willing to meet union committees and even to make concessions in working conditions, but they refuse to sign agreements. But an agreement is the one thing that the union desires above everything else, because its ability to survive and to hold its members usually depends upon its success in obtaining an agreement with an employer.

There are several important reasons, however, for believing that the increase in strikes may be less than most persons expect. Much will depend upon the rate of business improvement. A rapid rise in business activity would unquestionably produce a large crop of strikers which no one among employers, the labor leaders or the government could prevent. But if business gains are no more rapid than most persons now anticipate, at least during the first half of the year, conditions will not be favorable for successful strikes. Furthermore, a tempering influence exists in the fact that many organizations have made important gains during the last year and a half and are as much interested, for the time being, in consolidating these gains and in strengthening their new locals as in pushing into new territory. Finally, eager as the new unions are to win "recognition," most of them are not ready for strikes. There is always an element in new unions which is impatient and demands "action," but the influence of the leaders is almost invariably against strikes. Particularly in such industries as rubber, aluminum, cement and several others, where the new organizations have made a promising start without having gained much recognition, the unions have much to lose from premature and ill-advised strikes conducted against companies which possess large inventories.

Leadership

Much will depend upon the ability of the leaders to satisfy the demand of the rank and file for action and results. Perhaps it will be possible to satisfy them by developing the activities of the new organizations in handling individual grievances and in improving working conditions. As one experienced labor leader aptly put it, "There are many men in the labor movement who know how to organize a union, but who do not know what to do with it after it is organized." Since the enactment of Section 7a, most employers stand ready to meet committees from the new unions and to consider their complaints. Few of the new unions, however, have really taken full advantage of the new access which they have gained to employers. Some of the new unions may postpone the direct issue of recognition by becoming far more active in adjusting individual grievances.

How far the government will be willing to go in attempting to avert trouble remains to be seen. The danger spots are too numerous for the government to give attention to all of them, but the fact that labor is seeking much from the coming Congress will strengthen the hand of the government in dealing with key situations, such as steel and automobiles, where peace is essential to the continuance of recovery. But, although major strikes in steel, automobiles and rubber will probably be avoided, one is forced to conclude that the keen struggle to organize industry will prevent a drop in the number of strikes and that, if the pick-up in business is at all substantial, the increase in strikes will be substantial also.

New Attitude Among Some Employers

During the last year or so labor organizations have made trade agreements

in industries where virtually no agreements have heretofore existed, such as radio, petroleum, office equipment, rubber, retailing, aluminum and even automobiles. The terms of these agreements vary considerably. In some instances, as in the case of the Consolidated Oil Corporation, the Schulte Cigar Stores and some of the smaller rubber companies, they give relatively complete recognition to the unions; in other instances the recognition is not explicit and is restricted and qualified. Important extensions of union recognition have occurred in the pulp and paper industry and the lumber industry. On the railroads, the so-called company union is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Indeed, between June and December, 1934, the company union has been ousted by a vote of the workers in the mechanical departments of forty-eight railroads.

This trend may be expected to continue. Indeed, within the last several days an important agreement has been signed between the Borden Farm Products Company and the Brotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs, and another between the International Seamen's Union and the American Steamship Owners Association covering about 40,000 sailors employed by forty-one companies operated out of Atlantic and Gulf ports.

An appreciable minority of employers is questioning more frankly than ever the wisdom of adamant opposition to A. F. of L. organizations. They see that this opposition is steadily making the labor movement more political and more radical and that it is driving the settlement of labor conditions into the hands of the government. These men would prefer to go along in their old ways, but they are becoming convinced that new conditions require new policies. In several important industries, which will here remain unmentioned, important new agreements between large employers and labor organizations would not be surprising before the end of another year.

Company Unions

The National Recovery Act, as is well

known, led employers rapidly to organize employee representation plans among their employees. A survey by the National Industrial Conference Board in November, 1933, indicated that 45 per cent of the employees covered were dealing with their employers through such plans—three out of five plans having been started subsequent to the passage of the Recovery Act. Just as the organizing movement of the Federation of Labor has continued at a diminishing rate, so also has the organization of employee representation plans. A survey by the Conference Board in May, 1934, revealed that the proportion of employees covered by employee representation plans had increased to 49.6 per cent. The increase will continue but it will be slow, partly because the methods first used by employers in instituting these plans will not stand the scrutiny of the Labor Relations Board and partly because the institution of plans has often been a source of friction.

The Federation of Labor will again seek legislation intended to "outlaw" the "company" union. Indeed, as stated above, Mr. Green has declared that the revised Wagner bill will "head the list" of measures which the federation will ask of Congress. It is impossible, however, to outlaw such organizations provided the employees wish them. It is possible to prohibit certain practices on the part of employers, such as paying a stipend to employee representatives and initiating and supervising elections, and Congress is likely to do this. But as these practices have already been frowned upon by the Labor Relations Board, such legislation would have primarily a moral effect.

The "Majority Rule" Issue

The contest between the employee representation plans and the A. F. of L. unions has produced the "majority rule" issue, decided by the Labor Relations Board in the celebrated Houde case. As stated above, if the courts sustain this decision, the organizing activity of the federation will be greatly stimulated. A

Continued on Page 130

Remember this Symbol!



IT is the trade mark of the FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, the surety company that bonds more people and writes a larger volume of Fidelity and Surety business than any other company in the country . . . that through good times and bad has consistently maintained a strong, liquid financial position . . . that has been in business 45 years . . . that has never failed to meet its obligations . . . that appreciates the importance of prompt loss settlements and shows that appreciation in action.

**FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT
COMPANY OF MARYLAND • BALTIMORE**

REPRESENTATIVES EVERYWHERE

Net Public Debt \$25,914,818,407, an Increase of \$3,127,176,294 in 1934



TABLE I shows the gross debt, the balance in the general fund and the net debt of the United States at the end of each month from February, 1933, when the Roosevelt administration took office, to December, 1934. Scarcely less significant than the absolute size of and marked increase in the public debt, is its character, that is, the kinds of obligations by means of which the Treasury has financed the deficits of the fiscal year 1934 and the first six months of the

TABLE I. PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES.

(End of Month, Millions.)

| | Gross Debt. | General Fund Balance. | Net Debt. |
|-----------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| 1933. | | | |
| February | 20,935 | 221 | 20,714 |
| March | 21,362 | 493 | 20,869 |
| April | 21,441 | 241 | 21,200 |
| May | 21,853 | 364 | 21,489 |
| June | 22,539 | 862 | 21,677 |
| July | 22,610 | 834 | 21,776 |
| August | 23,096 | 1,260 | 21,899 |
| September | 23,051 | 1,146 | 21,905 |
| October | 23,050 | 909 | 22,141 |
| November | 23,534 | 1,107 | 22,427 |
| December | 23,814 | 1,026 | 22,788 |
| 1934. | | | |
| January | 25,071 | 1,537 | 23,531 |
| February | 26,052 | 4,902 | 21,150 |
| March | 26,187 | 4,818 | 21,339 |
| April | 26,118 | 2,294 | 23,834 |
| May | 26,155 | 2,022 | 24,133 |
| June | 27,053 | 2,582 | 24,471 |
| July | 27,189 | 2,472 | 24,717 |
| August | 27,080 | 2,137 | 24,943 |
| September | 27,190 | 2,193 | 24,997 |
| October | 27,188 | 1,812 | 25,376 |
| November | 27,299 | 1,597 | 25,701 |
| December | 26,479 | 2,564 | 25,915 |

fiscal year 1935. It has been said that in handling this problem the Treasury has pursued orthodox financial measures; and it has, indeed, been asserted that some of its refunding operations have been comparable with those conducted by other countries, especially Great Britain, in their efforts to reduce governmental expenditures by borrowing at lower interest rates.

It is true that the United States Treas-




Table II. The Gross Debt of the United States.

(End of Each Month, Millions of Dollars)

| | Bonds. | Notes. | Certif- icates. | Bills. | Interest Bearing Total. | Matured | Other Non- Interest. | Gross Debt. |
|-----------|--------|--------|--------------------|--------|-------------------------------|---------|----------------------------|----------------|
| 1930. | | | | | | | | |
| June | 12,112 | 2,390 | 1,264 | 156 | 15,922 | 32 | 232 | 16,185 |
| 1931. | | | | | | | | |
| June | 13,531 | 621 | 1,924 | 445 | 16,520 | 52 | 230 | 16,801 |
| 1932. | | | | | | | | |
| January | 14,307 | 795 | 1,839 | 375 | 17,515 | 41 | 259 | 17,816 |
| February | 14,307 | 795 | 2,200 | 518 | 17,820 | 40 | 265 | 18,126 |
| March | 14,307 | 796 | 2,568 | 520 | 18,190 | 47 | 270 | 18,507 |
| April | 14,307 | 796 | 2,562 | 622 | 18,287 | 40 | 269 | 18,597 |
| May | 14,277 | 1,041 | 2,792 | 619 | 18,729 | 40 | 268 | 19,037 |
| June | 14,250 | 1,465 | 2,831 | 616 | 19,161 | 60 | 266 | 19,487 |
| July | 14,257 | 1,487 | 2,907 | 647 | 19,297 | 50 | 264 | 19,612 |
| August | 14,257 | 2,197 | 2,656 | 648 | 19,758 | 47 | 262 | 20,067 |
| September | 14,257 | 3,031 | 2,389 | 623 | 20,296 | 55 | 260 | 20,611 |
| October | 14,257 | 3,539 | 2,044 | 645 | 20,485 | 55 | 273 | 20,813 |
| November | 14,257 | 3,539 | 2,038 | 643 | 20,476 | 52 | 278 | 20,806 |
| December | 14,257 | 3,539 | 2,038 | 643 | 20,476 | 52 | 278 | 20,806 |
| 1933. | | | | | | | | |
| January | 14,230 | 3,298 | 2,285 | 641 | 20,454 | 55 | 293 | 20,802 |
| February | 14,230 | 3,576 | 2,138 | 641 | 20,584 | 59 | 291 | 20,935 |
| March | 14,230 | 3,575 | 2,369 | 817 | 20,392 | 62 | 289 | 21,362 |
| April | 14,230 | 3,575 | 2,363 | 918 | 21,057 | 68 | 286 | 21,441 |
| May | 14,223 | 4,148 | 2,119 | 979 | 21,469 | 71 | 314 | 21,853 |
| June | 14,223 | 4,780 | 2,200 | 954 | 22,158 | 66 | 315 | 22,539 |
| July | 14,239 | 4,800 | 2,246 | 954 | 22,240 | 55 | 316 | 22,610 |
| August | 15,074 | 5,152 | 1,543 | 953 | 22,723 | 64 | 312 | 23,099 |
| September | 15,074 | 5,151 | 1,495 | 952 | 22,672 | 70 | 309 | 23,051 |
| October | 15,074 | 5,150 | 1,453 | 952 | 22,669 | 72 | 309 | 23,050 |
| November | 15,569 | 5,149 | 1,492 | 952 | 23,161 | 69 | 304 | 23,534 |
| December | 15,569 | 5,128 | 1,754 | 1,003 | 23,450 | 65 | 299 | 23,814 |
| 1934. | | | | | | | | |
| January | 15,597 | 5,627 | 2,280 | 1,214 | 24,717 | 54 | 297 | 25,068 |
| February | 15,579 | 2,278 | 1,379 | 2,570 | 24,707 | 48 | 297 | 26,052 |
| March | 15,579 | 6,925 | 1,816 | 1,378 | 25,698 | 60 | 400 | 26,158 |
| April | 15,579 | 6,889 | 1,814 | 1,378 | 25,599 | 53 | 467 | 26,118 |
| May | 15,695 | 6,678 | 1,819 | 1,404 | 25,588 | 59 | 509 | 26,155 |
| June | 16,510 | 6,932 | 1,635 | 1,404 | 26,480 | 54 | 518 | 27,053 |
| July | 16,516 | 6,951 | 1,683 | 1,454 | 26,605 | 57 | 527 | 27,189 |
| August | 16,517 | 6,921 | 1,682 | 1,379 | 26,495 | 66 | 519 | 27,080 |
| September | 15,922 | 8,020 | 1,156 | 1,529 | 26,626 | 54 | 510 | 27,190 |
| October | 15,808 | 8,027 | 1,154 | 1,654 | 26,643 | 48 | 497 | 27,188 |
| November | 15,768 | 8,036 | 1,153 | 1,804 | 26,761 | 47 | 491 | 27,299 |
| December | 16,245 | 9,586 | 1,958 | 2,944 | 27,944 | 50 | 484 | 28,479 |

*On which interest has ceased. †Consists mainly of U. S. notes, less gold reserve, and deposits for retirement of national bank and Federal Reserve Bank notes.

Table III. Percentage Distribution of the Gross Public Debt of the United States at Significant Dates.

| | Bonds. | Notes. | Certif- icates. | Bills. | Int. Bear. Total. | Matured | Other Non- Interest. | Gross Debt. |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------------------|--------|----------------------|---------|----------------------------|----------------|
| June 30, 1930 | 74.8 | 14.8 | 7.8 | 1.0 | 98.4 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 16,185 |
| June 30, 1931 | 90.5 | 3.7 | 11.5 | 2.6 | 98.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 16,801 |
| June 30, 1932 | 73.1 | 7.5 | 14.5 | 3.2 | 98.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 17,816 |
| Feb. 28, 1933 | 68.0 | 17.1 | 10.2 | 3.1 | 98.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 18,507 |
| June 30, 1933 | 63.1 | 21.2 | 9.8 | 4.2 | 98.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 18,597 |
| Dec. 31, 1933 | 65.4 | 21.5 | 7.4 | 4.2 | 98.5 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 19,037 |
| June 30, 1934 | 61.0 | 25.6 | 6.0 | 5.2 | 97.9 | 0.2 | 1.9 | 20,806 |
| Dec. 31, 1934 | 57.0 | 33.7 | 0.6 | 6.9 | 98.1 | 0.2 | 1.7 | 20,806 |

*On which interest has ceased. †Consists mainly of U. S. notes, less gold reserve, and deposits for retirement of national bank and Federal Reserve Bank notes.

ury has been able to borrow at extremely low rates and to prevent any marked increase in interest charges. In the fiscal year 1934, for example, the interest charges on the outstanding debt amounted to only \$756,617,127, as compared with interest charges of \$689,365,106 on a considerably smaller volume of total outstanding indebtedness in the fiscal year 1933; and in the fiscal year to Dec. 31, 1934, they amounted to \$413,879,607, as

against \$353,479,468 in the corresponding period of the previous fiscal year.

But there the comparison ceases to be valid. What the British refunding process accomplished was not only a reduction of about \$200,000,000 in annual interest charges but also a refunding of the equivalent of about \$13,500,000,000 in outstanding obligations into long-term bonds. Thus so long as the British Parliament succeeds in balancing the budget

no serious problem of Treasury financing is likely to arise in the near future.

Increase in Floating Debt

In this country the situation is directly the opposite, as is evident from Tables II and III. From these tables it is clear that what the United States Treasury has done is to finance the huge government deficits of recent years largely through the issue of comparatively short-term obligations, the perpetual refunding of which will constitute a serious problem unless and until they are refunded into long-term bonds. This problem will, moreover, be intensified as long as the government is unable or unwilling to meet its emergency expenditures by taxation instead of by borrowing. Thus in the calendar year 1935 the maturities which must be met, on the basis of obligations outstanding on Dec. 31, 1934, are as shown in Table IV.

Treasury Financing in 1934

The year 1934 opened with a fresh sinking spell in the market for government bonds, due to apprehension on the part of investors over what was eventually to be done with the American dollar. The revaluation of the dollar at approximately 59 per cent of its former gold value on Feb. 1 was followed, however, by a strong upward movement in the bond market which carried United States Government issues to new high records since the bank holiday.

In June, after one of the sharpest advances in government bond prices on record, the Treasury summoned enough courage to try a \$300,000,000 issue of 12-14-year Treasury bonds. This issue, together with a simultaneous issue of \$500,000,000 of 5-year notes, was immediately oversubscribed.

Further Uncertainty Over Money

Naturally, there was a general feeling of assurance after the successful completion of this financing and it is quite likely that the Treasury would have been able to go ahead with some important and much-needed refunding had it not been for still another occasion when the government's general monetary policy created widespread fear on the part of investors in the soundness of the country's monetary system. This second occasion, following about one year after the futile gold-buying policy, was the nationalization of silver and an active campaign on the part of the Treasury to carry out certain legislation enacted by the Seventy-third Congress with respect to adding silver to the country's metallic monetary reserves. Consequently toward the end of August the bond market again turned sharply downward and this decline was turned into what at one time threatened to become a mild panic when, on Aug. 9, it became known that there had been a poor response to the Treasury's offering of \$150,000,000 in Home Owners' Loan Corporation bonds, fully guaranteed by the government. After a temporary rally, government bonds resumed the decline until, in the middle of September, half the sharp rise of the first half of the year had been canceled. Consequently in July and August the Treasury confined its financing to 182-day Treasury bills, aside from a few small offerings of Federal Farm Mortgage and Home Owners' Loan Corporation bonds, which were contingent liabilities of the government.

In September, despite the unfavorable

Continued on Page 148

| RESOURCES | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| Loans and Discounts | \$37,005,342.07 |
| Overdrafts | 65,60 |
| United States Obligations | 162,064,793.76 |
| Other Bonds and Investments | 29,483,109.25 |
| Banking House, Furniture & Fixtures | 1,131,000.00 |
| Cash and Due from Banks | 51,446,230.49 |
| | \$281,130,541.17 |
| LIABILITIES | |
| Capital | \$7,500,000.00 |
| Surplus | 17,500,000.00 |
| Undivided Profits | 924,103.35 |
| Reserves | 9,476,894.17 |
| Circulating Notes | 2,383,440.00 |
| Dep | |

Virility or Sterility

Is the Outlook for Your Business One That Requires a Crystal Ball
OR
Do the Fundamentals Pursued Assure Continuity?

By R. H. ROSITZKE

Member of R. R. Associated Consultants Group

VIRILE OR STERILE: What is our particular outlook as to business possibilities for 1935? Can it safely be said that, because the general nature of things has an improved tone, every one engaged in business will enjoy a proportionate share of the upturn? Is there such a state as "Has Been" or can certain basic policies, principles of organization and operating control measures be inaugurated which will assure the posterity of past, present and future endeavors?

Uncontrolled Action a Menace

Wild, uncontrolled bursts of youthful endeavors are quite frequently more destructive than a senile passivity which allows matters to take their own course. Properly harnessing a fundamental reserve of energy with correct directions given is a buffer against inaction; which condition, unless it is curbed, gradually begets demise. Quite recently the writer came into contact with a group that organized a chain store trading corporation a few years ago. The organizers were men of fine calibre insofar as honesty of purpose and family background were concerned. However, their venture started with a burst of energy, credit was easily established, contacts were developed on an impossibly lavish basis, additional friends were drawn in, items were sold and distributed without any thought of costs or orderly methods of distribution. Within fifteen months the group destroyed the good-will of hundreds, established a distrust in the minds of a great many, cost their creditors plenty and in two cases disgraced their families.

Inactivity—Imperceptible—Is Cumulative In Effect

A discussion, quite recently, as to the financial status of a rather large Eastern concern was interesting. It was a one-man concern in its inception, managers were added, but "The Old Man ran the show." The depression came along and brought on a real struggle. The slowing down process only came to light clearly this last Fall when the company did not enjoy an increase in volume, although it was common knowledge that competition was improving its position in sizable gains. The founder of the company was a man of exceptional good judgment, with a very broad understanding of the business. He came to the brink of failure, however, because his activities were not properly supplemented in an organized manner. It would have been poor judgment on the part of his managers if they had attempted to take over their own reasonable share of duties. Beyond that, there was no immediate incentive to them for forcing a recognition of changing times and conditions.

Company Characteristics and Their Cost

Two rather large competitors in one of our largest industries are character-

ized by their origin. The one is over-engineered and undersold, the other is oversold and under-engineered. The first company goes through a great many long-winded engineering technicalities, has a superior product, but quite frequently loses its markets through excessive delays in the issuance of revised or new products. The other company is frequently in hot water with products not fully developed, pushed prematurely into unsuspecting markets. It is interesting to note that the company which is actually over-engineered is firm in the belief that its sales efforts are superior whereas the company which actually oversells its products is extremely proud of its technical accomplishments.

Both companies have been successful. Their endeavors singly or as a pair would produce an improved result of several million dollars annually if they exchanged viewpoints, improved their weaknesses and eliminated the exaggerations of their strength. These reflexes date back to the origin of the companies. The one was conceived and founded by a very successful engineer. The other company was started on a semi-promotional basis. Their original tendencies have been curbed somewhat and as time goes on, the outside viewpoint will enable them to overcome the disadvantages inherent in their conception.

History Need Not Repeat Itself

A discussion quite recently with a group of executives, in a company, the largest in its industry, held a moral. Two of the senior executives made the statement that their company had within the past two years become the largest in the industry. The third, a far-sighted individual, quoted the number of companies that had topped the list during the past thirty years, only to find themselves way down shortly thereafter. This brought on a lively discussion which finally boiled down to the thought that the success of these companies was the source of their failure. Success was attended by a loosening up and carelessness that came as an aftermath of a sudden feeling of impregnability and self glorification.

The executives of this company thereupon decided to probe every avenue in their organization for protecting and further insuring their success.

Was the value in their product sufficient? Did the equipment represent the most modern and up-to-date methods? Was the average age of their personnel something that required consideration? Were all responsible positions properly safeguarded? Were their unit costs in proper relationship? What were the possibilities existent in undeveloped mar-



kets? Was the best possible performance realized from every member? These phases and many others were given consideration.

Upon completion of this rather exhaustive introspection, they fully realized the tremendous number of loose ends within the company which, if allowed to accumulate, would ultimately convert success into failure.

Their attitude plus abilities, continued, is the greatest guarantee that can be given in forecasting possible returns on the investment of this company.

Perversions Reactionary

The many dominating bases upon which executives operate can be classified to cover the majority in several broad classes:

1—There is the type which insists that maintenance of a low calibre of personnel assures control, a low salary and wage level and automatically assumes that this represents low cost operation.

2—The group which assumes that the bringing in of a great maze of intellectual material will automatically solve the problems of the day. Remuneration is no consideration in the first analysis, because of an assumption that this will justify itself.

3—Those that consider cash reserves of the company impregnable and thereafter omit all other calculations.

4—The broad gauged group which relates everything to its measurable value. They are primarily interested in the results obtained or those being striven for. In their estimation of salary and wage levels they will think competitively in terms of unit cost, a high production per individual at good earning levels.

In among all of these groups, one finds all types of operators. There are those who think that arousing fear in their organization produces best results. Then, occasionally one finds some playing one executive or employee against another on a pure personality basis. A group gradually lessening, is the type that depends for its information upon a network of internal espionage.

There is something, depending upon conditions existent within companies, that can be said for each and all of these attitudes and basic viewpoints. However, extended deviation from a development of a normal and healthy relationship will create unhealthy organization reactions which have proved fatal in a great many cases.

Is it not best to?

1—To create a desire on the part of every member of an organization to produce the best results?

2—To develop measuring sticks which will be accepted by those measured and truly appraise progress?

3—To use this information in such a

manner that it will be for the benefit of those engaged to fight for the best interests of their activities?

4—To have every one feel that his efforts are being appraised without partiality or by some professional squealer who earns his living through development of exaggerations?

5—To give each one an inducement for improving his own living standards?

Futures Assured

Many other cases can be cited. The task of balancing the activities of any company is unending. The stimulation must be normal withal, constant in its effect. In this respect a company is quite similar to the individual person. A certain amount of exercise should be demanded constantly to avoid atrophy. There should be changes in actors and shows seen to avoid a state of boredom and mental sluggishness. A challenge as to the fundamental value and soundness of present activities develops standards of action and judgment that considerably increases the performances of all constituent members.

It is axiomatic that we all have that extra potential ability which occasionally is surprising even to ourselves. This reserve is there to a far greater degree in the rank and file of a company's employees. Such reserves, the greatest assurance of that extra bit which spells the difference between success and failure for the individual, is also a keystone in the success of entities.

The father of a family, after attempting to correct errors in the activities of household members, quite frequently finds that irrelevant comments of a stranger frequently make such corrections effective without effort. And so, many senior executives have found our counsel, pointed with the *profit motive*, directly effective in correcting maladjustments of long standing. Beyond that the counsel provided a means for continuing such advantages through the control media made effective and the incentive stimulation applied.

What Do You Think?

Conditions are changing considerably during these times. The closeness of our own relationships with our day in and day out problems, although giving a sound experience, do not enable us to realize our own possibilities. The problems are too customary and the solutions become staled.

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Reprints of this and other articles will be furnished upon request.

The Statistical Realities of the Influence of Agriculture on Business

By RUTH HOUGHTON



THE level of agricultural prices in relation to prices of other commodities is often spoken of as of great influence in shaping the course of general business activity. It is the purpose of this article to examine the economic reasoning upon which this theory is based and to test the theory statistically by comparing movements in agricultural prices and in business in the past, so as to provide a factual basis for appraising the effect of the present agricultural situation on the business outlook for 1935.

The theory of the business value of high agricultural prices is based on but one, and that the less important, of the two sets of relationships between business and agriculture. Agriculture is important to business; first as a source of raw materials and second as a market for manufactured goods. The raw material relationship is the more important. Agriculture supplies the raw materials for 40 per cent or more of the total number of factory wage-earners in this country. But the proportion of the total output of manufactured goods that it

consumes is much smaller. The number of industries affected by a shortage of raw materials of agricultural origin is much greater than the number hurt by a decline in farmer buying power.

Effect of Farm Prices on Business

Taken by itself, an increase in farmer buying power has a beneficial effect on business, because it improves the demand for certain types of goods. In so far as an increase in farm buying power may be achieved through an expansion in the value of agricultural exports (assuming that exports of non-agricultural commodities are not thereby reduced), business is stimulated. But so far as purely domestic trade is concerned the effect of a rise in agricultural commodities is to give the farmer more, and the manufacturer and his employees less. Farm products exchange with manufactured goods in a ratio more advantageous to the farmer and less advantageous to the manufacturer. If farm products are low, on the other hand, a smaller proportion of the expenditure of consumers will be

spent for food and other agricultural products and a larger proportion for manufactured goods. Low raw material prices, of course, aid the manufacturing industries, while high raw material prices tend to reduce profit margins and eventually to restrict demand.

Low agricultural prices, moreover, usually accompany large crops and high prices small crops. The industries engaged in transporting and marketing farm products naturally enjoy a heavier volume of business in years of good crops, which are likely to be years of low prices for farm products.

The question of the level of prices of farm products is distinct from that of their direction of movement. Falling prices are bad for manufacturing industries as well as for the farmer, because of the inventory loss they cause, and occasionally also because of the financial complications caused by severe declines in the commodity markets. But once prices are down and the inventory losses have been absorbed, the manufacturer's position is strengthened.

Manufacturing industry, therefore, benefits most from large crops at low prices. A large crop at high prices is moderately favorable, for although it means high prices for food and certain raw materials, activity is increased in the industries transporting agricultural products and certain manufacturing industries are benefited by the increased farm-buying power. The worst condition is small crops at high prices.

An excellent study of the business effect of fluctuations in agricultural prices was made a few years ago by L. H. Bean in an article "Post-War Interrelations Between Agriculture and Business" in the proceedings of the International Conference on Agricultural Economics, Volume II. The following is quoted from that article:

"The industries engaged in the distribution and processing of farm products are concerned more with the volume of farm output than with the money value of farm income. This distinction between output and income is a necessary one because large output may or may not mean large income. A large crop of wheat may bring a large income as, for example, in 1924. In that year the effect on both the industries dependent on the farmers' income and those dependent on the volume of traffic was identical. Or a large crop of wheat may bring a low income as it did in 1928, when the railroads and middlemen only were favorably affected. Large crops of potatoes and cotton usually mean smaller incomes and in those instances the effect of income on business is not identical with the effect of volume.

"Among the distributors of farm products whose prosperity rises and falls with farm output rather than with farm income the railroads may be cited as the outstanding example. Ordinarily, with freight rates practically unchanged from year to year, revenue tends to be determined by the volume of traffic handled. In the ten years from 1920 to 1929 inclusive, the marketings of farm products have been relatively heavy in years when freight from other sources declined. This may be inferred from a comparison between the annual variations in manufacturing output and in crop marketings in the past ten years. We find here a very definite inverse correlation. The heaviest movements of farm products occurred in 1921, 1922, 1924, 1927 and 1928. From the standpoint of transportation and industry, these large volumes were well timed, for in these years they served as partial offsets to business activity below normal. Similarly the lighter movement of farm products in 1920, 1923, 1925 and 1929 coincided with business activity above normal."

Chart 1 compares the course of business and the relative prices of farm products over the period 1875-1934. These annual averages are based on the Axe-Houghton index of general business activity corrected for trend for the period prior to 1919 (data for the years 1875-78 estimated on the basis of the Ayres index of general business activity) and on The Annalist index of general business activity for the period 1919-1934. The index of the relative level of farm products is one that was prepared by L. H. Bean in the study referred to above. It represents the ratio of the prices of farm products to non-agricultural prices. The ratios have been adjusted for trend.

Chart 2 shows an annual index of the relative value of agricultural production. This has been obtained by multiplying the index of production by another index of the value of farm products in relation to non-agricultural commodities. The relative value index has been corrected for trend.

Theory Unsound

If the theory of the business importance of farm buying power were sound, years of very high relative crop values should be followed by good business.


Is 86% Accuracy Good Enough?

| DATE | ADVICE | Combined Dow Jones Averages | LONG & SHORT | | LONG ONLY | |
|----------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------------|-------|-----------|------|
| | | | Gain | Loss | Gain | Loss |
| July 21 | Sell | 156.72 | | | | |
| Aug. 9 | Buy | 146.68 | 10.04 | | | |
| Sept. 8 | Sell | 145.93 | | .75 | | .75 |
| Sept. 15 | Buy | 139.51 | 6.42 | | | |
| Oct. 6 | Sell | 149.95 | 9.44 | | 9.44 | |
| Nov. 22 | Buy | 153.14 | | 6.19 | | |
| Dec. 7 | Sell | 158.95 | 5.81 | | 5.81 | |
| Dec. 14 | Cover | 154.98 | 3.97 | | | |
| Gains & Losses | | -1.74 | +36.68 | -4.94 | +15.25 | -.75 |
| Net Gain | | | +30.74 | | +14.50 | |

scribers who operated both long and short gained profits of 35.68 points against losses of only 4.94 points. Based upon points gained and lost, this establishes an accuracy rating of 86.2%. Those taking long positions exclusively gained 14.50 points.

The Pressure Indicator is the forecasting medium which features Trendograph Service. In the foregoing analysis it is assumed that profits would have been limited by the market swings reflected by the combined averages. Actually, the individual Trendograph Charts make it possible to select, in advance, those issues which will move faster, percentage-wise, than the market as a whole.

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The figures are detailed in the table. They cover the period from July 21st, 1934, (the first forecast), through the last completed transaction on December 14th of last year.

A net loss of 1.74 points in the combined averages is shown for the period and would, theoretically, have been realized by one "long" of the market during that time. In comparison, sub-

scribers who operated both long and short gained profits of 35.68 points against losses of only 4.94 points. Based upon points gained and lost, this establishes an accuracy rating of 86.2%. Those taking long positions exclusively gained 14.50 points.

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

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JAN 18 1935

Actually, however, there is no such connection between high crop values and good business. The years of highest crop values shown on the chart are 1882, 1891, 1898, 1902, 1904, 1912, 1919 and 1928. In four of these eight cases, 1891, 1898, 1904 and 1928, business was active in the year following. In the other four, business activity declined in the following year. While we cannot perhaps attribute the business reaction in these cases to the high value of the crop, there is certainly no ground here to support the theory that high crop values bring business prosperity.

To a certain extent the interests of agriculture and of manufacturing industry are opposed. High farm prices help the farmer chiefly at the expense of the non-agricultural population. But other things being equal, both tend to profit from large crops and to suffer from poor crops. The popular belief concerning the beneficial effect of high agricultural prices on business apparently originated in a period when agriculture formed a

ferent years were classified, on the basis of an index of agricultural output, as exceptionally bad, bad, good and exceptionally good. The movement of general business activity following these four different types of crops was then examined. It was evident from this study that the influence of good crops was not sufficient to produce important modification in the course of business decline. In 1884, 1895 and 1920 moderately good crops were followed by severe declines in general business activity. In cases where general business activity was not undergoing violent contraction, however, there was evidence of some relationship between the size of crops and business. In eight out of eleven cases of moderately good crops the business index showed a rising trend in the eight months beginning with August. In years of exceptionally good crops there was fairly close evidence of relationship between crops and business. In five out of six cases of exceptionally good crops covered by this study the



larger part of American economic activity than it does today.

A hundred years ago 80 per cent of the country's population was engaged in agricultural pursuits, as compared with only 20 per cent today. The business importance of farm prices has been exaggerated by the emphasis given agricultural conditions in political discussions. The prominence that proposals for farm relief have occupied in Congress during the past several years has tended to strengthen belief in the mistaken theory that high prices for farm products make for general business prosperity.

It is worth observing that the business importance of grain prices, particularly of wheat, is often overestimated. In 1928, for example, wheat was only 5.6 per cent of the gross value of agricultural produce and a variation of as much as 50 per cent in wheat prices would change the total value of all farm products only 2.8 per cent.

Exceptionally Good Crops Closely Followed by Good Business

The above study of the relationship between fluctuations in business activity and agriculture has been based upon annual data. We have also made a study, based upon monthly data, of business activity, for the purpose of determining the effect of good crops upon business in the months immediately following the crop-moving period. There is not space here to show the data upon which this study has been based. We can, however, summarize its results. Crops in the dif-

business index rose in the eight months beginning with August.

There were four cases of very bad crops in the period studied. Two of these cases were followed by business declines, one by a horizontal and one by a rising business trend. In moderately bad crop years six out of nine cases had a moderate downward trend, two an upward, and one a horizontal trend.

In general, then, the size of the crops appears to have some influence upon business conditions, although not infrequently this effect has been outweighed by other factors. Other studies suggest that the volume of agricultural production has often had some immediate effect upon the course of the security markets as well as upon business.

We conclude that a large volume of agricultural output has been a favorable general business influence, a small output an unfavorable influence. High prices of farm products have been unfavorable, low prices favorable. The best combination for business has been large crops and low prices. It is necessary to distinguish between the level of prices and the direction of the price movement. Rapidly falling agricultural prices are a temporarily unfavorable influence. Rising agricultural prices are a favorable business influence and consequently the rise in agricultural prices which has occurred over the past two years may be regarded as having exerted a favorable influence upon the general business situation.



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THE outstanding economic developments in Canada during 1934 were: A further rise in business activity; a marked expansion in foreign trade; an increase in wholesale commodity prices; a slight rise in the cost of living; a further increase in employment; a substantial increase in farmers' income; a slight rise in retail trade; a steady rise in bond prices; an increase in stock prices, accompanied by a reduction in turnover, and a decrease in the Federal deficit.

During the coming year it seems likely that political developments will play a more important part in determining the course of business than heretofore, for the reason that 1935 is an election year. It is not within the scope of this article to guess as to what party will win the elections, but regardless of who wins certain issues which will gain increased prominence stand out sharply. The railroad problem and the unemployment problem and coupled with both of these, the task of balancing the budget will be widely discussed. Reform will also be a favorite topic. Prime Minister Bennett has gone on record as wanting a "New Deal" in Canada. Some observers have read into his remarks that he is in favor of adopting the experiments being tried by the United States. That the policies of the administration in Washington will be copied in detail seems unlikely. To do so would badly unbalance the budget and place a severe strain on Canada's dollar. It does appear, however, that Canadian business is in for greater government intervention, but under the present system of government such intervention cannot reach the proportions possible in the United States. Canada also has the advantage of studying the effect of the numerous experiments in the United States and she should benefit by such a study.

The accompanying chart comparing Canadian and United States business activity reveals a striking difference in the pattern of the two curves since March, 1933. It is because of the greater stability of Canadian business activi-



ty since the depression low, that many in Canada wish to proceed slowly and with great caution along the path of increased government intervention in business. Another factor which the Canadian Government must consider is that Canada cannot afford to shut off foreign markets.

The Business Index

The Canadian business index last year reached a high of 78.5, while the low for the year was 70.4. The rise during the first part of the year carried the index up 14.8 per cent, while the subsequent reaction resulted in a 7.3 per cent loss. The November index, at 74.5, showed a net loss of 5.1 per cent from the year's

high, but a gain of 40.8 per cent from the 1933 low.

Table I gives the combined index and its components, each of which is adjusted for seasonal variation and, where neces-

The trade agreements signed with the United Kingdom have resulted in considerable shifting in trade, but as can be seen from Tables IV and V Canada has had the better of the bargain. For the

Total exports of merchandise amounted to \$598,508,000 for the first eleven months of 1934, as compared with \$486,159,000 for the corresponding period of 1933, an increase of 23.1 per cent. Total imports amounted to \$474,362,000, as compared with \$365,847,000 for the cor-

TABLE I. THE ANNALIST INDEX OF CANADIAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY



Table IV. Per Cent of Exports to the United Kingdom and the United States to Total Canadian Exports

| | United Kingdom. | | | | | United States. | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1931. | 1930. | 1929. | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1931. | 1930. | 1929. |
| January | 37.5 | 39.6 | 25.5 | 17.7 | 17.9 | 19.1 | 39.6 | 32.3 | 45.6 | 49.9 | 54.5 | 42.3 |
| February | 35.3 | 38.4 | 27.9 | 18.8 | 20.8 | 16.9 | 39.6 | 32.6 | 45.6 | 49.9 | 54.5 | 42.3 |
| March | 39.3 | 38.3 | 26.5 | 21.8 | 18.5 | 17.5 | 35.5 | 22.2 | 43.5 | 49.7 | 49.3 | 44.6 |
| April | 32.2 | 29.5 | 26.6 | 18.0 | 14.0 | 13.7 | 41.4 | 42.5 | 45.6 | 55.4 | 60.5 | 40.9 |
| May | 44.8 | 38.9 | 29.6 | 33.2 | 24.5 | 32.8 | 30.2 | 30.9 | 35.9 | 38.8 | 51.3 | 42.3 |
| June | 45.3 | 38.8 | 27.6 | 26.1 | 25.8 | 23.3 | 28.0 | 32.9 | 39.1 | 41.2 | 45.9 | 42.7 |
| July | 40.8 | 41.4 | 37.7 | 28.1 | 30.5 | 21.9 | 31.2 | 34.2 | 30.1 | 45.2 | 42.4 | 45.3 |
| August | 41.5 | 32.1 | 41.1 | 30.0 | 32.3 | 22.3 | 31.8 | 40.0 | 30.3 | 44.6 | 38.4 | 51.0 |
| September | 41.8 | 38.0 | 45.8 | 30.5 | 34.1 | 25.7 | 36.4 | 32.4 | 26.8 | 44.6 | 38.0 | 50.9 |
| October | 47.8 | 40.5 | 47.1 | 36.2 | 30.7 | 31.8 | 28.7 | 30.7 | 24.1 | 26.9 | 30.1 | 42.2 |
| November | 45.9 | 47.5 | 41.4 | 36.6 | 35.4 | 30.8 | 30.9 | 25.4 | 28.0 | 33.6 | 38.4 | 41.1 |
| December | 39.8 | 40.3 | 30.8 | 25.6 | 27.8 | ... | 35.1 | 25.2 | 38.5 | 41.0 | 43.1 | 41.1 |

Table V. Per Cent Imports From the United Kingdom and the United States to Total Canadian Imports

| | United Kingdom. | | | | | United States. | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1931. | 1930. | 1929. | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1931. | 1930. | 1929. |
| January | 23.0 | 21.9 | 18.7 | 16.2 | 15.5 | 15.9 | 60.0 | 60.9 | 63.1 | 67.9 | 66.1 | 69.5 |
| February | 24.1 | 24.4 | 19.9 | 15.9 | 14.9 | 14.7 | 58.4 | 58.8 | 62.6 | 69.5 | 67.8 | 70.0 |
| March | 20.8 | 21.6 | 20.5 | 16.0 | 14.4 | 12.9 | 61.2 | 56.4 | 59.9 | 67.3 | 71.7 | 74.3 |
| April | 18.7 | 26.2 | 17.3 | 16.5 | 13.4 | 12.5 | 57.6 | 66.3 | 68.3 | 71.1 | 64.5 | 74.6 |
| May | 22.7 | 21.0 | 19.2 | 17.9 | 15.0 | 14.0 | 56.8 | 54.8 | 56.9 | 60.6 | 64.5 | 71.3 |
| June | 20.9 | 24.1 | 17.6 | 16.3 | 15.5 | 14.5 | 57.8 | 54.7 | 57.7 | 63.7 | 65.9 | 68.2 |
| July | 22.4 | 24.6 | 20.7 | 18.4 | 15.3 | 15.5 | 54.2 | 55.3 | 56.8 | 59.9 | 64.1 | 67.5 |
| August | 22.4 | 25.9 | 20.4 | 18.3 | 16.9 | 16.1 | 55.8 | 51.8 | 57.5 | 58.1 | 62.5 | 66.8 |
| September | 22.1 | 24.5 | 21.8 | 17.8 | 16.7 | 16.4 | 56.2 | 51.0 | 56.6 | 59.9 | 62.9 | 66.4 |
| October | 23.2 | 25.6 | 22.3 | 18.1 | 17.0 | 15.3 | 54.6 | 49.8 | 55.5 | 57.8 | 61.7 | 66.5 |
| November | 25.1 | 25.9 | 25.7 | 18.6 | 21.2 | 15.8 | 50.7 | 49.8 | 49.8 | 55.5 | 56.4 | 64.4 |
| December | 23.6 | 24.2 | 20.7 | 19.7 | 17.2 | ... | 56.8 | 57.2 | 60.2 | 62.6 | 64.7 | 64.7 |

sary, for long-time trend, for September, October and November. Table II gives the combined index back to the beginning of 1919.

Foreign Trade

One of the most favorable developments of the year was a sharp rise in foreign trade. Exports, as a result of improved conditions in the foreign markets, rose 23 per cent, while imports, reflecting better internal conditions, increased 30 per cent. The balance of trade was again in favor of Canada, being 3.2 per cent greater than in 1933.

eleven months ended Nov. 30, 1934, exports to the United Kingdom accounted for 43.6 per cent of Canada's total exports, while in the corresponding period of 1933 they amounted to 39.6 per cent. Imports from the United Kingdom amounted to 22.4 per cent of Canada's total imports, against 25 per cent in 1933. Imports from the United States, on the other hand, amounted to 55.9 per cent of her total imports, as compared with 52.6 per cent in 1933. Exports to the United States amounted to 31.2 per cent of her total exports, against 32.1 per cent.

able balances of \$10,771,000 in 1931 and \$103,321,000 in 1930.

It will be noted that in 1930 and 1931 the balance of trade was unfavorable to Canada. As Canada has a considerable amount of bond servicing to do in foreign countries, any sizable unfavorable trade balance places a strain on her dollar. Last year's large favorable balance was an important factor contributing to the stability of her dollar. The Canadian dollar in the New York market was strong during most of the year and fluctuations were not great. The largest discount at which the Canadian dollar sold in New

Continued on Page 92

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Continued from Page 90

York was 1.57 cents, while the greatest premium was 3.69 cents.

Newsprint Production

Newsprint production showed an increase of 22.8 per cent last year. Output amounted to 2,358,117 tons for the first eleven months of the year, as compared with 1,841,700 tons for the corresponding period of 1933. The adjusted index of newsprint production reached a high of 84.7 for June, while the low for the year was 70.9 for January. An important event of the year was the




raising of the price of newsprint by the majority of manufacturers in the industry.

Iron and Steel Production

Steel ingot and pig iron production increased very sharply during the year, the gains for the first eleven months of the year over the corresponding period of 1933, amounting to 95.4 per cent and 91.4 per cent, respectively. Steel output totaled 700,187 long tons, as compared with 358,424 long tons, while pig iron production amounted to 364,631 long tons, as compared with 190,464 long tons.

Electric Power Production

Output of electricity in 1934 established a new high record, rising for the first eleven months of the year 20.5 per cent above the total for the corresponding period of 1933. Output amounted to 19,088,780,000 kilowatt hours, as compared with 15,845,115,000 kilowatt hours



for the first eleven months of 1933. The adjusted power index did not rise to a record high, because of the adjustment made for long-time trend. The index did, however, rise to the highest level since the middle of 1930, the high for the year being 89.7 for November, while the low was 81.5 for January. It is likely that when December figures are available, the adjusted index will show a further gain.

Freight Car Loadings

Freight car loadings showed a marked increase last year, the total for the year, compared with the 1933 and 1932 totals, being given in Table VI. Only two important groups of loadings decreased last year, these being grain and grain products shipments and l. c. l. merchandise shipments. The adjusted index of freight car loadings fluctuated within a narrow range. The high for the year was 69.3 for March, while the low was 60.9 for November. A less than seasonal decrease in loadings in December, however, caused a rise in the adjusted index to 63.3.

Mineral Production

The value of Canada's mineral production increased 25.7 per cent last year, according to an official estimate by the

Mining, Metallurgical and Chemical Branch of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Exclusive of the premium paid on gold, the value of output rose 19.8 per cent. The rise in value, although partly due to higher prices, was principally the result of increased production. The pro-

Nickel production showed a very sharp increase last year, the quantity produced rising 56.5 per cent, while the value rose 52.3 per cent. Total production amounted to 130,346,400 pounds, as compared with 83,264,658 pounds in 1933. The value of output rose to \$30,674,000 from

continued at a low level, although showing some increase over 1933. Total contracts awarded amounted to \$125,811,000, as compared with \$102,266,000 in 1933, an increase of 23.0 per cent. Last year's total, however, was below that for 1932 and sharply below that for 1931, 1930 and 1929. Total awards for these years were as follows: 1932, \$132,874,000; 1931, \$315,482,000; 1930, \$436,521,000; 1929, \$576,652,000. The problem of stimulating construction is, of course, closely connected with the unemployment problem. The Canadian Government has helped building somewhat by increasing its appropriations for public works, but nothing even closely resembling the measures adopted by the United States has been attempted. As a result of increased building activity last year, the production of structural materials increased.

TABLE VI.—FREIGHT CAR LOADINGS BY GROUPS
(Thousands of Cars)

| | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | ov. '33. |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Grain, grain prod. | 323.8 | 324.4 | 382.6 | *0.1 |
| Live stock | 78.6 | 73.2 | 70.2 | 7.4 |
| Coal | 318.1 | 265.9 | 255.6 | 19.6 |
| Coke | 28.5 | 30.9 | 27.0 | *7.8 |
| Lumber | 81.7 | 65.7 | 58.5 | 24.4 |
| Pulp wood | 63.8 | 48.1 | 43.6 | 32.6 |
| Pulp and paper | 96.9 | 78.8 | 71.7 | 23.0 |
| Other forest prod. | 100.0 | 82.7 | 78.3 | 20.9 |
| Ore | 68.8 | 46.7 | 40.7 | 47.3 |
| Merchandise, l. c. l. | 646.8 | 610.3 | 678.4 | 6.0 |
| Miscellaneous | 513.0 | 405.5 | 469.0 | 26.5 |
| Total | 2,320.0 | 2,032.2 | 2,175.6 | 14.2 |

*Decrease.

Employment


Employment continued to expand during the year, the adjusted index showing a gain of 8 per cent on Dec. 1 over the corresponding date in 1933 and a gain of 24.8 per cent over the depression low. The adjusted index on Dec. 1 rose to the highest level since October, 1931. The accompanying chart headed Recent Economic Changes in Canada graphically shows the steady increase in employment and also shows that the gain has been less than the rise in industrial production. In November, however, both indices showed the same percentage decline from the base year.

Wholesale Commodity Prices and the Cost of Living

Wholesale commodity prices and retail prices have been very stable during the past year, although showing increases over 1933. The wholesale commodity price index held close to the 71.5 mark for most of the year, while the cost of living index fluctuated around the 79.0 mark. The average for the wholesale price index showed a gain of 6.5 per cent over 1933, while the average for the cost of living index rose only 1.2 per cent.

Retail Trade

The rise in industrial production has failed to greatly stimulate retail trade. The adjusted index of retail sales for the first eleven months of the year rose 4.5 per cent over the corresponding period of 1933. The index after rising to a high of 77.2 in March declined to a low of 70.8



duction of all metals was valued at \$192,668,000, as compared with \$147,105,598 in 1933, an increase of 31 per cent.

Gold

Canada's most important mineral, from the standpoint of value of production is gold, accounting last year for 36.7 per cent of the total value of mineral output. The total quantity of gold milled increased only slightly, but the marked increase in gold prices resulted in a sharp increase in value of the output. The rise in prices last year, as was the case in 1933, resulted in the treating by mines of lower grade ore and in the opening of new mills. The opening of new mills caused the slight increase in the quantity produced. Total output amounted to 2,964,395 fine ounces as compared with 2,949,309 fine ounces in 1933, a gain of 0.5 per cent, while the value of this output, including estimated exchange equalization, rose to \$102,242,000 from \$84,350,237, an increase of 21.2 per cent. The value of output, based on the old standard rate of \$20.67 per fine ounce, amounted to \$61,279,000 as compared with \$60,967,625 in 1933, while the estimated exchange equalization on gold produced amounted to \$40,963,000 last year and \$23,382,611 in 1933. The average price of gold in Canada rose to \$34.49 per fine ounce from \$28.60 in 1933.

\$20,130,480. Of course, most of the nickel produced in Canada is exported, the United States and the United Kingdom being large consumers.

Copper production rose to a new high record last year, topping 1930, the previous high by 21 per cent. Production amounted to 367,054,472 pounds, as compared with 299,982,448 pounds in 1933, a gain of 22.4 per cent. The value of this output rose to \$26,881,000 from \$21,634,853, an increase of 24.2 per cent. The value of last year's output is below that for 1930, because of the lower level of prices last year. Exports in November reached a new all-time high, when 45,540,500 pounds were shipped.

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in July. Improvement in trade since that month has carried the adjusted index up to 75.5 for November.

Value of Field Crops up 27 Per Cent

The value of Canadian field crops last year was the highest since 1930, exceeding the 1933 total by 27 per cent. This rise in farmers' income is, of course, an important favorable factor in the business outlook, for the reason that such a large percentage of the population is dependent on farming for their income. The estimated value of all field crops was placed at \$536,498,600 by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and compares with \$423,597,000 in 1933, \$452,526,900 in 1932, \$435,966,400 in 1931 and \$662,040,900 in 1930. The rise in value was due to increases in unit prices and some improvement in yields. Table VII gives the value and average unit price of Canada's field crops in 1933 and 1934.

TABLE VII. VALUE OF CANADIAN FIELD CROPS

| | 1934 | | 1933 | | |
|------------------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| | Value. | Price. | Av. Unit | Value. | Price. |
| Wheat | \$159,455 | \$0.58 | \$122,864 | \$0.46 | |
| Oats | 106,385 | 0.33 | 75,389 | 0.25 | |
| Barley | 26,944 | 0.42 | 16,520 | 0.26 | |
| Rye | 2,405 | 0.44 | 1,506 | 0.35 | |
| Peas | 1,686 | 1.04 | 1,371 | 1.00 | |
| Beans | 1,058 | 1.33 | 878 | 0.99 | |
| Buckwheat | 4,699 | 0.53 | 4,203 | 0.50 | |
| Mixed grains | 15,464 | 0.41 | 12,752 | 0.33 | |
| Flaxseed | 1,122 | 1.18 | 714 | 1.13 | |
| Corn for husking | 4,283 | 0.65 | 2,830 | 0.56 | |
| Potatoes | 23,833 | 0.49 | 33,092 | 0.77 | |
| Turnips, &c. | 12,057 | 0.30 | 11,878 | 0.34 | |
| Hay and clover | 131,221 | 11.76 | 94,300 | 8.24 | |
| Alfalfa | 16,886 | 12.76 | 13,534 | 8.19 | |
| Fodder corn | 15,804 | 4.14 | 9,599 | 3.07 | |
| Grain hay | 10,964 | 7.11 | 19,407 | 6.58 | |
| Sugar beets | 2,326 | 5.64 | 2,760 | 6.04 | |
| Total | \$536,499 | | \$423,597 | | |

Banks

The outstanding event in the banking field was the formation of a central bank, which will begin operations this

year. For a discussion of Canada's banks and the new central bank the reader is referred to the article "Canadian Banking; A System With No Losses to Depositors Since 1923" by Benjamin Haggott Beckhart, in THE ANNALIST of Dec. 21, 1934.

The Budget

Further progress toward a balanced budget was made during 1934. Table

1933 and 1932, respectively. It is interesting to note that while capital expenditure decreased, public works appropriations were increased to \$5,295,000 from \$3,170,000.

The Bond Market

One of the outstanding events of the year was the strength in the bond market, particularly the strength in government securities. As a result of cheap

on long-term Dominion bonds declined from about 4 1/2 per cent at the beginning of the year to 3 1/4 per cent at the close of the year. Medium-term bonds declined from slightly below 4 1/2 per cent to about 2 1/2 per cent, while short-term bonds declined from 4 per cent to slightly above 2 per cent.

TABLE VIII. CANADIAN PUBLIC FINANCE

(Millions of dollars)


*Ap.1-No. Ap.1-No. Ap.1-No. 30, 1934. 30, 1933. 30, 1932.

| | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|
| Total ordinary revenue | \$245.1 | \$216.9 | \$222.3 |
| Loan account and special receipts | 488.7 | 460.1 | 242.2 |
| Total receipts | \$733.8 | \$677.0 | \$464.5 |
| Total ordinary expenditure | 243.5 | 239.0 | 248.8 |
| Total special expenditure | 31.3 | 27.0 | 26.0 |
| Total capital expenditure and non-active loans | 6.8 | 8.6 | 12.7 |
| Total expenditure | \$281.5 | \$274.7 | \$287.5 |
| Total loans and advances | 81.8 | 37.1 | 58.5 |
| Redemption of debt | 418.6 | 332.8 | 61.3 |
| Grand total disbursements | \$781.9 | \$644.5 | \$407.3 |

*Subject to revision.

The Stock Market

The stock market failed to share the increased activity of the bond market. Stock price indices, however, closed the year at a higher level than in 1933. The monthly index of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics is 86.2 for December and compares with 90.7 for April, the high for the year, 81.3 for July, the low for the year, and 75.3 for December, 1933. The volume of trading showed a decrease of over 30 per cent. The daily stock indices compiled by the Toronto Stock Exchange show that gold stocks had the greatest rise of the year, while industrials increased slightly. The index of miscellaneous mines decreased sharply for most of the year. H. E. HANSEN.



VIII gives a summary of Canadian public finance for the first eight months of the current fiscal year compared with the corresponding periods in the 1934 and 1933 fiscal years. It will be noted that there is a surplus in the ordinary account of the first eight months of the current fiscal year, but this surplus was not sufficient to take care of special expenditure. Totaling ordinary and special expenditure, there was a deficit of \$29,700,000, as compared with deficits of \$49,100,000 and \$52,500,000 for the corresponding periods ended Nov. 30,

money and an accumulation of investment funds, bond prices rose steadily during the year. Little new financing for the improvement and extension of plants occurred, but it is possible that a continuation of present conditions will see an increase in this type of financing during the current year. Improved conditions and the effort of the Dominion Government in balancing the budget resulted in a sharp rise in government securities. This improvement was not restricted to Dominion loans but was also shared by Provincial loans. The yield

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| | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | |
|---|----------|--------------|---------|---------------------|---------|
| July. | \$18.40* | May | \$26.38 | March | \$12.34 |
| Aug. | 16.60 | June | 32.84 | April | 11.88 |
| Sept. | 3.22** | July | 33.76 | May | 10.30 |
| Oct. | 2.38** | Aug. | 30.08 | June | 6.88 |
| Nov. | 18.18 | Sept. | 30.60 | July | 7.40 |
| Dec. | 37.42 | Oct. | 27.56 | Aug. | 9.62 |
| Jan. (1932). | 33.80 | Nov. | 29.90 | Sept. | 15.44 |
| Feb. | 23.50 | Dec. | 28.82 | Oct. | 16.50 |
| March. | 15.62 | Jan. (1933). | 26.42 | Nov. | 16.78 |
| April. | 39.68 | Feb. | 18.64 | Dec. | 19.00 |
| *Initial. **Period of Military Shut In. | | | | | |
| | | | | Total..... \$823.38 | |

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World Recovery Continues in Face of Shrinking International Trade



FURTHER domestic recovery and continued stagnation of international trade marked the year 1934 for the world as a whole. World industrial production, outside of Russia and the United States, attained to within 10 per cent of the 1928 level, while the excessive stocks of basic commodities that have burdened the agricultural and raw-material-producing countries enjoyed further if moderate reduction. International trade, on the other hand, failed to show improvement in the first half of the year, and in the second sank lower; such satisfaction as its record affords must be found in the improvement in certain countries and the relative stability of world trade as a whole over the past two years.

While world conditions at the close of the year were on balance better than a year before, the outlook remained extremely cloudy, with a number of critical spots unresolved. Notable among these were the strain in the Gold Bloc, the German situation and the increasingly complex system of treaties and regulations that continue to block world trade. In addition, our own experiment in this country continued to intrude a large element of uncertainty.




TABLE I. WORLD COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (1928=100.0)

| | Industrial Production | International Trade | Basic Commodity Prices | Int'l. Prices |
|-------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| | Except Trade | nat'l. Values | Gold | Composite |
| 1933. | U.S. & Russia | U.S. & Russia | U.S. & Russia | U.S. & Russia |
| July | 86.1 | 82.7 | 36.1 | 177 |
| Aug. | 82.6 | 83.1 | 35.6 | 174 |
| Sept. | 79.3 | 83.2 | 35.1 | 170 |
| Oct. | 76.4 | 85.1 | 34.0 | 165 |
| Nov. | 74.8 | 85.6 | 35.2 | 168 |
| Dec. | 76.3 | 85.8 | 34.9 | 165 |
| 1934. | Jan. | 78.7 | 87.8 | 35.8 |
| | Feb. | 80.5 | 88.7 | 35.0 |
| | Mar. | 82.6 | 90.1 | 35.8 |
| | April | 83.4 | 90.9 | 34.2 |
| | May | 84.5 | 92.1 | 35.4 |
| | June | 83.1 | 92.2 | 35.1 |
| | July | 79.2 | 90.8 | 33.6 |
| | Aug. | 77.4 | 91.0 | 33.2 |
| | Sept. | 76.2 | 89.6 | 32.6 |
| | Oct. | 76.8 | 88.8 | 31.8 |
| | Nov. | 76.8 | 88.8 | 31.8 |

*Preliminary.

†Adjusted for seasonal variation.

For data, 1929-33, see Business Statistics section.

The world situation is summarized in the chart entitled "World Commerce and Finance," with supporting data from July, 1933, in Table I. For those who are interested in following these and the other series in this article for the light they throw on the world situation, back figures since 1929 are given in the Business Statistics section of this issue. Sub-

sequent figures for the various series will be published in The Annalist as they become available.

World industrial production advanced steadily during the first half of the year, as internal recovery proceeded in most of the industrial nations. For the world outside of Russia and the United States


with an actual decline in Germany (see chart, "Industrial Production in Leading Countries"). There is nothing evident as yet, however, to indicate that the recession in these countries is more than temporary.

The situation in the Gold Bloc is another tale. French production has de-

inasmuch as they have suffered most during the depression and have accounted for the bulk of the unemployment. It is noteworthy that recovery abroad has generally included a revival of this type of activity. This is conspicuously true in the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland. In France, on the other hand, where the production of consumption goods has been maintained, that of investment goods has declined steadily, and the economic life has suffered accordingly.

Stabilization of International Trade

International trade for the world as a whole (see chart, "World Commerce and Trade") not only failed to show signs of recovery during the past year but fell in the second half to new low levels for the depression, if allowance is made for the normal seasonal variations in the movement. The unadjusted figures showed an actual increase during the period, but the gain was considerably less than that which usually takes place. The relative stability of world trade during the past two years after the drastic decline of the years before indicates that a resistance point may have been reached and that the recent decline may prove only temporary.



industrial production had by June reached 92.2 per cent of the 1928 level, a gain of more than 30 per cent from the July, 1932, depression low of 70.8.

Industrial production had by June reached 92.2 per cent of the 1928 level, a gain of more than 30 per cent from the July, 1932, depression low of 70.8.


clined steadily since midsummer of 1933. Production in Italy (associated closely with the Gold Bloc, even if not strictly of it) rose in the Spring, after declining with France during the second half of 1933, but has since shown an uncertain trend. In Belgium and the Netherlands the tendency has been downward.

The deflationary effects of the struggle of the group to avoid devaluation are reflected not only in the retrogression of industrial activity and the steadily downward trend of their price level but also in the fall in foreign trade. The latter last year was some 6.3 per cent under 1933, according to preliminary figures (Table II and chart, "Foreign Trade in Leading Countries") which place the 1934 movement at 4,262 millions of old gold dollars for the group, against 4,550 in 1933.

Sufficient gold reserves are controlled by the group to make it unlikely that its members need be forced off the standard by actual gold drainage, with the possible exception of Italy where exchange control, official or otherwise, has been in effect for several years. How long they can withstand the relentless deflation forced on them by the steady recession of gold values is another question. A definite upturn in the price level would of course relieve the situation. In any event, 1935 should see the answer.

Increased Activity in Investment Goods

The importance of a revival in the production of investment and durable goods has recently been much stressed,



After last Summer a degree of recession developed, the foreign production index dropping to a preliminary 88.8 for October, the latest month available. The reaction reflected primarily the halting of the advance in the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada, together

The quarterly index of the physical volume of world trade, compiled by the League of Nations, has not only maintained its level during the past two years but has even risen. While its movements must be accepted with some reservation, it suggests that the easing off of the value of international trade during the past two years reflects primarily a further recession in the price level, rather than any contraction in the physical quantity of goods moved. This conclusion is borne out by the trend of the Annalist International Composite (shown on the first chart and based on the wholesale price indices of nine countries), which declined steadily if slowly until last Spring.

As between countries, the agricultural group made the best foreign trade record last year, just as in 1933, if by a good record is meant the checking of the 1930-32 decline rather than any actual recovery of trade. The 1934 trade of the seventeen leading agricultural and raw material countries was reported at only a small 1.3 per cent under 1933, or a preliminary 5,626 millions of old gold dollars, against 5,701 the year before (Table

II, and chart of "Foreign Trade of Leading Countries"). The Danube Basin and the British Dominions actually increased their trade, while Argentina and Brazil showed only a small loss, due chiefly to lower imports. China, hit by the deflationary effects of our silver price policy, was an outstanding exception, with a loss of 9.8 per cent.

The record for the industrial countries was less satisfactory, the eleven leading countries (Japan and Russia excluded) showing a decline of 4.0 per cent from a year ago, their 1934 movement being estimated at 12,788, against 13,314 in 1933. Besides the Gold Bloc, already noted, the countries chiefly responsible for the decline were Germany, in consequence of her nationalistic policies, and the United States as a result of currency depreciation and the reduction in the gold value of her trade. Japanese trade increased, while that of the U.S.S.R. dropped sharply, reflecting the progress in industrialization.

Recovery in the Industrial Countries

Conditions in the United States and Canada are reviewed in detail elsewhere in this issue. Suffice it to say, as regards the former, that despite the extreme irregularity of the movement, the trend has been on the whole upward, and that the primary element of uncertainty relates to governmental policies. Exports on a United States dollar basis have advanced sharply to 1931 levels, but on a gold basis have failed to show improvement from the 1933 low point; imports while higher on a domestic currency basis, in terms of gold have declined further. In terms of old gold dollars our 1934 merchandise balance of trade was about 323 millions, against 168 in 1933, as well as the highest since 1930, a condition that in view of our investments abroad hardly augurs well for stabilization of international monetary and financial relationships.

Canadian business has followed the fluctuations in this country on the whole, although far less violently, industrial production having recovered about half its decline from the 1928 level. Exports have run below a year ago in gold value, but much of the disparity is due to a second consecutive crop failure. Imports have advanced, reflecting the increased industrial activity and improved purchasing power.

Progress in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom conditions continued somewhat irregularly to improve, the Economist index of general business activity standing at 103.4 per cent of 1928 in October, against only 94.8 a year previous. Some hesitation has developed in recent months, but indications of an impending recession are lacking. Unemployment continued to fall, the number wholly unemployed standing at 1,776,000 in October, against 1,973,000 a year before and 2,295,000 in October, 1932; the improvement, if not spectacular, has been steady. Wholesale prices and the cost of living have remained stable, in part due to the slow sinking of the pound. Exports and imports have both advanced in paper value, though not in gold, and the adverse balance of trade has been reduced, thanks to the somewhat larger increase in exports. Security prices sagged off during the middle of the year, but have since steadied; their failure to advance further appears to reflect uncertainty as to how far the domestic upturn can continue in the absence of a more pronounced improvement in foreign markets than has yet occurred.

It may be noted that the improvement has been primarily in the construction industry and the newer manufacturing en-

terprises, including especially automobiles and rayon, while textiles and coal have continued to stagnate. Geographically speaking, it is the newer south of England that is enjoying the greatest improvement.




TABLE III—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

| | Business Activity | Wholesale Prices | Stock Prices | Imports | Exports | Foreign Trade | The Pound |
|---------|-------------------|------------------|--------------|---------|---------|---------------|-----------|
| 1928 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Dec. 21 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 1933 | 94.0 | 111.7 | 102.3 | 29.8 | 49.4 | 19.6 | 68.6 |
| July | 97.9 | 112.4 | 102.5 | 31.0 | 52.5 | 21.5 | 67.4 |
| Aug. | 97.5 | 113.5 | 103.0 | 32.2 | 54.4 | 22.2 | 64.6 |
| Sep. | 94.8 | 110.4 | 102.6 | 34.1 | 57.2 | 23.1 | 64.6 |
| Oct. | 98.5 | 107.7 | 102.8 | 34.4 | 60.1 | 25.7 | 66.2 |
| Nov. | 98.2 | 108.4 | 102.8 | 30.4 | 59.1 | 28.7 | 67.3 |
| Dec. | 103.3 | 113.8 | 104.6 | 31.6 | 60.6 | 29.0 | 65.4 |
| Jan. | 102.6 | 115.8 | 105.3 | 30.1 | 52.1 | 22.0 | 62.6 |
| Feb. | 102.9 | 116.2 | 103.8 | 33.1 | 56.6 | 23.5 | 62.3 |
| Mar. | 101.6 | 117.3 | 102.8 | 30.1 | 51.3 | 21.2 | 62.7 |
| Apr. | 99.7 | 115.9 | 102.4 | 32.8 | 56.9 | 24.1 | 62.1 |
| May | 105.1 | 114.5 | 103.6 | 32.1 | 56.9 | 24.8 | 61.6 |
| June | 100.6 | 112.9 | 103.4 | 33.2 | 53.9 | 20.7 | 61.6 |
| July | 104.6 | 111.6 | 105.3 | 32.1 | 56.7 | 24.6 | 61.2 |
| Aug. | 102.1 | 111.3 | 105.2 | 34.0 | 54.5 | 20.5 | 60.3 |
| Sep. | 103.4 | 112.5 | 104.1 | 36.7 | 63.1 | 28.3 | 60.0 |
| Oct. | 104.1 | 113.8 | 104.1 | 36.1 | 60.7 | 24.6 | 61.0 |
| Nov. | 104.4 | 114.3 | 104.3 | 34.3 | 59.7 | 25.4 | 60.4 |
| Dec. | 104.4 | 114.3 | 104.3 | 34.3 | 59.7 | 25.4 | 60.4 |


*Adjusted for seasonal variation.
For business activity, prices and the pound, 1929-33, see Business Statistics section.

The German Puzzle

In Germany industrial activity rose further during the first half of the year, reaching 89.5 per cent of the 1928 level in July. Subsequently, production slowed up somewhat, apparently in part because of difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies of imported raw materials. Prices have tended upward, indeed so much so for agricultural products in consequence of a bad crop, that the government has undertaken to fix maximum prices for a number of commodities in place of the minima formerly prevailing. Imports on a seasonally adjusted basis increased sharply during the Spring in anticipation of the more stringent restriction measures progressively adopted during the year, but by November had fallen back to 1933 levels. Exports meanwhile continued their decline and Germany faces a merchandise trade deficit (Table II) for the year for the first time since 1928.

The various clearing agreements have proved disappointing, tending not only to reduce the total volume of trade, but to destroy as well the favorable balances with the various countries concerned, since they actually operate to facilitate imports into Germany. The

high cost of long-term loans continued unrelieved, despite the low rates for short-term money; it remains to be seen what relief will be obtained from the new laws requiring all earnings above 8 per cent (or above 8, if the stocks have already been paying more than 6) to be turned over to the Gold Discount Bank for investment in government loans.



development of "substitute" industries to supply merchandise formerly imported will probably take up a considerable part of the slack. The future is extremely obscure, since an experiment in government control is being tried on a scale equaled in peace time only by that in Russia. A lowering of the standard of living appears inevitable. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the present outlook is for the increasing withdrawal of Germany as an active factor in international commercial and financial relations.

TABLE IV—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN GERMANY.

| | Industrial Production | Wholesale Prices | Foreign Trade (Million Marks) |
|---------|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1928 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Dec. 21 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 1933 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| July | 70.6 | 93.9 | 385 |
| Aug. | 70.7 | 94.2 | 412 |
| Sep. | 71.0 | 94.9 | 432 |
| Oct. | 71.9 | 95.7 | 445 |
| Nov. | 73.2 | 96.0 | 394 |
| Dec. | 75.1 | 96.2 | 424 |
| 1934 | 75.1 | 96.2 | 374 |
| Jan. | 79.1 | 96.3 | 349 |
| Feb. | 82.5 | 96.2 | 343 |
| Mar. | 84.2 | 95.9 | 401 |
| Apr. | 86.1 | 95.8 | 316 |
| May | 88.1 | 96.2 | 337 |
| June | 89.4 | 97.2 | 339 |
| July | 89.5 | 98.9 | 321 |
| Aug. | 86.7 | 100.1 | 334 |
| Sep. | 86.0 | 100.4 | 350 |
| Oct. | 86.3 | 101.0 | 366 |
| Nov. | 101.2 | 356 | 346 |

*Adjusted for seasonal variation.
For production and prices, 1929-33, see Business Statistics section.

Elsewhere on the Continent

The situation in France has already been discussed in connection with world industrial production and international trade. Improved sentiment has been aroused by the new Flandin ministry, but the deflation has continued unchecked to date. Unemployed totaled 375,000 in November, against 258,000 a

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[AGENTS EVERYWHERE]

year ago—a new record for the depression. Business activity, wholesale prices, foreign trade and stock prices have all continued to retrogress, although the decline in foreign trade has chiefly been in imports, to the benefit of the balance of trade. The new ministry has taken steps to terminate the subsidies to the wheat and wine producers, and has otherwise shown a readiness to face aggressively the economic realities, but can hardly do much to relieve the fundamental strain. The future remains uncertain.




TABLE V—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN FRANCE.

| 1933. | 1913 | Industrial Production | | Wholesale Prices | | Foreign Trade | |
|-------|------|-----------------------|-------|------------------|------|---------------|------|
| | | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 |
| July | 88.2 | 401 | 1,466 | 2,212 | 746 | 100 | 100 |
| Aug. | 87.4 | 397 | 1,451 | 2,141 | 690 | 98 | 98 |
| Sep. | 86.6 | 397 | 1,590 | 2,154 | 564 | 96 | 96 |
| Oct. | 85.0 | 397 | 1,672 | 2,225 | 553 | 94 | 94 |
| Nov. | 84.3 | 403 | 1,683 | 2,289 | 606 | 92 | 92 |
| Dec. | 83.5 | 407 | 1,616 | 2,299 | 683 | 90 | 90 |
| Jan. | 83.5 | 405 | 1,512 | 2,303 | 791 | 88 | 88 |
| Feb. | 82.7 | 400 | 1,512 | 2,063 | 551 | 86 | 86 |
| Mar. | 81.9 | 394 | 1,489 | 2,291 | 802 | 84 | 84 |
| Apr. | 81.1 | 387 | 1,470 | 2,035 | 565 | 82 | 82 |
| May | 79.5 | 381 | 1,365 | 1,959 | 594 | 80 | 80 |
| June | 87.0 | 379 | 1,451 | 1,964 | 513 | 78 | 78 |
| July | 77.2 | 374 | 1,351 | 1,714 | 363 | 76 | 76 |
| Aug. | 76.4 | 371 | 1,391 | 1,672 | 281 | 74 | 74 |
| Sep. | 74.8 | 365 | 1,518 | 1,653 | 135 | 72 | 72 |
| Oct. | 74.0 | 357 | 1,565 | 1,795 | 230 | 70 | 70 |
| Nov. | 356 | — | — | — | — | 68 | 68 |

*Adjusted for seasonal variation. For production and prices, 1929-33, see Business Statistics section.

In Italy industrial activity has been maintained, despite some irregularity, at levels above a year ago; prices have been fairly firm, while unemployment declined to 970,000 in November, from 1,066,000 a year before. On the other hand, foreign trade has deteriorated, exports declining steadily, to the detriment of the balance of trade, since imports were little changed. The balance of trade was adverse by about 119 millions of old gold dollars in 1934, against 75 millions in 1933. Gold reserves have shrunk steadily throughout the year, the Banca d'Italia's gold holdings falling to 5,840 million lire in November from 7,082 a year

ago. The lira throughout much of 1934 has ranged between 3 and 4 per cent below par. Italy has had finally to replace the former unofficial control by severe exchange regulations in the effort to maintain the parity of her currency. Until gold prices cease to fall, however, it is difficult to see where she will find relief short of devaluation.




TABLE VI—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN ITALY.

| 1933. | 1913 | Industrial Production | | Wholesale Prices | | Foreign Trade | |
|-------|------|-----------------------|-------|------------------|------|---------------|------|
| | | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 |
| July | 88.2 | 401 | 1,466 | 2,212 | 746 | 100 | 100 |
| Aug. | 87.4 | 397 | 1,451 | 2,141 | 690 | 98 | 98 |
| Sep. | 86.6 | 397 | 1,590 | 2,154 | 564 | 96 | 96 |
| Oct. | 85.0 | 397 | 1,672 | 2,225 | 553 | 94 | 94 |
| Nov. | 84.3 | 403 | 1,683 | 2,289 | 606 | 92 | 92 |
| Dec. | 83.5 | 407 | 1,616 | 2,299 | 683 | 90 | 90 |
| Jan. | 83.5 | 405 | 1,512 | 2,303 | 791 | 88 | 88 |
| Feb. | 82.7 | 400 | 1,512 | 2,063 | 551 | 86 | 86 |
| Mar. | 81.9 | 394 | 1,489 | 2,291 | 802 | 84 | 84 |
| Apr. | 81.1 | 387 | 1,470 | 2,035 | 565 | 82 | 82 |
| May | 79.5 | 381 | 1,365 | 1,959 | 594 | 80 | 80 |
| June | 87.0 | 379 | 1,451 | 1,964 | 513 | 78 | 78 |
| July | 77.2 | 374 | 1,351 | 1,714 | 363 | 76 | 76 |
| Aug. | 76.4 | 371 | 1,391 | 1,672 | 281 | 74 | 74 |
| Sep. | 74.8 | 365 | 1,518 | 1,653 | 135 | 72 | 72 |
| Oct. | 74.0 | 357 | 1,565 | 1,795 | 230 | 70 | 70 |
| Nov. | 356 | — | — | — | — | 68 | 68 |

*Adjusted for seasonal variation. For production and prices, 1929-33, see Business Statistics section.

| 1933. | 1913 | Industrial Production | | Wholesale Prices | | Foreign Trade | |
|-------|------|-----------------------|-------|------------------|------|---------------|------|
| | | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 |
| July | 88.2 | 401 | 1,466 | 2,212 | 746 | 100 | 100 |
| Aug. | 87.4 | 397 | 1,451 | 2,141 | 690 | 98 | 98 |
| Sep. | 86.6 | 397 | 1,590 | 2,154 | 564 | 96 | 96 |
| Oct. | 85.0 | 397 | 1,672 | 2,225 | 553 | 94 | 94 |
| Nov. | 84.3 | 403 | 1,683 | 2,289 | 606 | 92 | 92 |
| Dec. | 83.5 | 407 | 1,616 | 2,299 | 683 | 90 | 90 |
| Jan. | 83.5 | 405 | 1,512 | 2,303 | 791 | 88 | 88 |
| Feb. | 82.7 | 400 | 1,512 | 2,063 | 551 | 86 | 86 |
| Mar. | 81.9 | 394 | 1,489 | 2,291 | 802 | 84 | 84 |
| Apr. | 81.1 | 387 | 1,470 | 2,035 | 565 | 82 | 82 |
| May | 79.5 | 381 | 1,365 | 1,959 | 594 | 80 | 80 |
| June | 87.0 | 379 | 1,451 | 1,964 | 513 | 78 | 78 |
| July | 77.2 | 374 | 1,351 | 1,714 | 363 | 76 | 76 |
| Aug. | 76.4 | 371 | 1,391 | 1,672 | 281 | 74 | 74 |
| Sep. | 74.8 | 365 | 1,518 | 1,653 | 135 | 72 | 72 |
| Oct. | 74.0 | 357 | 1,565 | 1,795 | 230 | 70 | 70 |
| Nov. | 356 | — | — | — | — | 68 | 68 |

*Adjusted for seasonal variation. For production and prices, 1929-33, see Business Statistics section.

internal situation but on the policy of the government. The decline in her foreign trade has already been noted; for Russia, unlike the rest of the world, this suggests improvement internally.

Japan

Expansion continued in Japan during 1934, but at a somewhat lower pace than the year before. Production and foreign trade rose to new heights for the depression. The yen depreciated further, without raising wholesale prices: in November it averaged only 34.7 per cent of its old parity.

Part of the decline of the yen undoubtedly reflects the pressure of rayon competition and dollar depreciation on the silk market in the United States, part the effort to gain trade advantages in foreign markets. Japan is dependent to a large extent on foreign sources for her raw materials, increased costs for which are now offsetting to an appreciable extent the benefits for her exports of the lower yen.

stimulating, but the growing deficit has raised doubts as to the soundness of the expansion and contributed to the break in stock prices in the late Summer and early Fall. The government budget constitutes at the present moment the weak spot in the Japanese structure.

The Agricultural Countries

For the agricultural and raw-material countries few statistics exist similar to those available for measuring conditions in the industrial nations, beyond the foreign trade movement and the price trend. Basic commodity stocks have shown a generally downward trend from their peak in 1932, although the improvement has been greater for raw materials than for foodstuffs. Prices have tended to be stabilized. The foreign trade of these countries, as already noted, was only slightly under 1933. Reports generally indicate further internal improvement, with the exception of China.

The Future of International Trade

It is hardly possible to do more than note the outpouring of treaties and regulations regarding foreign trade and exchange that has continued unchecked during 1934. Practically, despite the championship of Secretary Hull, the most-favored-nation clause is fast approaching complete ineffectiveness, nullified by quotas, exchange allocations, minute tariff classifications and a hundred other devices by which hard-pressed nations have sought to protect their interests. We are fast returning to a world governed by special agreements.

The definite lifting of the depression would undoubtedly result in many of the restrictions being removed. It is nevertheless questionable whether we can look for the restoration of the freedom of trade between nations that existed before the war.

That system was based on an integrated international economy co-existing with political nationalism. The war left the latter dominant and the twenty ensuing years of economic dislocation have only strengthened the currents of nationalism and the determination of each country to become self-sufficient.

The depression aggravated the movement, but hardly caused it. Long before the depression the industrial nations of Europe were endeavoring to expand their agriculture. Whether rising tariffs against the products of the agricultural and raw-material-producing countries are the chief cause of the increasing industrialization of the latter, in any event they contributed heavily; the movement is newer in them, but not apparently the less fundamental.

The consequence may well be the increasing elimination from international trade of the more highly standardized articles of machine production, of which textiles are the present most conspicuous example. Such merchandise will always be traded in between countries, but international trade is likely to become increasingly concentrated upon specialty goods, whether raw materials or finished manufactures.

Such a development would mean the end of the geographical distribution of labor as we have known it in the past. It could hardly take place without a severe lowering of the standard of living throughout much of the world. The non-European agricultural exporting countries would suffer with the others, as their whole economy and standards of living are built around their export markets. So long, however, as the present nationalistic forces dominate the economic system, a return to the old pre-war world of relative freedom of trade between nations seems improbable.

WINTHROP W. CASE.

TABLE VIII—ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN JAPAN.

| 1933. | 1913 | Industrial Production | | Wholesale Prices | | Foreign Trade | |
|-------|-------|-----------------------|-------|------------------|-------|---------------|------|
| | | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 | 1928 | 1913 |
| July | 132.3 | 137.6 | 156.1 | 138.4 | +17.7 | 41.4 | 100 |
| Aug. | 135.1 | 136.0 | 180.8 | 128.1 | +52.7 | 39.3 | 100 |
| Sep. | 134.6 | 137.8 | 178.3 | 132.1 | +46.2 | 36.8 | 100 |
| Oct. | 135.3 | 136.3 | 169.0 | 136.8 | +32.2 | 37.5 | 100 |
| Nov. | 138.1 | 135.0 | 161.6 | 167.1 | -5.5 | 38.1 | 100 |
| Dec. | 141.2 | 132.6 | 170.2 | 182.2 | -12.0 | 39.5 | 100 |
| Jan. | 140.1 | 132.6 | 126.2 | 142.8 | -16.6 | 38.1 | 100 |
| Feb. | 136.7 | 134.1 | 156.6 | 174.7 | -18.1 | 36.2 | 100 |
| Mar. | 137.6 | 133.7 | 173.7 | 204.8 | -31.1 | 35.8 | 100 |
| Apr. | 139.0 | 133.7 | 162.5 | 206.2 | -43.7 | 36.0 | 100 |
| May | 143.1 | 133.1 | 185 | 216.5 | -27.9 | 35.9 | 100 |
| June | 142.9 | 131.9 | 178.9 | 196.6 | -17.7 | 35.6 | 100 |
| July | 144.0 | 131.6 | 176.8 | 167.1 | +9.7 | 35.6 | 100 |
| Aug. | 144.0 | 133.7 | 206.4 | 179.7 | +26.7 | 35.4 | 100 |
| Sep. | 141.4 | 135.4 | 167.6 | 152.5 | +15.1 | 35.1 | 100 |
| Oct. | 137.4 | 137.4 | 201.5 | 177.9 | +24.0 | 34.0 | 100 |
| Nov. | 136.8 | 137.4 | 197.0 | 184.0 | +13.0 | 34.7 | 100 |

U. S. Exports Rise in 1934 With World Recovery; Imports Up Moderately



THE foreign commerce of the United States in 1934 was marked by further recovery in exports, reflecting to some extent the depreciation of the dollar, but more especially the progress of revival in most other parts of the world. Imports rose and fell with the fluctuation in domestic business, averaging for the year considerably above the year before.

Exports for 1934 are estimated at 2,152 millions of dollars (Table I and chart), against 1,675 in 1933, 1,611 in 1932, 2,424 in 1931 and 5,241 millions in 1929. How much of the increase in 1934 was due to the devaluation in the dollar and the resulting rise in prices for much of the merchandise exported is not easy to determine; if the monthly exports are converted to old gold dollars on the basis of average exchange rates prevailing in France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, the 1934 total becomes 1,285 millions, against 1,299 in 1933, thus forming a new low for the depression. Because of the large possibilities of error inherent in such a conversion, the value of the comparison is somewhat limited. It does suggest, however, that so far as the rest of the world is concerned our exports were not much greater than in 1933, even though our exporters received a much larger number of paper dollars therefor.

In this connection the export volume index of the Department of Commerce is of interest. This index indicates a physical volume of exports of 74 per cent of the 1923-25 level during January-October, 1934, compared with 66 during the same months in 1933, or an increase of somewhat over 12 per cent. The increase for the entire year is likely to be somewhat less, however, since the volume for the last two months of 1934 appears to have fallen off. The apparently contradictory findings of this index and of the change in the gold export value show the difficulty of attempting to determine what is really happening to our foreign trade, on the basis of current statistics. The dis-

biles are an outstanding example. The average value of the passenger cars exported in January to October, 1934, was \$551, against \$488 in the first ten months of 1933, an increase of 13 per cent. The average unit value of trucks exported in the same period was \$475 for 1934, against \$453 for 1933, an increase of 5 per cent. As the appreciation of the old gold dollar was far greater than either of these percentages, the unit value of these exports in terms of gold decreased.

could have been increased proportionately by a similar price policy is dubious. Our manufactures go for the most part to non-European countries where the tariff and other restrictions on merchandise of this kind, although increasing, are still relatively light. Our agricultural exports, on the other hand, go primarily to Europe, where the protection of the farmer has been a national policy for a considerable period. In these countries quotas and similar meas-

This was to have been expected, since recovery has been proceeding longest in these countries, and their international trade has shown the most signs of revival. Exports to Latin America increased 44.7 per cent (Table I); Canada 46.5 per cent, to Australia 69.7 per cent. Exports to Asia increased 41.8 per cent. Here Japan contributed the larger part of the gain; her increase in industrial activity, and consequently in import requirements, has been phenomenal.

European imports of American merchandise, on the other hand, increased only 17.7 per cent, or considerably less than the appreciation of the old gold dollar. The United Kingdom increased its purchases by 32.5 per cent, on account of the general improvement in internal conditions and the absence of a protectionist policy seriously affecting United States products.

Exports to Russia, although 68.6 per cent above 1933, were only nominal by comparison with predepression years. The hopes of those who saw great trade opportunities in our recognition of Russia must apparently continue to wait on a settlement of the debt and credit problems.

Exports to Germany, after increasing in 1933, dropped sharply last year, with a loss of 17.6 per cent from the year before. The decrease reflected the nationalistic policies of the Reich, the strict regulation of imports into Germany because of exchange difficulties, hostility to the United States on account of its more or less effective boycott (our imports from Germany declined 10.8 per cent), and especially the German efforts to effect a closer balancing of the trade with those countries that, like the United States, have been accustomed to sell more to her than they buy from her.

The gold bloc, including Italy, showed an increase of only 6.4 per cent in their imports from us, or, in terms of their own currencies, a considerable loss.

Exports of foodstuffs increased but



This reduction in cost to the foreign purchaser is closely related to the spectacular increase in the volume of American automobiles sold abroad, approximately 238,000 cars and trucks having been exported in 1934, against 108,100 in 1933. While the general improvement in foreign economic conditions also played an important part in the increase, this extraordinary rise of 120 per cent (Table II) to the highest volume since 1930 and probably since 1929 undoubtedly reflects to a large extent the lowering of prices in terms of gold.

ures of import control have been developed to a high degree of effectiveness, and a drastic reduction of prices would increase the volume sold to only a moderate degree.

Non-European Countries Show Most Recovery as Markets for America

On the whole, our exports to the agricultural and raw-material countries showed the greatest increase over 1933.

Table I. United States Foreign Trade With Leading Countries
(In millions of U. S. dollars, re-exports included with exports; as reported by the Department of Commerce)

| | Exports | | | | | Imports | | | | | P. C. Chg. 1933 to 1934 |
|--------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|---------|---------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------------------------------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1929. | 1934. | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1929. | 1934. | |
| Europe | | | | | | | | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 1,001 | 850 | 784 | 2,341 | + 17.7 | 490 | 462 | 389 | 1,333 | + 7.4 | |
| France | 354 | 312 | 288 | 848 | + 32.5 | 116 | 111 | 75 | 330 | + 4.6 | |
| Germany | 113 | 122 | 112 | 266 | - 3.3 | 65 | 50 | 45 | 171 | + 20.6 | |
| Italy | 115 | 140 | 134 | 410 | + 17.6 | 70 | 78 | 74 | 255 | + 10.8 | |
| U. S. S. R. [†] | 67 | 61 | 49 | 154 | + 10.2 | 35 | 39 | 42 | 177 | - 8.7 | |
| Canada | 15 | 9 | 12 | 82 | + 68.6 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 22 | + 7.3 | |
| Latin America | 309 | 211 | 241 | 948 | + 46.5 | 233 | 185 | 174 | 503 | + 26.1 | |
| Cuba | 45 | 25 | 29 | 129 | + 79.1 | 68 | 58 | 58 | 207 | + 16.7 | |
| Mexico | 56 | 38 | 32 | 134 | + 49.5 | 37 | 31 | 37 | 118 | + 21.1 | |
| Argentina | 43 | 37 | 31 | 210 | + 18.3 | 27 | 34 | 16 | 118 | - 18.1 | |
| Brazil | 43 | 30 | 29 | 109 | + 42.4 | 95 | 83 | 82 | 208 | + 14.0 | |
| Colombia | 22 | 15 | 11 | 49 | + 51.0 | 48 | 48 | 61 | 104 | + 1.0 | |
| Asia | 414 | 292 | 292 | 643 | + 41.8 | 509 | 426 | 362 | 1,280 | + 19.4 | |
| Japan | 214 | 143 | 135 | 259 | + 49.5 | 121 | 128 | 134 | 432 | - 5.2 | |
| China [‡] | 86 | 61 | 66 | 144 | + 40.2 | 50 | 42 | 30 | 178 | + 20.7 | |
| British Malaya | 4 | 2 | 2 | 15 | + 83.8 | 117 | 60 | 35 | 239 | + 94.9 | |
| Philippines | 18 | 45 | 45 | 86 | + 6.9 | 90 | 93 | 81 | 126 | - 3.7 | |
| Australia | 44 | 26 | 27 | 150 | + 69.7 | 9 | 8 | 5 | 32 | + 15.1 | |
| World | 2,152 | 1,675 | 1,611 | 5,241 | + 28.5 | 1,678 | 1,449 | 1,323 | 4,399 | + 15.8 | |
| Balance of trade | 474 | 226 | 288 | 842 | + 109.7 | | | | | | |

[†]1934 estimated from first eleven months; 1933 subject to revision. [‡]U. S. S. R. in Europe only. [†]Including Hongkong.

crepancy appears to be explainable by the fact that while the physical volume of exports actually did increase, their gold value did not change proportionately; the prices of many commodities were readjusted to a gold basis, but those of a large number of others were not, with the consequence that an increase in their volume has been offset by the lower unit prices received in terms of gold.

This is particularly true of our exports of manufactured goods, of which automo-

It will be noted from Table II that our exports of manufactured goods increased 43 to 45 per cent over 1933, although raw material and foodstuff shipments rose but 12 to 13. It is highly probable that the greater gain for our manufactures reflected in part this same failure of prices to advance proportionately to the decline in the dollar (although here again the foreign revival was also an important factor).

Whether our agricultural exports



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This is the combined experience of these executives, gained in managing many prominent hotels in America and Europe.

That this group has built a background of experience which appeals to the Hotel Public was demonstrated recently by the unparalleled acceptance of the New Hotel Delano of New York. Opened to the public for the first time in May 1934, this hotel is now over 95% occupied. (Taken from a Certified Public Accountant's report).

An actual performance of this kind is the greatest proof of the efficiency of this organization and shows a remarkable following of guests established over many years.

THE CAMBRIDGE
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12.7 per cent and were again exceeded in value by the group of semi-manufactured goods, which they had exceeded by a generous margin prior to 1933. Considering the world attitude on the matter of agricultural protectionism, little more was to be expected. Certainly any real revival in trade of this class seems unlikely, regardless of our efforts to negotiate trade agreements, while nationalistic policies prevail abroad.

Exports of crude materials, in which cotton and tobacco account for three-quarters, held up better, and in domestic dollar value were the highest since 1930.

Imports and Domestic Business Activity

Imports for 1934 are estimated at 1,678 millions of dollars, against 1,449 in 1933, 1,323 in 1932, 2,091 in 1931 and 4,399 in 1929. As will be seen from the chart, the year was marked by greater fluctuations than took place in exports, on account of the fluctuations in business conditions and prospects in this country and the consequent variations in demand.

The import gains were widely distributed, France, Canada, Cuba (sugar), Mexico, Brazil (coffee), China and British Malaya (rubber) in particular sending up more goods. On the other hand, losses from 1933 were reported for Germany, Italy, Argentina, Japan and the Philippines. Imports of bananas, furs, crude rubber, newsprint and copper increased sharply, while purchases abroad of sugar, hides and skins, raw silk and tin showed material losses.

The Depreciation of the Dollar and the Balance of Trade

The net effects to date of the devaluation of the dollar upon our foreign trade are not altogether clear. The greater proportionate rise in exports than in imports, or, conversely, the maintenance of exports in terms of gold values while imports sank steadily, is in accord with the theory of the advantages supposed to be derived from the depreciation of the currency. Because the trend of imports is so dependent on the course of business activity in this country and because both have suffered violent oscillations during the past two years, it is however difficult to answer definitively just how much of the relative gain of exports was due to this cause. It was without question a material factor, although the permanence of the advantage is open to doubt.

In any case, it is not easy to see where the increase of our export balance to

474 millions of dollars in 1934 from 226 in 1933, 288 in 1932, and 333 in 1931 is a cause for satisfaction. What we need for stable international trade and financial relations is a smaller balance—indeed, an unfavorable one—rather than a larger one, unless we are prepared to write off the bulk of our foreign investments.

The Cuban Treaty

The present administration has shown greater readiness than previous ones to recognize the fact that large export balances are not necessarily unmixed blessings, and has even shown disposition to apply it. The only result of their efforts to date is the Cuban treaty, signed last August. That treaty provided on

at the same time on a quota basis), and for seasonal duty reductions on fresh fruits and vegetables. Cuba in turn granted a large number of concessions, including substantial reductions on tariff rates on foodstuffs and many other American agricultural and industrial products.

The effect of the signing of the treaty upon Cuban-American trade has been prompt, so far as our exports are concerned. September exports to Cuba were 130.2 per cent above a year ago (Table III), against 73.2 in August and 20.6 in July; in October they were 188.6 per cent higher and in November 110.1. Imports failed to benefit correspondingly, partly because sugar, the chief export, is on a quota basis. November imports

proposed and negotiations undertaken with Haiti, Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Finland. Unfortunately for any benefits to our export trade, we are still subscribers to the most-favored-nation doctrine. We are, therefore, obligated to extend to all other countries with whom we have most-favored-nation agreements all tariff concessions made to any country, regardless of whether we receive any concessions in return. Obviously, our bargaining position is somewhat difficult if the recipient of our concessions knows that these same concessions will automatically be granted other nations as well.

TABLE III.—U. S. FOREIGN TRADE WITH CUBA

| | Per Cent Change from Previous Year |
|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Exports to Cuba. | from Cuba. |
| 1923 | |
| November | + 12.8 + 38.2 |
| December | - 2.2 - 6.0 |
| 1934. | |
| January | + 25.9 |
| February | + 31.4 |
| March | + 10.8 |
| April | + 84.3 |
| May | + 86.1 |
| June | + 47.5 |
| July | + 20.6 + 2.9 |
| August | + 73.2 + 18.0 |
| September | + 130.2 + 10.0 |
| October | + 188.6 - 9.2 |
| November | + 110.1 + 81.6 |

The attempt is to be made in the negotiations with the countries above-named to confine our concessions to those commodities that are supplied chiefly by the other country. Such commodities are for the most part not produced in this country—rubber, tin, coffee, bananas, &c.—and are not at present subject to a duty. Consequently, even for these we have little to offer, beyond a promise not to impose a tariff which we have no desire to do in any event. It is difficult to see what can be done along this line so long as we still insist upon the most-favored-nation doctrine.

Secretary Hull's championship of the doctrine is admirable, but comes from this country a little late. Other nations that have followed our lead in raising tariff schedules during the past decade are hardly likely to reverse their position at this time. Something might be done with tariff-bargaining in the absence of the doctrine, but the two together are incompatible. In any event, if all that such negotiations seek to do is to increase our export balance of trade, we could well do without them.

WINTHROP W. CASE.

Table II. Exports and Imports of Selected Commodities. (In millions; as reported by the Department of Commerce)

| Domestic Exports: | Unit. | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. | 1931. | 1930. | 1929. | 1933 to 1934. | P.C. Chge |
|------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|-----------|
| Crude materials | \$ | 662.4 | 590.6 | 513.7 | 566.8 | 829.1 | 1,142.4 | + 12.2 | |
| Foodstuffs | \$ | 228.7 | 203.0 | 241.5 | 373.9 | 541.2 | 753.9 | + 12.7 | |
| Semi-manufactures | \$ | 343.9 | 237.0 | 196.7 | 317.6 | 512.8 | 729.0 | + 45.1 | |
| Finished mfrs. | \$ | 881.2 | 616.6 | 624.2 | 1,119.7 | 1,898.1 | 2,531.8 | + 42.9 | |
| Total | \$ | 2,116.2 | 1,647.2 | 1,576.2 | 2,378.0 | 3,781.2 | 5,157.1 | + 28.5 | |
| Meat products | lb. | 254.0 | 231.4 | 191.0 | 253.3 | 380.3 | 445.5 | + 9.8 | |
| Lard (exc. neutral) | lb. | 445.0 | 579.1 | 546.2 | 568.7 | 642.5 | 829.3 | - 23.2 | |
| Wheat and flour | bu. | 36.6 | 27.5 | 82.1 | 125.7 | 149.2 | 154.3 | + 33.1 | |
| Fruits and products | \$ | 74.6 | 67.6 | 76.5 | 108.2 | 109.7 | 136.0 | + 10.4 | |
| Leaf tobacco | lb. | 453.5 | 420.4 | 387.8 | 503.5 | 561.0 | 555.3 | + 7.9 | |
| Raw cotton | bale | 5.8 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 6.5 | 7.4 | - 31.0 | |
| Cotton manufactures | \$ | 34.2 | 31.8 | 36.2 | 50.3 | 73.7 | 111.2 | + 7.5 | |
| Coal and coke | ton | \$12.0 | 9.6 | 9.6 | 13.1 | 17.4 | 19.7 | + 25.0 | |
| Crude petroleum | bbi. | 41.3 | 36.6 | 27.4 | 25.5 | 23.7 | 26.4 | + 12.8 | |
| Gasoline | bbi. | 31.3 | 26.0 | 25.4 | 30.2 | 46.3 | 57.2 | + 20.4 | |
| Lubricating oil | bbi. | 7.8 | 8.1 | 6.7 | 8.0 | 9.8 | 10.7 | - 3.7 | |
| Copper | lb. | 648.6 | 349.7 | 328.4 | 557.9 | 753.3 | 998.5 | + 85.6 | |
| Automobiles | No. | 238.0 | 108.1 | 66.4 | 130.7 | 237.6 | 536.2 | + 120.2 | |
| Other machinery | \$ | 246.5 | 146.1 | 146.0 | 337.8 | 552.7 | 661.5 | + 68.7 | |
| Iron and steel | ton | 3.0 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | + 120.5 | |
| Total imports : | | | | | | | | | |
| Crude materials | \$ | 473.7 | 418.2 | 358.3 | 642.2 | 1,002.2 | 1,558.6 | + 13.3 | |
| Foodstuffs | \$ | 518.4 | 416.9 | 406.9 | 527.1 | 693.5 | 962.2 | + 24.3 | |
| Semi-manufactures | \$ | 313.7 | 292.0 | 217.0 | 372.0 | 608.2 | 885.1 | + 7.4 | |
| Finished mfrs. | \$ | 351.7 | 322.2 | 340.6 | 549.3 | 757.0 | 993.5 | + 9.2 | |
| Total | \$ | 1,657.5 | 1,449.2 | 1,322.8 | 2,090.6 | 3,060.9 | 4,399.4 | + 14.4 | |
| Bananas (f.) | bunch | 47.3 | 39.6 | 49.5 | 55.9 | 62.7 | 65.1 | + 19.4 | |
| Coffee (f.) | lb. | 1,562.0 | 1,586.3 | 1,501.1 | 1,741.5 | 1,599.3 | 1,482.3 | - 1.5 | |
| Cane sugar (d.) | lb. | 5,550.0 | 5,748.2 | 4,941.4 | 6,350.7 | 6,988.3 | 9,776.8 | + 3.4 | |
| Hides and skins (fd.) | lb. | 198.0 | 340.0 | 190.2 | 271.7 | 399.9 | 515.7 | + 41.8 | |
| Furs, undressed (f.) | lb. | 38.9 | 33.3 | 25.1 | 47.9 | 57.6 | 108.0 | + 16.8 | |
| Raw silk (f.) | lb. | 59.9 | 67.2 | 74.1 | 83.9 | 73.7 | 87.1 | - 10.9 | |
| Crude rubber (f.) | lb. | 1,082.6 | 938.3 | 928.9 | 1,124.0 | 1,089.8 | 1,262.9 | + 15.4 | |
| Paper base stocks (f.) | lb. | 70.8 | 65.3 | 54.4 | 75.2 | 106.9 | 118.1 | + 8.4 | |
| Newsprint (f.) | lb. | 4,339.0 | 3,587.1 | 3,582.3 | 4,133.8 | 4,559.3 | 4,845.4 | + 21.0 | |
| Crude petroleum (d.) | bbi. | 31.7 | 31.9 | 44.7 | 47.2 | 62.1 | 78.9 | - 0.6 | |
| Copper (d.) | lb. | 407.2 | 287.4 | 392.0 | 585.9 | 817.2 | 974.3 | + 41.7 | |
| Tin, refined (f.) | lb. | 97.0 | 140.8 | 78.0 | 148.0 | 180.8 | 195.2 | - 31.1 | |

*1934 estimated from first eleven months; 1933 subject to revision. †Less imports. ‡Thousands of individual units. §Estimated from first ten months. ||Not including bonded; estimated from first ten months. ||Imports for consumption only, in 1934; same as total imports for duty-free merchandise. (f) Duty-free. (d) Dutiable. (fd) Partly dutiable.

the one hand for the reduction of our tariff on Cuban sugar by 0.6 cent a pound, for lower duties on rum, for reduced tariffs on cigar leaf tobacco, cigars and cheroots (these being placed

from Cuba were, nevertheless, 81.6 per cent above a year ago, and it is probable that subsequent months will show improved trade also.

Similar reciprocal treaties have been

Commodity Prices Up in 1934 on Drought and AAA; World Price Level Steady

COMMODITY prices advanced further in 1934, continuing the trend upward inaugurated the year before, when the United States abandoned the gold standard. While the rise during the first two months of the year reflected primarily the depreciation of the dollar, the greater part of the advance, unlike that in 1933, was independent of currency manipulations and was due rather to the drought and crop failure.

The average gain in prices, as measured by THE ANNALIST Index of Wholesale Commodity Prices, amounted to 15.2 per cent from Jan. 2 to Dec. 31, the index rising to 120.0 (1913=100.0) from 104.2 (Table I and chart). This gain was considerably greater than the appreciation of the old gold dollar in terms of current United States money, since the old dollar rose but 6.2 per cent during the period.



Even on a gold basis, consequently, THE ANNALIST index advanced, rising 8.5 per cent to 71.2 from 65.6.

The year fell roughly into six parts. During January and February the price level advanced steadily in terms of domestic currency as the dollar declined toward its new 59.06-cent par, prices on a gold basis showing little change. After stabilization of the dollar on Jan. 31 and the settling of exchange rates to the new basis, commodity prices marked time. In May and June a sharp advance took place as the drought assumed serious proportions. Its temporary breaking brought a relapse of prices at the end of June, after which they again marked time until well into August. Then the far-reaching character of the drought damage became really apparent and prices again advanced, this time to the

year's high point of 120.8 on Sept. 4. In September they fell back somewhat under the pressure of distress marketings of drought livestock. By the end of the month, however, the worst of this was past, and during the remaining two months the short supplies of grain and the sharply reduced numbers of cattle and hogs operated increasingly to raise the price level. THE ANNALIST index advanced steadily during this period to close at the year-end at 120.0, only slightly below the Sept. 4 high and except for that month the highest since 1930.

Diversity of Individual Price Movements

Movements of price indices are normally the result of divergent movements of the individual components. This was true of the price structure during the

past year. At one extreme was to be found the farm products group (Table I), which advanced 33.8 per cent during the year in consequence of the drought, and the food products group, which rose 19.0 per cent from much the same cause. At the other extreme the textile group declined 9.2 per cent, in part because of the restrictive effects on consumption of both the cotton processing tax and the increase in mill costs under the NRA.

Among the individual commodities the divergencies were even greater. Cottonseed oil sold on Dec. 31 at 9 1/2 cents, compared with only 3% on Jan. 2, a gain of 181.5 per cent that reflected principally the restricted cotton crop and the curtailed production of lard. On the other hand, worsted yarn sold at only \$1.33% at the end of the year, a decrease of 19.5 per cent from the year's opening price of \$1.66%, due in considerable measure to the government's attempt to peg wool prices at unwarranted levels.

While a great many influences deter-

mined the individual price movements, the most important single factor was beyond question the drought. The nine commodities in Table I showing the greatest percentage gains for the year, owe their gains to that cause.

Most of the rest of the farm products, especially those showing actual losses for the year, had made particularly large gains in 1933, frequently as a result of the NRA and AAA, the advances subsequently proving to be too large to be maintained.

TABLE I.—COMMODITY PRICE CHANGES IN 1934

(In terms of United States dollars; in cases of high and low prices, averages are used; for full descriptions of commodities, place where quoted, see weekly table of Spot Prices of Important Commodities.)

| | Dec. 31, 1934 | Jan. 2, 1935 | Chg. |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Annalist Index | 1934 | 1935 | |
| Farm products | 114.5 | 85.6 | + 33.3 |
| Food products | 120.8 | 101.5 | + 19.0 |
| All; U. S. dollars | 120.0 | 104.2 | + 15.2 |
| All; old gold dollars | 71.2 | 65.6 | + 8.5 |
| The gold dollar | 1.686 | 1.587 | - 6.2 |
| Metals | 109.7 | 105.3 | + 4.2 |
| Fuels | 161.7 | 157.0 | + 3.0 |
| Building materials | 112.1 | 112.0 | + 0.1 |
| Chemicals | 99.1 | 99.0 | + 0.1 |
| Miscellaneous | 79.5 | 84.8 | - 6.3 |
| Textile products | 108.0 | 119.0 | - 9.2 |
| Leading Commodities: | | | |
| Cottonseed oil, s. e. | .09% | .03% | + 181.5 |
| Hogs | 7.28 | 3.35 | + 117.3 |
| Lard | 10.05 | 5.35 | + 87.9 |
| Cattle | 10.52 | 5.88 | + 78.9 |
| Corn | 1.05% | 63 1/2 | + 65.9 |
| Beef | 15.00 | 9.50 | + 57.9 |
| Barley | 1.08% | 74 1/2 | + 46.2 |
| Hams | .09% | .06 1/2 | + 42.3 |
| Oats | .66 1/2 | .47 | + 41.5 |
| Rubber | .13% | .10 | + 37.5 |
| Hides | .12 | .09 1/2 | + 26.3 |
| Rye | .88% | .72 1/2 | + 22.8 |
| Cotton | 1.28% | 1.050 | + 22.4 |
| Coffee, Santos | .11% | .09% | + 17.1 |
| Bituminous coal | 2.05 | 1.75 | + 17.1 |
| Brick | 14.80 | 13.09 | + 13.1 |
| Wheat | 1.14 | 1.01 1/2 | + 12.0 |
| Copper, blue-eagle | .09 | .08 1/2 | + 9.1 |
| The gold dollar | 1.686 | 1.587 | - 6.2 |
| Pig iron | 17.90 | 16.90 | + 5.9 |
| Coke | 3.85 | 3.75 | + 2.7 |
| Silk | 1.51 1/2 | 1.47 1/2 | + 2.7 |
| Cement | 2.20 | 2.12 | + 2.3 |
| Printcloth | .06 1/2 - .06 1/2 | .06 1/2 - .06 1/2 | + 1.9 |
| Sugar, refined | .043 | .043 | 0.0 |
| Anthracite coal | 7.25 | 7.25 | 0.0 |
| Structural steel | 1.65 | 1.65 | 0.0 |
| Newspaper | 40.00 | 40.00 | 0.0 |
| Lumber | 16.23 | 16.44 | - 1.3 |
| Crude petroleum | 1.157 | 1.197 | - 3.3 |
| Tin | 5070 | 5225 | - 4.8 |
| Gasoline | .04% | .04% | + 5.1 |
| Lead | .03 1/2 | .040 | - 6.9 |
| Rayon | .60 | .65 | - 7.7 |
| Leather | .29 | .31 | - 9.7 |
| Wool, territory | .76 | .85 | - 10.6 |
| Cotton yarn | .30 1/2 | .32 1/2 | - 12.3 |
| Zinc | .03 1/2 | .042 1/2 | - 14.4 |
| Copper, "European" | .070 1/2 | .082 1/2 | - 14.8 |
| Worsted yarn | .13 3/4 | .16 6/7 | - 19.5 |

*Not quoted in weekly spot price table. [†]Without processing tax. [‡]Architectural Record composite, as of Dec. 15, 1934 and 1933.

Commodities that are on a world basis—those the prices of which are determined in world markets—largely lacked in 1934 the help of a depreciating dollar, which had buoyed them up the year before.

Foreign prices in terms of gold showed

drought (subsequently proving to be somewhat less serious than was at first supposed), advanced steadily to 73.4 in September. The slight decline that followed does not appear to be significant. Whether now that the immediate pres-

modities is much improved over a year ago. Stocks of raw materials especially have been reduced, but in the foodstuffs also the situation is generally better.

Wholesale prices in most foreign countries in terms of gold have moved in gen-

the efforts of the AAA to aid the farmer. The index of prices received by farmers for their products advanced to 103 per cent of pre-war parity in September (Table III, and chart, "Farm Prices") from 78 in December, 1933, and a depression low of 55 in February and March, 1933. The December, 1934, figure of 101 was only slightly lower. Much of the advance in 1934 was the result of the drought, just as much of that in 1933 had been due to the depreciation of the dollar, but a considerable part was the consequence of the government measures, wise or unwise from the longer viewpoint, designed to restore American agriculture.

On the other hand, the price-raising measures of the NRA together with the general recovery in prices have further increased the prices the farmer has had to pay for the goods he buys. From a post-war low of 100 in March, 1933 (in terms of the pre-war level), the index of prices paid by the farmer rose to 116 at the end of 1933 and to 126 in the last months of 1934 (Table III). The consequence was that much of the benefit of the higher agricultural prices was lost: while farm prices advanced 84 per cent from the depression low, the exchange value of the same products rose only 48 per cent, and by December, 1934, had attained only 80 per cent of pre-war parity.



little net change during the year. The Annalist International Composite, composed of the price indices of nine leading countries (Table II and chart, "Wholesale Price Indices for Leading Industrial Countries"), stood at 73.0 in November


1934 in conformity with The Annalist International Composite (Table II), showing weakness in the Winter and early Spring under the dollar pressure, and thereafter showing stability or recovery. The gold bloc is the outstanding exception. French prices resumed at the first of the year the decline that had proceeded almost without interruption since 1929. Belgian prices have continued a virtually unbroken decline. Dutch prices, after advancing in the latter part of 1933, have again turned downward.

TABLE II. ANNALIST INTERNATIONAL COMPOSITE OF WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES IN LEADING INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES


| | 1913=100.0; measured in gold; adjusted for post-war revaluation of currencies.) |
|-------|---|
| 1934 | 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 1928 |
| Jan. | 74.3 79.2 87.8 110.5 132.2 141.0 141.3 |
| Feb. | 73.1 78.1 87.6 109.0 129.5 141.2 140.6 |
| March | 72.2 77.8 87.8 108.4 126.6 141.6 141.3 |
| April | 71.9 77.1 87.2 107.4 125.9 140.0 142.7 |
| May | 71.5 76.1 85.4 105.4 124.2 138.0 144.1 |
| June | 71.8 77.5 83.5 104.1 122.2 137.7 143.0 |
| July | 72.1 76.7 83.4 103.3 120.3 139.8 142.5 |
| Aug. | 73.0 76.4 83.4 101.3 119.9 138.8 141.8 |
| Sept. | 73.4 74.5 84.5 98.3 118.2 138.6 141.6 |
| Oct. | 72.6 74.4 82.6 98.3 116.1 137.7 141.2 |
| Nov. | 73.0 73.7 81.0 94.4 114.7 135.5 141.4 |
| Dec. | 74.5 80.0 89.6 112.1 134.3 141.3 |

Countries represented: U. S. A., Canada, U. K., France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Japan.

Much of the advance of agricultural prices during the past two years reflects



(1913=100.0), compared with 73.7 in November, 1933. The index had continued the decline of 1933 until mid-Spring, when the pressure of the United States currency depreciation on foreign price levels appeared to have spent itself. It then turned and, aided by the world-wide sure of dollar devaluation has been removed, the world price level will show the long-awaited strength and turn definitely upward, will be for 1935 to answer. In the meantime it may be noted that the statistical position of many com-



The level of farm prices and their exchange value, however, take no account of the variations in the size of the crops sold, and to that extent fail to measure the changes in the total purchasing power of the farmer. The farmer's cash farm income is estimated monthly by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics from the prices received and the volume actually marketed. We have adjusted this index by the changes in the prices paid for goods bought and show the results in Table III as the Total Purchasing Power of Cash Farm Income.

WINTHROP W. CASE.

Table III. Farm Prices, Income, and Purchasing Power (From revised data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics)

| | Farm Prices (Pre-War=100) | | | *Total Purchasing Power of Farm Income (1924-29=100) | |
|-------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--|-------|
| | Prices Paid for Goods Bought. | Products Sold Received. | Exchange Value. | | |
| 1933. | | | | | |
| Jan. | 102 | 60 | 59 | 42.0 | 63.5 |
| Feb. | 101 | 55 | 54 | 36.7 | 56.1 |
| March | 100 | 55 | 55 | 37.5 | 57.9 |
| April | 101 | 58 | 57 | 46.5 | 71.1 |
| May | 102 | 68 | 67 | 62.5 | 94.6 |
| June | 103 | 71 | 69 | 68.5 | 102.7 |
| July | 107 | 83 | 78 | 77.5 | 111.8 |
| Aug. | 112 | 79 | 71 | 50.0 | 68.9 |
| Sept. | 116 | 80 | 69 | 49.5 | 58.4 |
| Oct. | 116 | 78 | 67 | 48.5 | 55.1 |
| Nov. | 116 | 80 | 69 | 52.5 | 69.8 |
| Dec. | 116 | 78 | 67 | 46.5 | 61.8 |
| 1934. | | | | | |
| Jan. | 117 | 77 | 66 | 52.0 | 68.6 |
| Feb. | 119 | 53 | 70 | 54.5 | 70.7 |
| March | 120 | 84 | 70 | 57.0 | 73.2 |
| April | 120 | 82 | 68 | 58.5 | 75.2 |
| May | 121 | 82 | 65 | 59.3 | 74.0 |
| June | 121 | 86 | 71 | 65.5 | 83.5 |
| July | 122 | 87 | 71 | 71.0 | 89.9 |
| Aug. | 125 | 96 | 77 | 62.5 | 77.2 |
| Sept. | 126 | 103 | 82 | 60.5 | 74.1 |
| Oct. | 126 | 102 | 81 | 55.0 | 68.6 |
| Nov. | 126 | 101 | 80 | 52.0 | 60.6 |
| Dec. | 126 | 101 | 80 | 48.7 | 64.8 |

*Adjusted for seasonal variation.

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Yardsticks for Measuring Economic Trends; Their Application Illustrated

By WILLIAM WREN HAY



THE New Deal has made everybody conscious of yardsticks, although so far the use of bureaucratic devised standards has been punitively rather than corrective while as measuring devices, Federal yardsticks conform to no standards, physical or ethical. As this is written, the necromancers of the National Recovery Administration are reported to be considering "what constitutes a fair return to the motor-car industry upon its investments." Whole industries have been "charted" by NRA, reputedly "to bring about a more balanced plan of economic production" which will alter the course and of necessity dictate the future of our business and industry.

Any one who has not succumbed to the ideology of the New Deal knows that the ink could scarcely dry on a plan before some new factor might be introduced to alter the situation as originally conceived, and all business men know that there is no profit in merchandise that was produced in good faith, but which consumers will have none of. The pages of the trade papers of years ago are replete with the bland announcements of "plans for next year," made by sales managers, now on relief, or perhaps with NRA, while the demand for members of NRA who are so prescient as to allocate consumers' buying and stockholders' dividends among the conforming Code members is so great that the staff is scattering like chaff.

The tragedy of belief in such astrology is that the enterprises regimented under national planning are more likely to be found in a necrology than in the investment manuals of the future.

Choice of a Yardstick

For certain purposes, it is comparatively easy to select a suitable yardstick for the measurement of economic data and business statistics. For instance, the use of durable articles like radio sets or washing machines and the consumption of cigarettes, oleomargarine, kilowatt hours and rayon are a function of the population using or consuming them. We have already advocated the use of population statistics for such general eco-


nomic data and also showed how the whole population could be used to measure a small part, like a metropolitan area. By the same reasoning, we can use a number of series of statistical data to measure parts of the whole and the application of this kind of a yardstick to the electric light and power industry is very illuminating.

It becomes a very simple matter to measure the growth and the present position of any electric utility in terms of the total kilowatt hours generated by central stations throughout the country. Such a comparison of the output of Commonwealth Edison Company, which operates entirely within the city limits of Chicago, reveals (Chart 1) a very steady

¹ Forecasting of Trends Simplified by Proper Use of Population Statistics by W. W. Hay. THE ANNALIST Nov. 2, 1934.

growth since the war; nor did this company's output of electricity decline a great deal, proportionately, during the depression years.

The city of Seattle municipal electric light department has published regularly the annual kilowatt-hours of electric current sold to residential customers and the revenues received for this class of service. The true measure of that revenue is the consumption of KWH (Chart 2). This sort of chart deserves a great deal of attention from politicians, investors and utility operators because it discloses at once the wide differences that exist between the rates of



different light and power companies for the same or comparable number of KWH sold to users. In the case illustrated (Chart 2), when the consumption was still small (less than 25-million KWH) the rate structure returned a small fixed amount (A) plus 4 cents per KWH and during that period of years the average use per customer did not exceed 30 KWH monthly. In 1923 a new rate was installed for this class of consumers and the use of electricity by residential customers increased very rapidly and now exceeds 90 KWH per month or more than 1,000 KWH annually, as compared with the average for the whole country of 600 KWH yearly. The new rate is sharply defined on the chart and results in the return of a much larger fixed revenue (B), due partly to the much larger number of customers, plus 2.3 cents per KWH.

The usefulness of graphic charts depends a great deal upon a correct evaluation of the economic background, nor can any except empirical results be attained. This is particularly the case with industrial studies, where knowledge of the stage of development of the industry ought to influence judgment a great deal. In the early stages of a new industry, it would be very difficult to make any plans because changes are too frequent and too sweeping, both in technological developments and for individual producers; during the intermediate period of rapid and sustained growth, producers need only swim with the tide; and in the final stages, when stabilization approaches, good planning is second only to successful merchandising in determining the survival of the few remaining manufacturers. Every factor affecting the fluctuations of a variable from its trend ought to be carefully analyzed and compensated for, if possible, for the soundness of a decision may depend a great deal upon the correct reading of the ideas that can be conveyed by charts and there is no substitute for intimate acquaintance with the facts that influence a situation.

Considering the importance of the pub-

¹ The present rate for residential customers is 5.5 cents for the first 40 KWH per month plus 2 cents per KWH for the next 200 KWH.

lic utilities, very little is really known about their actual business, that of supplying water, gas or electricity to widely scattered communities wherever and whenever demanded in whatever amounts. Precise methods for analyzing railroads in great detail have been in use for a number of years, but no such analytical procedure is applied to electric light and power companies. Nevertheless, it is a very simple matter to measure almost all of the various factors by the use of coordinate charts. A partial procedure might be somewhat as follows:


YARDSTICK (x-axis) TO MEASURE (y-axis)
Population of the U.S. Population Served
Population Served. KWH of Output
KWH of Output. System Peak Load
System Peak Load. Generator Capacity

These four steps, involving five estimates of the future, serve to determine in a rational manner the generator capacity that will need to be provided to serve the population of a utility at some future date.

We have already suggested the use of public utility figures as a possible yardstick for measuring the progress of a local business. It would be the height of folly to try to use the KWH output of a local utility unless we had carefully studied the territory that it serves and had determined the factors affecting its output. That is, one ought to know the conditions under which we are using the yardstick.

Detroit an Illustration

Every one knows that Detroit is the home of the automobile industry and many are familiar with the rapid growth of this large industrial area. A study of the population served by the Detroit Edison Company in terms of the popula-




tion of the whole country (Chart 3) does not present any grave difficulties because the fluctuations from a trend are readily ascribed to comparatively high rates of motor car production. However, when we examine (Chart 4) the KWH output of the utility company, we are confronted with the problem of compensating for changes in automotive output and of judging whether this influence is likely to be greater in the future, or less. This involves an inquiry into the Detroit industrial area.

In point of size Detroit is the fourth largest city in the country, both as to population and industrially (value of production, number of wage-earners, payrolls, &c.), being exceeded by New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. It is an area rich in raw materials and is well located with respect to both rail and water transportation. Although more popularly known for motor car production, Detroit also holds the first position in several other industries, among them stoves, vacuum cleaners, electric refrigerators and pharmaceuticals. Five out of six of all motor cars made are pro-

duced in this area and 200,000 factory workers are generally employed by the industry, which accounts for three-fourths of the industrial activity.

The area of the city of Detroit and its population quadrupled within two census decades, or between 1910 and 1930. The Detroit Edison Company was formed coincident with the beginning of the motor car industry and the territory served by it was added to by outward growth until it now comprises an area within a radius of about fifty miles from the first powerhouse in the city. All of its territory is contiguous and constitutes a natural economic area of 4,500 square miles and a population of 2,250,000. Less than 5 per cent of this area includes three-fourths of the total population served.



Industry in the Detroit area is highly electrified and the use of power purchased from the local utility is general because many manufacturing plants grew too rapidly for them to generate their own electricity and most of the larger concerns purchase bulk power from the Detroit Edison Company.

Despite a diversification of industrial activity in the Detroit area, the output of motor vehicles exerts a preponderant influence on the KWH output of this utility. Another study (not shown) of this electric output in terms of annual automotive production indicates that the expansion and contraction of motor car output creates a pro rata increase or decrease in the aggregate use of electricity by the population served by the Detroit Edison Company. Two scales (marked A and B, Chart 4) are drawn, above the long-time straight line trend of this company's business, at intervals corresponding to determined increments of annual motor car production above a "normal" output.

Heretofore, the activities of Ford Motor Company undoubtedly affected the measurement of KWH output of the Detroit Edison Company. When Ford went out of production, in 1927, the diminution of motor car production had no appreciable effect because at that time Ford performed more operations in its own shops, which generated their own electricity. Since then, Ford has come to depend more upon outside suppliers, three-fourths of whom are connected on the distribution system of the Detroit Edison Company. We judge, then, that the operations of the local electric utility would in future become more sensitive to automotive production, especially since several car makers outside of Detroit have been practically eliminated.

Another factor of importance to this utility is the tendency for steel producers to migrate into the Detroit industrial area. There are already four large rolling mills in the territory, excluding Ford, and a fifth mill is under construction. These rolling mills are large users of electricity and in addition there is a large and growing load from electric furnaces, which melt large tonnages of alloy steels used by the industry.

Utility Operations Show Improvement; Widespread Agitation and Its Causes



THE position of the public utilities at the beginning of 1935 seems highly paradoxical. On the one hand, their operations show steady improvement in volume, gross revenues, number of customers, lower rates; on the other, the price of their securities is constantly falling, many stocks are selling near or below the previous lows of the whole bear market, and with the exception of the high grade bonds of operating companies, the rank and file of their funded obligations are selling at prices which make it hard to conceive of them as a medium for financing.

Causes

The immediate causes of the glaring discrepancy are obvious—the widespread campaigns for rate reductions and the activities of the Federal Government in constructing and planning new power projects. But the reasons for these developments in turn cannot be lightly dismissed as merely the clumsy handling of public relations, the perversity of politicians, the alleged "socialistic" policies of the Roosevelt government or the "envy of the masses in a democracy."

The real reasons are to be sought in certain fundamentals and practices of the utilities themselves, and we believe that some light will be thrown on them by a comparison of the electric power and light industry, which has been most severely attacked, and the gas industry, on the one hand, with the long experi-

ence of the steam railroads on the other.

The preliminary estimates for 1934 indicate a substantial degree of improvement in the major branches of the utility industry. Production of electricity was estimated at ninety billion kilowatt hours by the Edison Electric Institute, an in-

crease of 5½ per cent to a new high record, while industrial power sales were up 8½ per cent and commercial sales 6 per cent.

Excessive capital investment resulting from the 1920-30 boom was reduced during last year, when only 100 million dollars was invested in new construction

down 200,000 kilowatts to 33,300,000.

The gas industry, in both its manufactured and natural gas divisions, showed similar improvement. Combined sales were 11.7 per cent higher, the number of customers increased 2.6 per cent and dollar revenues also increased 2.6 per cent.

Higher costs of operation and higher taxes prevented a commensurate increase of net revenues though adequate figures are not available in this regard.

Government Projects

Yet in spite of these achievements, the position of the utilities is an uncomfortable one. On the agenda for 1935 stand the renewal of efforts by the United States Government to come to an agreement with Canada for the development of power in the St. Lawrence Valley; the extension of the TVA not only in its own territory, but through parallel organizations such as the Missouri Valley Authority, the Wabash Valley Authority and the Arkansas River Authority. Projects under way costing an estimated 700 million dollars are to receive additional funds beyond the \$278,200,000 which has already been appropriated. They include the following:

| | | |
|------------------|-------|---------------|
| Tennessee Valley | | \$310,000,000 |
| Boulder Dam | | 165,000,000 |
| Fort Peck | | 84,000,000 |
| Grand Coulee | | 63,000,000 |
| Bonneville | | 55,000,000 |
| Casper-Alcova | | 22,700,000 |
| Total | | \$699,700,000 |

To these may be added the Santee Cooper development in South Carolina, Central Valley in California, the Bay of Fundy in Maine and perhaps others.

The City of New York with the help



crease of 5½ per cent over 1933; number of customers increased over 2 per cent, to 24,850,000, and gross revenues increased 3 per cent to \$1,833,000,000. Rates continued their steady decline to an average of 5.30 cents, some 3.6 per cent below 1933. Domestic sales increased

compared with an average annual expenditure of 750 million dollars during the decade 1920-30. For the first time in the history of the industry, total generating capacity showed a net decline, due to the closing down of several older and less efficient plants which brought it

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INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT



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of PWA funds will embark on the largest test of municipal ownership and operation in the United States, as a direct result of a rate controversy. Even if court action should succeed in stopping this development, or for that matter, the activities of the PWA, it is hard to believe that this will constitute a permanent barrier.

Widespread Dissatisfaction

The fact remains that there is widespread dissatisfaction with public utility rates, and there is little doubt that this dissatisfaction will be further increased by the publication scheduled for some time this month of the preliminary report of the Federal Trade Commission on electric power and light rate studies, following its recent adverse report on holding companies, which also touched lightly on the practices of natural gas



pipe-line companies. The same body will report later on its investigation of the gas industry, which has been comparatively little affected by the activities of the Federal Government and much less than the electric utilities by local campaigns for rate reduction.

It is entirely beside the point for the utilities to show that they are now supplying 15 per cent more electric current to domestic consumers than in 1930 for about the same monthly bill, as a result of rate reduction. The essence of the matter lies not in national averages or in the policies of the best managed companies, nor in the fact that, absolutely speaking, the total cost of electric power to the domestic consumer is approximately 9 cents a day, less than the price of a package of cigarettes—or of a single good cigar, to quote a leading utility executive. It is no wonder that he finds it "difficult to understand all the agitation and extravagant statements concerning the cost of electric power to the domestic consumer."

Reasons

The dissatisfaction of large sections of the population with the utility rates, which is reflected in the campaigns for rate reduction and in the government's program for new construction, is based on the belief that a large proportion of present public utility rates are (1) arbitrary, (2) discriminatory and (3) based on the requirements of financial manipulation rather than of the needs of operating companies.

The utilities, which are vested with a public interest, which are creatures of the State, which carry on their operations by grace of franchises from public bodies, will not be on a sound footing until they either abolish the practices complained of or are able to prove con-

vincingly that the apparent grievances are based on genuine technical engineering necessity.

Confusing Rate Structures

As to arbitrary rate-making, a few instances will suffice. In one of the largest metropoles of the United States,

parison with the price of gas delivered, the spread between wholesale and retail is less than in the case of the electric utilities, while the natural gas industry stands somewhere between the two. Correspondingly, resentment at apparent discrimination is a minor factor in the movement for rate reduction in the man-

States is transmitted over State boundaries, not to estimate the amounts that are transmitted over long distances within the same State. Interconnection and superpower were slogans of the utility boom of the past decade, as well as the spread of holding companies, and the attraction of millions of new investors to the public utility field by bond houses and by customer "ownership" campaigns. The widespread ownership of utility securities, originally intended to be a source of favorable public opinion for the utilities, has turned into the opposite, now that millions of investors have incurred losses from their purchases. Part of the agitation for government or municipal ownership is undoubtedly based on the desire of these small capitalists to exchange depreciated utility securities for government or municipal bonds or cash.

Exposures and Exploitations

In the meantime the financial abuses of the holding company device, which are in part responsible for the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars to utility investors, have been exposed in the press, in government hearings and court proceedings; and while they have been exploited, they have not been invented by politicians.

Because manufactured gas is not transmitted over long distances, the isolated gas company has remained fairly common; in natural gas, however, the growth of long-distance transmission has led to interconnection, consolidation and the growth of holding companies, with, of course, in some cases, the corresponding abuses.

The Railroad Analogy

The situation in the utilities presents a considerable analogy to that of the railroads in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The railroads in that period were constantly under attack, not primarily because their rates were absolutely high in themselves; on the contrary, it was a period of acute rate wars in the United States. The railroads were attacked because of their arbitrary policies, their rebates, their discrimination from shipper to shipper and from

Continued on Page 132

the focus of a particularly bitter rate controversy now and for years past, the electric rates are some 30 per cent higher than in the average of the country as a whole. In the State of Virginia gas rates vary 65 per cent or more for comparable service in comparable communities. Rate structures show a bewildering variety of permutations and combinations, flat rate, block rates, minimum charges, service charges, cumulative rates, &c., in communities within a few miles of each other, depending solely on the policies of the controlling interests. The man in the street is bound to ask himself why a city in Pennsylvania should have a rate structure different from that of a near-by city of similar size, but similar to that of a city in Texas where the lighting system is owned by the same company.

Power at the bus bar of the generating plant costs a quarter to one-half of a cent per kilowatt hour; delivered to the consumer, it costs from 3 to 14 cents, and averages 5.30 cents. Every utility operator knows and tries to explain that, in part, the difference is due to the cost of transmission and distribution. This is also, he goes on to explain, why he can afford to charge a large industrial customer, who adds little to the cost of distribution, billing, meter reading, &c., a fraction of a cent per kilowatt hour, while the rate to the domestic consumer is hundreds of per cent higher. But the man in the street considers the wide spread between the wholesale and the retail price unjustified. He thinks of it as a discrimination, a subsidy or a rebate in favor of the large commercial or industrial consumer. Nor is his resentment mollified in the slightest when utility advocates attack the Ontario Hydroelectric Power Commission for subsidizing the domestic consumer!

Because the cost of production of manufactured gas is relatively high in com-

manufactured gas field but is much more important in the natural gas industry.

Finally, the concentration of ownership and control of electric utilities in huge holding companies, as well as the specific financial abuses and manipulations which that has made possible, are the reflections in the field of finance of the technical fact that electricity can be transmitted economically over distances of hundreds of miles. Some 18 per cent of the electricity produced in the United



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Position and Prospects of the Railroad, Automobile And Aircraft Industries



THE year just ended has witnessed a diversity of trends in the major transportation industries. In general, there was an increase in freight traffic and in passenger travel; but, during the second half of the year the advantages usually accompanying an increase in gross revenues were more than counterbalanced by abnormally high operating costs. Hence, net profits showed a tendency to decline in relation to gross earnings. It seems likely that this will continue to be the case during the early months of 1935. The situation is most acute in the case of the railroads, but the rise in operating costs has also adversely affected both the automobile manufacturers and the aviation companies.

Effect of Governmental Interference

Granting that the railroads have many difficult problems of a basic nature that must be settled before railway operations can be placed on a sound foundation, their immediate embarrassment is due to unwise governmental interference rather than to any such basic maladjustments. The wage increase and pension plan could hardly have been made effective at a less propitious time. These

two years by commodity groups, together with the percentage distribution of loadings and the net increase over the preceding year.

its is, of course, to be found in the abnormal increases in operating expense. While rates have remained inflexible, expenses have risen and still further in-

Table I. Classification of Car Loadings by Groups.


| | 1934 | | | 1933 | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Number (Thousands of Cars.) | Per Cent Change from 1933. | Per Cent Distribution of Cars. | Number (Thousands of Cars.) | Per Cent Change from 1932. | Per Cent Distribution of Cars. |
| Grain and products..... | 1,642 | -1.1 | 5.3 | 1,660 | +0.1 | 5.7 |
| Live stock..... | 1,074 | +21.1 | 3.5 | 887 | -6.7 | 3.0 |
| Coal..... | 6,684 | +6.8 | 19.8 | 5,695 | +5.2 | 19.5 |
| Coke..... | 335 | +12.2 | 1.1 | 298 | +32.1 | 1.0 |
| Forest products..... | 1,147 | +4.2 | 3.7 | 1,101 | +20.7 | 3.8 |
| Ore..... | 795 | +6.9 | 2.6 | 743 | +232.9 | 2.5 |
| Merchandise (l. c. l.)..... | 8,244 | -2.4 | 26.8 | 8,446 | -7.1 | 28.9 |
| Miscellaneous..... | 11,465 | +10.3 | 37.2 | 10,390 | +4.7 | 35.6 |
| Total..... | 30,786 | +5.4 | 100.0 | 29,220 | +2.8 | 100.0 |

The decline in less-than-carload freight in each of the past two years when total loadings were increasing brings into clear relief the inroads that motor transportation is making on railway traffic. In point of volume l. c. l. freight is the second most important class of carloadings and the problem of motor competition would be an extremely important one even if traffic diversion were confined to that one class of freight. When it is considered, however, that diversion is occurring in practically every class of traf-

fic and that the supremacy of the railroads in the miscellaneous (manufactured goods) class is being challenged by motor competitors, the gravity of the situation becomes even more pronounced.

Increases are in prospect. It has been estimated that fuel costs have risen approximately 20 per cent during the past year and that prices of materials and supplies have risen 15 per cent. This means, in effect, that for the same amount of fuels and supplies as were used in 1933 the railroads must pay 17 per cent, or nearly \$80,000,000 more than in that year. Wages have also risen

¹Maintenance charges were kept at a minimum in order to show even this return.



acts, coupled with rising costs of fuel and materials, have greatly weakened railway credit. Had it been possible to delay these acts, even for a few months, the railroads might well have contributed to recovery; as it is, they constitute an element of weakness that may considerably retard recovery.

The total volume of railway traffic in 1934 was somewhat greater than in the previous year. Although final figures are not yet available, preliminary reports indicate that gross revenues for 1934 were about 5.7 per cent above those for 1933. Total carloadings amounted to 30,785,594, compared with 29,220,052 in 1933—an increase of 5.4 per cent. Similar increases were reported in passenger traffic, although the real importance of streamlining and increased speed has probably been somewhat over-emphasized.

Traffic Increase Uneven.

The increase in freight traffic has been by no means evenly distributed among the various classes of freight. Table I shows carloadings for the past

five and that the supremacy of the railroads in the miscellaneous (manufactured goods) class is being challenged by motor competitors, the gravity of the situation becomes even more pronounced.

Net Income Lower

Although railway activity, as represented by gross revenues and by car loadings has increased during the past twelve months, this increase has not carried through to net income. Whereas an increase in gross should normally result in an even greater proportionate increase in net profits, this has not been the case. Net income for 1934, according to preliminary estimates, will be even lower than for 1933. At the end of November profits were running about 3 per cent behind the corresponding eleven-month period of 1933. Some recovery in net income (on a seasonally adjusted basis) was undoubtedly experienced in the last month of 1934, but there seems little chance that this will suffice to bring profits for the year as a whole up to anywhere near the 1933 figure.

The reason for this low level of prof-

and are due to increase still more rapidly during the coming half year. The railroad "wage bill" in 1933 was \$1,404,000,000; if the projected wage rises and the pension plan materialize, the cost for the same amount of man-power on April 1, 1935, will have risen to \$1,622,000,000!

Widespread Insolvency

Taking the actual and prospective increases in expense into account and assuming that traffic remains at approximately the same level as that averaged during the past eighteen months, one is forced to conclude that the chances of profits on railroad shares in 1935 are anything but good. Return on property investment in 1933 was 1.8 per cent¹; in 1934 it was still lower. Obviously any such rate cannot support the existing amount of railway capital. Unless means are found for increasing net earnings (either through an immediate rise in traffic volumes or through a marked increase in operating efficiency) there seems no way, short of increased government aid, to avoid a general write-down of railway investments. Already companies representing one-sixth of the

¹Maintenance charges were kept at a minimum in order to show even this return.



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total trackage in the country are insolvent.

It was recognition of these conditions that led the Federal Government to come to the rescue of the railroads. In order to stave off general bankruptcy throughout the industry and a complete loss of confidence in railway securities, the government through its various agencies has loaned approximately \$595,000,000 to the railroads. Yet, even this large amount can be considered little more than a stop-gap. Complete restoration of railroad credit must await clear evidence of a revival in earning power. At the moment such evidence is not at hand—and the problem of refunding some two billion dollars of railway debt over the next five years remains unsolved.

Government Ownership Expected

The large investment of the government in the railroads and the probability that this investment will be further increased in the future leads certain students of transportation to expect eventual nationalization of the railway system. The argument in this connection has been admirably summarized by Winthrop M. Daniels, formerly chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as follows:²

The likelihood of government ownership and operation of the railroads in the not distant future is due to the large existing burden of railroad indebtedness to the Federal Government; to the impending maturities which threaten widespread insolvencies if government loans are not further extended; to the depressed market price of railroad stocks, which would make available a controlling interest at a low figure; and to the eagerness of the largest holders of railroad bonds to surrender them in exchange for government obligations.

In addition to a continuation of direct aid to the railroads during 1934, the government, through Coordinator Eastman and his organization, made progress in furthering cooperation and coordination of the various independent operating companies. The coordinator's studies are being made with a view to eliminating the present wastes which are brought about largely through the lack of unity in our railway system. Although handicapped by the "intense individualism which prevails among railroad managements and their instinctive resistance to anything which spells collective action," Mr. Eastman has finally succeeded in impressing on these executives the absolute necessity for a thoroughgoing readjustment of their operations. The formation last Summer of the Association of American Railroads, with wider powers than have ever before been delegated to any central railway organization, is a belated attempt to cooperate with the coordinator and, by so doing, to forestall any move toward nationalization of the railroads. At present, both the coordinator's office and the association are working out plans for a freight car pooling system from which economies amounting to as much as \$100,000,000 annually are expected.

The fact that the railroad managements finally realize the necessity of fundamental readjustments in their methods of doing business and that they are now disposed to cooperate with the administration in any reasonable program of reorganization is the one bright spot in the present railway situation. In the meantime Chairman Jones of the Re-

²The net increase in Federal loans to the railroads since 1932 has been as follows:

| | |
|-------------|---------------|
| 1932 | \$280,000,000 |
| 1933 | 57,000,000 |
| 1934 (est.) | 258,000,000 |

Total \$595,000,000

The 1934 figure includes \$37,000,000 from agencies other than RFC and PWA.

³"Toward Nationalized Railroads," by Winthrop M. Daniels. *Current History*, Vol. XII, pp. 407-12. (January, 1935).

construction Finance Corporation has expressed a willingness to carry the roads along until some plan of reorganization can be effected. Eventually, of course, these Federal loans must be repaid, and as long as they remain outstanding they must weaken railroad credit in general. At the moment, however, no other solution, short of allowing a large number of railroads to go into receivership, appears possible.

The Outlook for 1935

The outlook for the railroads during 1935 may be summarized as follows:

Traffic: Moderate increase over 1934 appears probable.

Rates: Competitive transportation agencies preclude any substantial increases.

Expenses: Further rise in operating costs (amounting to perhaps 5 per cent) seems likely.

Profits: Net income expected to remain far below normal.

Regulation: An effort will probably be made to delay direct Congressional action until after the coordinator's studies are completed. Any drastic regulation of competing agencies seems unlikely.

Finances: Continued Federal aid in the form of loans appears necessary.

AUTOMOBILES

So far as production of automobiles is concerned, both the 1934 records and the outlook for 1935 are definitely encouraging. Total output last year amounted to about 2,800,000 cars, or an increase of around 45 per cent over the previous year. This figure is less than normal replacement requirements so that the accumulated shortage at the end of the year was greater than in January, 1934. Present indications are that 1935 production may run between 3,000,000 and 3,500,000 units, if general business activity holds up to reasonably fair levels. Ford alone has announced a goal of one million cars. Tentative production schedules for the first quarter call for production of about 800,000 units or approximately 10 per cent more than were produced in the first quarter of 1934. Table II shows a comparison of the estimated output for 1934 with that of earlier years.




TABLE II—ANNUAL PRODUCTION, EXPORTS AND REGISTRATION
(Thousands of Cars and Trucks)

| Year. | Production. | Exports. | Sales. | Registration ¹ | Domestic Total Registration |
|-------|-------------|----------|--------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1920 | 2,227 | 176 | 2,051 | 9,232 | |
| 1921 | 1,616 | 60 | 1,556 | 10,465 | |
| 1922 | 2,544 | 127 | 2,417 | 12,240 | |
| 1923 | 4,034 | 234 | 3,800 | 15,092 | |
| 1924 | 3,603 | 293 | 3,310 | 17,595 | |
| 1925 | 4,266 | 428 | 3,838 | 19,937 | |
| 1926 | 4,301 | 392 | 3,909 | 22,001 | |
| 1927 | 3,401 | 466 | 2,935 | 23,133 | |
| 1928 | 4,359 | 582 | 3,777 | 24,493 | |
| 1929 | 5,358 | 733 | 4,625 | 26,501 | |
| 1930 | 3,356 | 405 | 2,951 | 26,545 | |
| 1931 | 2,390 | 241 | 2,149 | 25,832 | |
| 1932 | 1,371 | 120 | 1,251 | 24,115 | |
| 1933 | 1,920 | 176 | 1,744 | 23,827 | |
| 1934 | 2,800 | *340 | *2,460 | 24,840 | |

¹Estimated. ²Dec. 31.

Large Accumulated Shortage

There is unquestionably a large accumulated shortage of motor vehicles that must be filled before conditions can be said to have returned to normal. Total registrations now amount to slightly less than 25,000,000 cars, and the average life of the cars in use is 7-2-3 years. On this basis, annual replacements should amount to approximately 3,250,000 units. In a period of real prosperity, when fewer old cars are being used, replacement demand would probably run as high as 3,500,000. In addition to this replacement demand, an accumulated shortage of perhaps 2,500,000 cars has been built up through keeping cars on the road long after their operation has become uneconomical. The group of people who formerly owned an automobile, but have been forced to get along without one during the depression, probably



constitutes a potential demand for about 1,250,000 units. The export market ought normally to take another 500,000 cars.

Taking into consideration all of these sources of potential demand, it seems reasonable to estimate that a total shortage, domestic and foreign, of about 7,500,000 cars will have occurred by the end of 1935. In other words, in order to place the motor industry back in the same position that it occupied at the end of 1929, production of 7,500,000 cars would be necessary during 1935. The extent to which these shortages will actually make themselves felt during the next twelve months cannot, of course, be estimated at present.

Foreign Sales Larger

A particularly encouraging development during 1934 was the increase in foreign sales of American-made cars. In 1929 American cars accounted for 52 per cent of the total overseas market. This figure fell to a low point of 20 per cent during the Fall of 1932, but since that time has shown steady recovery. At present nearly one out of every three cars sold abroad is of American make. Export sales constituted approximately 12 per cent of domestic production last year, compared with the previous high record of 15 per cent in 1929. Thus, the motor industry has already made considerable progress in regaining its foreign markets. Further recovery in this direction depends largely on the success of the administration in arranging trade treaties under the Trade Agreements Act.

The 1935 models introduced to the public during December and at the recent New York show embodied no such spectacular changes as those experienced last year when Chrysler presented its radically streamlined "Airflow" models. On the majority of the cars a further

development of the streamline principle was to be noted, as was a general tendency to redistribute the weight toward the front of the car. The manufacturers appear to have succeeded finally in getting the public to accept styles that render obsolete (in appearance, at least) the models of three and four years ago. The current changes, however, are by no means so fundamental as that which brought about the shift from open to closed cars, and their effect on the purchaser's sales resistance is likely to be correspondingly less. The actual advantage of the new models over those of two or three years ago is certainly not nearly so great as the car manufacturers would have the public believe, even though there has been gradual improvement in engine and body design.

Price Trends and Profits

Other tendencies noted at the show were the large number of new, lower-priced lines added by those companies which formerly confined their activities to the medium and high-priced groups, and the slight increase in retail prices over the levels existing in 1934. It seems safe to predict that competition will be keener in the low-priced models during the current year than ever before. Ford's campaign for a million cars will call for strenuous competition from the other two of the "big three"—Chrysler and General Motors. It is difficult to see how the smaller companies can subsist on the crumbs thrown to them from the upper table. There is nothing in the present situation that gives promise of alleviating the plight of the small independent producers.

Even among the "big three" the outlook for profits is uncertain. The profit margins of both General Motors and Chrysler were considerably narrower in 1934 than in 1933, and the third quarter

of 1934 (the latest for which reports are available) saw a drastic decline in unit profits. This was due in part to rises in the costs of materials and labor⁴ and in part to increased competition among manufacturers. The increase in 1935 prices does not appear to allow any margin for further increases in costs and, as we have noted, competition is likely to become more, rather than less, keen. Consequently the outlook for profits is rather less favorable than the prospective increase in demand might seem to indicate.

The adverse factors mentioned above should have little or no effect on manufacturers of automobile accessories, trucks and the higher-priced passenger cars. From present indications, companies in these fields may well register further improvement in earnings during the coming year.

AIRCRAFT

THE aviation industry is one that, had it not been for unsound financing in 1929, need hardly have realized that a depression was occurring. The experience of such soundly organized companies as Douglas Aircraft and United Aircraft and Transport may be pointed out as substantiation of the above statement. Neither of these companies reported a loss for any of the depression years.

The continued progress of aviation, in both the transport and manufacturing fields, is clearly shown in the annual figures included in Table III. In most branches of production and transportation aviation showed remarkable progress during the year. The figures for air mail volume reflect the difficulties between the government and the mail carriers in the early part of 1934, but

⁴ Increases in labor costs under the code are estimated to have resulted in a rise in total costs of about 17 per cent.

since resumption of this service by private carriers, the volume of air mail has been running well ahead of that for 1933.

Notable Progress

Among notable commercial aviation developments during the past year, perhaps none is of greater importance than the increase in the cruising speed of transport planes, which reduced the transcontinental record for commercial planes to 11 hours 31 minutes. The year also witnessed the construction of the largest heavier-than-air craft ever built in the United States, which was designed for use in a regular transpacific service.

TABLE III—ANNUAL AVIATION STATISTICS 1926-1934

| Year. | No. of Pass. (Thous.) | Pounds Express (Thous.) | Pounds Mail (Thous.) | No. of Planes Built. | No. of Engines Built. |
|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1926..... | 6 | 6 | 433 | 1,136 | ... |
| 1927..... | 13 | 12 | 1,223 | 2,186 | |
| 1928..... | 53 | 35 | 3,632 | 4,761 | 3,252 |
| 1929..... | 165 | 198 | 7,772 | 6,034 | 7,378 |
| 1930..... | 387 | 287 | 8,514 | 2,684 | 3,766 |
| 1931..... | 458 | 885 | 9,351 | 2,394 | 3,776 |
| 1932..... | 505 | 1,324 | 7,658 | 1,142 | 1,898 |
| 1933..... | 546 | 1,885 | 7,645 | 1,057 | 1,980 |
| 1934*.... | 465 | 2,100 | 6,500 | 1,100 | 2,500 |

*Estimated.

Source: (Years 1926-33) Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America.

Cancellation of the air mail contracts brought to the public attention the express service offered by the transport companies and resulted in a sharp increase in the use of this type of service. Since 1929, annual air express shipments have risen from 200 tons to 2,100 tons; mail tonnage during the same period has remained practically stationary. It seems probable that, in a relatively short space of time, the increases in passenger and express traffic will more than counterbalance the lower rate of return on the new mail contracts. As this occurs, the air lines will become less and less dependent for their profits on the whims of political groups and will come to occupy a more stable position in the transportation system of the country.

Disparities in Price Levels the Root Cause of the Stagnation in Building


By WILLIAM C. BOBER

PERHAPS no other industry was so much in the limelight in 1934 as the construction industry, though certainly not because of its brilliant achievements in that year. Its deplorably low level was pointed to with the utmost alarm by hosts of writers, orators and business men. It has obviously been a continuous headache to the administration. But in a great deal of public discussion the necessary note of realism was strikingly absent. Fundamentals were lost sight of and many of us have dealt primarily with symptoms instead of underlying causes. If private capital stubbornly refuses to flow into construction there must be a very good reason. There can be only one such reason: fundamental economic conditions are such that the industry is prevented from offering private capital the opportunity for reasonable profit with reasonable security. Private capital, and there is plenty of it idle today, seldom fails to flow freely if reasonable profit and security are possible. Back of that again, especially in case of residential construction, there can be only one fundamental reason—lack of effective demand for new structures. In other words, a shortage of people, either as owners or tenants, who want new housing and are willing and able to pay for it at present-day prices. It is obviously, therefore, primarily a matter of people's incomes and the price of houses.

The glut in real estate mortgages overhanging from the late boom and the re-

sulting distaste for new mortgages on the part of the traditional lenders of mortgage money would not in themselves prevent new building. Their distaste is a symptom, not a basic cause. If large

levels more in detail. The first point is whether people want or need housing today. The Department of Commerce's real property survey in sixty-four cities has established what most of us had long



groups of people existed who wanted new homes and could readily pay at present-day prices, private capital would speedily create new financing channels if the old ones were jammed—just as a river with a powerful head of water behind it creates new channels for itself if the old one are blocked.

Let us examine the above fundamen-

suspected, namely, that vast numbers of Americans live in antiquated, run-down homes.

The effective demand for shelter built by private capital in the past has come from great masses of people with sufficient income either to buy homes or pay rent in new homes built for them by professional builders. Much of this effective

demand was pretty well taken care of, too well in fact, in the years 1922 to 1929. Such periods of boom cannot repeat themselves at short intervals. People do not wear out homes like clothes or automobiles. The replacement cycle is far longer and the building cycle normally moves in much longer waves than the general business cycle. Chart 1 illustrates the building cycle since 1882. Note the three peaks of 1890, 1909 and 1928 roughly at twenty-year intervals. Also note the lows in 1882, 1900 and 1921. Of course, two complete cycles are not conclusive enough to justify a generalization that a twenty-year cycle exists. But fragmentary building records in certain cities, going back in some cases to the Civil War, seem to confirm the twenty-year cycle.

Assuming for the moment that twenty years represent a figure worth serious consideration, we could ordinarily expect a new peak around 1948 and a low around 1958, after which building activity would begin to rise merely through the operation of obsolescence. It is true that in no previous period did building activity rise so far above the rough, estimated normal as from 1924 to 1929; but it is also true that at no time did it drop so far below the "normal" as since 1929. In fact, the almost complete suspension of residential activity after 1931 should materially shorten the trough of the building cycle wave that had its peak in 1928.

How Widespread Was the Late Boom?
In viewing the building cycle we must not be carried away by mere mathe-

matics. Much more important are: (1) Basic economic factors such as the decline in rate of growth of population, the resulting rise in number of families per given 1,000 people, the shifting of population due to economic causes, and (2) fundamental technological changes such as the development of new building methods as represented for instance by the pre-fabricated house which looms in the background as a future factor of vast significance.

Furthermore, we must remember that as a matter of fact we never had a truly national building boom before 1929. There was a tremendous concentration of building activity in rather restricted geographical zones.

Any widespread decentralization would completely change the building picture and the twenty-year cycle. Of course we have no basis for belief that any such decentralization is in sight in the near future. But undoubtedly overbuilding even for the relatively prosperous classes did not take place in many important sections of the United States in the last decade.

Income and Costs

We now come to the next fundamental factor, the income of the prospective home owner or tenant. We know that all through the depression the national income paid out exceeded the income produced. If we take the latter figure as the more significant of the two, there was a decline from 83 billions in 1929 to perhaps 42 or 43 billions in 1934, a decline of not very far from 50 per cent. Yet building costs, if we use the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's figures, consisting of labor at site and material, averaged 100 in 1929 and stood at 88 in September, 1934, a decline of only 12 per cent. Obviously then, the average person would have to pay a larger portion of his income today for occupying a new home than he did in 1929.

It is true that the Federal Reserve Bank's building costs use labor at official union rates which are frequently disregarded in the depth of depression. Nevertheless, these high rates hang like the sword of Damocles over the prospective home builder because they are likely to become effective as soon as there is any resumption of building activity. Here we have one of the outstanding disparities that result in stagnation of trade—the disparity between current incomes and current building costs. Chart 2 shows national income produced roughly adjusted to the growth of population. It will be noted that residential construction has declined to an unprecedented extent, yet its rate of decline has been little sharper than that of the per capita income. The conclusion is obvious.

Will High Costs Throttle Building?

High labor and building costs do not necessarily prevent building. That of course was conclusively proved by the boom period before 1929. But incomes were much higher then and the need for space for those with adequate incomes was vastly more pressing because no previous boom had taken place for many years. If the business machine gets going, it will raise incomes with it, and if building costs can be kept horizontal, the disparity between building costs and incomes will decline. The question then becomes: If housing is not to be the lever to bring about recovery, what other lever can we use? We are of course referring to housing with private capital. If we are realists we might as well recognize that the administration, under continual pressure to prime the business pump, will go into government housing on a very

large scale whether we like it or not, unless a vastly greater volume of private capital is attracted than seems at all probable today.

The true answer, however, is that it is


building with private capital. The urban real estate debt has roughly reached the colossal total of 36 billions, of which perhaps 21 billions or so is on urban homes and the rest on other city structures,

beginning to draw tenants from his slightly antiquated building. He had "confidence," however, not because of some oration he had heard but because he was making a profit. He, therefore, decided to modernize, and even to add a new ultra-modern wing on the vacant lot. He could raise the money because his property, bought as a result of foreclosure, had no mortgage on it. It had been wiped out by bankruptcy. The property could, therefore, be mortgaged once more and a new debt created. With the proceeds and his own capital (he was making a profit) he started his building operations. The building cycle moved up another notch.

But in This Depression

Price deflation and debt liquidation started swiftly but very unevenly after the Spring of 1930, when the first attempts to check the flood had proved futile. By Summer of 1932 it appeared as if the process had gone far enough in this country to provide a base from which the cycle could start permanently upward again. But we cannot be sure, even though world recovery began at that time. We had made false starts in 1930 and 1931. The downward cycle had in itself created vast new disparities. Many of the "orthodox" adjustments had not been made. Manufacturers, many of them, insisted on maintaining prices. The building unions insisted on the prosperity wage scale.

The entire recovery today is therefore



A STUDY IN DISPARITIES
Disparities between price levels are the root cause of business stagnation. On a per capita basis, national income for 1934 was probably less than for 1913. But building costs are now 70 per cent higher than in 1913. There was also a widening disparity, from the Spring of 1933 to July, 1934, between rents and building costs. Since last Summer this gap has narrowed slightly. On the further narrowing of this disparity depends the future of income-producing property.




TABLE I. URBAN DEBTS, REAL ESTATE VALUES AND POPULATION

| | Urban Population. | Billion Dollars | | | Urban Debt Per Capita. |
|-----------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Value of Urban Real Estate. | Debt on Urban Real Estate. | P. C. of Debt to Value. | |
| 1913..... | 46,000,000 | 49 | 7 | 14 | \$152 |
| 1921..... | 55,000,000 | 79 | 12 | 15 | 218 |
| 1929..... | 69,000,000 | 157 | 38 | 24 | 550 |
| 1934..... | 70,000,000 | 75 | 35 | 46 | 500 |

Table II. Engineering Contracts Awarded in 48 States
(Engineering News Record: Thousands of Dollars)

| | Private. | State and Municipal. | Federal. | Total. | Grand Total. |
|-----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|-----------|--------------|
| | | | | | Grand Total. |
| 1925..... | 1,522,191 | 1,002,980 | 34,272 | 1,037,252 | 2,559,443 |
| 1926..... | 1,764,692 | 1,038,893 | 50,262 | 1,089,155 | 2,853,847 |
| 1927..... | 1,998,526 | 1,204,477 | 50,763 | 1,255,240 | 3,253,766 |
| 1928..... | 2,158,634 | 1,350,131 | 69,815 | 1,419,946 | 3,578,580 |
| 1929..... | 2,661,822 | 1,242,592 | 103,901 | 1,346,493 | 3,950,315 |
| 1930..... | 1,784,337 | 1,272,777 | 116,445 | 1,389,222 | 3,173,259 |
| 1931..... | 1,356,004 | 1,115,350 | 280,960 | 1,396,310 | 2,432,314 |
| 1932..... | 320,724 | 627,719 | 270,866 | 898,585 | 1,219,309 |
| 1933..... | 329,230 | 521,959 | 217,180 | 739,139 | 1,068,369 |
| 1934..... | 241,263 | 759,167 | 360,166 | 1,119,333 | 1,360,596 |

fallacious to look for one lever alone to perform the tremendous task of raising a nation's business level. Prosperity is not merely a matter of new building materials or new industries or inventions, and certainly not of merely spending money if further economic maladjustments are created. It is basically a matter of price parities—that is of bringing about price and income levels so that great groups of people can swap the products of their labor with each other.

The Debts

We come now to the matter of debts, frequently held to be an insuperable obstacle to the early resumption of

which, with a touch of irony, are often referred to as income-producing property.

It is instructive, first of all, to consider how we got out from under indebtedness in former depressions. We liquidated a large portion by means of the "cleansing bath of bankruptcy" as some one has called it.

Somehow It Worked

Next, competition started to get in its work. The gentleman of the "strong hands," who now owned a foreclosed, debt-free, profit-making apartment house, took notice of the new, more modern apartment houses springing up, be-

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on a different basis than after former depressions and we are truly sailing uncharted seas.

Extent of Liquidation

There has of course been considerable debt liquidation since 1929. In spite of the efforts of the Home Owners Loan Corporation and other agencies, foreclosures in 1,012 identical communities were 158,395 in first ten months of 1934, as compared with 175,296 for the corresponding period of 1933; 172,924 in 1932, as against only 53,231 in 1926. HOLC had spent \$2,000,000,000 by Oct. 30 in saving 600,000 homes. But this of course was not liquidation, as it merely set up a Federal debt for private indebtedness. On the other hand, certain available figures show that liquidation by end of 1933 had not gone very far.

Realizing that recovery in the durable goods industries, especially in construction, has always depended on the capacity to create and carry new debts, the question at once arises whether we can create new mortgages for new construction on top of the vast structure of unliquidated indebtedness carried over from

previous construction. The answer must take other factors into account. Debts do not exist in a vacuum. Figures representing indebtedness only have meaning when related to population, income, value of the mortgaged assets, carrying charges and other factors.

The Weight of the Debts

Robert Doane recently gave out the figures shown in Table I, which we have adjusted slightly. Naturally, they can be little more than guesses, but they are interesting.

If Mr. Doane's figures are reasonably correct, the percentage of indebtedness on urban real estate rose from 14 in 1913 to only 15 in 1921. It increased sharply to 24 per cent in 1929 and had almost doubled by 1934, not because the debt was being increased—it was being very slowly liquidated—but because real estate values were being subjected to unprecedented deflation. If business recovery develops along sound lines, confidence in real estate values will return and values will rise. That is one way of easing the debt burden apart from liquidation. The rise in the Department of

Commerce's index of rents is one of the most important guides to the situation. Obviously, if rents rise, real property becomes more valuable. This index reached a peak in 1924 and declined continually from then on—a warning to the construction industry that received little attention before 1929. The index did not strike final bottom until February, 1934, and has been slowly climbing since. If this rise continues, it is the first true sign that an effective, not merely a theoretical, demand for space is developing. It is the figure that the professional builder looks at—that and the cost of building. Each point in the rise of the rent index adds value to real estate, lightens the debt burden and brings new construction that much nearer.

The figures further show a steep rise in urban indebtedness per capita. In the past the urban debt could rise without any growth of per capita debt at all because urban population was growing fast. The situation will be different in this decade. Some cities will grow, of course. But in general, urban population will reflect the declining rate of growth for the country as a whole. There is no

doubt, however, that a very large part of this debt is highly concentrated in the big metropolitan cities and it is certain that the debt burden in a great number of smaller communities is not excessive.

The Carrying Charges

There is another and highly important method of lightening the burden of the debt. That is by reducing the carrying charges. A debt of \$2,000,000 at 4 per cent interest is no more burdensome as far as current carrying charges are concerned than a debt of only \$1,000,000 at 8 per cent. Considering the staggering size of indebtedness, it is of the utmost importance to cut down the carrying charges wherever this can be done, but it is equally important that the interest rates on new mortgages be maintained at a level high enough to attract new capital. It will be no mean task to strike a balance between these two demands. The debt burden must be lightened and yet new capital must be attracted. In times of depression, capital seeks security at any price and accepts

Continued on Page 132

Steel Outlook Dampened by Uncertain Prospects for Rail and Building Demand

By M. DAVID GOULD



A SURVEY of the present position of the steel industry should do much to disillusion those who still have over-optimistic ideas as to the extent and the soundness of the measure of industrial recovery which has been achieved to date. Like the other heavy industries—copper, lumber, cement, &c.—steel continues to drag along at a relatively low ratio of production to capacity. Last year's production of 25,900,000 tons of ingots was equivalent to some 37 per cent of capacity, an improvement of only 14 per cent over 1933. The rate of production by quarters shows far greater irregularity than the merely seasonal fluctuations of any "normal" year, as follows: First quarter, 40 per cent of capacity; second, 54 per cent; third, 24 per cent; fourth, 28 per cent.

In terms of weekly production ratios the irregularity is even more pronounced: the highest week's production was 62 per cent of capacity, the lowest 17½ per cent, comparing with the depression low of 11 per cent.

Because the rate of recovery has been far from uniform in the various industries consuming steel, the proportions taken by these industries have been widely distorted from the normal ratios on which a degree of balance in the steel industry rests. The main outlets for steel last year were as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| Automobiles | 21.0% |
| Building construction | 13.5% |
| Railroads | 10.5% |
| Agriculture | 7.5% |
| Containers | 10.0% |

This has led to a disproportionate increase in the proportion of rolled products represented by light rolled steel (sheets, skelp, tinplate) and a correspondingly lower proportion of the total output in the form of structural steel, plates and rails.


To this have corresponded disproportions in the participation of the various steel centres in total output. Pittsburgh and Chicago, best equipped for handling orders for heavy material, have fallen behind, relative to Cleveland and Detroit, whose output better suits the requirements of the automobile and can industries. Similarly, United States Steel has

fallen behind the independents in proportion of total steel produced.

The first full year's operations of the Steel Code have been generally regarded as satisfactory, as well they might, since in its price-fixing provisions the code carries out more effectively and with the weight of a greater authority the purposes which the steel industry used to try to accomplish by gentlemen's agreements, the Gary dinners, &c. Moreover, the provision of the code forbidding the installation of new blast furnaces, open hearths and Bessemer converters, pre-

scanty margin was wiped out by the losses incurred through a lower rate of operations in the second half. At current rates of operation, around 44 per cent, it is questionable whether steel companies can do much better than break even.

This lends particular significance to the gathering storm clouds of coming labor troubles, postponed during 1934 through Presidential intervention. The intervening period has shown no indications of progress toward a real settlement, but rather of preparations for a



vents the repetition of such performances as the enormous additions to steel ingot capacity in 1930 and 1931 when the market was visibly falling away from the steel producers.

But the excessive competition restrained in this way from one field flows into another; rolling mill capacity increased by 1,000,000 tons last year, and it is anticipated that a further 2,000,000 tons will be added in 1935.

With the constricted market and increased rolling capacity, the outlook for better earnings in 1935 depends on increased demand from the capital goods industries, from building construction and the railroads. At rates of capacity which prevailed in the first half of last year, earnings of the industry as a whole were equivalent to only 1 per cent on the invested capital, and even this

bitter struggle. The storm may break on short notice, too, if we may believe the reports that the American Federation of Labor is preparing to tie up a strike in the steel industry with strikes in the automobile, textile and possibly other industries. In view of the small margin of profit, the fight for union recognition and improved conditions for the steel workers will hardly find a broad economic basis for easy and painless settlement in a broad margin of profits out of which the industry might make concessions, but rather the reverse.

Unquestionably a better feeling is prevalent in steel circles because of the continued upward counter-seasonal trend of new orders, the visible determination of the Roosevelt régime to continue its program of public spending, and particularly the intimations of a revival of

interest in building projects under the cautious encouragement of the Federal Housing Administration, and the hopes of improvement in agricultural buying based on a higher level of farm product prices supported by AAA activities.

STEEL INGOT AND PIG IRON PRODUCTION

| | (Thousands of tons) | Pig Iron. |
|---------------|---------------------|-----------|
| Steel Ingots. | | |
| 1914 | 22,820 | 23,050 |
| 1915 | 31,284 | 29,663 |
| 1916 | 41,402 | 39,039 |
| 1917 | 43,619 | 38,186 |
| 1918 | 43,051 | 38,506 |
| 1919 | 33,695 | 30,583 |
| 1920 | 40,881 | 36,414 |
| 1921 | 19,224 | 16,544 |
| 1922 | 34,568 | 26,880 |
| 1923 | 43,486 | 40,059 |
| 1924 | 36,811 | 31,108 |
| 1925 | 44,141 | 36,403 |
| 1926 | 46,936 | 39,070 |
| 1927 | 43,777 | 36,232 |
| 1928 | 50,325 | 37,538 |
| 1929 | 54,850 | 42,286 |
| 1930 | 39,595 | 31,399 |
| 1931 | 25,429 | 18,275 |
| 1932 | 13,323 | 8,686 |
| 1933 | 22,594 | 13,213 |
| 1934 | 25,261 | 15,911 |

The foregoing, however, should suffice to indicate the desirability of a certain reserve in estimating the immediate outlook for steel producers.

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Extraordinary Influences Affecting the Precious And Non-Ferrous Metals

By PERCY E. BARBOUR



GOLD and silver and the non-ferrous base metals faced the most diverse and complicated situations in 1934 ever presented in the same market. Gold could only be sold to the government and its price was fixed at \$35 an ounce, as compared with the previous world price for years of \$20.67 per ounce.

The price for silver was fixed by the government at 64½ cents, and later silver was nationalized. The New York market has therefore had two quotations, the government price and the world price.

Copper operated under a code, for most of the year, under which there was a fixed price for Blue Eagle copper; there was another for non-Blue Eagle (bootleg) copper, and there was another export price.

Lead and zinc operated under codes but without price-fixing provisions, and prices were determined by the law of supply and demand.

There was a moderate improvement over 1933 but the promise of the first and second quarters failed to carry through the third and last. As one metal authority puts it, "opinion is virtually unanimous as to the cause, that the efforts of Washington are not succeeding." The mining industry was never in better shape to produce abundantly and efficiently and if in the battle of Roosevelt vs. Recovery (Ralph West Robey) recovery should win, the mining industry has a bright outlook.

GOLD

THE gold production of the world for 1934 I estimate at 26,814,000 ounces, an all-time high, compared with 25,369,879 ounces in 1933, with 24,227,415 ounces in 1932 and with 22,593,833 ounces the previous pre-depression peak in 1915. Thus the 1915 peak, which was supposed to mark the beginning of the decadence of gold mining, has been exceeded in each of the last three years and each year has exceeded the one before.

Every country in the world indicates an increase over the previous year except Canada and South Africa. These two, the world's third and first producers respectively, have produced more tons of ore, but of lower grade, thus producing less ounces of gold. The high price for gold has made the mining of low-grade ores profitable. The higher grade ore remains to be mined. Thus both total profits and the length of life of the mines have been increased. Canada's production is estimated at 2,920,000 ounces, compared with 2,947,618 ounces in 1933 and 3,044,387 ounces in the previous year. Transvaal produced 8,741,509 ounces the first ten months of 1934, as compared to 9,224,871 ounces during the same period in the previous year. The Transvaal production for the full year 1934 is estimated at 9,615,639 ounces compared with 11,025,000 ounces in 1933 and 11,559,000 ounces in the previous year.

The United States production is estimated at 2,736,000 ounces, the highest since 1919; this compares with 2,536,913 ounces in 1933 and 2,449,032 ounces in 1932.

Russia the Star Performer

Russia made the greatest advance. A recent dispatch from Moscow gives the information that Serebrovski, president of the gold trust, reported to Stalin that

the Russian gold production for the first eleven months of 1934 "increased 49 per cent as compared with the full year 1933." The dispatch continues "that the total for 1934 is likely to reach 170,000,000 rubles."

The production for 1933 is given by the American Bureau of Metal Statistics as 2,814,000 ounces. The above rate of increase would indicate a production of 4,192,000 ounces for 1934. The Soviet gold ruble contains .774234 grams of pure gold. Therefore, if 170,000,000 rubles are produced, as anticipated in the Moscow dispatch, this would be equivalent to 4,232,000 ounces. However, if the twelfth month averaged the same as the other eleven for which the production is known and given the 1934 total would be 4,082,000 ounces and this I expect to be realized. This looks like a very large increase over 1933 and other previous years.

Production Stimulated by Roosevelt

The United States price for gold was \$34.06, until Jan. 15, after which it was moved up to \$34.45, where it remained until Feb. 1. Effective this latter date the government was authorized to buy

mined prior to Dec. 22, 1933, and including all bullion not eligible for sale to the United States Government, stood at 43½ to 44½ cents per ounce at the beginning of the year. It fluctuated within narrow limits up for three months and down for two. In May, however, it started a more or less steady upward climb, reaching 55½ cents Nov. 23, a high since 1929. The low for the year was 41.75 cents. It closed at 54.75 cents.

SILVER PRODUCTION, 1934

(Ounces)

| | World. | United States. |
|-----------|------------|----------------|
| January | 14,828,000 | 2,025,000 |
| February | 13,368,000 | 1,903,000 |
| March | 13,640,000 | 2,791,000 |
| April | 16,519,000 | 2,389,000 |
| May | 16,131,000 | 2,303,000 |
| June | 14,871,000 | 2,312,000 |
| July | 13,667,000 | 2,312,000 |
| August | 15,481,000 | 2,353,000 |
| September | 14,974,000 | 2,786,000 |
| October | 15,411,000 | 2,099,000 |
| November | 15,308,000 | 1,976,000 |

Pig Silver

The monthly production as given in the accompanying table and the domestic production in the accompanying chart show that the government price fixing for silver, nearly 50 per cent in excess of the world price, did not stimulate silver production either domestically or abroad, despite the resulting foreign ex-

| | Gold and Silver Production | | | |
|-------|----------------------------|--------|--------|-----------|
| | (Thousands of fine ounces) | | | |
| | U.S.A. | Canada | Russia | Transvaal |
| 1915 | 4,888 | 918 | 1,273 | 9,096 |
| 1916 | 4,479 | 930 | 1,088 | 9,297 |
| 1917 | 4,061 | 739 | 871 | 9,018 |
| 1918 | 3,321 | 700 | 580 | 8,418 |
| 1919 | 2,919 | 767 | 532 | 8,332 |
| 1920 | 2,476 | 765 | 57 | 8,158 |
| 1921 | 2,422 | 928 | 43 | 8,129 |
| 1922 | 2,363 | 1,263 | 147 | 7,010 |
| 1923 | 2,503 | 1,233 | 251 | 9,149 |
| 1924 | 2,528 | 1,525 | 958 | 9,575 |
| 1925 | 2,352 | 1,736 | 985 | 9,598 |
| 1926 | 2,335 | 1,782 | 992 | 9,956 |
| 1927 | 2,197 | 1,883 | 1,061 | 10,354 |
| 1928 | 2,223 | 891 | 1,100 | 10,354 |
| 1929 | 2,208 | 1,928 | 1,100 | 10,412 |
| 1930 | 2,286 | 2,102 | 1,300 | 10,716 |
| 1931 | 2,396 | 2,694 | 1,700 | 10,878 |
| 1932 | 2,449 | 3,044 | 1,990 | 11,559 |
| 1933 | 2,537 | 2,948 | 2,814 | 11,025 |
| 1934* | 2,736 | 2,920 | ... | 9,616 |

*Estimated.

gold at \$35 per ounce, and this price prevailed throughout the balance of the year.

This huge increase in the price for gold, over the old price of \$20.67, has stimulated gold production in every corner of the world and if the price is raised to \$41.34, for which there has been much agitation in this country, it will still further stimulate production. Much more low-grade material will become profitable and in so far as present plants are operated on this lower grade material their output in ounces will decrease, but new sources will come into production and the final total will probably show further increase.

SILVER

PERHAPS the less said about the silver situation the better. If one takes a truthful, sound position as to silver one immediately gets into a fight; and if one takes the other side one is associated either with the most misguided lot or the greatest charlatans (it will require more perspective to differentiate) with which current affairs are afflicted.

On Dec. 21, 1933, the price of silver was fixed at 64½ cents, as the result of government fiat. It remained the government price throughout the year applicable to new domestic production. The New York price for silver of so-called foreign origin, including domestic silver

ports. There was no reason among the well informed to expect that it would. There is only one strictly silver mine of any importance operating in the United States. Silver production is almost entirely a by-product of nonferrous base metal production. Colonel H. H. Stout, a distinguished metallurgist, in a paper before the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America has shown that " * * * with silver price below 40 cents silver production runs fairly parallel with the total production of copper plus lead plus zinc and is therefore mostly involuntary. * * * " At 25 cents an ounce silver production is 96 per cent involuntary." If he had needed vindication of his figures 1934 amply provided it. The government price of 50 per cent over world prices did not increase domestic production, but was merely a political silver offering. Because there is no silver mining industry, per se, in this country — barring one lone and not great producer — silver production will increase only when business recovers sufficiently to require the mining of more copper, lead and zinc and therefore the production of more by-product silver.

The nationalizing of silver, the closing of trading in silver on the New York Commodity Exchange, the resulting opening of a silver exchange in Montreal, the protest of China because of the ill effect on her interior economy produced by the United States artificially high

government prices for silver and later the Chinese export duty of 10 per cent on its silver, have no bearing whatever on the mine production of silver. They are only episodes in ill-advised government tinkering with money and the law of supply and demand with respect to a metal which is a commodity pure and simple and has no sacrosanct qualities just because at various times in the world's history and in various places it has been used as a medium of exchange.

Political Aspects

Considerable interest was aroused late in the year by a letter sent out from a New York financial house "in which a suggestion was made as to a solution of the present difficulties, which would be an increase in the monetary value of silver to its former gold ratio. They say this step would result in the establishment of a mint price for silver of about \$2.18 per fine ounce, would give the Treasury a large profit on its present silver holdings, &c."

The Washington correspondent of The



New York Times wrote last Spring of the President, "Recently he confided to the public his sorrowful admission that the much-touted Warren gold-purchase plan had not worked. * * * His experiences with gold have made him more resolved than ever not to attempt something similar with silver" (Arthur Krock, April 26, 1934). Nevertheless, nationalization of silver followed. A great deal of hard common sense and truth is behind the following extract from the Sun Dial:

Q.—I say, what does the nationalization of silver mean?

A.—It means fewer tiresome debates on the floors of Congress, longer newspaper editorials and a high fever among all good Republicans.

Q.—How is silver nationalized?

A.—The government takes over all free silver stocks, wraps them in the American flag and hopes nothing serious will come of it.

The most outstanding thing in the silver farce is the utter refutation of the main argument of the advocates of a rise in the price of silver and the untold benefits it would be to poor China and other Orientals forming half the population of the world who use silver for currency. China was forced to diplomatic protest as a result of the ill effects on her economic situation. She was informed that it was a matter of law and nothing could be done about it. Our solicitude for the poor Oriental seemed to have ended when we secured the silver dold for our silver producers.

COPPER


OWING to the complexity of the copper situation and the many diverse factors entering into it, an appraisal of the year 1934 and of the outlook depends entirely on whether one takes a view of the year in retrospect or a long-range view of future business recovery and also on whether the esti-

mate is made from a domestic or foreign standpoint.

In this country mine production was less than the year before but there was a very material reduction in refined stocks and there was a substantial betterment in price. There was also a moderate increase in consumption despite the fact that general business conditions during the last six months of the year were far from heartening.

New High Records Abroad

A broad the consumption of copper increased markedly, reaching the highest ever recorded, general recovery there having far outdistanced that in the United States. However, foreign mine production also increased to a new high record; Canada and Rhodesia produced more than ever before. Moreover, foreign plans for increases in production and plant, if carried out, indicate a still further large increase in 1935. But despite the great improvement in foreign consumption and production, the world price at which the foreign production was sold was very low on the average and reached a bottom of 6.075 cents, New York export price, which is equivalent to



a gold-dust price of 3.584 cents, with a 59-cent depreciated dollar. This figure is only of academic interest because of the depreciation also in other foreign exchanges.

The outlook from the foreign standpoint would be quite cheerful were it not for the fact that the South American copper, produced by United States companies, finds its only outlet abroad on account of our tariff. It is this copper which has kept the world price depressed. On the other hand, it is this foreign outlet which has enabled the domestic companies, with both foreign and domestic production, to resume dividends in a small way in face of the statistical situation.

Foreign Producers Divide the Market

Being thoroughly skeptical of the efficacy of the New Deal, the domestic outlook does not seem to me to be propitious. The foreign field offers a fairer promise of progress and increased consumption to be fought for by the South American, Canadian and African producers; with Canadian copper a by-product and its cost somewhat a matter of bookkeeping and with South American copper having the edge on cost over Africa, but the distinct disadvantage of a strong European nationalism, which is euphemistic for antagonism.

Efforts are again rife to establish what is in effect a world copper cartel, composed of the eight or ten principal American and foreign producers; but foreign editorial comment is sarcastic. One London source writes at length of "America's wanng grip on world's copper trade"; The Manchester Guardian asks, "Are the low cost people prepared to hold up an umbrella to shelter high-cost properties in the United States?" and The London Metal Bulletin says, "Owing to the fiasco of Copper Exporters, Inc., only a few years ago, however, there are signs of a greater disposition, on this occasion merely to balance production, with consumption and to leave prices to look after themselves."

Under the Blue Eagle

The most outstanding event in the copper situation domestically was the adop-

tion of an NRA Copper Code with provisions for restriction of production and fixing of prices, both of which have been done. Thus is accomplished under a Presidential executive order what was heretofore illegal under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, which, in so far as prices were concerned, Copper Exporters, Inc., succeeded in circumventing. The code required the setting up of an authority to administer it and the statement has been made that "there are more complications in the code of fair competition than have arisen under open-market practices all during the last fifty years." However, under the code aegis stocks have been reduced, cutthroat competition has been eliminated which would otherwise have arisen because all parties to the code were not in favor of it and some yielded under duress what they considered their constitutional rights, and a price has been maintained during more than half of the year 30 to 40 per cent above the world price.

Copper started the year at a price of 8.025 cents per pound New York refineries; the corresponding export price

tons, showing a decrease for eleven months of 158,500 tons. An increase in stocks was looked for during the last month and the total decrease for the year is estimated at 152,000 tons. Most of this was in United States stocks. The Bureau of Mines figures give total smelter and refining stocks in the United States at the end of 1934 as 462,000 tons, as against 600,500 tons at the end of 1933, a decrease of 137,500 tons.

Stocks in bonded warehouses in England were 53,807 tons on Dec. 15. Stocks in United States warehouses increased from 11,876 to 24,696 tons. Hence the world visible stocks at the end of the year are estimated at 550,000 tons. This is equivalent to more than a year's domestic supply at the present rate of consumption, and nearly six months' world supply.

Domestic consumption for the year, including secondary copper produced by primary plants, is estimated at 440,000 tons, as compared with 381,726 tons in 1933 and with 335,981 tons the previous year.

Foreign consumption for the year is estimated at 1,137,000 tons, compared

demand defeated the sumptuary laws of the New Deal and lead statistics and prices were unfavorable at the end

ZINC

As the year closed, the zinc situation did not make such good reading. At the end of December stocks of slab zinc amounted to 119,830 tons, as against 104,710 tons Jan. 1. Production increased from 32,954 tons in January to 35,685 tons in December. Deliveries for the third quarter amounted only to 70,599 tons, in comparison with 97,769 tons during the second quarter and 91,646 tons during the first quarter and 122,281 tons during the third quarter of 1933. Deliveries during the last quarter of 1934 were 91,929 tons, compared with 92,449 during the last quarter of 1933. Zinc business picked up with steel in April, but the severe business recession during the Summer ended all hopes for betterment and the third quarter saw a big falling off in demand and deliveries and the year ended poorly.

Early in the Fall serious consideration was given to plans for curtailment of metal output. Meetings of the custom smelters were held, but finally resulted only in the appointment of a committee to consider what steps should be taken to balance production and consumption in 1935. As always happens in such cases, certain companies held large stocks of metal, while others had maintained a level book. The latter maintained that in any curtailment they should not be penalized, but that those sources which had been piling up stocks should be called upon either to reduce production or suspend it entirely.

The domestic situation was not helped any by conditions abroad, although foreign statistics showed an improvement. Cartel stocks decreased from 147,975 tons at the beginning of the year to 123,779 tons at the end of October, but latterly statistics showed considerable deterioration. This was attributed partly to a big increase in the German output since production began at the new Magdeburg electrolytic zinc plant. It was expected that by the end of the year the plant would be running to full capacity, 40,000 metric tons annually.

Cartel Abandoned

According to foreign dispatches, the International Zinc Cartel was to cease functioning Jan. 1, 1935. The break-up is the result of the attitude of German producers, who for some time have wanted to withdraw, and their request for a larger quota to care for the new Magdeburg production; the intended withdrawal of the Australian producers who find it profitable to keep up production and pay cartel fines for the excess, and the preferential duty on zinc imported into the United Kingdom in favor of Empire producers.

At the beginning of the year zinc was quoted at 4.30-4.35 cents St. Louis and closed the year at 3.725 cents. The high and low quotations for the year were 4.40 and 3.65 cents respectively.

The domestic zinc industry adopted an NRA code but zinc statistics and prices failed to show any benefit; in fact, they got worse. The law of supply and demand in the zinc industry defeated the sumptuary laws of the New Deal, and this in spite of all the "pump priming" to business in general. Trade papers are whistling in the dark when they say that current domestic stocks are only sufficient to supply about four months' needs at the current rate of consumption. They are three or four times as large as they were during that post-war period when business was running on an even and prosperous keel. The outlook is not promising.

REFINED AND BLISTER COPPER

(Short tons—2,000 pounds)

| | Production. | | Consumption. | | Stocks, U.S.A. |
|-------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|----------------|
| | U.S.A. | World. | U.S.A. | World. | |
| 1922 | 511,970 | 996,147 | 502,046 | 1,095,811 | 288,500 |
| 1923 | 754,000 | 1,411,990 | 730,728 | 1,331,040 | 348,000 |
| 1924 | 819,000 | 1,522,394 | 756,579 | 1,491,923 | 318,000 |
| 1925 | 854,000 | 1,589,717 | 813,497 | 1,673,843 | 278,000 |
| 1926 | 878,000 | 1,637,489 | 904,217 | 1,726,532 | 300,500 |
| 1927 | 847,419 | 1,682,361 | 825,182 | 1,758,058 | 286,000 |
| 1928 | 935,198 | 1,892,350 | 983,472 | 2,009,383 | 268,500 |
| 1929 | 1,026,348 | 2,130,589 | 1,119,386 | 2,084,560 | 403,000 |
| 1930 | 710,690 | 1,734,745 | 808,758 | 1,714,187 | 532,500 |
| 1931 | 524,631 | 1,487,992 | 600,753 | 1,406,535 | 636,300 |
| 1932 | 255,509 | 994,238 | 335,981 | 1,080,695 | 691,000 |
| 1933 | 233,649 | 1,114,740 | 381,726 | 1,242,183 | 600,500 |
| 1934* | 225,800 | 1,278,000 | 440,000 | 1,577,000 | |

*Dec. 31 of each year. *Estimated.

was 8.050 cents. During February and March it held at 7.775 cents. It was advanced in four steps to 8.775 cents the early part of June under the code aegis and remained there throughout the remainder of the year. This is equivalent to 9 cents f. o. b. Valley points. About the middle of April the export price fell below the New York price and continued downward until Oct. 10, when it touched 6.075 cents, the low for the year. It closed the year at 6.700 cents. The anomaly of this difference is viewed differently here and abroad. The domestic copper people point with pride to the results of the copper tariff and the code which enabled them to maintain a nine-cent price during more than six months of the year, while the foreign commentators wonder how the American people enjoy paying 2 to 2½ cents per pound over the world price.

Production Higher

According to figures of the Copper Institute, unofficially but regularly published, the domestic monthly production of mines varied from 15,500 to 20,250 tons monthly. The indicated total for the full year is 225,800 tons, compared with 233,649 tons in 1933 and 255,509 tons in the year previous.

Foreign mine production increased more or less regularly from 57,000 tons at the beginning to 84,000 tons in November. The total of foreign mine production is estimated at 1,053,000 tons, compared with 911,091 tons in 1933 and 738,729 tons the previous year.

Stocks Lower

World stocks of refined copper in the hands of refiners on Jan. 1, 1935, as estimated by the Copper Institute, were 494,300 tons, as compared with 642,000 tons on Jan. 31, 1934. Stocks in foreign bonded warehouses amounted to 41,984 tons. At the end of November the world stocks in refiners' hands were 483,500

with 744,714 tons in 1933 and 965,174 tons in 1929, the boom year.

LEAD

The lead industry had a dull year. Stocks of refined lead increased from 203,061 tons on Jan. 1 to 240,595 tons at the end of July and then decreased every month to 229,859 tons at the end of October. Total stocks of lead, all forms, in smelters' and refiners' hands, in transit and in process, increased from 284,625 tons Jan. 1 to 315,492 tons at the end of October. Consumption and production were fairly well balanced during the first five months of the year but with the slackening of business, statistics went the wrong way and, in the fall, production actually showed an increase even in the face of increasing stocks and decreasing business. Domestic production in January was 34,818 tons, fell to 28,723 tons in April, jumped to 34,741 tons in May, fell to 27,070 tons in September and in October jumped to 31,243 tons.

Shipments to consumers during the first seven months of 1934 were 207,798 tons, against 191,906 tons in the same period the previous year.

LEAD AND ZINC PRODUCTION

(Short tons—2,000 pounds)

| | Lead Production. | | Zinc Production. | |
|-------|------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|
| | U.S.A. | World. | U.S.A. | World. |
| 1923 | 530,000 | 1,314,001 | 531,202 | 1,059,821 |
| 1924 | 590,000 | 1,467,265 | 535,846 | 1,125,188 |
| 1925 | 662,500 | 1,669,854 | 590,928 | 1,265,714 |
| 1926 | 696,000 | 1,770,278 | 638,533 | 1,373,212 |
| 1927 | 670,000 | 1,887,998 | 613,548 | 1,464,091 |
| 1928 | 649,800 | 1,841,012 | 619,595 | 1,566,919 |
| 1929 | 688,000 | 1,932,520 | 631,601 | 1,620,896 |
| 1930 | 593,129 | 1,570,707 | 504,463 | 1,554,742 |
| 1931 | 411,236 | 1,538,534 | 300,738 | 1,107,948 |
| 1932 | 277,435 | 1,295,108 | 215,531 | 873,806 |
| 1933 | 292,543 | 1,321,554 | 324,705 | 1,103,468 |
| 1934* | 360,000 | 1,475,000 | 382,700 | |

*Estimated by Bureau of Mines.

The New York price for lead was 4 cents at the beginning of the year, rose to 4.25 cents in April and then with some slight irregularities fell to 3.50 cents and closed the year at 3.70 cents.

The domestic lead industry adopted an NRA code, but the law of supply and

Coal Production and Prices Up in a Transitional Year of Shifting Tonnage

By A. T. SHURICK



BITUMINOUS coal production in 1934 was 357,000,000 tons, which compares with THE ANNALIST estimate of 369,000,000 tons, a difference of 3 per cent. The 1934 production is up 7 per cent from 1933 and 15 per cent above 1932, the lowest in two decades; but it is still 38 per cent off from 1926, the year of recent maximum production, when it amounted to 573,366,985 tons.

The 1934 production was satisfactory, considering the estimates of ten million unemployed. It is gratifying evidence that the immediate prospects do not justify a much quoted opinion that "it seems possible for this country to do a good year's business on a consumption of as low as 300,000,000 tons of bituminous coal."

Decline in West Virginia Proportion

Comparative output of the three major mining sections for 1933 and 1934 is shown in Table I, with the percentage of national production contributed by each. Southern production is up 6.3 per cent, against 9.5 per cent for Northern.

Southern West Virginia had its first loss in percentage of national production since 1923, exclusive of 1928, following the abnormal production of 1927 with protracted strikes at Northern mines. The increase of Southern mine wages reacted sharply on West Kentucky, which made but 2.13 per cent of National production, compared with its peak year of 4.10 per cent in 1927.

The Pennsylvania pick-up of 2.00 in its proportion of national production, Table I, is the widest increase in two decades exclusive of the abnormal year 1923; Pennsylvania has made a satisfactory start in the recovery of its former proportion of around 36 per cent. Ohio and Northern West Virginia reacted from the high percentages made during the 1933 strike year in Pennsylvania; these losses were helped along by freight-rate decision against Ohio coals, and by a strike in Northern West Virginia.

Midwest coals have responded slowly to the mine-wage revisions of which they are the leading beneficiary, not to mention their special equipment for low-cost production under high-wage scales. The severe liquidation of the past decade has reacted upon the recuperative powers of Midwest operators, but they have less ground to recover than the Eastern coals.

Anthracite Has Good Year

Anthracite production for 1934 amounted to 57,385,000 tons, compared with 49,541,344 in 1933. This increase of 16 per cent is still too far behind the approximate normal of 73,828,000 in 1929, and substantially off from the record production of 99,611,811 tons in 1917. The pick-up in 1934 was due to better general consumption and to recapturing business supplanted by bituminous coals under their former low-wage scales.

Effort to establish an anthracite code has been suspended. Prospects for the industry continue encouraging, though internecine labor-union controversies have created incipient trouble locally. A constructive move is under way to consolidate the bulk of the independent anthracite production in a single marketing agency.

Bituminous Problems

Both operators and miners are concentrating efforts on perfecting the bitumi-

nous Coal Code and anticipating its expiration next June. Results under the Code have given the coal man a new concept, stimulating his imagination, and the industry is verging to the other extreme from its former ultra-conservatism. Revolutionary plans are simmering at the Washington conference as this is written, the possibilities of which cannot be presently appraised.

Negotiations of a new wage scale for April 1 is one of the immediate problems with grave possibilities. The United Mine Workers are restive at imperfections in the code that jeopardize its future; the union's demonstrated capacity to close down industry of the country, with 80 per cent of the coal production organized in 1922, is a measure of what may be anticipated with the present 95 per cent unionization of the mines.

Crisis in Price Differentials

Inter-district price differentials have proved an insurmountable problem after more than a year of continuing conferences and temporary expedients. The situation is precisely as a year ago when a crisis was developing and this review stated that code prices were one of the major problems belonging to the history of 1934.

But 1934 came to a close with a formal declaration by the Western Pennsylvania Division (the second largest in the country) that threatens to precipitate independent action in price determination. Intradistrict price control will continue, but a breakdown in interdistrict prices is in prospect that will force the government into the picture. The situation has concealed potentialities of grave import, but the administration has shown a singular adeptness in handling these matters.

The violation of code minima prices, either surreptitiously or through various subterfuges, has come in for belated investigation by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, and brought a threat of strike action against offending companies by the United Mine Workers. Adequate machinery for fixing and controlling prices in the most immediate and serious problem facing the industry.

The Long-Pull Outlook

The proposed increase in freight rates of 3 to 30 cents a ton, estimated to average 20 to 25 cents on all coal, puts these rates 3 to 8 cents a ton above the previous high average of 1920-22. This increase, with the code price increases, will react on the long-pull prospects for the industry, and will be immediately adverse to the long-haul Southern coals to the Northern industrialized zone, most of this tonnage taking the maximum increase. The average coal tariff on the Chesapeake & Ohio, for example, is \$1.65 per ton (1932), compared with \$1.19 on the New York Central¹. The ruling on this is expected in March.

Enactment of a thirty-hour week statute by the present Congress will step up coal costs materially, due to peculiar technical conditions inherent in coal mining, with a further repercussion on the outlook for the industry.

Hydropower under construction and projected will ultimately total the equivalent of 40,000,000 tons of bituminous

¹See study by the writer in the October, 1933, "Mining and Metallurgy."
²From a study by the writer in "An Analysis of the Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co." Railroad Analyses, Inc., Baltimore, Md.

Continued on Page 123

Table I. Production by States and Districts

| | Millions of Tons. | | | Per Cent of National Production. | | |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------|--------|----------------------------------|--------|--------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | Ch'ge. | 1934. | 1933. | Ch'ge. |
| Southern. | | | | | | |
| Southern West Virginia | 74.9 | 70.5 | + 4.4 | 20.98 | 21.14 | - 0.16 |
| Eastern Kentucky | 30.1 | 28.3 | + 1.8 | 8.43 | 8.47 | - 0.04 |
| West Kentucky | 7.6 | 7.8 | - 0.2 | 2.13 | 2.35 | - 0.22 |
| Virginia | 9.4 | 8.2 | + 1.2 | 2.63 | 2.46 | + 0.17 |
| Total | 122.0 | 114.8 | + 7.2 | 34.17 | 34.42 | - 0.25 |
| Eastern. | | | | | | |
| Pennsylvania | 92.0 | 79.3 | + 12.7 | 25.77 | 23.77 | + 2.00 |
| Northern West Virginia | 23.3 | 23.8 | - 0.5 | 6.53 | 7.14 | - 0.61 |
| Ohio | 19.9 | 19.6 | + 0.3 | 5.57 | 5.87 | - 0.30 |
| Total | 135.2 | 122.7 | + 12.5 | 37.87 | 36.78 | + 1.09 |
| Midwest. | | | | | | |
| Illinois | 40.5 | 37.4 | + 3.1 | 11.35 | 11.22 | + 0.13 |
| Indiana | 15.0 | 13.8 | + 1.2 | 4.20 | 4.12 | + 0.08 |
| Total | 55.5 | 51.2 | + 4.3 | 15.55 | 15.34 | + 0.21 |
| Total Northern | 190.7 | 173.9 | + 16.8 | 53.42 | 52.12 | + 1.30 |
| Total tonnage covered | 312.7 | 288.7 | + 24.0 | 87.59 | 86.54 | + 1.05 |
| Other production | 44.3 | 44.9 | - 0.6 | 12.41 | 13.46 | - 1.05 |
| Total for country | 357.0 | 333.6 | + 23.4 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 0.00 |

*Preliminary figures for eleven months, with December estimated.

Table II. Tidewater and New England Shipments.
(Ten Months Ended October)

| Tidewater Shipments. | Thousands of Tons. | | Thous. | Per Cent. |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | | |
| Northern: | | | | |
| Central Pennsylvania | 5,143 | 4,648 | + 495 | + 10.7 |
| Meyersdale, Cumberland-Piedmont | 1,750 | 1,620 | + 130 | + 8.0 |
| Western Pennsylvania and Fairmont | 1,845 | 1,575 | + 270 | + 17.2 |
| Total northern | 8,738 | 7,843 | + 895 | + 11.4 |
| Southern: | | | | |
| Low volatile | 11,324 | 10,631 | + 693 | + 6.5 |
| High volatile | 3,601 | 3,829 | - 228 | - 6.0 |
| Total southern | 14,925 | 14,460 | + 465 | + 3.2 |
| Total tidewater | 23,663 | 22,303 | + 1,360 | + 6.1 |
| New England Shipments: | | | | |
| Northern, via tidewater | 904 | 595 | + 309 | + 51.9 |
| Northern, via rail | 4,477 | 3,838 | + 639 | + 16.8 |
| Total northern | 5,381 | 4,433 | + 948 | + 21.4 |
| Southern coastwise | 8,798 | 8,798 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Total shipments | 14,179 | 13,231 | + 948 | + 7.2 |

Table III. Ohio and Michigan Coal Receipts
(Nine Months Ended September, Thousands of Tons)

| Eastern. | Ohio. | | Michigan. | | Change. |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|-----------|---------|---------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | 1934. | 1933. | |
| Western Pennsylvania | 3,868 | 2,885 | + 983 | + 34.0 | 225 |
| C. Pa., Som.-My'dl. & Cum.-Pied. | 224 | 115 | + 109 | + 94.8 | + 204.1 |
| Fairmont | 1,324 | 1,070 | + 254 | + 23.7 | 167 |
| Northern & Eastern Ohio | 4,270 | 4,323 | - 53 | - 1.2 | 440 |
| Southern Ohio | 1,492 | 1,092 | + 400 | + 36.7 | 476 |
| Total Eastern | 11,178 | 9,485 | + 1,693 | + 17.8 | 1,308 |
| Southern: | | | | | |
| So. W. Va. high volatile | 3,135 | 3,273 | - 138 | - 4.2 | 3,233 |
| So. W. Va. low volatile | 2,736 | 2,665 | + 71 | + 2.7 | 2,292 |
| N. E. Ky. & McRoberts | 842 | 662 | + 180 | + 27.3 | 1,312 |
| Hazard, Harlan & S. Apn. | 1,512 | 1,540 | - 28 | - 1.9 | 1,803 |
| Total Southern | 8,225 | 8,140 | + 85 | + 1.1 | 8,640 |
| Unclassified | 1,120 | 428 | + 692 | + 161.7 | 163 |
| Total receipts | 20,523 | 18,053 | + 2,470 | + 13.7 | 10,111 |

*Includes Clearfield and Reynoldsville in 1934 only.

| Midwest. | Westbound Shipments. | | | Lake Shipments. | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|--------|---------|---------|
| | Thous. | Tons. | Change. | Thous. | Tons. | Change. | |
| Northern. | | | | | | | |
| Ohio | 8,114 | 7,585 | + 529 | + 7.0 | 2,473 | 2,340 | + 133 |
| Pennsylvania | 8,533 | 9,207 | - 3,326 | + 64.0 | 9,604 | 7,302 | + 2,302 |
| N. W. Va., Cum'dl-Pied. | 2,498 | 2,086 | + 402 | + 19.1 | 1,170 | 1,074 | + 96 |
| Total Eastern | 19,145 | 14,888 | + 4,257 | + 28.5 | 13,247 | 10,716 | + 2,531 |
| Midwest (Illinois & Ind.) | 34,900 | 30,359 | + 4,550 | + 15.0 | 13,247 | 10,716 | + 2,531 |
| Total Northern | 54,054 | 45,247 | + 8,807 | + 19.5 | 13,247 | 10,716 | + 2,531 |
| Southern: | | | | | | | |
| So. W. Va. low volatile | 11,283 | 10,878 | + 406 | + 3.7 | 6,189 | 5,869 | + 320 |
| So. W. Va. high volatile | 11,012 | 10,275 | + 737 | + 7.2 | 6,865 | 6,564 | + 361 |
| East Ky., Tenn. & Virginia | 9,742 | 9,358 | + 383 | + 4.1 | 5,738 | 4,935 | + 803 |
| West Kentucky | 4,846 | 4,715 | + 131 | + 2.8 | 311.4 | 370.8 | - 59.4 |
| Total Southern | 36,583 | 35,227 | + 1,656 | + 4.7 | 18,792 | 17,308 | + 1,484 |
| Total shipments | 90,937 | 80,474 | + 10,463 | + 13.0 | 32,039 | 28,024 | + 4,015 |

*Nine months ended September. †Season to Nov. 1.

Table V. Midwest and Northwest Rail Receipts.

| Midwest Receipts. | Northwest Receipts. | | Thous. | Tons. | Change. | Thous. | Tons. | Change. | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-------|---------|--------|---------|---------|------|
| | 1934. | 1933. | P.C. | 1934. | 1933. | P.C. | 1934. | 1933. | P.C. |
| Southern. | | | | | | | | | |
| Sou. W. Va. high volatile | 1,991 | 1,938 | + 53 | + 2.8 | 173.7 | 220.5 | - 46.8 | - 21.3 | |
| Sou. W. Va. low volatile | 5,404 | 5,328 | + 76 | + 1.4 | 643.6 | 772.6 | - 129.0 | - 16.7 | |
| N. E. Ky. & McRoberts | 1,181 | 1,090 | + 91 | + 8.3 | 162.4 | 202.8 | - 40.4 | - 20.2 | |
| Hazard, Harlan & So. App. | 1,816 | 2,069 | | | | | | | |


Petroleum Industry Harassed by Production Control Problem; Consumption Increases

THE petroleum industry was marked in 1934 by increased production, consumption and exports, by the maintenance of crude prices despite weakness in the refined markets, and by the efforts of the government to exercise control over production, culminating in the adverse Supreme Court decision early in 1935.

Crude production is estimated at 900 millions of barrels during 1934, on the

exports totaled approximately 67 millions, against 61 in 1933, and 28 in 1932, and were the highest since 1927. It will be noted that net exports of crude have been increasing in recent years, while those of refined have been declining; the trend reflects the gradual development of refining facilities in foreign countries.

The price structure was steady during most of the year. The 10-field crude



basis of the first eleven months, or very slightly above 1933, and the highest since 1929. Total imports, although above 1933, were lower than in other recent years.

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

(In millions of barrels of 42 gallons; from data of the United States Bureau of Mines)

*1934. 1933. 1932. 1931. 1930. 1929.

| Supply: | Crude | 900 | 899 | 785 | 851 | 898 | 1,007 |
|---------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-------|-------|
| Other oils... | 38 | 35 | 37 | 46 | 55 | 55 | 55 |
| Total | 938 | 934 | 822 | 897 | 953 | 1,062 | |
| Imports: | | | | | | | |
| Crude | 35 | 33 | 45 | 47 | 62 | 79 | |
| Refined | 13 | 13 | 30 | 39 | 44 | 30 | |
| Total supply | 986 | 980 | 897 | 983 | 1,059 | 1,171 | |

| Indicated Consumption: | Domestic | 915 | 865 | 836 | 903 | 926 | 940 |
|------------------------|----------|-----|-----|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Exports: | | | | | | | |
| Crude | 42 | 37 | 27 | 26 | 24 | 26 | |
| Refined | 73 | 70 | 76 | 99 | 133 | 137 | |
| Total | 1,030 | 972 | 939 | 1,028 | 1,083 | 1,103 | |

| Stocks: | Net change | +8 | -42 | -45 | -24 | +68 |
|---------|------------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Crude | 7 | 4 | -18 | -11 | -38 | -53 |
| Refined | 60 | 57 | 46 | 60 | 89 | 107 |
| Total | 67 | 61 | 28 | 49 | 51 | 54 |

*Estimated. ¹Natural gasoline and benzol.

Domestic consumption is estimated at 915 millions of barrels, against 865 in 1933, and the highest since 1930. Net

price average of the Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter stood at \$1.197 from Jan. 1 to May 11, when it advanced to \$1.207. It remained at that figure until Nov. 9, when the pressure of increasing "hot oil" production sent the average down to \$1.182. A further reduction to \$1.157 took place on Dec. 7, at which it stood at the year-end, although a slight recovery to \$1.162 was reported on Jan. 4, 1935.

The central question during the year was whether the Federal Government could make effective its attempt to regulate production. The government's reluctance to press its control methods in the courts reflected doubt as to their constitutionality. That doubt was confirmed by the Supreme Court decision of Jan. 7, 1935. Whether new legislation can be drawn that will stand test in the courts and at the same time accomplish the regulation the administration seeks is far from certain. In the meantime the oil code and the various State laws continue operative, although in view of the experience of the past it is doubtful whether they will serve to prevent the destruction of crude price levels by cheap oils.

Foreign U. S. Cotton Markets Curtailed by 12-Cent Loans; Year's Consumption Lower

FOR cotton the year 1934 was distinguished by the further advance of prices to the highest levels since 1930, by the smallest crop since 1921, by the falling off of consumption and exports, by curtailment in the textile industry and the ensuing strike, by the enactment of the Bankhead Act, the 12-cent loans and the beginning of a second year of AAA control.

The year opened with spot cotton selling at 10.50 in New York. Prices advanced rapidly during the first half of January on the silver-purchase program and the budget message, and again, after a pause, on the devaluation of the dollar to 59.06 cents as of January 31, spot cotton reaching a Spring high of 12.65 on Feb. 10. Growing opposition in Congress to the original specifications of the proposed Bankhead Act, and the prospect of their modification, caused prices to slip off during the ensuing two months, the process being aided by the threat of drastic legislation from Congress regarding

hours of work in industry, &c. Reports purporting to indicate that the President was opposed to inflation broke prices toward the end of April, the spot market dropping to 10.75 on May 1. The ever-fresh silver agitation rallied the market, which had been unaffected by the tardy enactment of the Bankhead Act on a 10,000,000-bale basis, and by the end of June spot prices had risen to 12.45. Subsequent advances followed upon the crop estimates issued July 9 and Aug. 9 and the development of the drought, prices reaching their peak of 13.95 for the year on Aug. 9. Thereafter the market receded slowly for two months to 12.25 on Oct. 9, as the textile strike tied up the industry and general business receded, and exports fell off. Prices then marked time to the end of the year, slowly rising to 12.85 on Dec. 31.

The 1934 cotton crop amounted to 9,731,000 bales, according to the final estimate released Dec. 8, comparing with 13,047,000 in 1933, and 13,001,000 in 1932,

and, as noted, was the smallest since 1921. The yield per acre of 169.2 pounds was the smallest since 1929, reflecting the effects of the drought in Texas and Oklahoma. Acreage for harvest amounted to 27,515,000, against 29,978,000 in 1933, 35,939,000 in 1932, 38,705,000 in 1931, 42,454,000 in 1930 and 43,242,000 in 1929. It was the smallest acreage harvested since 1901, the result, of course, of the reduction under the AAA, although the goal of 25,000,000 acres was not reached.

World cotton production in 1934 is estimated at 23,000,000 bales, against 26,100,000 the year before, 23,700,000 in 1932, and 27,500,000 in 1931. Production of foreign cottons is estimated at 13,269,000 bales, against 13,053,000 in 1933, 10,699,000 in 1932, and 10,405,000 in 1931.

Foreign acreage was about 44,727,000, against 44,422,000 in 1933, 40,761,000 in 1932, and 42,295,000 in 1931; in connection with the statement that foreign acreage has been sharply increased by reason of the AAA it should be noted that the increase took place in the planting for

WORLD COTTON ACREAGE

(Thousands of acres, as estimated by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics)

| | 1934- 1935. | 1933- 1934. | 1932- 1933. | 1931- 1932. |
|----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| U. S. A. | 27,515 | 29,978 | 35,939 | 38,705 |
| India | 22,600 | 22,953 | 20,761 | 22,358 |
| Egypt | 1,798 | 1,873 | 1,135 | 1,747 |
| China | 6,747 | 6,142 | 5,630 | 4,800 |
| Total | 58,660 | 60,946 | 63,465 | 67,610 |
| Russia | 4,483 | 4,858 | 5,139 | 5,281 |
| Turkey | 491 | 400 | 358 | 491 |
| Other | (8,248) | 8,196 | 7,738 | 7,618 |
| World | 72,242 | 74,400 | 76,700 | 81,000 |
| Foreign | (44,727) | 44,422 | 40,761 | 42,295 |

*Preliminary. ¹Commercial crop chiefly.

†Area planted to Dec. 1 () Estimated.

NEW YORK COTTON FUTURES—1934

| Week Ended: | Jan. '34. | Mar. '34. | May '34. | July '34. | Oct. '34. | Dec. '34. | Jan. '35. |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Jan. 6. | 10.53 | 10.20 | 10.60 | 10.30 | 10.78 | 10.92 | 10.60 |
| Jan. 13. | 10.94 | 10.60 | 11.00 | 10.65 | 11.17 | 10.72 | 11.11 |
| Jan. 20. | 11.43 | 10.99 | 11.49 | 11.03 | 11.65 | 11.18 | 11.82 |
| Jan. 27. | 11.19 | 10.93 | 11.24 | 10.97 | 11.38 | 11.11 | 11.53 |
| Feb. 3. | 11.60 | 12.00 | 11.22 | 11.78 | 11.36 | 11.94 | 11.52 |
| Feb. 10. | 12.32 | 11.78 | 12.48 | 11.72 | 12.64 | 11.89 | 12.83 |
| Feb. 17. | 12.37 | 11.75 | 12.54 | 11.90 | 12.71 | 12.05 | 13.03 |
| Feb. 24. | 12.18 | 11.90 | 12.34 | 12.08 | 12.51 | 12.23 | 12.85 |
| Mar. 3. | 12.28 | 11.68 | 12.38 | 11.77 | 12.50 | 11.90 | 12.07 |
| Mar. 10. | 12.14 | 11.97 | 12.26 | 12.05 | 12.38 | 12.16 | 12.65 |
| Mar. 17. | 12.35 | 12.21 | 12.05 | 12.48 | 12.21 | 12.60 | 12.34 |
| Mar. 24. | 12.05 | 11.80 | 12.13 | 11.84 | 12.23 | 11.95 | 12.53 |
| Mar. 31. | 12.64 | 12.22 | 12.88 | 12.11 | 12.55 | 12.11 | 12.13 |
| Apr. 7. | 12.64 | 12.41 | 12.10 | 11.90 | 12.23 | 12.01 | 12.52 |
| Apr. 14. | 12.57 | 12.31 | 12.09 | 11.81 | 12.18 | 11.92 | 12.49 |
| Apr. 21. | 12.35 | 11.90 | 11.84 | 11.41 | 11.95 | 11.50 | 12.26 |
| Apr. 28. | 12.00 | 11.31 | 11.51 | 10.71 | 11.61 | 10.86 | 11.85 |
| May 5. | 11.65 | 11.13 | 11.08 | 10.53 | 11.22 | 10.70 | 11.51 |
| May 12. | 11.92 | 11.61 | 11.38 | 11.19 | 11.65 | 11.31 | 11.77 |
| May 19. | 12.02 | 11.57 | 11.49 | 11.14 | 11.59 | 11.14 | 11.92 |
| May 26. | 11.94 | 11.69 | 11.83 | 11.37 | 11.71 | 11.42 | 11.80 |
| June 2. | 12.28 | 11.83 | 12.37 | 11.92 | 12.11 | 11.88 | 12.18 |
| June 9. | 12.59 | 12.09 | 12.67 | 12.19 | 12.09 | 11.62 | 12.33 |
| June 16. | 12.71 | 12.39 | 12.79 | 12.47 | 12.20 | 12.33 | 12.44 |
| June 23. | 12.71 | 12.40 | 12.81 | 12.52 | 12.17 | 12.45 | 12.27 |
| June 30. | 12.79 | 12.52 | 12.88 | 12.62 | 12.28 | 12.98 | 12.69 |
| July 7. | 12.67 | 12.53 | 12.77 | 12.42 | 12.18 | 12.39 | 12.57 |
| July 14. | 13.42 | 12.35 | 13.47 | 12.45 | 13.16 | 12.07 | 13.34 |
| July 21. | 13.59 | 13.11 | 13.66 | 12.87 | 13.17 | 12.69 | 13.50 |
| July 28. | 13.28 | 12.86 | 13.35 | 12.89 | 13.27 | 13.04 | 13.21 |
| Aug. 4. | 13.51 | 13.22 | 13.55 | 13.28 | 13.63 | 13.37 | 13.39 |
| Aug. 11. | 14.15 | 13.28 | 14.23 | 13.48 | 14.21 | 13.42 | 14.03 |
| Aug. 18. | 13.87 | 13.40 | 13.95 | 13.47 | 14.00 | 13.50 | 13.57 |
| Aug. 25. | 13.74 | 13.46 | 13.80 | 13.53 | 13.89 | 13.59 | 13.40 |
| Sep. 1. | 13.56 | 13.19 | 13.62 | 13.28 | 13.70 | 13.31 | 13.33 |
| Sep. 8. | 13.51 | 13.15 | 13.57 | 13.20 | 13.64 | 13.28 | 13.27 |
| Sep. 15. | 13.30 | 12.86 | 13.36 | 12.91 | 13.42 | 12.92 | 13.08 |
| Sep. 22. | 13.10 | 12.78 | 13.13 | 12.84 | 13.17 | 12.88 | 12.91 |
| Sep. 29. | 12.93 | 12.47 | 12.98 | 12.53 | 13.02 | 12.57 | 12.69 |
| Oct. 6. | 12.57 | 12.22 | 12.64 | 12.27 | 12.70 | 12.28 | 12.35 |
| Oct. 13. | 12.63 | 12.05 | 12.68 | 12.12 | 12.70 | 12.14 | 12.53 |
| Oct. 20. | 12.56 | 12.33 | 12.62 | 12.38 | 12.62 | 12.42 | 12.48 |
| Oct. 27. | 12.48 | 12.26 | 12.57 | 12.32 | 12.56 | 12.20 | 12.44 |
| Nov. 3. | 12.31 | | | | | | |

and 400 on June 30, 1932. This, if realized, would leave domestic stocks at little above normal.

WORLD WHEAT SUPPLY AND DISAPPEARANCE

(Millions of bushels, all data subject to revision; as estimated by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics)

| | 1934-1935 | 1933-1934 | 1932-1933 | 1931-1932 | 1930-1931 |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Production: | | | | | |
| U. S. A. | 496 | 529 | 746 | 932 | 890 |
| Canada | 275 | 270 | 443 | 321 | 421 |
| Argentina | 252 | 286 | 241 | 220 | 232 |
| Australia | 137 | 175 | 214 | 191 | 214 |
| Total | 1,160 | 1,260 | 1,644 | 1,864 | 1,757 |
| Danube | 249 | 371 | 222 | 370 | 353 |
| Oth'r Europe | 1,267 | 1,380 | 1,270 | 1,066 | 1,007 |
| Other | 744 | 711 | 675 | 754 | 733 |
| World | 3,420 | 3,722 | 3,811 | 3,854 | 3,850 |
| Russian exp'ts. | 110 | 34 | 19 | 72 | 112 |
| Carryover | 752 | 789 | 696 | 688 | 583 |
| Total supply. | (4,182) | 4,545 | 4,526 | 4,594 | 4,545 |
| Disappearance. | 3,783 | 3,793 | 3,737 | 3,898 | 3,877 |
| Carryover, | | | | | |
| June 30. | (389) | 752 | 789 | 696 | 668 |

*Last year's figure used. [†]Except Russia. [‡]Except Russia and China. [§]Estimated.

The short crop in this country was paralleled by small crops in Canada, Argentina and the Danube, as well as some other parts of Europe, and the world crop, ex-Russia and China, is currently estimated at 3,420 millions of bushels, against 3,722 in 1933, 3,811 in 1932 and 3,854 in 1931; it is the smallest since 1925-26. Assuming the same consumption as in 1933-34, June 30 stocks may well be reduced to about 389 millions, against 752 last June 30, and 789 on June 30, 1933; they would then be the

smallest since 1928, although still above normal.

Reflecting the reduced supplies in most of the exporting countries, world wheat exports in 1934 equaled only about 519 millions of bushels, against 587 the year before, 683 in 1932 and 783 in 1931. Only those of the Argentine have been well maintained, reflecting the good crop in that country.

WORLD WHEAT EXPORTS

(Millions of bushels for calendar years, flour in equivalent bushels of wheat: U. S. data from the Department of Commerce, Canadian from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, both for calendar years; other for fifty-two weeks, as reported by Broomhall.)

| | 1934-1935 | 1933-1934 | 1932-1933 | 1931-1932 | 1930-1931 |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| United States.... | 28 | 82 | 126 | 149 | 154 |
| Canada | 217 | 251 | 210 | 252 | 254 |
| North America.... | 197 | 234 | 339 | 331 | 362 |
| Argentina | 175 | 145 | 127 | 135 | 86 |
| Australia | 97 | 152 | 153 | 160 | 76 |
| Russia | 9 | 22 | 20 | 88 | 77 |
| Other | 42 | 33 | 42 | 69 | 71 |
| Total | 519 | 587 | 683 | 783 | 672 |
| 811 | | | | | |

*Estimated on basis of first eleven months of year.

The world wheat agreement founded during the year on the same abundant Argentine grain, that country being unwilling or unable, in the face of the unexpectedly large output, to hold her shipments to the agreed quota.

The 1935 acreages of contracting farmers under the AAA was set at 15 per cent less than that of the base period, 1928-32, or the same as in 1934. Payments of 29 cents a bushel on the domestic allotment, and the processing tax of 30 cents a bushel, continued unchanged.

Coffee Aided by Brazilian Destruction

FOR coffee 1934 was a year of higher prices which were in part lost toward the end, of well maintained consumption, and of improvement in the statistical position of the commodity.

The year opened with the March Santos contract selling at 9.00 to 9.20. Through January and February the market advanced on the government financial developments (silver program, budget, dollar devaluation), better consumption, and rumors of Brazilian support, May Santos reaching 11.29 in the first

part of March. The market then marked time, as spot demand slackened, reacting somewhat in May. On June 22 prices broke on cabled reports of withdrawal of support by the Brazilian Government; actually two Brazilian firms appeared to have withdrawn and precipitated the break. The market rallied in early August on unfavorable crop conditions, declined slowly throughout September and October, to steady off in the last two months on stagnant actuals demand, March Santos closing at 10.45-10.50.

NEW YORK COFFEE FUTURES—D CONTRACT—1934.

(Basis Santos No. 4.)

| Week | Mar., '34. | May, '34. | July, '34. | Sep., '34. | Dec., '34. | Mar., '35. |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Ended: | High. Low. |
| Jan. 6. | 9.19 9.02 | 9.33 9.20 | 9.46 9.32 | 9.79 9.65 | 9.91 9.76 | 10.45 11.58 |
| Jan. 13. | 9.60 9.18 | 9.80 9.34 | 9.90 9.40 | 10.26 9.74 | 10.10 9.87 | 10.50 11.22 |
| Jan. 20. | 9.85 9.54 | 10.06 9.72 | 10.20 9.85 | 10.50 10.16 | 10.60 10.26 | 10.75 11.22 |
| Jan. 27. | 9.70 9.40 | 9.90 9.60 | 10.05 9.70 | 10.32 10.03 | 10.48 10.15 | 10.50 10.76 |
| Feb. 3. | 9.90 9.48 | 10.15 9.68 | 10.25 9.85 | 10.58 10.16 | 10.60 10.25 | 10.65 10.72 |
| Feb. 10. | 10.15 9.85 | 10.37 10.08 | 10.50 10.12 | 10.82 10.47 | 10.96 10.60 | 10.65 10.72 |
| Feb. 17. | 10.65 10.21 | 10.95 10.43 | 11.07 10.57 | 11.32 10.93 | 11.45 11.04 | 10.80 10.35 |
| Feb. 24. | 10.80 10.35 | 11.03 10.62 | 11.10 10.65 | 11.43 11.02 | 11.57 11.12 | 11.20 10.86 |
| Mar. 3. | 10.80 10.52 | 11.13 10.64 | 11.26 10.75 | 11.58 11.10 | 11.66 11.21 | 11.40 10.97 |
| Mar. 10. | 11.05 10.78 | 11.29 10.86 | 11.42 10.97 | 11.73 11.28 | 11.83 11.40 | 11.50 11.05 |
| Mar. 17. | 10.82 10.65 | 11.13 10.65 | 11.25 10.80 | 11.58 11.10 | 11.66 11.21 | 11.25 10.95 |
| Mar. 24. | 10.45 10.45 | 10.65 10.20 | 10.89 10.39 | 11.16 10.70 | 11.27 10.81 | 10.90 10.50 |
| Mar. 31. | 10.80 10.50 | 11.12 10.65 | 11.23 10.95 | 11.32 10.04 | Mar., '35. | 10.45 10.45 |
| Apr. 7. | 10.85 10.45 | 11.00 10.59 | 11.33 10.90 | 11.41 10.04 | 11.50 11.22 | 10.45 10.45 |
| Apr. 14. | 10.77 10.68 | 10.91 10.67 | 11.23 10.97 | 11.34 11.08 | 11.38 11.15 | 10.45 10.45 |
| Apr. 21. | 10.79 10.65 | 10.96 10.76 | 11.25 11.13 | 11.38 11.20 | 11.46 11.40 | 10.45 10.45 |
| Apr. 28. | 10.91 10.66 | 11.05 10.83 | 11.45 11.19 | 11.56 11.29 | 11.61 11.42 | 10.82 10.68 |
| May 5. | 10.82 10.68 | 11.28 11.05 | 11.41 11.15 | 11.31 11.31 | 11.31 11.31 | 10.82 10.68 |
| May 12. | 10.82 10.60 | 10.93 10.57 | 11.31 10.00 | 11.40 11.09 | 11.45 11.32 | 10.82 10.60 |
| May 19. | 10.60 10.45 | 10.85 10.52 | 11.30 10.87 | 11.38 10.99 | 11.44 11.11 | 10.82 10.60 |
| May 26. | 10.88 10.81 | 11.32 10.97 | 11.45 11.17 | 11.45 11.26 | 11.51 11.51 | 11.66 11.63 |
| June 2. | 11.06 10.95 | 11.43 11.34 | 11.58 11.45 | 11.65 11.51 | 11.65 11.51 | 11.66 11.63 |
| June 9. | 10.98 10.75 | 11.35 11.08 | 11.48 11.22 | 11.52 11.37 | 11.47 11.42 | 11.35 11.08 |
| June 16. | 10.70 10.30 | 11.15 10.70 | 11.32 10.78 | 11.33 10.90 | 11.40 10.96 | 11.30 10.70 |
| June 23. | 10.51 9.95 | 10.95 10.39 | 11.10 10.55 | 11.18 10.61 | 11.21 10.73 | 11.20 10.55 |
| June 30. | 9.96 9.41 | 10.48 9.90 | 10.64 10.06 | 10.72 10.11 | 10.75 10.35 | 10.75 10.35 |
| July 7. | 9.88 9.50 | 10.30 9.77 | 10.55 10.00 | 10.65 10.15 | 10.74 10.23 | 10.75 10.35 |
| July 14. | 9.80 9.78 | 10.35 10.10 | 10.58 10.25 | 10.55 10.37 | 10.62 10.40 | 10.75 10.35 |
| July 21. | 9.97 9.67 | 10.42 10.13 | 10.58 10.27 | 10.63 10.35 | 10.64 10.40 | 10.75 10.35 |
| July 28. | 9.85 9.30 | 10.36 10.05 | 10.52 10.19 | 10.52 10.24 | 10.62 10.31 | 10.75 10.35 |
| Aug. 4. | 11.04 10.83 | 10.70 10.45 | 10.87 10.61 | 10.95 10.70 | 11.03 10.77 | 10.75 10.45 |
| Aug. 11. | 11.35 11.30 | 11.18 10.97 | 11.25 11.05 | 11.28 11.07 | 11.34 11.02 | 11.35 11.30 |
| Aug. 18. | 11.12 11.05 | 11.08 10.83 | 11.05 10.89 | 11.12 11.04 | 11.15 11.08 | 11.35 11.30 |
| Aug. 25. | 10.84 10.72 | 11.25 10.99 | 11.08 10.94 | 11.17 10.85 | 11.17 10.98 | 11.35 11.30 |
| Sep. 1. | 11.07 11.00 | 10.92 10.72 | 11.15 10.75 | 11.25 10.75 | 11.34 10.72 | 11.35 11.30 |
| Sep. 8. | 11.06 11.00 | 11.25 10.99 | 11.15 10.70 | 11.30 10.82 | 11.34 10.72 | 11.35 11.30 |
| Sep. 15. | 10.93 10.72 | 10.99 10.57 | 10.84 10.55 | 10.88 10.52 | 10.93 10.55 | 10.93 10.72 |
| Sep. 22. | 10.84 10.64 | 10.99 10.57 | 10.88 10.55 | 10.91 10.54 | 10.92 10.55 | 10.93 10.72 |
| Sep. 29. | 10.93 10.64 | 10.99 10.57 | 10.88 10.55 | 10.91 10.54 | 10.92 10.55 | 10.93 10.72 |
| Oct. 6. | 10.74 10.59 | High. Low. | 10.60 10.40 | 10.65 10.41 | 10.68 10.44 | 10.60 10.40 |
| Oct. 13. | 10.67 10.50 | 10.65 10.60 | 10.50 10.35 | 10.53 10.30 | 10.58 10.33 | 10.40 10.35 |
| Oct. 20. | 10.63 10.45 | 10.62 10.47 | 10.53 10.30 | 10.58 10.31 | 10.62 10.46 | 10.40 10.35 |
| Oct. 27. | 10.53 10.38 | 10.53 10.45 | 10.44 10.20 | 10.34 10.12 | 10.31 10.12 | 10.50 10.35 |
| Nov. 3. | 10.35 10.11 | 10.37 10.13 | 10.50 10.25 | 10.58 10.41 | 10.48 10.29 | 10.40 10.25 |
| Nov. 10. | 10.50 10.25 | 10.50 10.25 | 10.40 10.27 | 10.30 10.16 | 10.31 10.16 | 10.40 10.25 |
| Nov. 17. | 10.32 10.16 | 10.30 10.24 | 10.43 10.18 | 10.35 10.21 | 10.35 10.21 | 10.40 10.25 |
| Nov. 24. | 10.35 10.22 | 10.35 10.23 | 10.43 10.18 | 10.35 10.21 | 10.35 10.21 | 10.40 10.25 |
| Dec. 1. | 10.47 10.29 | 10.43 10.32 | 10.43 10.11 | 10.44 10.21 | 10.43 10.26 | 10.40 10.25 |
| Dec. 8. | 10.46 10.21 | 10.46 10.35 | 10.57 10.30 | 10.46 10.19 | 10.40 10.22 | 10.40 10.25 |
| Dec. 15. | 10.38 10.35 | 10.42 10.35 | 10 | | | |

Friday, January 18, 1935

at about 11,100,000, all pledged for the loan and therefore untouchable.

The destruction program, financed by an export tax, will have accounted for some 37,600,000 bags altogether, by the end of this season. The program will possibly be suspended temporarily with the prospective elimination of available

coffees for the purpose, but if the 1935-1936 season produces the normally heavy crop, it will presumably have to be put back into effect. That season should normally produce not less than 10,000,000 bags in excess of consumption needs. So goes the cycle of overproduction and destruction.

Cocoa Marked by Year of Heavy Consumption

After rising 100-odd points from the opening prices of 1934 (4.10 to 4.35 for March) on the dollar devaluation and other inflationary developments of January, cocoa experienced an uneventful five months, with little change after the January tops had been lost. The German midsummer "purge" and the generally unsettled state of European affairs weakened the market in midsummer, and prices declined consistently to the beginning of October, the recession in business, hedge sales against the new crop and tired long liquidation contributing to the decline. The bottom was reached at the beginning of October, when the December contract touched 4.28. Moderate recovery occurred in early December, the

year ending with March about 5.00.

Consumption in the United States was heavy during 1934, chocolate manufacturers reporting a very active year. Imports at the three chief North Atlantic ports totaled 3,157,000 bags, according to Marcone & Co., against 3,207,000 in 1933, and 3,240,000 in 1932.

UNITED STATES COCOA IMPORTS

(Thousands of bags imported at New York, Boston and Philadelphia; as reported by Marcone & Co.)

| | 1934 | 1933 | 1932 | 1931 | 1930 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Bahia | 1,166 | 1,236 | 1,128 | 839 | 613 |
| Accra | 907 | 938 | 1,106 | 823 | 773 |
| Lagos | 429 | 274 | 277 | 228 | 182 |
| Sanchez | 322 | 251 | 231 | 359 | 278 |
| Ivory Coast | 115 | 63 | 61 | 115 | 54 |
| Guayaquil | 86 | 44 | 62 | 59 | 95 |
| Trinidad | 71 | 110 | 72 | 146 | 135 |
| Lag. Caracas | 70 | 138 | 102 | 109 | 95 |
| Costa Rica | 57 | 57 | 107 | 107 | 78 |
| Other | 81 | 96 | 94 | 138 | 138 |
| Total | 3,157 | 3,207 | 3,240 | 2,923 | 2,441 |

year ending with March about 5.00.

Consumption in the United States was

heavy during 1934, chocolate manufacturers reporting a very active year. Imports at the three chief North Atlantic ports totaled 3,157,000 bags, according to Marcone & Co., against 3,207,000 in 1933, and 3,240,000 in 1932.

WORLD SUGAR MOVEMENT

(Thousands of long tons, raw sugar value, for year ended Aug. 30; as estimated by B. W. Dyer & Co.)

| | Year | Year's Stocks | Production | Consump. | End Stocks. | Chge. in Con- | Stocks. spt'n. |
|---------|--------|---------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1922-23 | 18,741 | 19,361 | 4,462 | 619 | 23.0 | | |
| 1923-24 | 20,662 | 19,855 | 5,269 | + 807 | 26.5 | | |
| 1924-25 | 24,566 | 22,680 | 7,155 | + 1,886 | 31.5 | | |
| 1925-26 | 24,958 | 24,313 | 7,800 | + 645 | 32.1 | | |
| 1926-27 | 24,567 | 24,725 | 7,642 | + 158 | 30.9 | | |
| 1927-28 | 26,616 | 26,098 | 8,160 | + 518 | 31.2 | | |
| 1928-29 | 27,744 | 26,620 | 9,284 | + 1,124 | 34.9 | | |
| 1929-30 | 27,654 | 26,081 | 10,857 | + 1,573 | 41.6 | | |
| 1930-31 | 29,107 | 27,011 | 12,953 | + 2,096 | 48.0 | | |
| 1931-32 | 26,426 | 26,718 | 12,661 | - 292 | 47.4 | | |
| 1932-33 | 24,903 | 26,082 | 11,482 | - 1,179 | 44.0 | | |
| 1933-34 | 26,271 | 26,587 | 11,166 | - 316 | 42.0 | | |

*Revised.

announcement of the 1934 quotas. Further advances took place in August and September, reflecting the new Cuban

treaty setting the Cuban duty at .9. In October the market declined, but recovered most of the loss before the end of the year, the March contract closing the year at about 1.90 or slightly above.

Under the Jones-Costigan act a processing tax of $\frac{1}{2}$ cent per pound raw value was established, effective June 8, simultaneously with the reduction of the Cuban duty to 1.50.

On Sept. 4 the new Cuban treaty became effective, and the Cuban duty dropped to .9 cent. The Cubans attempted to maintain a fixed selling price, equal to about 3.19 cents duty paid at New

York, but found considerable difficulty in moving their supplies at desired prices while insular sugars were pressing to fill their quotas, and while operators holding Cubas in American warehouses were willing to sell them at materially lower prices. The Cuban price was later reduced to the equivalent of 3.08 $\frac{1}{2}$, without effecting the desired disposition of the unsold portion of the Cuban quota. Cuba finally filled her quota, but the fact that total 1934 consumption in this country proved to be somewhat less than originally estimated, together with her being the last to fill her quota, left her

NEW YORK SUGAR FUTURES—1934.

| Week Ended: | Contract No. 1. | | | | | | | |
|-------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | Jan. '34. High. | Jan. '34. Low. | Mar. '34. High. | Mar. '34. Low. | May '34. High. | May '34. Low. | July '34. High. | July '34. Low. |
| Jan. 6 | 1.18 | 1.15 | 1.25 | 1.23 | 1.34 | 1.28 | 1.38 | 1.44 |
| Jan. 13 | 1.19 | 1.16 | 1.26 | 1.21 | 1.31 | 1.27 | 1.36 | 1.41 |
| Jan. 20 | 1.30 | 1.22 | 1.31 | 1.26 | 1.45 | 1.34 | 1.53 | 1.58 |
| Jan. 27 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.46 | 1.40 | 1.51 | 1.44 | 1.55 | 1.63 |
| Feb. 3 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.62 | 1.43 | 1.65 | 1.47 | 1.68 | 1.72 |
| Feb. 10 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.67 | 1.59 | 1.70 | 1.62 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Feb. 17 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.66 | 1.55 | 1.75 | 1.62 | 1.76 | 1.81 |
| Feb. 24 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.63 | 1.50 | 1.76 | 1.67 | 1.82 | 1.83 |
| Mar. 3 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.53 | 1.69 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Mar. 10 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Mar. 17 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Mar. 24 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Mar. 31 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Apr. 7 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Apr. 14 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Apr. 21 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Apr. 28 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| May 5 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| May 12 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| May 19 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| May 26 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| June 2 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| June 9 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| June 16 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| June 23 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| June 30 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| July 7 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| July 14 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| July 21 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| July 28 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Aug. 4 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Aug. 11 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Aug. 18 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Aug. 25 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Sep. 1 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Sep. 8 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Sep. 15 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Sep. 22 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Sep. 29 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Oct. 6 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Oct. 13 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Oct. 20 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Oct. 27 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Nov. 3 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Nov. 10 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Nov. 17 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Nov. 24 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Dec. 1 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Dec. 8 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Dec. 15 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Dec. 22 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Dec. 29 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |
| Dec. 31 | 1.34 | 1.30 | 1.60 | 1.56 | 1.76 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.77 |

| Range for 1934 | NEW YORK RUBBER FUTURES—1934 | | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | Jan. '34. High. | Jan. '34. Low. | Mar. '34. High. | Mar. '34. Low.</th | | | | |

bearing the brunt of the reduced consumption. Quotas for 1935 were set at a total of 4,470,658 short tons raw value

for non-Continental regions after deducting overshipments in 1934, against 4,658,798 allotted to 1934.

Higher Rubber Prices Reflect Restriction

THE year 1934 for rubber was marked by the adoption of the new rubber restriction plan, by the rise of rubber prices to the highest levels since 1930 and by the further rise of consumption from the low levels of 1932.

The year opened with the May contract selling at the 9.20-9.50 level. Rumors of an impending restriction agreement were ripe throughout the first four months of the year, and the market advanced spectacularly to a high of 16.03 on May 7, when an agreement was announced. The actual restriction proved to be less than the market had hoped for, and the market broke, September falling to 12.26 at the end of May. Prices then advanced to the year's high for the December contract of 16.49, reached on Aug. 9. The market declined thereafter virtually until the end of the year, along with receding business in this country, although the decline leveled out in December. The year closed with May selling at 13.10-13.40.

The restriction agreement, which includes Malaya, Netherlands India, Ceylon, India, Burma, North Borneo, Sarawak, Siam and Indo-China, provides for basic quotas of 996,500 tons in 1934, 1,088,000 in 1935, 1,168,000 in 1936, 1,217,000 in 1937 and 1,251,000 in 1938,

these figures purporting to represent their normal unrestricted production in these years. Of the chief exporters Malaya is allotted 504,000 tons in 1934, Netherlands India 352,000 and Ceylon 77,500. The actual restriction imposed was relatively modest, being set at 10

WORLD MOVEMENT OF CRUDE RUBBER

(Thousands of long tons as reported by the Commodity Exchange, Inc.)

*1934. 1933. 1932. 1931. 1930. 1929.

World:
Shipments 1,044 852 708 797 820 861
Absorption 934 814 685 671 716 807
Stocks 681 637 600 634 491 339

Far Eastern Shipments:
Malaya (net) 461 441 404 419
D. E. I. 381 281 211 259
Ceylon 79 54 49 62

Total 921 786 665 738

U. S. A.
Consumption 451 403 332 349 376 470
Stocks 361 354 346 292 190 92

Net Imports:

U. S. 459 398 394 476
U. K. 156 73 50 85
France 54 63 42 48
Germany 61 54 45 39
Japan 74 67 56 43
Other 229 142 123 122

World 1,033 797 710 813

*Estimated. †Nov. 30.

per cent of the 1934 basic quotas for August and September, 20 per cent for October and November and 30 per cent for December. For the first three months of 1935, production is authorized at 75 per cent of the 1935 quota.

to advance, continuing to rise during the last quarter of the year with improving consumption and general business, and the prospects of a rise in rayon prices

that finally took place in December. The year closed with March selling at about \$1.40, or slightly above the opening level.

Wool Prices Fall With Lower Consumption

THE wool market, after holding steady during January and February at 106 to 109, began thereafter a decline that lasted without much pause throughout the Spring and Summer. Prices reached the 77.78 level in the latter part of September, following the termination of the textile strike, German import restrictions contributing to the decline. With the pick-up in textile consumption in the late Autumn, the general business upturn and the drawing to a close of an off-year in the two-year textile cycle, the market steadied at around 80 and closed the year slightly under that price.

Consumption of combing and carpet wool in the United States in 1934 was estimated at 350 millions of pounds, against 422 in 1933.

UNITED STATES WOOL CONSUMPTION

(Millions of pounds, combing and clothing wool, grease basis; as reported by the

Bureau of the Census)

| | Domestic | Foreign | Total | % Domestic |
|-------|----------|---------|-------|------------|
| 1924 | 285 | 127 | 412 | 69.2 |
| 1925 | 272 | 119 | 392 | 69.5 |
| 1926 | 254 | 131 | 385 | 66.0 |
| 1927 | 320 | 103 | 423 | 75.7 |
| 1928 | 334 | 69 | 403 | 82.9 |
| 1929 | 343 | 85 | 428 | 80.2 |
| 1930 | 280 | 65 | 345 | 81.2 |
| 1931 | 371 | 43 | 414 | 89.6 |
| 1932 | 314 | 17 | 330 | 95.0 |
| 1933 | 396 | 25 | 422 | 94.0 |
| 1934* | 350 | — | — | — |

*Estimated.

Hide Consumption Highest Since 1929

THE hide market suffered heavily during the year from the liquidation of drought cattle and the building up of government-owned stocks

through relief purchases. The year 1934 opened with the March contract selling about 10.50 to 10.80. Prices moved irregularly until May, when the market

NEW YORK HIDE FUTURES—1934

| Week Ended: | March | June (old) | Sept. (old) | Dec. (old) | High. Low. |
|--------------------|-------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Jan. 6 | 10.80 | 10.50 | 11.50 | 11.00 | 11.85 | 11.25 | 12.55 | 12.05 | 11.95 |
| Jan. 13 | 10.80 | 10.80 | 11.35 | 10.60 | 11.71 | 11.00 | — | — | — |
| Jan. 20 | 10.55 | 10.35 | 11.45 | 11.00 | 11.91 | 11.45 | 12.15 | 12.05 | 12.05 |
| Jan. 27 | 10.85 | 10.30 | 11.80 | 11.25 | 12.10 | 11.65 | — | — | — |
| Feb. 3 | 11.00 | 10.40 | 11.98 | 11.20 | 12.35 | 11.75 | — | — | — |
| Feb. 10 | 10.65 | 10.15 | 11.70 | 11.10 | 12.05 | 11.55 | 12.00 | 11.90 | 11.90 |
| Feb. 17 | 10.00 | 9.75 | 11.35 | 11.00 | 11.65 | 11.00 | 12.05 | 11.80 | 11.80 |
| Feb. 24 | 9.70 | 9.20 | 11.10 | 10.75 | 11.65 | 11.20 | 12.00 | 11.65 | 12.40 |
| Mar. 3 | 9.05 | 9.00 | 10.65 | 10.20 | 11.20 | 10.70 | 11.65 | 11.20 | 11.55 |
| Mar. 10 | 8.00 | 8.00 | 10.50 | 10.20 | 11.00 | 10.70 | 11.45 | 11.15 | 11.45 |
| Mar. 17 | 10.75 | 10.40 | 11.30 | 10.95 | 11.70 | 11.40 | — | — | — |
| Mar. 24 | 10.85 | 10.35 | 11.50 | 11.00 | 11.95 | 11.40 | 12.25 | 12.00 | 11.45 |
| Mar. 31 | 11.25 | 10.90 | 12.00 | 11.50 | 12.40 | 12.00 | 12.55 | 12.55 | 12.55 |
| April 7 | 11.60 | 11.20 | 12.25 | 11.90 | 12.65 | 12.30 | 12.45 | 12.15 | 12.79 |
| April 14 | 11.75 | 11.50 | 12.40 | 11.95 | 12.85 | 12.40 | 12.60 | 12.15 | 13.30 |
| April 21 | 11.40 | 11.20 | 12.00 | 12.00 | 12.00 | 11.75 | 12.10 | 12.10 | 12.55 |
| April 28 | 11.19 | 10.90 | 11.90 | 11.55 | 12.15 | 11.85 | 11.92 | 11.50 | 12.40 |
| May 5 | 10.80 | 10.60 | 11.40 | 11.10 | 11.85 | 11.45 | 11.50 | 11.25 | 11.85 |
| May 12 | 10.61 | 10.15 | 11.15 | 10.60 | 11.50 | 11.00 | 11.65 | 11.20 | 12.05 |
| May 19 | 9.70 | 9.30 | 10.60 | 9.90 | 10.55 | 10.40 | 10.30 | 10.00 | 10.45 |
| May 26 | 8.95 | 8.30 | 10.10 | 9.20 | 9.75 | 9.60 | 10.15 | 9.36 | 9.75 |
| June 2 | 8.30 | 7.75 | 9.30 | 8.50 | 8.82 | 8.30 | 9.80 | 8.55 | 9.85 |
| June 9 | 10.55 | 9.45 | 9.35 | 9.00 | 9.50 | 8.20 | 9.55 | 8.75 | 10.45 |
| June 16 | 11.50 | 11.50 | 9.60 | 9.60 | 10.40 | 9.80 | 9.50 | 10.05 | 11.30 |
| June 23 | 10.80 | 10.65 | — | — | 9.85 | 9.25 | 10.35 | 9.75 | 10.00 |
| June 30 | 10.20 | 9.15 | — | — | 9.00 | 7.50 | 9.00 | 8.55 | 8.70 |
| July 7 | 9.05 | 8.60 | — | — | 7.40 | 7.00 | 7.20 | 8.65 | 8.19 |
| July 14 | 9.40 | 8.80 | — | — | 7.75 | 7.51 | 7.80 | 8.65 | 8.40 |
| July 21 | 9.50 | 8.30 | — | — | 7.60 | 7.00 | 7.90 | 8.65 | 8.05 |
| July 28 | 8.60 | 7.75 | — | — | 6.70 | 6.25 | 6.90 | 7.85 | 8.30 |
| Aug. 4 | 7.80 | 7.05 | — | — | 6.25 | 6.00 | 6.15 | 6.70 | 6.70 |
| Aug. 11 | 8.20 | 6.90 | — | — | 6.50 | 5.55 | 6.70 | 7.70 | 8.00 |
| Aug. 18 | 8.75 | 7.90 | — | — | 7.25 | 6.55 | 7.35 | 7.78 | 8.08 |
| Aug. 25 | 8.46 | 8.02 | Sept. 1935. | 8.70 | 7.60 | 7.30 | 7.50 | 7.20 | 8.15 |
| Sept. 1 | 8.27 | 7.93 | High. Low. | 8.15 | 7.70 | 7.40 | 7.11 | 7.60 | 7.35 |
| Sept. 8 | 8.70 | 8.15 | 9.05 | 8.70 | 8.50 | 8.10 | 8.75 | 8.40 | 8.75 |
| Sept. 15 | 8.69 | 8.07 | 8.80 | 8.40 | 8.75 | 7.75 | 7.40 | 8.00 | 8.37 |
| Sept. 22 | 8.55 | 8.30 | 8.82 | 8.70 | 8.75 | 7.90 | 7.58 | 7.95 | 8.10 |
| Sept. 29 | 8.49 | 8.15 | 8.77 | 8.54 | 8.75 | 7.97 | 7.65 | 8.24 | 7.90 |
| Oct. 6 | 8.20 | 7.95 | 8.48 | 8.30 | 8.65 | 8.37 | 7.63 | 7.50 | 8.00 |
| Oct. 13 | 8.15 | 7.79 | 8.46 | 8.14 | 8.75 | 8.43 | 7.62 | 7.35 | 7.90 |
| Oct. 20 | 8.37 | 7.98 | 8.60 | 8.43 | 8.75 | 8.43 | 7.76 | 7.65 | 8.07 |
| Oct. 27 | 8.32 | 8.10 | 8.55 | 8.40 | 8.75 | 8.43 | 7.55 | 7.50 | 8.00 |
| Nov. 3 | 8.67 | 8.19 | 9.95 | 8.50 | 8.75 | 8.43 | 8.00 | 7.66 | 8.35 |
| Nov. 10 | 9.35 | 8.60 | 9.60 | 9.15 | 8.50 | 8.04 | 9.00 | 8.36 | 8.46 |
| Nov. 17 | 9.28 | 8.65 | 9.55 | 9.00 | 8.65 | 8.05 | 8.65 | 8.95 | 8.46 |
| Nov. 24 | 9.11 | 8.50 | 9.47 | 8.80 | 8.41 | 7.90 | 8.50 | 8.21 | 8.21 |
| Dec. 1 | 9.11 | 8.75 | 9.33 | 9.05 | 8.40 | 8.20 | 8.75 | 8.55 | 8.55 |
| Dec. 8 | 9.29 | 9.62 | 9.12 | 9.55 | 8.60 | 8.30 | 8.94 | 8.48 | 8.48 |
| Dec. 15 | 9.47 | 9.13 | 9.84 | 9.44 | 8.90 | 8.75 | 8.78 | 8.60 | 9.12 |
| Dec. 22 | 9.73 | 9.38 | 10.10 | 9.76 | 10.15 | 10.15 | 8.95 | 8.85 | 9.09 |
| Dec. 29 | 10.00 | 9.50 | 10.42 | 9.88 | 10.65 | 10.55 | 8.95 | 9.70 | 9.15 |
| Dec. 31 | 10.07 | 10.00 | 10.39 | 10.31 | — | — | 9.64 | 9.61 | — |

*New contract.

Range for 1934. { March 11.00 8.00 June 1935. 11.98 7.75

Dec. 1934. 12.40 5.55 Sept. 1935. 12.40 5.55

commenced to decline sharply in anticipation of increased cattle slaughter because of the drought. Although prices rallied in mid-June on the partial relief of the drought in the Southwest, they shortly resumed their decline as the drought spread to the North and the government announced its relief-purchase program, "old" September touch-

ing the year's bottom for the contract at 5.55 in early August. The government, after long negotiations, finally agreed to withhold its purchases from the market, and prices turned upward, rising to the end of the year, which closed with the March (new) contract at the 9.50 level.

The year was one of heavy leather consumption, about 17,800,000 equivalent

hides being consumed, against 17,600,000 in 1933, and 14,600,000 in 1932; consumption was the highest since 1929, when it amounted to 19,200,000. Inspected slaughter and cattle hide production were some 3,000,000 above 1933, owing to the government relief purchases, about 3,000,000 head having been slaughtered for government agencies up to early Novem-

ber. Stocks are correspondingly higher. The ultimate disposition of these supplies is uncertain, and until it is known they will tend to depress prices.

Shoe production for the year is expected to reach 353,000,000 of pairs, against 350,000,000 in 1933 and 313,000,000 in 1932, and would be the best since 1929.

WINTHROP W. CASE.

Greater Stability in Foreign Exchange Market



COMPARED with the two preceding years, 1934 was one of relative stability in foreign-exchange quotations. It was marked, however, by a sustained nervousness in the foreign exchange market, an unprecedented movement of gold into this country from others and a shift in the centre of uncertainty from the dollar to the gold-bloc currencies of Europe.

The outstanding event was the revaluation of the dollar on Jan. 31 at 59.06 per cent of its former parity and the simultaneous adoption by this country of an "international gold-bullion standard."

Currency manipulation through changes in the official price for gold had begun to lose favor with the administration, it had appeared, even before the opening of the year. During the closing month of 1933 there had been few shifts in the official gold price. That price, fixed by the RFC, carried over the end of the year at \$34.06 an ounce, compared with the statutory price of \$20.67.

Confusion in Foreign Exchanges

Revaluation of the dollar at 59.06 per cent of its former value by Presidential proclamation at 3:10 P. M. on Jan. 31 by establishing the price of gold at \$35 an ounce created the utmost confusion

in foreign exchanges. In contrast to the newly established parity of 40.94 per cent discount below the old par of exchange, the dollar had been quoted, just prior to devaluation, at about 39 per cent discount. This meant that all the European currencies were far below their new parities and that enormous profits were available to banks which obtained gold abroad and imported it here for sale to the Treasury at \$35 an ounce.

Nevertheless, in the first few days the dollar, instead of declining, advanced. The French franc, which had been quoted at 6.42 cents on Jan. 31, compared with its parity of 3.92 cents, fell on Feb. 5 to 6.16½ cents, compared with its new parity of 6.63 cents. Similar heavy discounts prevailed in other exchanges.

Sterling, which stood at \$4.99 on Jan. 31, rose to \$5.03½ immediately after devaluation of the dollar, but crashed to \$4.88 on Feb. 2, the lowest price since Nov. 4, 1932; then rallied to \$5.13½ on Feb. 19 and ranged between \$5.05 and \$5.09½ in the final week of the month.

The heavy discounts on the gold-standard currencies of Europe and the fact that the price of gold in London remained throughout February and most of March below the officially established price here set in motion the largest international movement of gold ever recorded.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN 1934

(Cable Rates)

| Part | England | Australia | South Africa | France | Italy | Germany | Holland | Spain | Canada | Belgium | Switzerland | Greece |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------|--------------|----------|----------|---------------|---------|-------------|-----------|
| Unit | (Sovereign) | (Sovereign) | (Sovereign) | (Sovereign) | (Lira) | (Reichsmark) | (Florin) | (Peseta) | (Canad. Dol.) | (Belga) | (Franc) | (Drachma) |
| Week Ended: | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. |
| Jan. 6 | 5.18½ | 5.07% | 4.12% | 4.08% | 5.18% | 5.13% | .0625 | .0611½ | .0821 | .3800 | .3720 | .6395 |
| Jan. 13 | 5.11% | 5.07% | 4.08% | 4.06% | 5.13% | 5.11% | .0616 | .0608 | .0826 | .0815½ | .3738 | .6390 |
| Jan. 20 | 5.16% | 4.94% | 4.10% | 3.96% | 5.16% | 4.94% | .0640 | .0622½ | .0854 | .0832 | .3870 | .6395 |
| Jan. 27 | 5.01% | 4.93% | 4.00 | 3.97 | 5.03% | 4.99% | .0629½ | .0617½ | .0840 | .0826 | .3810 | .6445 |
| Feb. 3 | 5.03% | 4.87 | 4.02% | 3.90% | 5.06% | 4.91 | .0643 | .0622 | .0862 | .0829½ | .3885 | .6570 |
| Feb. 10 | 5.03% | 4.93% | 4.02% | 3.94% | 5.06% | 4.96% | .0649 | .0616½ | .0863 | .0827 | .3890 | .6616 |
| Feb. 17 | 5.10% | 5.03% | 4.08 | 4.02% | 5.12 | 5.06% | .0649 | .0617 | .0873 | .0864 | .3930 | .6685 |
| Feb. 24 | 5.14% | 5.04% | 4.10% | 4.04 | 5.15% | 5.07 | .0657 | .0650½ | .0872 | .0857 | .3960 | .6715 |
| Mar. 3 | 5.08% | 5.06% | 4.06% | 4.05% | 5.10% | 5.08% | .0658½ | .0656 | .0866½ | .0851 | .3970 | .6730 |
| Mar. 10 | 5.08% | 5.06% | 4.06½ | 4.05% | 5.10% | 5.08% | .0658½ | .0657 | .0861 | .0855 | .3973 | .6730 |
| Mar. 17 | 5.10% | 5.07% | 4.08½ | 4.07% | 5.12½ | 5.11% | .0658 | .0657½ | .0859 | .0856 | .3980 | .6740 |
| Mar. 24 | 5.11% | 5.09% | 4.09 | 4.07½ | 5.13% | 5.11% | .0663 | .0657½ | .0863 | .0855½ | .3990 | .6755 |
| Mar. 31 | 5.14% | 5.04% | 4.11½ | 4.08 | 5.16% | 5.12 | .0659½ | .0656½ | .0861 | .0855 | .3975 | .6750 |
| Apr. 7 | 5.18% | 5.13½ | 4.15% | 4.11% | 5.20% | 5.16 | .0662½ | .0657½ | .0863½ | .0858 | .3986 | .6776 |
| Apr. 14 | 5.18 | 5.15% | 4.14½ | 4.12% | 5.19% | 5.17% | .0660½ | .0659½ | .0860 | .0851½ | .3975 | .6764 |
| Apr. 21 | 5.18 | 5.13% | 4.14½ | 4.10% | 5.19% | 5.15% | .0663½ | .0659½ | .0862½ | .0851 | .3977 | .6763 |
| Apr. 28 | 5.15% | 5.13% | 4.12½ | 4.10 | 5.17% | 5.15% | .0668½ | .0662 | .0860½ | .0853 | .3975 | .6785 |
| May 5 | 5.14% | 5.10% | 4.10% | 4.08% | 5.15% | 5.13 | .0664½ | .0662½ | .0856½ | .0853 | .3974 | .6822 |
| May 12 | 5.13% | 5.10% | 4.09½ | 4.08% | 5.14½ | 5.12% | .0663½ | .0660½ | .0854½ | .0849 | .3963 | .6811 |
| May 19 | 5.11% | 5.10% | 4.09 | 4.08% | 5.13½ | 5.12% | .0662½ | .0660 | .0853 | .0850 | .3948 | .6803 |
| May 26 | 5.11% | 5.08% | 4.08½ | 4.07 | 5.13% | 5.10% | .0660 | .0658½ | .0850½ | .0842 | .3919 | .6812 |
| June 2 | 5.09% | 5.06% | 4.07% | 4.05% | 5.11½ | 5.08½ | .0660½ | .0657½ | .0853 | .0848 | .3954 | .6822 |
| June 9 | 5.07% | 5.03% | 4.05% | 4.03 | 5.09 | 5.05% | .0658½ | .0654½ | .0851 | .0849 | .3900 | .6783 |
| June 15 | 5.06% | 5.03% | 4.04% | 4.04 | 5.08½ | 5.07 | .0660½ | .0656½ | .0852 | .0847 | .3872 | .6795 |
| June 23 | 5.05% | 5.03% | 4.04 | 4.02% | 5.07 | 5.05% | .0661 | .0659% | .0853 | .0848 | .3804 | .6791 |
| June 30 | 5.06% | 5.02½ | 4.05% | 4.02% | 5.08% | 5.05% | .0660½ | .0659½ | .0852½ | .0850 | .3850 | .6794 |
| July 7 | 5.08½ | 5.04% | 4.05½ | 4.03% | 5.08% | 5.06% | .0660 | .0657½ | .0854 | .0856½ | .3974 | .6822 |
| July 14 | 5.04% | 5.03% | 4.03% | 4.03% | 5.08½ | 5.06 | .0660 | .0659 | .0857 | .0855 | .3962 | .6815 |
| July 21 | 5.04% | 5.03% | 4.03% | 4.03% | 5.06 | 5.06 | .0661 | .0658½ | .0859 | .0857 | .3950 | .6823 |
| July 28 | 5.04% | 5.02% | 4.03% | 4.02% | 5.08% | 5.05% | .0660½ | .0659½ | .0852½ | .0850 | .3950 | .6817 |
| Aug. 4 | 5.04% | 5.03 | 4.03% | 4.02% | 5.06% | 5.05% | .0662 | .0658 | .0861 | .0855 | .3916 | .6756 |
| Aug. 11 | 5.11% | 5.04% | 4.09% | 4.03% | 5.13% | 5.06% | .0663½ | .0660½ | .0859 | .0854½ | .3972 | .6785 |
| Aug. 18 | 5.11% | 5.07% | 4.08% | 4.06 | 5.12% | 5.09% | .0664½ | .0665 | .0873 | .0863 | .3990 | .6842 |
| Aug. 25 | 5.09% | 5.06% | 4.07% | 4.05% | 5.09% | 5.08% | .0668 | .0666½ | .0871 | .0867 | .3965 | .6852 |
| Sep. 1 | 5.06% | 4.98% | 4.05 | 3.99% | 5.06% | 4.99 | .0665 | .0666 | .0871 | .0867½ | .3997 | .6876 |
| Sep. 8 | 5.02% | 4.99% | 4.01% | 4.00 | 5.02% | 5.00 | .0663½ | .0667½ | .0871 | .0868 | .3968 | .6855 |
| Sep. 15 | 5.02 | 4.99½ | 4.01% | 4.00 | 5.02 | 5.00% | .0663½ | .0666 | .0871 | .0869 | .3972 | .6837 |
| Sep. 22 | 5.01% | 4.98% | 4.00% | 3.99% | 5.01 | 4.99% | .0663 | .0667 | .0868½ | .0867½ | .4012 | .6873 |
| Sep. 29 | 4.98% | 4.96 | 3.98½ | 3.97% | 4.98% | 4.96% | .0667 | .0664 | .0864 | .0863½ | .4019 | .6864 |
| Oct. 6 | 4.95 | 4.91% | 3.94½ | 3.93% | 4.93½ | 4.91% | .0664½ | .0663 | .0864 | .0861½ | .4060 | .6819 |
| Oct. 13 | 4.93% | 4.89% | 3.94½ | 3.92 | 4.93½ | 4.90 | .0666 | .0660½ | .0864 | .0858½ | .4076 | .6795 |
| Oct. 20 | 4.98 | 4.90% | 3.98½ | 3.92½ | 4.97% | 4.91% | .0666 | .0662½ | .0866½ | .0861½ | .4073 | .6854 |
| Oct. 27 | 4.98% | 4.95 | 3.98½ | 3.96% | 4.98½ | 4.95% | .0663 | .0659½ | .0861 | .0854½ | .4052 | .6820 |
| Nov. 3 | 4.99 | 4.95% | 3.98½ | 3.97% | 4.98% | 4.96% | .0659½ | .0658½ | .0857 | .0854 | .4030 | .6778 |
| Nov. 10 | 5.01% | 4.98% | 4.00% | 3.99% | 5.00% | 4.99 | .0659½ | .0658½ | .0855½ | .0853½ | .4020 | .6760 |
| Nov. 17 | 5.01 | 4.99 | 4.00½ | 3.99% | 5.00½ | 4.99% | .0659 | .0658½ | .0855 | .0854 | .4025 | .6761 |
| Nov. 24 | 4.99% | 4.98% | 3.99½ | 3.98% | 4.99½ | 4.98% | .0659½ | .0658½ | .0852 | .0850 | .4018 | .6764 |
| Dec. 1 | 4.98% | 4.97 | 3.96½ | 3.97% | 4.99½ | 4.97% | .0659½ | .0658 | .0851 | .0850 | .4017 | .6764 |
| Dec. 8 | 4.96% | 4.94% | 3.96½ | 3.95% | 4.96% | 4.94% | .0659 | .0658 | .0851 | .0851 | .4025 | .6758 |
| Dec. 15 | 4.96 | 4.94 | 3.96½ | 3.95% | 4.95% | 4.94% | .0659 | .0658 | .0854 | .0852 | .4015 | .6764 |
| Dec. 22 | 4.95% | 4.93% | 3.96 | 3.95% | 4.95 | 4.94 | .0661 | .0659 | .0856 | .0854 | .4027 | .6766 |
| Dec. 29 | 4.94% | 4.93% | 3.95½ | 3.94% | 4.94% | 4.93% | .0661 | .0660 | .0856 | .0854 | .4026 | .6774 |
| Dec. 31 | 4.94% | 4.93% | 3.95½ | 3.94% | 4.94% | 4.94 | .0661 | .0661 | .0858 | .0857 | .4031 | .6782 |
| Range for 1934 | 5.18% | 4.87 | 4.15% | 3.90% | 5.20% | 4.90 | .0669 | .0680 | .0873 | .0815% | .4073 | .6868 |

¹Based on new gold value of the United States dollar as established on Jan. 31, 1934. ²Demand rate.

more stable conditions than the foreign exchange markets had witnessed in years.

In each of these months, it is true, the franc dipped briefly below the gold-import point, but never remained there long.

the lowest price since February. On Oct. 16, however, a rally set in as buyers who had postponed their purchases in expectation of cheaper exchange scrambled to cover their needs.

By the end of the month the pound had rallied above \$4.98 and early in November it crossed \$5. There followed a period of unusual steadiness until mid-December, when the exchange weakened again. In the meantime the gold-bloc currencies had been beset by extreme

weakness. The French franc, which had dropped below the gold-import point at the end of October, continued at or under that level throughout November and the better part of December.

Belgian, Swiss and Netherlands exchanges also fell below their gold points in November and remained there until late in December.

Heavy Imports of Gold

In the last two months of the year

upward of \$200,000,000 gold was imported from abroad, shipments being received from France, Belgium, Holland, England, India and, in smaller amounts, from Canada, the Far East and South America.

The period was one of acute anxiety over the future of the gold bloc. In the case of Belgium special measures had to be taken to protect the exchange, including the borrowing from the Federal Reserve Banks here of more than \$15,-

000,000 in the form of a loan on gold en route here, the borrowing of above \$68,000,000 from bankers in Holland and strenuous supporting measures by the Bank of France.

The monetary gold stocks of the country, having been increased in the year by \$1,396,000,000 exclusive of the write-up incident to revaluation, stood at the highest figure, by weight as well as by dollar value, in the history of the country, at \$8,228,000,000 on Dec. 28.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN 1934

| | Sweden | Denmark | Norway | Austria | Czechoslovakia | Yugoslavia | Portugal | Rumania | Hungary | Finland | India | Hongkong |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|----------------|------------|------------|------------|----------|------------|----------|----------------|
| Par | \$453740 | \$453740 | \$453740 | \$238244 | \$189938 | \$0.02982 | \$0.074831 | \$0.010127 | \$296125 | \$0.042642 | \$617978 | \$ |
| Unit | (Krona) | (Krone) | (Krone) | (Schilling) | (Zloty) | (Crown) | (Dinar) | (Escudo) | (Pengo) | (Finmark) | (Rupee) | (Silver Doli.) |
| Week Ended | High. | Low. | High. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. |
| Jan. 6. | 2675 | 2620 | 2315 | 2270 | 2605 | 2555 | 1825 | 1780 | 0473 | 0468 | 0220 | 0215 |
| Jan. 13. | 2640 | 2620 | 2285 | 2270 | 2570 | 2547 | 1775 | 1775 | 0468 | 0464 | 0216 | 0212 |
| Jan. 20. | 2665 | 2555 | 2305 | 2210 | 2595 | 2485 | 1850 | 1812 | 0484 | 0474 | 0223 | 0215 |
| Jan. 27. | 2590 | 2545 | 2240 | 2205 | 2525 | 2480 | 1825 | 1800 | 0476 | 0458 | 0219 | 0215 |
| Feb. 3. | 2600 | 2516 | 2255 | 2180 | 2535 | 2450 | 1850 | 1812 | 0482 | 0470 | 0224 | 0219 |
| Feb. 10. | 2595 | 2550 | 2253 | 2202 | 2532 | 2475 | 1865 | 1800 | 0486 | 0468 | 0225 | 0217 |
| Feb. 17. | 2635 | 2595 | 2282 | 2248 | 2565 | 2530 | 1885 | 1880 | 0455 | 0426 | 0228 | 0225 |
| Feb. 24. | 2660 | 2610 | 2303 | 2260 | 2587 | 2543 | 1890 | 1880 | 0415% | 0414% | 0227 | 0227 |
| Mar. 3. | 2630 | 2612 | 2275 | 2260 | 2560 | 2545 | 1905 | 1895 | 0417 | 0416 | 0230 | 0228 |
| Mar. 10. | 2625 | 2610 | 2275 | 2265 | 2558 | 2545 | 1900 | 1900 | 0416 | 0416 | 0228% | 0228 |
| Mar. 17. | 2635 | 2619 | 2282 | 2268 | 2565 | 2552 | 1900 | 1900 | 0416% | 0416 | 0228 | 0228 |
| Mar. 24. | 2642 | 2625 | 2287 | 2274 | 2573 | 2560 | 1900 | 1900 | 0417% | 0416 | 0229 | 0227 |
| Mar. 31. | 2656 | 2628 | 2298 | 2275 | 2584 | 2560 | 1900 | 1900 | 0416 | 0415% | 0228 | 0228 |
| Apr. 7. | 2675 | 2652 | 2318 | 2292 | 2605 | 2582 | 1910 | 1900 | 0417% | 0415% | 0229% | 0228 |
| Apr. 14. | 2672 | 2658 | 2315 | 2302 | 2605 | 2590 | 1905 | 1903 | 0417 | 0416 | 0229 | 0228 |
| Apr. 21. | 2672 | 2646 | 2315 | 2292 | 2607 | 2580 | 1925 | 1900 | 0422 | 0416 | 0231 | 0228 |
| Apr. 28. | 2662 | 2647 | 2305 | 2294 | 2592 | 2580 | 1915 | 1900 | 0421 | 0418% | 0230 | 0229 |
| May 5. | 2654 | 2633 | 2300 | 2281 | 2587 | 2566 | 1912 | 1904 | 0419 | 0418% | 0229% | 0228% |
| May 12. | 2646 | 2635 | 2295 | 2283 | 2580 | 2567 | 1905 | 1904 | 0419 | 0418 | 0229 | 0228 |
| May 19. | 2639 | 2633 | 2286 | 2282 | 2571 | 2565 | 1905 | 1903 | 0418% | 0418 | 0229 | 0227 |
| May 26. | 2638 | 2622 | 2285 | 2272 | 2570 | 2555 | 1903 | 1897 | 0418% | 0418 | 0230 | 0228 |
| June 2. | 2627 | 2611 | 2275 | 2263 | 2560 | 2544 | 1902 | 1897 | 0417% | 0416 | 0228 | 0227 |
| June 9. | 2620 | 2596 | 2268 | 2247 | 2550 | 2530 | 1905 | 1897 | 0418 | 0416 | 0229 | 0228 |
| June 16. | 2612 | 2598 | 2264 | 2251 | 2545 | 2532 | 1904 | 1900 | 0417% | 0416 | 0229 | 0228 |
| June 23. | 2605 | 2596 | 2257 | 2247 | 2538 | 2531 | 1900 | 1896 | 0416% | 0415% | 0229 | 0228 |
| June 30. | 2611 | 2593 | 2262 | 2245 | 2545 | 2526 | 1900 | 1897 | 0416 | 0415% | 0229 | 0228 |
| July 7. | 2611 | 2600 | 2263 | 2252 | 2545 | 2533 | 1900 | 1898 | 0416 | 0415% | 0230 | 0229 |
| July 14. | 2602 | 2597 | 2260 | 2250 | 2536 | 2511 | 1900 | 1898 | 0416 | 0415% | 0230 | 0229 |
| July 21. | 2605 | 2598 | 2258 | 2251 | 2536 | 2523 | 1900 | 1898 | 0416% | 0416 | 0230 | 0229 |
| July 28. | 2602 | 2596 | 2254 | 2249 | 2535 | 2530 | 1900 | 1898 | 0416 | 0415% | 0230 | 0229 |
| Aug. 4. | 2605 | 2585 | 2257 | 2248 | 2537 | 2529 | 1905 | 1900 | 0417 | 0415% | 0231 | 0229 |
| Aug. 11. | 2640 | 2602 | 2290 | 2254 | 2580 | 2535 | 1925 | 1903 | 0423 | 0417 | 0234 | 0230 |
| Aug. 18. | 2638 | 2619 | 2282 | 2270 | 2565 | 2563 | 1925 | 1919 | 0423 | 0420 | 0234 | 0232 |
| Aug. 25. | 2629 | 2613 | 2279 | 2265 | 2561 | 2548 | 1920 | 1915 | 0422 | 0421 | 0233% | 0232 |
| Sep. 1. | 2612 | 2573 | 2263 | 2228 | 2546 | 2507 | 1920 | 1915 | 0422 | 0421 | 0233 | 0232 |
| Sep. 8. | 2590 | 2577 | 2244 | 2236 | 2525 | 2511 | 1922 | 1917 | 0423 | 0422 | 0233 | 0232 |
| Sep. 15. | 2587 | 2576 | 2241 | 2231 | 2520 | 2511 | 1920 | 1916 | 0422 | 0422 | 0233 | 0232 |
| Sep. 22. | 2585 | 2573 | 2238 | 2228 | 2519 | 2507 | 1918 | 1917 | 0422 | 0422 | 0234 | 0232 |
| Sep. 29. | 2574 | 2558 | 2229 | 2215 | 2509 | 2493 | 1915 | 1908 | 0422 | 0421 | 0233 | 0232 |
| Oct. 6. | 2553 | 2535 | 2212 | 2198 | 2488 | 2469 | 1908 | 1904 | 0421 | 0420% | 0232 | 0231 |
| Oct. 13. | 2547 | 2523 | 2207 | 2186 | 2480 | 2461 | 1910 | 1903 | 0422 | 0420 | 0233 | 0231 |
| Oct. 20. | 2567 | 2532 | 2220 | 2192 | 2501 | 2467 | 1909 | 1900 | 0422% | 0420% | 0231 | 0230 |
| Oct. 27. | 2575 | 2555 | 2231 | 2212 | 2509 | 2488 | 1908 | 1898 | 0420% | 0419% | 0230% | 0230 |
| Nov. 3. | 2574 | 2555 | 2229 | 2212 | 2508 | 2488 | 1893 | 1890 | 0418% | 0418% | 0230 | 0229 |
| Nov. 10. | 2585 | 2572 | 2238 | 2227 | 2519 | 2506 | 1890 | 1889 | 0418% | 0418% | 0229 | 0228 |
| Nov. 17. | 2583 | 2573 | 2237 | 2224 | 2516 | 2507 | 1890 | 1889 | 0418% | 0418% | 0229 | 0228 |
| Nov. 24. | 2578 | 2568 | 2232 | 2224 | 2512 | 2502 | 1884 | 1882 | 0418% | 0418% | 0230 | 0229 |
| Dec. 1. | 2578 | 2565 | 2230 | 2219 | 2510 | 2500 | 1884 | 1884 | 0418% | 0418% | 0228% | 0228% |
| Dec. 8. | 2559 | 2549 | 2213 | 2207 | 2495 | 2484 | 1885 | 1883 | 0418% | 0418% | 0228% | 0228% |
| Dec. 15. | 2558 | 2547 | 2215 | 2206 | 2492 | 2483 | 1883 | 1882 | 0418% | 0418% | 0228% | 0228% |
| Dec. 22. | 2555 | 2547 | 2213 | 2206 | 2489 | 2482 | 1886 | 1883 | 0418% | 0418% | 0228% | 0228% |
| Dec. 29. | 2551 | 2545 | 2210 | 2204 | 2487 | 2480 | 1886 | 1884 | 0418% | 0418% | 0228% | 0228% |
| Dec. 31. | 2550 | 2550 | 2208 | 2208 | 2485 | 2485 | 1886 | 1886 | 0419% | 0419% | 0228% | 0228% |
| Rge for 1934 | 2675 | 2616 | 2318 | 2180 | 2607 | 2450 | 1925 | 1775 | 0486 | 0475 | 0234 | 0227 |

Based on new gold value of the United States dollar as established on Jan. 31, 1934. ¹Stated values are estimated market values, in gold, of silver content of unit.

| | Manila | Straits Settlements | Japan | Colombia | Argentina | Export Rate | Free Inland | Export Rate | Free Inland | Chile | Peru | Uruguay | 1 Mexico |
|-----------|---------------|---------------------|----------|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| Par | \$ | P. I. | \$ | \$1.6470 | \$1.718724 | \$ | \$20,250 | \$ | \$20,250 | \$ | \$4,740 | \$1,7510 | \$0,0840 |
| Unit | (Silver Doli) | (Silver Peso) | (Dollar) | (Yen) | (Gold Peso) | Peso | (Paper Peso) | (Paper Mrels) | (Paper Mrels) | (Gold Peso) | (Gold Peso) | (Silver Peso) | (Silver Doli) |
| Wk. Ended | High. | Low. | High. | Low.</ | | | | | | | | | |



EARNINGS of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company showed a steady decline for the first three quarters of last year. For the nine months ended Sept. 30, 1934, net income amounted to \$90,203,878, equal to \$4.83 per common share, as compared with \$101,351,844, or \$5.43 a share, for the corresponding period of 1933. Walter S. Gifford, president, in his quarterly letter to stockholders reported that preliminary data indicated that earnings for 1934, treating the Bell System as a whole and including the Eastern Electric Company, amounted to about \$5.85 a share.

The number of toll and long-distance calls handled in 1934 was about 5 per cent greater than for 1933, he says. The Bell System had a net gain of about 298,000 telephones, against a net loss of 630,000 for 1933. At the end of the year about 13,460,000 telephones were in service, 14 per cent below the maximum development reached in 1930.

TABLE II. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

| Quarters ended: | Gross Earnings. | Net Income. | Income a Share. |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Mar. 31, 1933. | \$57,285,310 | \$32,383,187 | \$1.74 |
| Mar. 31, 1934. | 57,931,473 | 33,032,108 | 1.77 |
| June 30, 1933. | 58,907,327 | 33,840,947 | 1.81 |
| June 30, 1934. | 54,215,636 | 28,967,087 | 1.55 |
| Sep. 30, 1933. | 59,382,807 | 35,127,710 | 1.88 |
| Sep. 30, 1934. | 52,790,051 | 28,204,683 | 1.51 |

9 Months ended:

Sep. 30, 1933. 175,575,444 101,351,844 5.43

Sep. 30, 1934. 164,937,160 90,203,878 4.83

Subject to minor changes when final figures are released. *Includes dividends from companies which did not as a whole earn them by about \$2,000,000 in the initial nine months of 1934 and by approximately \$16,900,000 in corresponding period of 1933.

*Based on 18,662,275 shares.

CHANGES IN CAPITALIZATION

Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific—Formation of a committee to represent holders of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway 7 and 6 per cent preferred stocks has been announced. The company is in bankruptcy.

Colorado & Southern—In connection with the maturity on May 1 of its refunding and extension mortgage 4½ per cent gold bonds, amounting to \$33,168,900, the Colorado & Southern Railway Company has sent a letter signed by Ralph Budd, its president, to known holders of the company's general mortgage 4½ per cent bonds seeking their assent to extension of the maturity of the principal of the refunding bonds. The general mortgage bonds outstanding amount to \$20,000,000.

Federal Land Banks—Offering has been made by Brown Harriman & Co., Inc., and the First Boston Corporation of \$5,000,000 of Federal Land Banks Consolidated 4 per cent bonds, dated July 1, 1934, and due July 1, 1946. The bonds

are priced at 102½ to yield about 3.72 per cent to the first callable date, which is July 1, 1944.

The securities are the joint and several obligations of the twelve Federal Land Banks. Interest on them is exempt from all Federal, State and municipal income taxes.

Gillette Safety Razor Company—The company has offered to purchase up to \$1,000,000 face value of its ten-year 5 per cent convertible gold debentures, due on Oct. 1, 1940, at 103½ and accrued interest. This price is equivalent to \$1,050.56 prin-

Oil Company announced last week that it had placed three of its Midwestern subsidiaries under its own name. These companies are the White Star Refining Company of Detroit, the Lubrite Refining Corporation of St. Louis and the White Eagle Oil Corporation of Kansas City.

Under the new set-up, the White Star Refining Company has become the White Star Division of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company. The other companies likewise have become divisions of Socony-Vacuum. The company announced that this step is being taken to identify more closely these

tributary to the creditors would be \$14,852,870.55, which is considerably less than the total claims of creditors. The details of this estimate are set forth in the report of Scovell, Wellington & Co. on file with the court.

"This committee, after consideration of the data referred to above, and after conferences with the trustees and others, believes that if there should be a liquidation of the Studebaker group of properties at this time, the creditors would be paid only in part, and the preferred stockholders of Studebaker would receive nothing at all. Therefore, the committee feels itself obligated to advise the preferred stockholders that, in its opinion, if the properties are not continued as a going




Table I. American Telephone & Telegraph Company
(Thousands of Dollars)

| Year Ended Dec. 31: | Dividends Received. | Total Income. | Net Earnings. | Interest Charges. | Times Earned. | Net Income. | (Average age). | Earned a Share. | Dividends Declared. |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| 1925 | \$75,396 | \$180,459 | \$129,036 | \$21,631 | 5.97 | \$107,405 | \$11.79 | \$81,044 | |
| 1926 | 91,964 | 197,911 | 138,931 | 21,941 | 8.53 | 116,990 | 11.95 | 86,496 | |
| 1927 | 99,957 | 216,525 | 150,384 | 21,769 | 9.91 | 128,615 | 11.76 | 97,380 | |
| 1928 | 119,176 | 231,782 | 165,268 | 22,098 | 7.48 | 143,170 | 12.11 | 103,321 | |
| 1929 | 140,912 | 275,696 | 193,823 | 27,663 | 7.01 | 166,190 | 12.67 | 116,379 | |
| 1930 | 148,179 | 292,015 | 197,980 | 32,436 | 6.10 | 165,545 | 10.44 | 139,238 | |
| 1931 | 150,136 | 287,842 | 197,817 | 31,151 | 6.35 | 166,667 | 9.05 | 163,588 | |
| 1932 | a 137,380 | 252,487 | 170,994 | 25,087 | 6.82 | 145,907 | 7.82 | 167,955 | |
| 1933 | a 127,913 | 235,272 | 162,169 | 24,712 | 6.56 | 137,457 | 7.37 | 167,960 | |

| Year Ended Dec. 31: | Total Dividends Earned. | Property Total Invested. | P. C. Earned. | P. C. Invested. | Cash Earned. | On Prop. Capital. | Net Equivalent. | Working Capital. | Surplus For Year. | Total Surplus. |
|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| 1925 | \$1,336,863 | 8.0 | \$1,560,618 | 6.9 | \$72,485 | \$33,656 | \$26,361 | *\$139,150 | | |
| 1926 | 11,479,867 | 7.9 | 1,710,626 | 6.8 | 116,739 | 85,456 | 30,494 | *188,996 | | |
| 1927 | 11,527,011 | 8.4 | 1,856,142 | 6.9 | 79,278 | 49,766 | 79,174 | 272,436 | | |
| 1928 | 11,736,617 | 8.2 | 2,052,839 | 7.0 | 143,576 | 107,354 | 39,349 | 317,405 | | |
| 1929 | 11,925,814 | 8.6 | 2,416,700 | 6.9 | 41,387 | 6 5,853 | 49,811 | *370,383 | | |
| 1930 | 2,104,971 | 6.1 | 2,755,248 | 6.0 | 388,858 | 330,359 | 26,507 | 322,369 | | |
| 1931 | 2,742,832 | 5.1 | 2,937,100 | 5.1 | 254,468 | 195,655 | 3,078 | 325,494 | | |
| 1932 | 2,675,179 | 5.5 | 2,930,024 | 5.0 | 170,638 | 112,820 | 42,048 | 303,351 | | |
| 1933 | *2,668,125 | 5.2 | 2,878,948 | 4.8 | 186,645 | 138,499 | 30,504 | 272,677 | | |

* Dividends of \$9 a share were paid each year. * Includes premium on capital stock. + Excludes reserves for contingencies and capital stock premium. (a) The companies paying these dividends as a whole failed to earn them by approximately \$23,571,000 in 1933 and \$22,400,000 in 1932. Nothing was received from Western Electric Company, Inc., which unit operated at a loss of about \$13,722,000 in 1933 and \$12,600,000 in the preceding year. (b) Does not include special dividend of \$47,938,865 received from Western Electric, which was paid from accumulated profits. (d) Deficit.

capital and interest for each \$1,000 debenture. The debentures are to be presented to the Old Colony Trust Company on or before Jan. 23.

Interborough Rapid Transit—The voting trustees of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company's common stock have ratified the proposed agreement with the Manhattan Railway Company, under which Samuel Untermyer is authorized to negotiate with the city for inclusion of the properties of both companies in a transit unification plan. The vote was formal, the stockholders having ratified the agreement a week ago. The Manhattan Railway stockholders also have approved it.

Madison Square Garden—The New York Stock Exchange has approved for listing 324,860 shares of capital stock of the Madison Square Garden Corporation as a substitute for the voting trust certificates now representing this issue on the Exchange. The ten-year agreement under which the certificates were issued will expire on Feb. 1, on which date holders will receive stock in exchange for certificates.

Roxy Theatres—Federal Judge Francis G. Caffey has signed an order restraining the Continental Bank and Trust Company from continuing with foreclosure proceedings against the Roxy Theatres Corporation in the State Supreme Court.

The proceedings were instituted by the bank as trustee under a \$3,390,000 bond issue last September. The court pointed out that a reorganization petition had been filed on June 9, 1934.

Socony-Vacuum Oil Company—In line with its policy of consolidating all operations under one company, the Socony-Vacuum

affiliated marketing companies with the world-wide facilities and resources of Socony-Vacuum.

Studebaker Corporation—The committee for holders of preferred stock of the Studebaker Corporation has sent a letter to the stockholders urging support of the plan of reorganization on which a hearing will be held in the United States District Court in Fort Wayne, Ind., on Jan. 25. It says that unless the majority of the preferred stock is deposited under the plan, the reorganization may not be effected unless the court determines that the corporation is insolvent, or that the plan provides adequate protection for each class of stock.

"The Studebaker enterprise," the letter says, "we believe, faces but two alternatives: either liquidation or reorganization with adequate working capital and low fixed charges."

"During the receivership, which preceded the present reorganization proceedings under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act the receivers, now the trustees, requested the preparation by responsible accountants, reporters and engineers of various appraisals, reports and surveys which are on file with the court and open to inspection by any security holder. These documents show, among other things, estimated liquidation values of the properties of the Studebaker Corporation and its subsidiaries.

"As you will have noted from page 5 of the plan, Scovell, Wellington & Co. have estimated that upon liquidation of the properties under the conditions therein stated and making the assumptions referred to, the net sum available for dis-

| Maturity | Issued Date | At Date | Outstanding |
|---------------|----------------|------------|-------------|
| Jan. 23, 1935 | July 23, 0.07% | 75,200,000 | |
| Jan. 30, 1935 | Aug. 1, 0.09% | 75,025,000 | |
| Feb. 6, 1935 | Aug. 8, 0.12% | 75,327,000 | |
| Feb. 13, 1935 | Aug. 15, 0.25% | 75,320,000 | |
| Feb. 20, 1935 | Aug. 22, 0.23% | 75,090,000 | |
| Feb. 27, 1935 | Aug. 29, 0.22% | 75,655,000 | |
| Mar. 6, 1935 | Sep. 5, 0.18% | 75,290,000 | |
| Mar. 13, 1935 | Sep. 12, 0.23% | 75,365,000 | |
| Mar. 20, 1935 | Sep. 19, 0.28% | 75,041,000 | |
| Mar. 27, 1935 | Sep. 26, 0.29% | 75,023,000 | |
| Apr. 3, 1935 | Oct. 3, 0.28% | 75,038,000 | |
| Apr. 10, 1935 | Oct. 10, 0.24% | 75,360,000 | |
| Apr. 17, 1935 | Oct. 17, 0.21% | 75,248,000 | |
| Apr. 24, 1935 | Oct. 24, 0.20% | 75,102,000 | |
| May 1, 1935 | Oct. 31, 0.19% | 75,015,000 | |
| May 8, 1935 | Nov. 7, 0.21% | 75,075,000 | |
| May 15, 1935 | Nov. 14, 0.22% | 75,045,000 | |
| May 22, 1935 | Nov. 21, 0.21% | 75,168,000 | |
| May 29, 1935 | Nov. 28, 0.23% | 75,287,000 | |
| June 5, 1935 | Dec. 5, 0.22% | 75,139,000 | |
| June 12, 1935 | Dec. 12, 0.20% | 75,079,000 | |
| June 19, 1935 | Dec. 19, 0.18% | 75,020,000 | |
| June 26, 1935 | Dec. 26, 0.12% | 75,300,000 | |
| July 2, 1935 | Jan. 2, 0.10% | 75,150,000 | |
| July 10, 1935 | Jan. 9, 0.12% | 75,185,000 | |
| July 17, 1935 | Jan. 10, 0.15% | 75,079,000 | |

Total \$1,954,036,000

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES

| Interest Bearing | Total |
|------------------|------------------|
| 1935 | \$27,952,624,925 |
| Jan. 11 | \$28,486,471,595 |
| 1934 | |
| Dec. 31 | 27,544,037,950 |
| Nov. 30 | 26,760,967,700 |
| Oct. 31 | 26,643,039,700 |
| Sept. 30 | 26,626,131,850 |
| Aug. 31 | 26,495,065,000 |
| July 31 | 26,604,561,450 |
| June 30 | 26,480,487,870 |
| May 31 | 25,587,812,170 |
| Apr. 30 | 25,599,068,320 |
| Mar. 31 | 25,698,167,820 |
| 1933 | |
| Dec. 31 | 23,450,261,380 |
| | 23,813,790,736 |

*Approximate.

For last week's price range see "Bond Transactions,

concern and liquidation is forced, there is no possibility of the preferred stockholders realizing any equity in the properties.

"This committee feels strongly, therefore, that it is to the best interest of the preferred stockholders that the Studebaker Corporation should be reorganized promptly as a going concern. To accomplish this, additional working capital will have to be supplied, and the existing debt of more than \$21,000,000 now in default, together with accrued interest thereon since March 18, 1933, must be provided for.

"The present plan of reorganization proposed in the court on Dec. 27, 1934, offers a means to achieve these results. If the plan is consummated, the underwriting of the new debentures and common stock to be offered to the present stockholders for cash as part of the plan should assure working capital considered adequate by the trustees. The existing indebtedness will be eliminated, except for the issuance of \$451,822 principal amount of new debentures to the Rockne creditors in part exchange for their present indebtedness, and the preferred stockholders accorded a participation in the reorganized enterprise. Under the plan, the preferred stockholders receive, without payment, in exchange for each share of existing preferred stock held by them, one and one-fourth shares of common stock of the new company to be formed. In addition, the plan affords them the right to subscribe with respect to each share of existing preferred stock for \$15 principal amount of new debentures to be created under the plan, and two and two-ninths shares of common stock of the new company, upon payment of \$15 in cash."

Westinghouse Electric—Directors of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company have declared a dividend consisting of one-quarter of a share of common stock of the Radio Corporation of America for each share of preferred stock and of common stock of the company, payable on Feb. 18 to holders of record of Jan. 21.

In view of the preferential rights of the preferred stock of the company, the directors declared also an optional dividend of \$3.50 a share on the preferred stock, the holder having the option to accept such cash dividend in exchange for the quarterly share of Radio Corporation. This di-

vidend, including the optional, constitutes as to holders of the company's preferred stock full payment of preferential dividends for 1935, the announcement said.

On Feb. 18, when the distribution of Radio Corporation stock is made, full information will be given by the company with respect to handling fractional receipts and also with respect to the exercise by holders of preferred stock of the right to the optional dividend. The company advised no action be taken prior to Feb. 18 by holders of preferred shares with reference to the optional dividends.

On the basis of an average price of 5% for Radio Corporation common shares the current value of a one-fourth share is \$1.31.

CORPORATE NET EARNINGS INDUSTRIALS

| Company. | 1934. | 1933. | 1934. | 1933. | Com. Share |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| American Yvette Co.: | | | | | Net Profit Earnings. |
| Yr. Aug. 31... *\$62,469 *\$126,371 | | | | | |
| Automatic Voting Machine Corp.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Nov. 30... 395,846 69,583 \$1.10 \$0.19 | | | | | |
| Bing & Bing, Inc.: | | | | | |
| Sep. 30 qr... *193,697 *154,137 | | | | | |
| 9 mo. Sep. 30. *408,982 *628,956 | | | | | |
| Continental Motors Corp.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Oct. 31... *1,977,620 *3,497,764 | | | | | |
| Endicott Johnson Corp.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Nov. 30... 2,167,678 2,154,941 4.34 4.30 | | | | | |
| Florsheim Shoe Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Oct. 31... 402,336 586,810 a1.01 a1.22 | | | | | |
| Gobel (Adolf), Inc.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Oct. 27... *491,297 *242,073 | | | | | |
| Hart-Carter Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Nov. 30... *39,574 *126,000 | | | | | |
| Julian & Kokene Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Oct. 31... 165,065 120,315 1.11 .81 | | | | | |
| Loew's, Inc.: | | | | | |
| 12 wk., Nov. 22. 2,001,308 1,594,608 1.23 .95 | | | | | |
| Lindsay Light Co.: | | | | | |
| mYr. Dec. 31. 41,828 33,182 .45 .31 | | | | | |
| Madison Square Garden Corp.: | | | | | |
| Nov. 30 qr... 29,160 *40,106 .11 ... | | | | | |
| 6 mo. Nov. 30. *50,987 *205,629 | | | | | |
| Manhattan Shirt Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Nov. 30... 77,384 248,548 .34 1.10 | | | | | |
| Northern Securities Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... 169,116 48,717 4.27 1.23 | | | | | |
| Peerless Corp.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Sep. 30... *172,862 *75,799 | | | | | |
| Reynolds (R. J.) Tobacco Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... 21,536,894 21,153,721 2.15 2.11 | | | | | |
| Scotten Dillon Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... 423,516 410,674 1.41 1.37 | | | | | |
| Stetson (John B.) Co.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Oct. 31... 342,232 *93,841 .91 ... | | | | | |
| Woolworth (F. W.) & Co., Ltd.: | | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... £3,802,278 £3,407,948 95.19% 84.88% | | | | | |
| Zenith Radio Corp.: | | | | | |
| †Oct. 31 qr... *13,582 £123,405 | | | | | |
| 6 mo. Oct. 31. *50,155 £131,741 | | | | | |

UTILITIES NET INCOME

| | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| Am. Water Works & Elec. Co.: | | | | |
| 12 mo. Nov. 30. 2,980,898 3,591,503 h1.02 h1.37 | | | | |
| Continental Gas & Elec. Corp.: | | | | |
| Nov. 30 qr... 29,160 *40,106 .11 ... | | | | |
| 6 mo. Nov. 30. *50,987 *205,629 | | | | |
| Manhattan Shirt Co.: | | | | |
| Yr. Nov. 30... 77,384 248,548 .34 1.10 | | | | |
| Northern Securities Co.: | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... 169,116 48,717 4.27 1.23 | | | | |
| Peerless Corp.: | | | | |
| Yr. Sep. 30... *172,862 *75,799 | | | | |
| Reynolds (R. J.) Tobacco Co.: | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... 21,536,894 21,153,721 2.15 2.11 | | | | |
| Scotten Dillon Co.: | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... 423,516 410,674 1.41 1.37 | | | | |
| Stetson (John B.) Co.: | | | | |
| Yr. Oct. 31... 342,232 *93,841 .91 ... | | | | |
| Woolworth (F. W.) & Co., Ltd.: | | | | |
| Yr. Dec. 31... £3,802,278 £3,407,948 95.19% 84.88% | | | | |
| Zenith Radio Corp.: | | | | |
| †Oct. 31 qr... *13,582 £123,405 | | | | |
| 6 mo. Oct. 31. *50,155 £131,741 | | | | |

RAILROADS NET INCOME

| | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe System: | | | | |
| 11 mo. Nov. 30. 6,089,540 3,505,263 .16 p2.82 | | | | |
| Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R. R.: | | | | |
| 11 mo. Nov. 30. 1,019,893 279,898 | | | | |
| Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R.: | | | | |
| 11 mo. Nov. 30. 2,481,865 2,272,652 2.87 2.63 | | | | |
| Pittsburgh & West Virginia Rwy.: | | | | |
| 11 mo. Nov. 30. *67,768 *79,354 | | | | |
| Wheeling & Lake Erie Rwy.: | | | | |
| 11 mo. Nov. 30. 898,809 1,076,223 q1.33 q3.07 | | | | |

*Net loss. †Profit before Federal taxes. ^aOn 6% preferred stock. ^bOn shares outstanding at close of respective periods. ^mPreliminary report. ^pOn preferred stock. ^mIndicated quarterly earnings as shown by comparison of company's reports for quarter and six months periods. ^aOn Class A shares.

RAILROAD EARNINGS

| | | | | |
|--|-------------|--|--|--|
| Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe | | | | |
| 1934. 1933. | | | | |
| November net loss... \$223,420 | \$1,278,738 | | | |
| Eleven months' net income... 6,089,540 | 3,505,263 | | | |

11 mo. Nov. 30. 898,809 1,076,223 q1.33 q3.07

| | | | | |
|--|-----------|--|--|--|
| Bangor & Aroostook | | | | |
| 1934. 1933. | | | | |
| Current assets, Nov. 30. 3,949,862 | 1,717,234 | | | |
| Current liabilities ... 706,555 | 621,787 | | | |
| Investment in stocks, bonds, &c. ... 150,000 | 510,734 | | | |
| Funded debt due within six months ... 10,000 | 10,000 | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|------------|--|--|--|
| Boston & Maine | | | | |
| Current assets, Nov. 30. 10,842,175 | 11,641,589 | | | |
| Current liabilities ... 19,315,189 | 19,365,066 | | | |
| Investment in stocks, bonds, &c. ... 2,447,620 | 2,424,197 | | | |
| Funded debt due within six months ... 1,087,239 | 2,945,666 | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|--|--|--|
| Central of Georgia | | | | |
| November net loss... 188,009 | 267,445 | | | |
| Eleven months' net loss 2,366,164 | 2,461,244 | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|------------|--|--|--|
| Chesapeake & Ohio | | | | |
| Current assets, Nov. 30. 33,099,690 | 28,568,404 | | | |
| Current liabilities ... 16,109,130 | 19,156,837 | | | |
| Investment in stocks, bonds, &c. ... 685,669 | 686,419 | | | |
| Funded debt due within six months ... 3,767,000 | 3,767,000 | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|-----------|--|--|--|
| Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville | | | | |
| November net loss... 166,782 | 121,641 | | | |
| Eleven months' net loss 1,777,162 | 1,492,894 | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|------------|--|--|--|
| Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific | | | | |
| November net loss... 1,494,373 | 1,270,424 | | | |
| Eleven months' net loss 14,584,783 | 12,868,439 | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Chicago & North Western | | | | |
| November net loss... 1,053 | | | | |

Bond Redemptions and Defaults



DETAILED information on any bond redemption listed below, including the serial numbers of bonds called by lot, will be furnished without charge to *Annalist* subscribers. Requests for such information may be made by telephone (LACKAWANNA 4-1000), telegraph or letter.

BOND REDEMPTIONS

BONDS and warrants of five municipalities were added last week to the January list of securities called for payment before their dates of maturity. Only one of the calls was for an entire issue, the others being parts of issues to satisfy sinking-fund operations. Redemptions posted for later months were not quite so large as in previous weeks, with domestic industrial bonds the principal retirements. The current month's refundings total \$116,594,000, against \$27,286,000 in the previous month and \$24,569,000 in January, 1934, for corresponding weeks.

Bonds called for redemption in January are classified below:

| | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| Industrial | \$59,249,000 |
| Public utility | 6,699,000 |
| State and municipal | 37,089,000 |
| Foreign | 11,126,000 |
| Miscellaneous | 2,431,000 |
| | \$116,594,000 |

Aberdeen, Wash., various of local improvement bonds, called for payment at par between Jan. 2 and Jan. 24, 1935, at office of the City Treasurer.

Albany County, Wyo., 5 per cent bonds 1-18 and 4% per cent bonds 19-75, both inclusive (\$75,000), of School District 1, called for payment at par on Feb. 1, 1935, at the Albany National Bank, Laramie, Wyo.

Alexandria (City of), \$7,100 of 4 per cent Loan of 1902 bonds, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at the National Bank of Egypt, Alexandria, Cairo and London.

American Machine and Foundry Co., entire issue of secured 6s, due Apr. 1, 1939, called for payment at 102 on Apr. 1, 1935. The Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., New York, is trustee.

Argentine Railway, \$84,900 of Guarantees Rescission 4 per cent Sterling Loans of 1896 and 1899, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935.

Bannock County, Idaho, bonds 1-63, inclusive, of Rural High School District 5, dated July 1, 1922, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at the First Security Bank of Idaho, Boise, Idaho.

Bernalillo County, N. M., bonds 1-10, inclusive, of School District 9 buildings 6s, dated June 1, 1923, called for payment at par on June 1, 1935, at office of the County Treasurer, Albuquerque, N. M.

Billings, Mont., bonds 99-109, inclusive, of

sewer 5s, and bonds 16 and 17 of park 5s, dated July 1, 1919, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at the Chase National Bank, New York.

Bozeman, Mont., various of bonds and warrants, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at office of the City Treasurer, Bozeman.

Chicago (City of), various of tax-anticipation warrants, called for payment at par on Jan. 16, 1935, at office of the City Treasurer, or the Guaranty Trust Co., New York.

Chinese Government (Imperial), £170,320 of 5 per cent Hukuang Railways Loan of 1911 bonds, due 1951, called for payment at par on June 15, 1935, at the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., London.

Credit Foncier Egyptien, various of 3 per cent Loan of 1905 bonds, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935.

Flathead County, Mont., various of warrants, called for payment at par on Dec. 26, 1934, at office of the County Treasurer.

General Petroleum Corp., entire issue of first 5s, due Aug. 15, 1940, called for payment at 102% on Feb. 15, 1935, at the Guaranty Trust Co., New York, or the Bank of California, N. A., San Francisco. Coupons due Feb. 15, 1935, should be collected in the usual manner.

Glasgow, Mont., electric light bonds 1-13, waterworks bonds 1-10 and sewer bonds 1-5, all inclusive, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at office of the City Treasurer.

Grange Co. and Grange Warehouse and Storage Co., entire issue of first 7s, due Aug. 1, 1937, called for payment at 105 on Feb. 1, 1935, at the Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., San Francisco.

Italy, £25,260 of 5 per cent Loan of 1862 bonds (Maremma Railway), called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at the Hambros Banks, Ltd., London.

Jerusalem Girls' College, Ltd., £420 of first mortgage bonds and debentures, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at Coutts & Co., London.

Kasimbazar Raj, various of first 6½ per cent Sterling Debenture Loan bonds, called for payment at par on Jan. 1, 1935, at Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co., London.

Kentucky Title Trust Co., various of bonds called for payment at par on Feb. 1, 1935, at the Kentucky Title Trust Co., Louisville, Ky.

King County, Wash., bonds 14 and 15 of Local Improvement District 1 of Water District 17, called for payment at par on Dec. 15, 1934, at office of the County Treasurer.

Kresge (S. S.), entire issue of first 5s, due June 1, 1945, called for payment at 100% on June 1, 1935. The Detroit Trust Co., Detroit, is trustee.

Kroonstad (Municipality of), £1,700 of 4½ per cent sterling debentures, called for payment at par on Dec. 31, 1934, at the Barclays Bank, London.

Land Bank of Egypt, various of 3½ per cent bonds, called for payment at par on Jan. 2, 1935, at the company's office, Alexandria, the Societe Marseillaise de Credit Industrial et Commercial et de Depots, Paris, the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, London and Paris, and Lombard, Odier & Co., Geneva.

Larimer County, Col., \$25,000 of School District 5 bonds, called for payment at par on Jan. 15, 1935, at office of the County Treasurer, Fort Collins, Col. Numbers called: Issue of Apr. 1, 1921, 18-31; issue

of 1926 to 1934.

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of 1926 to 1934.

Land Bank of Egypt, various of

National Cottonseed Products Corp., in default on Jan. 1, 1935, interest payment on issue of first and refunding 6 1/2s, due 1941.

Newton Steel Co., in default on Jan. 1, 1935, principal payment on issue of first 7s, due 1935. Interest due Jan. 1, 1935, was paid.

Noble County Investment Co., in default on June 1, 1932, interest payment on issue of first lien collateral trust 6s. A distribution of 4 per cent was made in November, 1934.

Northern Redwood Lumber Co.—Funds for payment of coupons due Dec. 1, 1934, on issue of first 6s, due 1937, have been made available.

Ohio Building Realty Co.—Non-depositing holders of first 6 1/2s, due 1939, realized \$9.25 per \$100 of bonds from sale of company's assets.

Post Street Investment Co., in default on July 1, 1934, interest payment on issue of first 6s, due 1950.

Porto Alegre (City of)—Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co. have notified holders of 7 1/2s, due 1966, that funds have been deposited with them sufficient to make a payment in United States currency of 17 1/2 per cent of face amount of the coupons due Jan. 1, 1935, amounting to \$6.564 for each \$37.50 coupon and \$3.284 for each \$18.75 coupon.

Such payment, if accepted by the holders of these bonds and coupons, must be accepted in full payment of such coupons. No provision has been made for the coupons maturing Jan. 1, 1932, to Jan. 1, 1934, inclusive, but they should be retained for future adjustment.

Rio de Janeiro (State of)—The City Bank Farmers Trust Co., New York, has notified holders of extended secured 6 1/2s, due 1959, that there has been remitted funds for payment of the Jan. 1, 1935, coupons at rate of 17 1/2 per cent of dollar face amount of such coupons. Coupons accordingly will be paid at the rate of \$5.6875 per \$32.50 coupon upon presentation and surrendered thereof to the City Bank Farmers Trust Co. Coupons presented for payment must be accompanied by a letter of transmittal wherein coupon holder agrees to accept such payment in full satisfaction and discharge of such coupons. No provision has been made for the unpaid coupons due prior to July 1, 1934, but they should be retained for future adjustment.

San Paulo (State of)—Speyer & Co., as special agents for State of San Paulo fifteen-year 8 per cent external loan of 1921, and Speyer & Co. and J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., as special agents for State of San Paulo twenty-five-year 8 per cent

external loan of 1925 and forty-year 6 per cent external dollar loan of 1928, have announced that funds have been deposited with them sufficient to make a payment of 20 per cent of the face amount of the Jan. 1, 1935, coupons of the loans. Acceptance of such payment is optional with holders of the above bonds and coupons, but if accepted must be taken in full satisfaction of the interest.

Current Security Offerings BONDS

Buffalo, N. Y., City of, \$200,000 school 4s, due April 1, 1938-43, yield 2.60% to 3.05%, offered Jan. 10. The Chase National Bank, N. Y.

Columbus, Ohio, City of, \$1,078,000 4s, F & A, due Feb. 1, 1940-43, yield 2.75% to 3.25%, offered Jan. 11. Brown Harriman & Co., Inc., N. Y.; Hayden, Miller & Co., Cleveland; Lowry Sweeney, Inc., the Huntington National Bank of Columbus; Wells-Dickey Co., Minneapolis. (Bought from RFC.)

Federal Land Banks \$5,000,000 cons. 4s, due Jan. 1, 1946, price 102 1/4, yield 3.72%, offered Jan. 12. Brown Harriman & Co., Inc., First Boston Corp., N. Y.

Harrington Park, N. J., Borough of, \$88,000 (of a new issue of \$113,000) rfdg. 5 1/2s, due Dec. 15, 1936-49, yield 4.50% to 5.25%, offered Jan. 14. MacBride, Miller & Co., N. Y.

Irvington, N. J., Village of, \$34,000 4s, due March 15, 1935-48, yield 1.50% to 3.60%, offered Jan. 12. Phelps, Fenn & Co., N. Y.

New Jersey, State of, \$10,000,000 2 1/2s, J & J, due Jan. 1, 1936-43, yield 0.60% to 2.50%, offered Jan. 10. Lehman Brothers, Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., and a large syndicate.

Port Jervis, N. Y., \$95,000 3 1/2s, due Jan. 15, 1938-45, yield 2.60% to 3.20%, offered Jan. 12. Phelps, Fenn & Co., N. Y.

Savings and Loan Bank of the State of New York \$444,000 a. f. reg. 4s, Series 125, due Aug. 1, 1942, price 100%, offered Jan. 10. Neergaard, Miller & Co., N. Y.

United States Treasury \$75,079,000 182-day Treasury bills, due July 17, 1935, average price 99.926, average rate on bank discount basis 0.15%, offered Jan. 14. United States Treasury.

Warren County, Tenn., \$40,000 high school 3 1/2s, due Jan. 1, 1955, yield 3.50%, offered Jan. 5. Gray, Shillinglaw & Co., Nashville.

News of Foreign Securities



PRICES on the London Stock Exchange showed a slight decline for the week, partly the result of profit taking. The Annalist index of twenty stocks is 19.98 for Jan. 15, as against 20.03 for Jan. 8. British Government securities declined slightly. German bonds rose on Tuesday as a result of the Saar vote. Brazilian bonds declined.

Prices on the Paris Bourse rallied sharply. The Annalist index of fifteen stocks rising to the highest level since Sept. 11, 1934. The index is 37.06 for Jan. 15, as against 35.11 for Jan. 8. Trading on the Bourse was stimulated as a result of the Saar vote, while Premier Flandin's speech on Saturday also had a stimulating influence. Coal and chemical shares were a feature of the market at the close of the week.

Berlin prices also advanced, although the gains were small. The Annalist index rose to 25.87 for Jan. 15 from 25.46 for Jan. 8. The German victory in the Saar was, of course, the outstanding development of the week.

British Banks Report—Leading British banks continue to show increased earnings for 1934. The Westminster Bank's net profits were £1,524,880, an increase of £59,925 compared with 1933. The dividend again was 18 per cent. Premises and pension funds again receive £100,000 and £200,000, respectively. The carry-forward was increased from £400,495 to £481,085. The sum of £1,820,157, withdrawn in 1931, was restored to reserve.

The National Provincial Bank earned £1,643,759, an increase of £40,335. The dividend of 15 per cent was maintained.

The pension fund receives £100,000 and £878,881 goes forward, against £857,034 the year before.

Profits of the Midland Bank were £2,292,217, an increase of £25,371. The dividend of 16 per cent was repeated. The contingency reserve receives £270,000, against £556,000 in 1933. Bank premises receive £250,000, against nothing in 1933, leaving £371,946 to carry forward, compared with £866,482 the year before.

Total resources of Barclays Bank, Ltd. (London), one of England's "big five," were £413,407,530 on Dec. 31, an increase of about £1,350,000, compared with the balance sheet at the close of 1933, according to cabled advices received in New York by the bank's representatives.

Current deposits and other accounts were reported as £380,093,758, an increase of £1,300,000. Cash items totaled £46,809,953; balances with other British banks and checks in course of collection, £11,889,908, and bills discounted, £47,572,778. The profits for

1934 amounted to £1,708,173, a rise of £103,493 over the results for 1933.

General Electric Company, Ltd.—The stockholders of the General Electric Company, Ltd., have approved an increase in authorized capital to £9,600,000 by the creation of 2,000,000 new common shares of £1 each, to be offered in exchange for debenture stock at about the current market quotation at the time of the offer.


Actual terms and conditions of the plan are still subject to negotiation. Lord Hirst, chairman of the company, said at the extraordinary meeting of stockholders. The directors had rejected any idea of what is commonly termed an issue on bonus terms to common stockholders, he added.

Gothenburg Bank—A deficit amounting to 29,000,000 kronor appears in the accounts of the Gothenburg Bank, according to an official communiqué issued on Jan. 9. Shareholders face the necessity of further sacrifices in addition to 75,000,000 kronor written off in the last three years.

In order to cover the deficit the bank proposes to use some of the capital and reserve funds. The capital will be written down from 43,750,000 to 21,875,000 kronor, each 250-kronor share being reduced to a value of 125 kronor. New shares to the number of 175,000 with a value of 125 kronor will be issued.

Woolworth & Co., Ltd.—Net profits of almost £5,000,000 and dividends of 80 per cent for the past year were reported on Jan. 8 by F. W. Woolworth & Co., Ltd., which operates 598 "three penny and six penny" stores throughout the British Isles.

The profits for 1934 amounted to £4,879,950, an increase of £354,600 over the 1933 figures. A final dividend of 50 per cent was declared on ordinary five-shilling shares, bringing the year's total to 80 per cent. Despite such large dividends, there was an undistributed balance of £5,614,454 to be carried on to next year's accounts, an increase of £118,400 compared with last year.



LISTED FOREIGN BONDS

The par value of listed foreign bonds sold in the New York market:

N. Y. Stock Exchange, N. Y. Curb
Week ended Jan. 12 '35 \$10,651,000 \$677,000
Week ended Jan. 5 '35 8,228,500 1,043,000
Week ended Jan. 13 '34 21,861,000 2,256,000
1935 to date..... 17,271,000 1,633,000
1934 to date..... 37,062,000 3,745,000

FOREIGN BOND AVERAGES

(10 Foreign Issues)

High. Low. Last.
Week ended Jan. 12, '35 110.39 109.85 109.94

THE ANNALIST WEEKLY INDICES OF FOREIGN STOCK PRICES

| 1934. | London. | Paris. | Berlin. |
|--------------|---------|----------|---------|
| Nov. 13..... | 18.62 | 34.13 | 24.77 |
| Nov. 20..... | 19.04 | 33.19 | 24.92 |
| Nov. 26..... | 18.90 | 33.19 | 24.73 |
| Dec. 3..... | 19.41 | 33.15 | 25.23 |
| Dec. 11..... | 18.64 | 33.46 | 24.73 |
| Dec. 18..... | 19.14 | 32.40 | 24.44 |
| Dec. 24..... | 19.29 | Holiday. | 24.44 |
| Dec. 31..... | 19.49 | 132.91 | 24.73 |

1935.

Jan. 8..... 20.03 35.11 25.46

Jan. 15..... 19.98 37.06 25.87

Dec. 29.

Foreign Government Securities

| IN LONDON | IN PARIS | IN NEW YORK |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| British 3 1/2% War Loan. | French 3% Rentes. | 1920 Amort. Govt. 5 1/2% Rep. 7%. |
| British 2 1/2% Consols. | French 5% Rentes. | German 5 1/2% German 5 1/2% \$43%. |
| British 4% Consols. | 82 fr 20c 118 fr 60c 31 1/2 43 | 82 fr 60c 118 fr 75c 33 1/2 45 |
| 1960-1990. | 82 fr 20c 118 fr 60c 31 1/2 43 | 82 fr 20c 118 fr 75c 33 1/2 45 |
| Jan. 7..... 109% | 93% | 121% |
| Jan. 8..... 109% | 93% | 121% |
| Jan. 9..... 109% | 93% | 121% |
| Jan. 10..... 109% | 93% | 121% |
| Jan. 11..... 109% | 93% | 121% |
| Jan. 12..... 109% | 93% | 121% |

GERMAN SECURITIES

ALL BLOCKED REICHSMARKS

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The Stock Market Outlook

Continued from Page 74

return of the pound to the gold standard.

Unpredictable Factors

Labor troubles interfered seriously with the course of business recovery in 1934. It is feared by some observers that a recurrence of labor difficulties may prevent recovery during the next year or two. This is of course a possibility which must be taken into account. One the other hand it should be remembered that periods of business recovery in the past have often been marked by serious labor disturbances, as for example, 1922.

It is evidently impossible to judge at this time whether political and labor developments will prevent a real general business recovery from setting in within the next year or two. We cannot predict labor and political events with any degree of certainty. All that the business man or investor can do is to observe developments as carefully as possible.

Inflation and the Danger of a Subsequent Collapse

There is one other danger in the general outlook, which is of a long-term sort and which has received much less attention than the difficulties which surround the question of the next general business recovery. It is possible that the real danger to the situation is not that business will not recover, but that when the recovery comes, it may, on account of the tremendous possibilities of inflation, be carried to unreasonable lengths and be followed by severe collapse. This is, however, a problem which is likely to cause much less concern to the average business man or investor than the question of how soon the next genuine recovery sets in within the next year or so.

From our survey of the present general business and financial situation we may conclude that there is a reasonably strong probability of a substantial recovery in stock prices occurring over the next several years. Whether this recovery set in within the next year or is longer delayed appears to depend to a considerable extent upon political and labor developments.

What's Ahead for 1935?

What opportunities to capitalize? What pitfalls to avoid? What investments for Recovery?

ANNUAL UNITED OPINION Forecast for 1935 answers 16 vital questions on the business and financial outlook that will prove a valuable guide to profits in the New Year.

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list of 10 stocks selected by our
staff as offering the best profit
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UNITED BUSINESS SERVICE
210 Newbury St., Boston, Mass.

Stock Transactions—N. Y. Stock Exchange

Complete Transactions for 1934 and for Calendar Week Ended Jan. 12.

| 1933 | | Range for Year | | 1934 | Net | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | Last Dividend Payable Per Share | Earnings Per Share | Wk's Range Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | Wk's Chge. | Wk's Sales | | | | | |
|------|--------|----------------|-------|---------|--------|--------------|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|------------|------------|-------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| High | Low | High | Low | Date | Last | Chge | | | Per Rod | | | | | | | | | |
| 40% | 13% | 43 | 1-18 | 35 | 1-17 | 40 | + 8 | 2,160 | ABRAHAM & ST. np...AST | 155,150 | 12-31-34 | 1 1/4 Q A | .362 | 40 | 36% | 40 | ... | "none |
| 97 | 80 | 111 | 1-28 | 89 | 1-28 | 100 | + 28 | 3,780 | Adams Express np...ADE | 1,714,749 | 1-30-34 | 1 1/4 Q A | .258 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 10 | 30 |
| 13% | 3 | 17 | 1-28 | 6 | 7-6 | 7 1/4 | - | 5,174 | Adams Express np...ADE | 60,548 | 12-31-34 | 1 1/2 Q | .71 | 6 1/2 | 6% | 6% | ... | 8,300 |
| 71 | 39 | 85 | 1-13 | 70 | 1-28 | 85 | + 15% | 2,010 | Adams Mills np...ALL | 156,000 | 2- 1-35 | 50 C | .6 | 1.91 | 33 1/2 | 31 | - 2 1/2 | 2,300 |
| 21% | 8 | 34 | 4- 5 | 16 | 1- 5 | 32 1/2 | - 15% | 34,900 | Addresso-Mult \$10...AIN | 760,213 | 4-11-32 | 25 C | .9 | .45 | 8 1/2 | 8 | - 1 1/2 | 2,300 |
| 12% | 5 | 11 | 2- 6 | 63 | 1- 4 | 88 | - | 109,762 | Advance Bum np...ARN | 277,600 | 2- 1-35 | 50 C | .6 | 5 1/4 | 5 1/4 | 5 1/4 | - 1/2 | 1,000 |
| 11% | 5 | 9 | 2- 6 | 47 | 2- 5 | 34 | - | 50,200 | Affiliated Prod np...APP | 382,800 | 2- 1-35 | 50 C | .9 | .49 | 7 1/2 | 7 | - 1/2 | 800 |
| 112 | 47 | 113 | 1-26 | 91 | 6- 2 | 121 1/2 | + 13% | 20,600 | Air Reduction np...ADN | 84,200 | 1-15-35 | 75 C | .9 | 3.64 | 11 1/2 | 11 1/2 | - 3 | 5,100 |
| 4 | 2 | 3 | 4-28 | 18 | 11- 2 | 1% | - | 57,200 | Air W El Ap np...AWY | 40,000 | 1-15-35 | 150 C | .5 | 40 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | 2,300 |
| 33 | 11 1/2 | 23 1/2 | 1-15 | 16 | 9- 4 | 187 | - 3 1/2 | 1,779,200 | Ala & Vicksburg np...ALM | 42,000 | 10- 1-34 | 3 1/2 S | 3.00 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | "none |
| 178 | 170 | 205 | 7- 5 | 21 | 1 1/2 | 12-21 | - 1% | 40 | Albany & Susq. np...AQS | 35,000 | 1- 1-35 | 160 C | .202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 202 | 24,300 |
| 81 | 5% | 54 | 4- 10 | 45 | 12-27 | 75 | + 1% | 241,400 | Allegh Corp np w \$30 w...AWL | 4,152,547 | 1-11-34 | 1 1/2 Q | .9 | .84 | 17 1/2 | 17 1/2 | - 1/2 | 4,700 |
| 20 | 1% | 16 | 4- 9 | 37 | 12-27 | 55 | + 1% | 48,000 | Allegh Corp np w 5% x \$30 w...AWL | 546,053 | 5- 1-31 | 1 1/2 Q | .9 | .11 | 7 | 6 | - 1/2 | 1,600 |
| 21 | 1% | 14 | 4- 9 | 42 | 12-27 | 6 | + 1% | 45,900 | Allegh Corp np w 4% x \$40 w...AWL | 10,100 | 1-15-35 | 50 C | .5 | .5 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | - 1/2 | 1,000 |
| 26 | 5 | 23 | 2-23 | 15 | 6-18 | 187 1/2 | - | 6,000 | Allegheny Steel np...ACL | 2,100 | 1-15-35 | 50 C | .74 | 23 | 21 | 21 | - 2 1/2 | 400 |
| 83 | 52 | 98 | 7- 26 | 82 | 1- 10 | 98 1/2 | + 16 1/2 | 273,850 | Alleg Chem & Dye np...ACD | 32,000 | 1- 1-35 | 3 1/2 S | .9 | .80 | 15 1/2 | 15 1/2 | - 1/2 | 800 |
| 70 | 70 | 160 | 7- 27 | 115 1/2 | 9- 17 | 137 1/2 | - 10 1/2 | 273,850 | Alleg Chem & Dye np...ACD | 2,401,208 | 2- 1-35 | 1 1/2 Q | .5 | 5.50 | 140 1/2 | 133 1/2 | - 5 1/2 | 4,500 |
| 125 | 115 | 130 | 6-22 | 122 1/2 | 1- 16 | 123 | - 1 1/2 | 11,400 | Allied Chem & Dye pf...AH | 392,849 | 1- 2-35 | 1 1/2 Q | .42-24 | 124 | 124 | 124 | 124 | 100 |
| 26% | 6 | 23% | 2- 5 | 106 | 7-26 | 167 1/2 | - 7 1/2 | 544,800 | Allis-Chalmers Mfg np...AH | 1,360,600 | 5-16-32 | 12 1/2 C | .9 | .65 | 17 1/2 | 15 1/2 | - 1/2 | 13,600 |
| 24 | 5% | 20 | 2- 5 | 111 | 7-28 | 185 | + 6 1/2 | 50,500 | Alp Port Cement np...AHP | 711,000 | 1- 2-35 | 25 C | .12 | .62 | 20 1/2 | 17 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 2,100 |
| 94% | 7% | 74 | 4- 10 | 45 | 12-27 | 75 | + 1% | 227,000 | Amalgamated Leather \$1ALR | 175,000 | 1- 2-35 | 50 C | .6 | .42 | 35 | 35 | - 1/2 | 1,900 |
| 40 | 5 | 45 | 3-13 | 25 | 1- 6 | 27 | + 2 | 11,800 | Amalgamated Leather \$7 pf \$50 | 292,070 | 1- 2-35 | 50 C | .6 | .42 | 20 1/2 | 17 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 1,000 |
| 33 | 18% | 58 | 6- 9 | 106 | 1- 10 | 106 1/2 | - 5 1/2 | 222,000 | Amalgamated Leather \$10 pf \$50 | 120,000 | 1- 2-35 | 50 C | .6 | .42 | 20 1/2 | 17 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 6,000 |
| 21% | 8 | 24 | 1- 8 | 25 | 1- 8 | 25 | - | 208,500 | Am Chem of Del np...AHD | 232,168 | 12-31-34 | 50 C | .3 | .44 | 52 1/2 | 50 1/2 | - 1/2 | 8,900 |
| 28% | 8 | 24 | 4- 27 | 117 1/2 | 9- 18 | 147 | + 1% | 231,900 | Am Bank Note \$10...ABN | 652,773 | 1- 2-32 | 50 C | .9 | .80 | 15 1/2 | 13 1/2 | - 1/2 | 2,300 |
| 49% | 34 | 50% | 4- 27 | 102 | 1- 4 | 46 | + 6 | 8,920 | Am Bank Note pf \$50... | 89,913 | 1- 2-35 | 75 C | .9 | .56 | 46 | 43 | - 3 | 80 |
| 42% | 9% | 38 | 2- 5 | 19 | 9- 17 | 29 1/2 | - 1/2 | 85,600 | Am Brake Shoe np...ABK | 612,916 | 12-31-34 | 20 C | .6 | .50 | 140 1/2 | 133 1/2 | - 5 1/2 | 3,100 |
| 89% | 13 | 62 1/2 | 1- 31 | 208 | 7- 26 | 318 | - 20 1/2 | 615,800 | Am Com Alcohol \$20...ACF | 96,000 | 12-31-34 | 1 1/2 Q | .6 | .94 | 119 1/2 | 119 1/2 | - 1/2 | 200 |
| 14% | 6 | 26 1/2 | 6- 19 | 196 | 11- 21 | 154 | + 15 1/2 | 773,100 | Am Can \$25... | 2,473,998 | 2-15-35 | 12 1/2 C | .504 | .117 | 110 1/2 | 111 1/2 | - 1/2 | 12,100 |
| 13% | 12 | 12 1/2 | 1- 26 | 128 1/2 | 1- 6 | 151 | + 26% | 18,400 | Am Can pf... | 18,400 | 1- 2-35 | 25 C | .12 | .62 | 17 1/2 | 17 1/2 | - 1/2 | 300 |
| 10% | 6 | 12 1/2 | 1- 26 | 128 1/2 | 1- 6 | 151 | + 26% | 28,000 | Am Can Fdy np...ACF | 600,000 | 10- 1-31 | 25 C | .6 | .24 | 20 1/2 | 17 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 1,000 |
| 50% | 15 | 56 1/2 | 2- 31 | 120 | 4- 20 | 41 | + 1 1/2 | 53,700 | Am Car & Fdy np... | 300,000 | 7- 1-32 | 1 1/2 C | .6 | .14 | 40 | 41 | - 1/2 | 6,000 |
| 14% | 3% | 40 | 1- 24 | 19 | 8- 7 | 9 | + 1 1/2 | 22,300 | Am Chain np... | 250,221 | 4-20-31 | 50 C | .6 | .36 | 9 | 9 | - 1/2 | 100 |
| 51% | 34 | 70 | 12% | 106 | 1- 10 | 146 1/2 | - 1 1/2 | 107,026 | Am Chain pf... | 107,026 | 12-31-34 | 1 1/2 C | .6 | .57 | 40 | 38 | - 2 1/2 | 700 |
| 27 | 20 | 25 | 7- 26 | 82 | 1- 10 | 131 | + 1 1/2 | 57,700 | Am Chick np... | 445,000 | 4- 1-35 | 75 C | .9 | .16 | 68 1/2 | 68 1/2 | - 1/2 | 1,400 |
| 64% | 2 | 64 1/2 | 2- 5 | 19 | 9- 17 | 29 1/2 | - 1/2 | 17,200 | Am Coal \$25... | 60,000 | 2- 1-35 | 75 C | .6 | .03 | 35 | 25 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 600 |
| 121 | 22% | 216 | 1- 10 | 171 | 7- 27 | 114 | - 6 1/2 | 90,400 | Am-Haw S S \$10...ABS | 500,000 | 12-31-34 | 25 C | .11 | .103 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | - 1/2 | 500 |
| 16% | 24 | 104 | 2- 5 | 76 | 5- 26 | 51 | - | 43,800 | Am Hide & Leather np...AH | 112,741 | 1-30-34 | 1 1/2 C | .3 | .46 | 51 1/2 | 51 1/2 | - 1/2 | 400 |
| 57% | 13 | 135 | 1- 21 | 175 | 8- 1 | 24 1/2 | - 7 1/2 | 64,000 | Am Hide & Leather pf... | 100,000 | 3- 2-31 | 35 C | .3 | .08 | 25 1/2 | 24 1/2 | - 1/2 | 2,200 |
| 42% | 3 | 36 | 1- 26 | 26 1/2 | 6- 27 | 21 | + 1 1/2 | 143,400 | Am Encasual Tiling np...AEN | 243,170 | 3-31-31 | 25 C | .9 | .83 | 27 1/2 | 27 1/2 | - 1/2 | 3,400 |
| 13% | 10% | 105 | 2- 31 | 4 | 12-27 | 41 | - 1 1/2 | 10,200 | Am Europe See np...AMU | 354,500 | 1- 2-35 | 1 1/2 C | .0 | .03 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | 5,500 |
| 114 | 105 | 195 | 3% | 62 | 12- 7 | 32 | + 1 1/2 | 18,100 | Am Express ...AMX | 1,474,000 | 1- 2-35 | | | | | | | |

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 | | Range for Year 1934 | | | Net Ch'ge | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | Last Dividend Payable Rate per Share | Per Share | Earnings | Wk's Range | Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | Wk's Sales | | | | | |
|------|------|---------------------|-------|------|-----------|--------------|----------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------|------------|----------------|------------|-------|------|-------|--------|--------|
| High | Low | High | Low | Date | Last | | | | | | Jan. | High | Low | Last | Ch'ge | | | | |
| 41% | 20 | 16% | 2-1 | 35% | 7-27 | 42% | + 1% | 88,200 | Baner & Arnes \$50...BNK | 141,702 | 1- 2-35 | 62c Q 11 | 4.77 | 40 | 40 | - 2% | 100 | | |
| 110 | 68% | 115 | 12-19 | 85% | 1- 5 | 114 | + 1% | 3,260 | Baner Bros np...BKR | 34,800 | 1- 1-31 | 115c Q 11 | 25.85 | 110 | 110 | - 1% | 300 | | |
| 7% | 6% | 2- 5 | 7-24 | 4 | + 1 | | | 68,840 | Barker Bros cv pf...BKR | 150,000 | 1- 1-31 | 50c | 9 | 5 | 5 | - 1% | 300 | | |
| 24% | 54% | 38% | 4-12 | 16% | 1- 9 | 34% | + 16% | 14,630 | Barker Bros cv pf...BKR | 28,200 | 4- 1-32 | 1,625c | 9 | 48.21 | 36% | 35 | 1% | 220 | |
| 11 | 3 | 10 | 1-22 | 5% | 10- 4 | 56 | - 1% | 745,200 | Barnesall \$5...BDL | 2,258,779 | 5- 11-31 | 25c | 9 | 4.18 | 7 | 6% | 8,000 | | |
| 52% | 3% | 34% | 11-15 | 23 | 5- 8 | 43% | + 18% | 109,700 | Bayuk Cigar, Inc. np...BY | 98,851 | 12-15-34 | 1.00 | 9 | 6.31 | 44% | 43% | 43% | 500 | |
| 100 | 27 | 10% | 12-19 | 89 | 1-15 | 108 | + 18% | 3,720 | Bayuk Cigar 1st pf...BY | 25,458 | 1-15-34 | 1.75 | Q 9 | 28.65 | 108 | 107% | - 1% | 220 | |
| 27 | 7 | 19% | 4-28 | 104 | 7-27 | 17% | + 6% | 170,400 | Beatrice Creamery \$35...BRY | 377,719 | 7- 1-34 | 1.75 | Q 9 | 8.04 | 18 | 16% | - 1% | 3,200 | |
| 85 | 45 | 10% | 12-20 | 50 | 1- 1 | 100 | + 42% | 5,600 | Beatrice Creamery pf...BRY | 105,000 | 1- 2-32 | 1.75 | Q 9 | 8.96 | 100% | 99% | 100% | none | |
| 33 | 33 | 3% | 34% | 29 | 31 | 1-25 | 36 | + 8 | 90 | Beech Creek R R np...BCH | 120,000 | 1- 2-35 | 60c Q | ... | ... | 36 | ... | none | |
| 100 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | | | |
| 70% | 45 | 76% | 12- 6 | 58 | 3- 2 | 70% | + 8% | 20,400 | Beech Nut Packing \$20...BNU | 446,250 | 1- 2-35 | 11.25 | Q 11 | 4.77 | 40 | 40 | - 1% | 100 | |
| 12% | 3% | 15% | 4-24 | 8% | 1- 3 | 12% | + 1% | 346,300 | Bedding Hemingway np...BV | 465,032 | 10-31-34 | 50c | 9 | 2.74 | 124 | 125% | 125% | 7,200 | |
| 101% | 62% | 127 | 9- 8 | 95% | 1- 9 | 110% | + 14% | 15,400 | Bell Ry Am St pt...BLW | 27,971 | 9-21-34 | 7.02 | 9 | 1.14 | 114 | 114% | 114% | 300 | |
| 21% | 6% | 38% | 4-12 | 16% | 1- 9 | 34% | + 16% | 1,054,050 | Bendix Aviation Cip \$5...BEX | 2,067,663 | 4- 1-32 | 1.25 | Q 9 | .83 | 17% | 8% | - 1% | 13,300 | |
| 15% | 5% | 19% | 4-26 | 12% | 1-31 | 16% | + 2% | 313,000 | Benedict Ind Loan Corp. np...BNL | 2,094,459 | 1-30-35 | 37c Q | 9 | 1.45 | 17% | 16% | 16% | 4,600 | |
| 33% | 4% | 44% | 11-26 | 26 | 7-28 | 36 | + 9% | 117,900 | Best & Co. Inc. np...BET | 300,000 | 2-15-35 | 50c | 9 | 1.17 | 38% | 35 | 1% | 3,200 | |
| 49% | 10% | 49% | 2-18 | 60% | 10-28 | 32% | - 4% | 1,869,600 | Bethlehem Steel np...BS | 2,022,898 | 2-15-33 | 50c | 9 | 41.49 | 34% | 31 | 1% | 50,900 | |
| 22% | 25% | 25% | 12-19 | 54% | 1- 6 | 54% | + 6% | 30,920 | Bethlehem Steel 7% pt...BS | 1,000,000 | 10- 1-34 | 1.75 | Q 9 | .15 | 77% | 70 | 71 | - 1% | 7,700 |
| 20% | 6% | 6% | 12-19 | 54% | 1- 6 | 54% | + 6% | 182,300 | Bethlehem Steel 8% Cpt np...BS | 1,022,000 | 2-15-34 | 60c | 9 | .43 | 24% | 23 | 23% | 520 | |
| 19% | 3% | 16% | 1-30 | 19% | 7-17 | 11 | + 4% | 182,300 | Blaw Knox np...BKK | 1,322,395 | 3- 1-32 | 12c | Q 9 | .68 | 13% | 13% | 13% | 27,300 | |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | | | |
| 21 | 6% | 26% | 2- 7 | 17 | 10- 2 | 23% | + 4% | 3,900 | Bloomingdale Bros np...BBL | 300,000 | 12-27-34 | 10c Q | 9 | 4.25 | 23 | 22 | 22 | 140 | |
| 88 | 53 | 10% | 11-23 | 88 | 1- 8 | 106 | + 18% | 2,185 | Bloomingdale Bros pf...BBL | 30,400 | 2- 1-35 | 1.75 | Q 11 | 11.04 | 107 | 107 | 107 | 60 | |
| 50 | 24 | 56% | 2-10 | 22 | 11-30 | 33 | - 12 | 2,65 | Bloenthal (S) pf...SBM | 25,000 | 1- 2-33 | 9 | 9 | 36.84 | 36% | 36% | 36% | 20 | |
| 11% | 11% | 11% | 12- 6 | 6% | 10-29 | 9% | + 1% | 134,100 | Boeing Airplane \$5...BOE | 521,883 | 1- 2-35 | 1.75 | Q 11 | 9.7 | 8% | 8% | - 1% | 4,300 | |
| 58% | 9% | 65% | 1-24 | 44% | 9-17 | 56% | + 1% | 356,900 | Bohm Alumin & Br \$5...BHL | 352,418 | 12-28-34 | 75c | Q 9 | 3.59 | 59% | 56% | - 1% | 3,400 | |
| 78 | 52 | 94 | 12-29 | 76 | 5-14 | 94 | + 18% | 8,000 | Bomar Am. np...BAM | 100,000 | 1-24-35 | 1.00 | Q 9 | 4.08 | 96 | 94 | 95 | 300 | |
| 37% | 18% | 22% | 1-19 | 19% | 1- 6 | 23% | + 3% | 849,000 | Borden Co np...BDO | 4,412,958 | 12- 1-34 | 40c | Q 11 | 1.05 | 25% | 23% | 1% | 10,900 | |
| 22% | 5% | 5% | 12-31 | 18% | 1- 2 | 31% | + 9% | 57,000 | Borg Warner \$10...BOR | 1,250,000 | 1- 1-35 | 15c | Q 9 | .24 | 31 | 29 | 30 | 1 | 18,100 |
| 30 | 10% | 10% | 2- 5 | 25 | 12-27 | 31% | - 1% | 13,500 | Boston & Me R R np...BMR | 385,751 | 1- 1-31 | 1.11 | Q 11 | .11 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 1% | 100 |
| 4% | 3% | 3% | 2- 9 | 5% | 7-25 | 1% | - 1% | 16,500 | Botany Cons M A np...BTY | 100,000 | 5-15-24 | 1.00 | Q 9 | .21 | 1% | 1% | 1% | 200 | |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | | | |
| 14% | 2% | 28% | 12-31 | 12 | 1- 6 | 28% | + 15% | 1,554,900 | Briggs Mfg np...BGI | 1,979,000 | 1- 2-35 | 150c | 9 | 2.49 | 28% | 27% | 27% | 38,000 | |
| 18% | 7% | 27% | 12-13 | 14 | 7-20 | 24% | + 10% | 32,600 | Briggs & Strat np...BGG | 299,995 | 12-31-34 | 50c | 9 | 1.81 | 24% | 24% | 24% | 700 | |
| 40% | 25% | 37% | 7-18 | 26 | 1- 4 | 34% | + 6% | 124,300 | Bristol Myres \$5...BMY | 700,280 | 12- 1-34 | 160c | Q 12 | 2.63 | 36% | 34% | 35 | 3,300 | |
| 41% | 21% | 44% | 8-27 | 25% | 3-27 | 40% | + 7 | 813,100 | Bklyn M Transit np...BMT | 769,911 | 1-15-35 | 75c | Q 9 | 2.13 | 40% | 38% | - 1% | 3,900 | |
| 83% | 64% | 97% | 7-21 | 82% | 1- 4 | 90% | + 11% | 33,200 | Bklyn M Transit pf np...BMT | 249,468 | 7-15-35 | 1.50 | Q 9 | 8.77 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 700 | |
| 9% | 3% | 3% | 2- 7 | 26% | 3-27 | 35% | - 1% | 62,300 | Bklyn Q & T np...BQT | 500,000 | 1-24-35 | 50c | 9 | 4.27 | 34% | 33% | 34% | 900 | |
| 35 | 3 | 44% | 4-25 | 16 | 7-25 | 31% | - 6% | 36,030 | Bklyn Q & T np...BQT | 283,220 | 2- 2-35 | 1.00 | Q 9 | 1.73 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 200 | |
| 54% | 1% | 92% | 12-15 | 24 | 11-27 | 75 | + 5% | 13,000 | Bklyn Q & T np...BQT | 741,576 | 1- 1-34 | 25c | Q 12 | 1.54 | 58% | 57% | - 1% | 3,500 | |
| 134% | 24% | 15% | 2-16 | 5% | 7-31 | 14% | + 5% | 204,400 | Bullard np...BUD | 53,307 | 1- 1-35 | 50c | 9 | 1.28 | 15% | 15% | - 1% | 1,500 | |
| 5% | 6% | 6% | 4-28 | 25 | 1- 9 | 45 | + 14% | 21,450 | Bulova Watch np...BVA | 275,000 | 9- 1-31 | 75c | Q 9 | 3.11 | 58% | 57% | - 1% | 300 | |
| 5% | 6% | 6% | 2- 1 | 1% | 1-26 | 2% | + 5% | 2,200 | Burns Br np...BVA | 22,856 | 11-14-30 | 2.00 | Q 9 | 2.61 | 2% | 1% | 1% | 200 | |
| 118 | 108% | 125% | 12-14 | 118% | 6- 1 | 124% | + 6% | 1,100 | Burns Br np...BVA | 10,000 | 1- 2-35 | 2.00 | Q 9 | 2.11 | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1,900 | |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | | | |
| 43% | 8% | 82% | 2- 7 | 13% | 7-26 | 19% | - 4% | 314,500 | Byers (A) np...ABY | 666,635 | 1- 1-35 | 1.75 | Q 11 | 6.34 | 65% | 64% | 64% | 4,100 | |
| 80 | 30% | 67% | 4-23 | 8% | 8- 6 | 48 | + 17% | 5,220 | Byers (A) np...ABY | 63,400 | 1- 2-32 | 1.75 | Q 11 | 7.12 | 71% | 71% | 71% | 120 | |
| 34% | 7% | 44% | 8-29 | 18% | 1- 4 | 38% | + 18% | 379,300 | Calif Fack np...CF | 419,112 | 1-2-32 | 20 | 5c | 6.61 | 58% | 57% | - 1% | 140 | |
| 29% | 1% | 14% | 1-23 | 12% | 1- 2 | 11% | + 1% | 108,500 | Calif Fack np...CF | 22,202 | 10-24-34 | 50c | 9 | 4.25 | 35% | 34% | 35% | 150 | |
| 9% | 1% | 12% | 3-26 | 3% | 2- 6 | 28 | - 1% | 622,300 | Budd (E) np...BDM | 1,028,000 | 3-15-35 | 1.15 | Q 11 | 1.46 | 10% | 10% | - 1% | 3,900 | |
| 20% | 52% | 65% | 1- 2 | 21 | 10% | 70 | - 11% | 525,810 | Burroughs A M np...BHG | 525,810 | 1-15-35 | 1.75 | Q 9 | 2.34 | 51% | 50% | - 1% | | |

the additional 3,500,000 tons they formerly held in New England. Anthracite is up 20 per cent into this market; it has recovered consumption which the Southern smokeless coals supplanted under the low wage scales ruling into 1933.

Southern High Volatiles Behind in Ohio

Ohio coal receipts for the first nine months are up 14 per cent. Table III, with an increase of 18 per cent in Eastern coals and 1 per cent on the large Southern shipments. The leading tonnage from Eastern Ohio was adversely affected by a revision of intrastate freight tariffs in February, reducing the differential against Western Pennsylvania from 39 cents to 10 cents a ton. Southern coals were benefited proportionately, but this was not sufficient to overcome the new wage differentials, and Southern general purpose coals are behind 1933.

Michigan receipts are up 16 per cent, with the relatively small Eastern tonnage showing a substantial pickup of 34 per cent under the new wage differentials, compared with an increase of 13 per cent for the Southern coals, largely on smokeless and special purpose grades. Midwest coals, which formerly supplied 13.6 per cent of this market (1918), doubled their tonnage in 1934, but the volume is still negligible.

Northern Shipments West Recover 20 Per Cent of Ultimate Shift

Westbound shipments for the first nine months are 13 per cent ahead of 1933, with Southern coals up 5 per cent, against 19 per cent for Northern. The sizable pickup of 64 per cent in the large Pennsylvania tonnage was due in part to light shipments in 1933, a strike year; Ohio had a good year in 1933 as a result of the Pennsylvania strike, making for a smaller increase in 1934, when the movement was further restricted by the revision in local freight rates.

Southern high volatiles are holding their own with smokeless and special purpose coals in all westbound territory where they do not come in competition with the high-grade Central Pennsylvania coals in volume. The mid-West is picking up less rapidly than other Northern coals due to low consumption in its restricted market territory.

The approximate status quo in Southern coals westbound and substantial increases in Northern are in line with expected results under the code wage scales; with the old contracts carried over into the first year under the code, general evasion of code prices and slow adjustment of them to conform with the new wage differentials, about 20 per cent of the estimated ultimate shift in tonnage has materialized in this important market.

Pennsylvania Lake Shipments High

Lake shipments in 1934 amounted to 35,900,000 tons, an increase of 10 per cent over 1933 and only 9 per cent under the record year of 1929. Receipts at the Upper American Docks up to Sept. 1 were close to the record, 20 per cent ahead of 1933 and 84 per cent above 1932, but reloadings from the docks were only 4 per cent ahead of 1933, in line with the 5 per cent increase on rail coals into that territory, and lake shipments tapered off the concluding months. Reloadings from the Upper Docks for the year to Nov. 1 were 9,177,000 tons, compared with 8,979,000 in 1933, an increase of 2 per cent compared with an increase of 17 per cent in receipts.

Lake shipments by origin fields to

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933— | | Range for Year 1934 | | Net Ch'ge | | Year's Sales | | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | | Shares Listed | | Last Dividend Payable Rate Period | | Earnings Per Share | | Wk's Range Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | | Wk's Sales | |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--|---|---------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------|
| High | Low | High | Low | Date | Last | Ch'ge | | | | | | | | | | High | Low | Last | Ch'ge |
| 25 | 18 ^{1/2} | 30 ^{1/2} | 11-30 | 23 ^{1/2} | 1-5 | 29 ^{1/2} | + 6 | 8,300 | Comm Credit 7% 1st pf \$25. | 152,150 | 12-31-34 | 43 ^{1/2} c Q | 9 | 9.73 | 30 | 29 ^{1/2} | 30 | + 1 | 600 |
| 25 ^{1/2} | 18 ^{1/2} | 30 ^{1/2} | 12-11 | 24 | 1-3 | 30 | + 5 | 8,880 | Comm Credit 8% pf B \$25. | 138,821 | 12-31-34 | 50 | Q | 9.25 | 30 | 29 ^{1/2} | 30 | + 1 | 390 |
| 43 ^{1/2} | 18 | 61 | 8-18 | 35 ^{1/2} | 1-4 | 58 | + 21 ^{1/2} | 503,075 | Comm Inv Trust np...CIT | 2,518,420 | 1-2-35 | 1.00 | Q | 2.52 | 62 ^{1/2} | 58 | 58 ^{1/2} | + 3 | 14,300 |
| 97 ^{1/2} | 84 | 114 | 11-23 | 91 | 1-3 | 114 | + 24 | 25,100 | Comm Inv Tr 6% cv pf np... | 140,461 | 1-2-35 | 1.50 | Q | 36.38 | 114 ^{1/2} | 114 | 114 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 400 |
| 37 ^{1/2} | 9 | 36 ^{1/2} | 1-20 | 15 ^{1/2} | 7-26 | 21 ^{1/2} | + 10 ^{1/2} | 2,605,450 | Comm Solvents np...CV | 2,638,187 | 12-31-34 | 30 | C | 7.70 | 23 ^{1/2} | 21 ^{1/2} | 21 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 58,200 |
| 6 ^{1/2} | 14 ^{1/2} | 25 ^{1/2} | 1-20 | 20 ^{1/2} | 7-26 | 27 ^{1/2} | + 7 ^{1/2} | 2,960,100 | Commonwealth & South np... | 33,652,000 | 1-3-32 | 1.50 | Q | 8.05 | 29 ^{1/2} | 31 ^{1/2} | 31 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 38,600 |
| 11 | 3 | 19 ^{1/2} | 4-23 | 21 ^{1/2} | 1-2 | 30 ^{1/2} | + 8 ^{1/2} | 25,100 | Con Nas Pub np...South & South | 1,189,603 | 1-3-32 | 1.50 | Q | 8.19 | 30 ^{1/2} | 31 ^{1/2} | 31 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 7,900 |
| 27 ^{1/2} | 7 ^{1/2} | 35 ^{1/2} | 11-19 | 22 | 7-26 | 34 ^{1/2} | + 10 | 527,100 | Conoco-Nafta np...COG | 340,000 | 10-1-31 | 50 | Q | 9.18 | 71 ^{1/2} | 71 ^{1/2} | 71 ^{1/2} | + 1 | *none |
| 18 | 6 ^{1/2} | 14 ^{1/2} | 3-5 | 7 ^{1/2} | 9-7 | 9 ^{1/2} | + 1 ^{1/2} | 15,500 | Congress Cigar np...CNG | 1,390,000 | 12-15-34 | + 80 ^{1/2} c Q | 8 | 1.11 | 34 ^{1/2} | 32 ^{1/2} | 32 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 10,400 |
| 60 | 52 | 61 | 6-23 | 32 | 1-29 | 32 | + 20 | 210 | Conn Rwy & Light...CRW | 89,772 | 1-2-35 | 1.12 ^{1/2} c Q | 8 | 4.59 | 37 | 37 | 37 | + 4 ^{1/2} | 50 |
| 55 ^{1/2} | 50 ^{1/2} | 61-25 | 55 | 1-18 | 58 | + 4 ^{1/2} | 8,880 | Conn Rwy & Light pf... | 81,429 | 1-2-35 | 1.12 ^{1/2} c Q | 8 | 9.56 | 55 | 40 | 58 | + 1 | *none | |
| 19 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} | 31-17 | 54 ^{1/2} | 7-26 | 9 ^{1/2} | + 3 ^{1/2} | 14,500 | Consel Cigar np...CGR | 250,000 | 4-1-32 | 75 ^{1/2} c | 9 | 9.15 | 10 ^{1/2} | 9 | 9 | + 2,000 | | |
| 31 ^{1/2} | 18 ^{1/2} | 42-27 | 54 ^{1/2} | 7-26 | 9 ^{1/2} | + 2 ^{1/2} | 1,080 | Consel Cigar 6 ^{1/2} % pf pf... | 83,838 | 2-1-35 | 1.62 ^{1/2} c Q | 9 | 5.85 | 75 | 72 ^{1/2} | 75 | + 1 | 190 | |
| 38 ^{1/2} | 70 | 75 | 12-16 | 49 | 2-13 | 68 ^{1/2} | + 23 ^{1/2} | 2,220 | Consel Cigar 7% pf 6 ^{1/2} xw... | 22,249 | 3-1-35 | 1.75 Q | 8 | 3.62 | 75 | 70 | 75 | + 1 | *none |
| 60 | 30 ^{1/2} | 75 | 12-29 | 31 | 1-5 | 75 | + 44 ^{1/2} | 152,700 | Cons Film Ind \$1...CFM | 524,973 | 1-2-31 | 50 | Q | 9.43 | 87 ^{1/2} | 61 ^{1/2} | 61 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 26,300 |
| 54 ^{1/2} | 14 ^{1/2} | 62-21 | 1% 14 | 7-27 | 5 ^{1/2} | + 3 ^{1/2} | 152,700 | Cons Film Ind np... | 400,000 | 1-2-35 | 50c n50c | 9 | 2.07 | 21 ^{1/2} | 20 ^{1/2} | 21 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 18,500 | |
| 14 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12-31 | 10 ^{1/2} | 1-2 | 20 ^{1/2} | + 9 ^{1/2} | 261,100 | Consolidated Gas np... | G 11,765,527 | 3-15-35 | 25 ^{1/2} c | 12 | 2.30 | 22 ^{1/2} | 21 ^{1/2} | 21 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 115,100 | |
| 64 ^{1/2} | 34 | 47 ^{1/2} | 2-6 | 18 ^{1/2} | 12-26 | 20 ^{1/2} | + 18 ^{1/2} | 2,653,250 | Consolidated Gas pf np... | 2,099,249 | 2-1-35 | 1.25 Q | 12 | 17.50 | 82 | 78 ^{1/2} | 80 | + 1 | 4,600 |
| 99 | 81 ^{1/2} | 75 | 7-23 | 71 | 12-27 | 80 | + 3 | 116,365 | Continental Baking pf... | 405,600 | 1-2-35 | 1.00 Q | 39 | 3.45 | 47 ^{1/2} | 47 ^{1/2} | 47 ^{1/2} | + 2 | 400 |
| 5 ^{1/2} | 1 ^{1/2} | 4 ^{1/2} | 2-13 | 7 ^{1/2} | 9-18 | 13 ^{1/2} | + 1 ^{1/2} | 58,100 | Continental Laundry np...LAU | 400,000 | 1-3-33 | 12 ^{1/2} c | 9 | 4.45 | 2 | 1 ^{1/2} | 1 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 400 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 2,433,000 | Continental Ins Co \$2.50...C18 | 14,211,700 | 10-31-34 | 1.00 | Q | 1.28 | 112 ^{1/2} | 110 | 110 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 23,700 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 4,500 | Continental Motor np...CMR | 2,448,652 | 10-30-29 | 20 ^{1/2} c | 9 | 1.41 | 16 ^{1/2} | 16 ^{1/2} | 16 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 36,400 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 93,900 | Cont Oil Del \$5... | 304,776 | 4-1-32 | 1.50 Q | 12 | 4.32 | 20 ^{1/2} | 20 ^{1/2} | 20 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 300 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 730,600 | Contol Textile np... | C 2,102,285 | 1-15-25 | 1.75 Q | 6 | 6.11 | 11 ^{1/2} | 11 ^{1/2} | 11 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 10,500 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 223,000 | Cont C of A \$20... | CN 373,555 | 1-31-34 | 30c | 9 | 1.06 | 13 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 24,100 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 98,500 | Conti Baking np A... | C 291,813 | 1-3-28 | 1.00 Q | 9 | 5.52 | 45 ^{1/2} | 45 ^{1/2} | 45 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 20,900 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 20,000 | Conti Baking B np... | C 2,000,000 | 1-2-35 | 1.00 Q | 12 | 3.00 | 39 ^{1/2} | 31 ^{1/2} | 31 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 1,400 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 2,000 | Continental Baking pf... | C 405,600 | 1-2-35 | 1.00 Q | 34 | 9 | 47 ^{1/2} | 47 ^{1/2} | 47 ^{1/2} | + 2 | 400 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 1,000 | Continental Can 320 new...CH | C 2,665,191 | 2-15-35 | 60c Q | 9 | 6.75 | 64 ^{1/2} | 64 ^{1/2} | 64 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 14,700 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 53,900 | Cont Diamond F 55... | C 2,050,000 | 6-30-31 | 25c | 9 | 1.47 | 28 ^{1/2} | 28 ^{1/2} | 28 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 600 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 12,000 | Continental Ins Co \$2.50...C18 | C 1,949,596 | 1-10-35 | 75c S | A | 1.30 | 34 ^{1/2} | 34 ^{1/2} | 34 ^{1/2} | + 1 | 2,500 |
| 10 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 12 ^{1/2} | 10-18 | 10 ^{1/2} | 2-9 | 11 ^{1/2} | + 5 ^{1/2} | 12,000 | Continental Motor np...CMR | C 2,448,652 | 10-30-29 | 20c | 9 | 1.41 | 16 ^{1/2} | 16 ^{1/2} | 16 | | |

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Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| Week's Sales | High | Low | Range for Year 1934 | Net | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | Last Dividend Payable Rate | Dividend Per Share | Earnings Per Share | Wk's Range Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | Wk's Sales | | | | | | |
|--------------|------|------|---------------------|-------|--------------|----------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|-----------|---------|-------|
| 600 | 400 | 23 | 4-26 | 5 | 7-26 | 94% | - | 4,910 | Faller Co 2d pf np..... | 35,015 | 4-1-32 1.50 | 6 d2.15 | 81/4 81/4 | - 1/2 | 20 | | | |
| 390 | 20% | 6% | 2-12 | 1% | 7-25 | 94% | - | 67,000 | GABRIEL CO A np..... | 10,000 | 1-1-28 87/4c | 9 d1.15 | 24/4 24/4 | - 1/2 | 400 | | | |
| 14,300 | 400 | 6% | 2-19 | 8-12 | 12-19 | 84% | - | 10,760 | Ganado Co mfr..... | 119,304 | 3-15-32 | 25c | 6 d1.66 | 94/4 94/4 | - 1/2 | 80 | | |
| 58,200 | 20% | 6% | 2-6 | 5% | 7-27 | 79% | - | 187,300 | Gen Am Inv np..... | 1,300,220 | - | - | 71/4 65/4 | - 1/2 | 3,600 | | | |
| 7,900 | 12 | 2% | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 82% | + 9% | 6,300 | Gen Am Inv pf w w np..... | 80,000 | 1-2-35 1.50 | Q | 85 84/4 | 85 85 | - 1/2 | 300 | | |
| 10,400 | 85 | 42 | 87 | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 38% | 330,200 | Gen Am Trans Corp \$5.GMT | 818,833 | 1-2-35 87/4c | S | 9 2.35 | 381/4 361/4 | - 1/2 | 4,300 | | |
| 100 | 43% | 13% | 43% | 2-19 | 30 | 8-9 | 38% | 297,100 | General Asphalt \$10..... | 413,333 | 6-15-32 | 25c | 12 .02 | 15/4 16/4 | - 1/2 | 17,200 | | |
| 50 | 27 | 4% | 2-4 | 12 | 7-26 | 18% | + 1% | 243,000 | General Baking \$5..... | 1,584,799 | 11-1-34 | 35c | 39/4 .44 | 89/4 77/4 | + 1/2 | 4,700 | | |
| *none | 20% | 10% | 14% | 2-5 | 6% | 10-27 | 8 | - 37% | 6,050 | General Baking pf np..... | 90,775 | 1-2-35 2.00 | Q | 39/4 14.04 | 116 118 | + 1/2 | 30 | |
| 108% | 98% | 108% | 2-7 | 10% | 5-8 | 102% | + 3% | 207,700 | Gen Bronze Cp \$5..... | 287,780 | 9-1-30 | 25c | 3 .004 | 7/4 6 | + 1/2 | 7,400 | | |
| 10% | 10% | 3% | 3-9 | 5 | 9-18 | 6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | |
| 2,000 | 190 | 11% | 6% | 2-1 | 2% | 7-26 | 6% | - | 83,000 | General Cable np..... | 546,000 | - | - | 65.91 | 31/4 3 | - | 500 | |
| 500 | 22 | 24 | 12 | 2-1 | 4% | 7-27 | 6% | - | 35,500 | General Cable A np..... | 369,318 | 6-1-30 | 1.00 | 9 d2.52 | 64/4 64/4 | - 1/2 | 400 | |
| 14,300 | 46 | 6% | 3-20 | 14% | 1-9 | 26% | + 11% | 24,800 | General Cable pf np..... | 150,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.75 | 9 d1.07 | 27/4 27/4 | - 1/2 | 700 | | |
| 26,200 | 48% | 24% | 11% | 52% | 27 | 1-2 | 59% | - | 116,000 | General Cigar np..... | 472,082 | 2-1-35 | 1.40 | Q | 9 3.03 | 63/4 60/4 | - 1/2 | 3,700 |
| 7,900 | 12 | 2% | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 82% | + 9% | 6,300 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 | |
| 10,400 | 85 | 42 | 87 | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 38% | 330,200 | General Electric np..... | 28,845,936 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .41 | 23/4 21 | - 1/2 | 107,800 | |
| 100 | 43% | 13% | 43% | 2-19 | 30 | 8-9 | 38% | 297,100 | General Electric spec \$10..... | 4,292,961 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 3.18 | 11 11 | - 1/2 | 5,700 | |
| 50 | 27 | 4% | 2-4 | 12 | 7-26 | 18% | + 1% | 243,000 | General Foods Corp np..... | 5,359,751 | 11-1-34 | 45c | Q | 9 1.72 | 34/4 33/4 | - 1/2 | 16,400 | |
| *none | 20% | 10% | 14% | 2-5 | 6% | 10-27 | 8 | - 37% | 6,050 | General Foods pf np..... | 9,775 | 1-2-35 2.00 | Q | 39/4 14.04 | 116 118 | + 1/2 | 4,700 | |
| 108% | 98% | 108% | 2-7 | 10% | 5-8 | 102% | + 3% | 207,700 | Gen Bronze Cp \$5..... | 287,780 | 9-1-30 | 25c | 3 .004 | 7/4 6 | + 1/2 | 7,400 | | |
| 10% | 10% | 3% | 3-9 | 5 | 9-18 | 6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | |
| 2,000 | 190 | 11% | 6% | 2-1 | 2% | 7-26 | 6% | - | 83,000 | General Cable np..... | 546,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .004 | 13/4 13/4 | - 1/2 | 500 |
| 500 | 22 | 24 | 12 | 2-1 | 4% | 7-27 | 6% | - | 35,500 | General Cable A np..... | 369,318 | 6-1-30 | 1.00 | 9 d2.52 | 64/4 64/4 | - 1/2 | 400 | |
| 14,300 | 46 | 6% | 3-20 | 14% | 1-9 | 26% | + 11% | 24,800 | General Cigar np..... | 150,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.75 | Q | 9 3.03 | 63/4 60/4 | - 1/2 | 3,700 | |
| 26,200 | 48% | 24% | 11% | 52% | 27 | 1-2 | 59% | - | 116,000 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 |
| 7,900 | 112 | 100 | 127% | 12-31 | 97 | 1-8 | 127% | + 27% | 6,780 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 |
| 10,400 | 85 | 42 | 87 | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 38% | 330,200 | General Electric np..... | 28,845,936 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .41 | 23/4 21 | - 1/2 | 107,800 | |
| 100 | 43% | 13% | 43% | 2-19 | 30 | 8-9 | 38% | 297,100 | General Electric spec \$10..... | 4,292,961 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 3.18 | 11 11 | - 1/2 | 5,700 | |
| 50 | 27 | 4% | 2-4 | 12 | 7-26 | 18% | + 1% | 243,000 | General Foods Corp np..... | 5,359,751 | 11-1-34 | 45c | Q | 9 1.72 | 34/4 33/4 | - 1/2 | 16,400 | |
| *none | 20% | 10% | 14% | 2-5 | 6% | 10-27 | 8 | - 37% | 6,050 | General Foods pf np..... | 9,775 | 1-2-35 2.00 | Q | 39/4 14.04 | 116 118 | + 1/2 | 4,700 | |
| 108% | 98% | 108% | 2-7 | 10% | 5-8 | 102% | + 3% | 207,700 | Gen Bronze Cp \$5..... | 287,780 | 9-1-30 | 25c | 3 .004 | 7/4 6 | + 1/2 | 7,400 | | |
| 10% | 10% | 3% | 3-9 | 5 | 9-18 | 6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | |
| 2,000 | 190 | 11% | 6% | 2-1 | 2% | 7-26 | 6% | - | 83,000 | General Cable np..... | 546,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .004 | 13/4 13/4 | - 1/2 | 500 |
| 500 | 22 | 24 | 12 | 2-1 | 4% | 7-27 | 6% | - | 35,500 | General Cable A np..... | 369,318 | 6-1-30 | 1.00 | 9 d2.52 | 64/4 64/4 | - 1/2 | 400 | |
| 14,300 | 46 | 6% | 3-20 | 14% | 1-9 | 26% | + 11% | 24,800 | General Cigar np..... | 150,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.75 | Q | 9 3.03 | 63/4 60/4 | - 1/2 | 3,700 | |
| 26,200 | 48% | 24% | 11% | 52% | 27 | 1-2 | 59% | - | 116,000 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 |
| 7,900 | 112 | 100 | 127% | 12-31 | 97 | 1-8 | 127% | + 27% | 6,780 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 |
| 10,400 | 85 | 42 | 87 | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 38% | 330,200 | General Electric np..... | 28,845,936 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .41 | 23/4 21 | - 1/2 | 107,800 | |
| 100 | 43% | 13% | 43% | 2-19 | 30 | 8-9 | 38% | 297,100 | General Electric spec \$10..... | 4,292,961 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 3.18 | 11 11 | - 1/2 | 5,700 | |
| 50 | 27 | 4% | 2-4 | 12 | 7-26 | 18% | + 1% | 243,000 | General Foods Corp np..... | 5,359,751 | 11-1-34 | 45c | Q | 9 1.72 | 34/4 33/4 | - 1/2 | 16,400 | |
| *none | 20% | 10% | 14% | 2-5 | 6% | 10-27 | 8 | - 37% | 6,050 | General Foods pf np..... | 9,775 | 1-2-35 2.00 | Q | 39/4 14.04 | 116 118 | + 1/2 | 4,700 | |
| 108% | 98% | 108% | 2-7 | 10% | 5-8 | 102% | + 3% | 207,700 | Gen Bronze Cp \$5..... | 287,780 | 9-1-30 | 25c | 3 .004 | 7/4 6 | + 1/2 | 7,400 | | |
| 10% | 10% | 3% | 3-9 | 5 | 9-18 | 6% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | |
| 2,000 | 190 | 11% | 6% | 2-1 | 2% | 7-26 | 6% | - | 83,000 | General Cable np..... | 546,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .004 | 13/4 13/4 | - 1/2 | 500 |
| 500 | 22 | 24 | 12 | 2-1 | 4% | 7-27 | 6% | - | 35,500 | General Cable A np..... | 369,318 | 6-1-30 | 1.00 | 9 d2.52 | 64/4 64/4 | - 1/2 | 400 | |
| 14,300 | 46 | 6% | 3-20 | 14% | 1-9 | 26% | + 11% | 24,800 | General Cigar np..... | 150,000 | 1-2-31 | 1.75 | Q | 9 3.03 | 63/4 60/4 | - 1/2 | 3,700 | |
| 26,200 | 48% | 24% | 11% | 52% | 27 | 1-2 | 59% | - | 116,000 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 |
| 7,900 | 112 | 100 | 127% | 12-31 | 97 | 1-8 | 127% | + 27% | 6,780 | General Cigar C p..... | 50,000 | 6-1-35 | 1.75 | Q | 9 34/4 14.13 | 130 128 | - 1/2 | 180 |
| 10,400 | 85 | 42 | 87 | 3-13 | 73 | 8-9 | 38% | 330,200 | General Electric np..... | 28,845,936 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 .41 | 23/4 21 | - 1/2 | 107,800 | |
| 100 | 43% | 13% | 43% | 2-19 | 30 | 8-9 | 38% | 297,100 | General Electric spec \$10..... | 4,292,961 | 1-25-35 | 1.50 | Q | 9 3.18 | 11 11 | - 1/2 | 5,700 | |
| 50 | 27 | 4% | 2-4 | 12 | 7-26 | 18% | + 1% | 243,000 | General Foods Corp np..... | 5,359,751 | 11-1-34 | 45c | Q | 9 1.72 | 34/4 33/4 | - 1/2 | 16,400 | |
| *none | 20% | 10% | 14% | 2-5 | 6% | 10-27 | 8 | - 37% | 6,050 | General Foods pf np..... | 9,775 | 1-2-35 2.00 | Q | 39/4 14.04 | 116 118 | + 1/2 | 4,700 | |
| 108% | 98% | 108% | 2-7 | 10% | 5-8 | 102% | + 3% | 207,700 | Gen Bronze Cp \$5..... | 287,780 | 9-1-30 | 25c | 3 .004 | 7/4 6 | + 1/2 | 7,400 | | |
| 10% | 10% | 3% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

turbed world trade and injured the countries of the gold bloc at a critical time; and it has frightened the financial world until the reviving impulse to investment has been again paralyzed.

Public Works

There remains the public works policy. At best this is a device to substitute public spending for the private spending that so grievously declines in depression. As such a substitute it must be confined to the construction of works and establishments that do not compete with private enterprise. It is of the very nature of public works that eventually it becomes impossible, politically, geographically and economically, to find projects that have any claim to social desirability and yet do not compete with private enterprise. The whole policy breaks down and degenerates into a general course of reckless expenditure, in one of two channels, one a general outpouring for relief, the other the construction of works that definitely compete with private business.

In 1934 the program followed this inevitable course in both directions. The rash and costly CWA episode was of the first type, the creation of TVA and the financing of municipal light plants of the second. The net effect of our public works policy has probably been adverse to recovery. It has certainly not primed the pump. Whatever stimulation it has afforded has been more than offset by public fears as to the budget, by the alarm of investors and by the apprehension of business men over the invasion of private enterprise. It is an ironic commentary on our present political situation that our policy of public spending should be inspired by an alien economist whose doctrine is rejected by his own country.

What Can Government Do?

We thus arrive at the conclusion that the attempt, completely tested in 1934, to force recovery in this country by legislation has not succeeded. It was doomed to failure at its birth. A depression has its roots deep in the economic soil. It is the inescapable result of the development of morbid conditions in the economic body. It is an economic effort to undertake by legislative experiments to halt or evade the inevitable purging process by which the economic system rids itself of its accumulated poisons.

The developments of 1934 have demonstrated that attempts at artificial recovery may actually impede the process of natural recovery. The entire recovery program has been aimed at the price structure. Its failure has demonstrated that prices are not the key to recovery but the prospect of profits from business enterprise. Public spending and restriction of production and raising of costs do not improve the prospects of profits. It has demonstrated, finally, that the wisest government policy is that which concentrates on relief and repair and amelioration. The RFC, the loans to home-owners and farmers, the emergency relief of the destitute and the CCC have served a splendid purpose over the whole area of distress.

Recovery

On the whole, the developments of 1934 have been in the direction of recovery. The liquidation and deflation of preceding years came to a close. Business failures were greatly reduced. Bank deposits increased, even by more than the huge volume created by bond inflation. Corporation profits showed a small

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933- High Low Range for Year 1934 | Net Chge | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticket Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | Last Dividend Payable | | Earnings Per Share | Wk's Range | | Wk's Sales | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|----------|---------|----------|-------|---------|----------|--------|
| | | | | | Date | Last | | Wk | High | | | | | | | | | |
| 40% | 12 | 81 1/2 | 11-30 | 21% | 1- 4 | 79 | + 60% | 12,830 | Interstate Dept. Stores pf... | 26,500 2- 1-35 | n.35 Q | 6 3.18 | 84% | 84% | 2% | 2% | 100 | |
| 11 1/4 | 17 | 18 | 2- 9 | 5% | 1- 3 | 74 | - 1/2 | 11,700 | Interstate Corp. np... | 22,722 3- 15-24 | 25c | 6 3.11 | 64% | 64% | - 1/2 | - 1/2 | 100 | |
| 32 | 11 | 36 | 12-18 | 24% | 1-29 | 33 1/2 | + 8% | 36,500 | Interstate Corp. \$1...ICR | 59,486 1- 20-34 | 1.00 | 1.39 | 36 | 34 | 35% | - 1/2 | 1,500 | |
| 90 | 85 | 110 | 8- 7 | 90 | 1-31 | 110 | + 20% | 36,500 | Interstate Corp. pf \$1... | 49,886 1- 2-35 | 1.50 | 4.45 | 45.45 | 110 | 110 | - 1/2 | - 1/2 | *none |
| 45 | 23 | 57 1/2 | 12- 1 | 33 | 1- 9 | 56 | - 21% | 45,700 | JEWEL TEA np... | 280,000 1-15-35 | 1.25 Q | 28 | 5.51 | 57 | 56 | 56 | 5% | 700 |
| 63 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 66 1/2 | 1-30 | 39 | 8- 6 | 54 | - 6% | 975,200 | Johns-Manville Corp. np...JMP | 750,000 1-16-32 | 25c | 1 9 | .26 | 57% | 52 | 52% | - 4% | 19,900 |
| 106 1/2 | 42 | 121 | 12- 6 | 101 | 1- 4 | 119 | + 21% | 6,470 | Johns-Manville Corp. % pf... | 75,000 1- 2-34 | 1.75 Q | 9 | 1.82 | 123 | 122 | 122 | 3 | 50 |
| 115 | 115 | 140 | 10-11 | 135 | 2- 14 | 140 | + 25% | 20 | Joliet & Chicago... | 15,000 1- 2-23 | 1.75 Q | 9 | 1.50 | 130 | 140 | - | - | *none |
| 91 | 35 | 77 | 12- 3 | 45 | 8- 1 | 56 1/2 | - 5 | 14,390 | Jones & Laugh \$7 pf... | 600,000 10- 2-23 | 2.25 Q | 9 d 4.84 | 68 | 57% | 63 | 52% | - | 1,500 |
| 110 | 98 | 114 1/2 | 12-14 | 97 1/2 | 1- 3 | 114 | + 16 | 2,940 | K C P & L 1st pf...KLT | 40,000 10- 2-23 | 1.50 Q | 12 | 3.43 | 115 | 114 | - | - | *none |
| 24% | 6 1/2 | 19% | 4-21 | 6% | 7-26 | 8 | - 3 | 92,000 | Kan City Southern... | KSU 300,000 8- 1-31 | 50c | 10 45.20 | 83% | 71% | 71% | 3% | 600 | |
| 34 1/2 | 12 | 27 1/2 | 10-11 | 105 | 12-27 | 12 1/2 | - 3% | 29,900 | Kansas City Corp. pf... | 210,000 4-15-33 | 50c | 10 44.08 | 131% | 12% | 12% | - | 600 | |
| 93 | 25 | 10 1/2 | 4-13 | 6 | 7-26 | 8 1/2 | + 1% | 73,400 | Kaufmann D St \$12.50... | KKN 600,000 1-28-35 | 20c | A 5.51 | 81% | 81% | x81% | - | 1,700 | |
| 19 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 1-20 | 13% | 1- 4 | 16 1/2 | - 2% | 159,700 | Kayser (J) \$5... | JKS 484,120 9-15-34 | 25c | 3 2.21 | 16% | 16% | + 1/2 | - | 1,200 | |
| 25 | 8 | 37 1/2 | 8- 2 | 20 | 1- 9 | 35 1/2 | + 20% | 2,800 | Keith-A-O % pf... | KLO 64,304 10- 1-31 | 1.75 Q | 40 | 33 | 35% | - | - | *none | |
| 6 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 14 1/2 | 3-12 | 1 | 12-19 | 7 1/2 | - 3% | 333,800 | Kelly-Spring Tire \$5 new... | KKS 758,861 1- 2-35 | 6 d.95 | 1 1/2 | 1% | 1% | + 1/2 | - | 1,800 | |
| 31 1/2 | 6 | 22 1/2 | 1-18 | 5 | 7-26 | 7 1/2 | - 3% | 47,400 | Kelly-Spr Tire \$6 np new... | KLD 52,647 1- 2-35 | d.11.08 | 98% | 98% | - | - | 2,500 | | |
| 2 | 2 | 10 | 1- 6 | 3 | 7-26 | 8 | + 2% | 11,700 | Kenley Hays Wheel \$1... | KW 290,285 1- 2-35 | 9 1.18 | 77% | 77% | - | - | 300 | | |
| 6 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 2- 6 | 15 | 7-26 | 11 1/2 | - 2% | 11,700 | Kenley Hays Wheel \$1... | KL 1,398,500 1- 2-35 | 9 1.31 | 44% | 44% | - | - | 300 | | |
| 15 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 3-14 | 11 1/2 | 7-26 | 16 1/2 | + 4% | 1,398,500 | Kelvinator Corp. np...KLV | 1,198,500 1- 2-35 | 32 1/2c | A 0.18 | 181% | 16% | 17% | - | 50,200 | |
| 24 1/2 | 27 | 65% | 12-16 | 11 | 3- 3 | 64 1/2 | + 28 1/2% | 1,398,500 | Kend Co cp pf... | KL 300,000 8- 1-31 | 50c | 10 42.33 | 99% | 67 | 67 | - | - | 600 |
| 73 | 30 | 94 | 12-17 | 65 1/2 | 1- 8 | 89 | + 30 | 4,040 | Kend Co cp pf... | KLL 37,626 12- 1-34 | 1.50 Q | 24w | 3.18 | 93% | 90% | 92 1/2% | + 3 1/2% | 50 |
| 25 1/2 | 73 | 23 1/2 | 6-13 | 16 | 11- 2 | 174 | - 31 | 2,306,300 | Kennecott Copper np... | KN 10,754,665 12-31-34 | 15c | 6 .38 | 18% | 16% | 16% | + 1/2 | 32,700 | |
| 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 4-12 | 97 | 12-27 | 97 | - 2% | 9,700 | Kim Clark Cp np... | KMB 499,800 10- 1-32 | 25c | 9 2.28 | 11 | 11 | 11 | + 1/2 | 100 | |
| 30 | 8 1/2 | 45 1/2 | 4-13 | 3 | 1- 6 | 54 | + 1% | 32,200 | Kinney (G) Co np... | KNX 160,000 4- 1-31 | 25c | 6 5.40 | 5 1/4 | 5 1/4 | - | - | 100 | |
| 7 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 42 1/2 | 4-26 | 13 1/2 | 1- 1 | 6 | + 23% | 7,160 | Kinney (H) Co np pf... | KNO 50,547 3- 1-31 | 2.00 | 6 2.79 | 34% | 34% | - | - | 420 | |
| 22 | 10 | 55 | 4- 4 | 14 | 11- 2 | 21 | - 31 | 2,100 | Kreager Dept. Stores \$1... | KDS 243,524 1- 2-35 | 6 d.61 | 20 | 42 | 42 | 42 | - | - | 100 |
| 16 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 5- 13 | 13 1/2 | 1- 2 | 21 1/2 | - 8% | 90,000 | Kreager (S) \$10... | KGS 5,171,804 1- 2-35 | 25c | 12 1.27 | 21% | 21% | 20% | - | 16,300 | |
| 10 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 114 1/2 | 12-10 | 101 | 1- 4 | 111 | + 10% | 3,390 | Kreager (S) Co pf... | KGT 20,000 1- 2-35 | 1.75 Q | 42 0.22 | 112 | 110 | 110 | - | 70 | |
| 44 1/2 | 27 | 65% | 12-11 | 16 | 1- 3 | 64 1/2 | + 28 1/2% | 21,600 | Kress (S) Co np... | KKS 1,787,727 1- 2-35 | 40c | 4.23 | 69% | 67 | 67 | - | - | 400 |
| 35% | 14 1/2 | 33% | 4-23 | 23 1/2 | 1- 8 | 28% | + 4% | 403,300 | Kroger G & B np... | KR 1,848,278 12- 1-34 | 40c Q | 24w | 1.27 | 28% | 27% | - | 6,200 | |
| 80 | 30 | 63 1/2 | 2-18 | 29 | 7-26 | 21 | - 23 | 2,430 | LACLEDE GAS CO...LG | LAC 107,000 12-15-33 | 1.50 | 12 2.18 | 21 | 20 | 20 | - | 40 | |
| 61 | 31 1/2 | 60 | 2- 9 | 27 | 12-27 | 27 | - | 2,360 | Laclede Gas Co pf... | LAC 25,000 12-15-33 | 2.50 | 12 14.53 | 30 | 29 | 29 | + 2 | 20 | |
| 10 1/2 | 19 1/2 | 31 1/2 | 4-13 | 3 | 1- 6 | 54 | + 1% | 181,600 | Lambert Co np... | LAM 746,371 1- 2-35 | 75c | 9 2.52 | 25% | 25% | - | - | 3,000 | |
| 12 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 31 1/2 | 4-14 | 19 | 1- 5 | 54 | + 1% | 15,900 | Lambert Bryan np... | LBY 104,483 1- 2-35 | 1.25 Q | 1 1.12 | 16% | 16% | - | - | 100 | |
| 22 | 15 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 4-24 | 23 1/2 | 1- 8 | 22 1/2 | - 4% | 69,800 | Life Savers \$5... | LDS 15,700 1- 2-35 | 40c | 9 1.73 | 23% | 21% | - | - | 2,700 | |
| 98 | 49 | 110 | 11- 26 | 73 1/2 | 1- 6 | 101 1/2 | + 25 | 33,400 | Littig & M \$25... | LDM 589,856 1- 2-34 | 1.00 Q | 0.84 | 106% | 103% | 103 | - | 1,500 | |
| 140 1/2 | 121 | 152 1/2 | 12-13 | 128 | 1- 13 | 151 | - 23 | 12,300 | Littig & Myers pf... | LDM 225,141 1- 2-35 | 1.75 Q | 77.18 | 152% | 151% | - | - | 200 | |
| 12 1/2 | 13 | 13 1/2 | 7-18 | 18 | 1- 15 | 18 1/2 | + 24% | 15,700 | Lithium Corp np... | LIL 189,512 12- 1-35 | 37 1/2c Q | 1.37 | 19 1/2% | 19 1/2% | - | - | 1,000 | |
| 10 1/2 | 10 | 36 1/2 | 12-13 | 102 | 1- 22 | 22 | - 5 | 56,700 | Lithium Corp np... | LWMW 211,057 6- 2-28 | 1.00 Q | 0.30 | 24 1/2% | 22 1/2% | - | - | 1,600 | |
| 18 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 19 1/2 | 2- 6 | 11 1/2 | 1- 3 | 18 | - | 13,200 | Link Belt Corp... | LB 740,350 12- 1-35 | 10c Q | 9 .60 | 19 1/2% | 17 1/2% | - | - | 1,200 | |
| 37 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 21 1/2 | 4-19 | 16 1/2 | 7-26 | 30 1/2 | + 2% | 307,000 | Liquid Carbon np... | LQ | 350,000 2- 1-35 | 1.50 Q | 1.32 | 30% | 28% | - | - | 9,100 |
| 36 1/2 | 37 | 12 1/2 | 2- 10 | 26 | 7-26 | 34 1/2 | + 5% | 2,910,300 | Lowe's np... | LW 1,464,205 12-31-34 | 1.00 Q | 0.71 | 104% | 103 1/2% | - | - | 43,300 | |
| 75 1/2 | 35 | 105 | 11- 30 | 72 | 1- 2 | 104 1/2 | + 32 1/2% | 20,050 | Lowe's 36 1/2 np pf... | LW 1, | | | | | | | | |

Friday, January 18, 1935

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|---------------------|-------|----------|-------|----------|--------------|----------------------------------|--|--|
| 1933 | | Range for Year 1934 | | Net Date | | Low Date | | Last Chg/e | | |
| High | Low | High | Low | Date | Last | Chg/e | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | |
| 20% | 8 | 33 | 12- 6 | 14 | 7-20 | 30 | +15 | 18,200 | Myer (F E) & Bro np. MBC | 200,000 12-31-34 40c .. A 2.58 31 30 30 -2 300 |
| 21% | 11% | 32% | 1-30 | 12% | 7-28 | 18% | -6% | 1,326,200 | Nash, Ch & St L. CHA | 2,730,000 1-2-35 25c Q .. A 1.91 17 17% -2 31,300 |
| 27 | 13 | 46 | 1-14 | 1-17 | 11-22 | 24 | -9 | 3,300 | National Acme S. NCM | 250,000 1-2-31 1.50 .. A 1.11 27.72 24 24 -28 6,200 |
| 7% | 1% | 8% | 1-20 | 30 | 5% | 1-18 | -1% | 145,400 | National Aviation np. NIV | 500,000 1-1-31 20c .. A 0.30 7.74 6% 6% 6% 110 |
| 13% | 4% | 13% | 1-30 | 5% | 9-14 | 8% | -1% | 101,900 | National Bellini Hess pf. NBB | 477,353 1-1-31 1.50 .. A 0.82 5.54 6% 6% 6% 1,700 |
| 9% | 1% | 14% | 1-16 | 25% | 10- 1 | 28% | -1% | 92,800 | Nati Biscuit Co S. BI | 6,289,423 1-15-35 50c .. A 1.06 7.54 6% 6% 6% 1,700 |
| 60% | 31% | 49% | 1-16 | 25% | 1-17 | 28% | -1% | 16,000 | National Biscuit Co pf. | 248,043 11-30-34 1.75 Q .. A 0.93 36.01 145 143 142 -1% 13,600 |
| 145 | 118 | 148% | 7-23 | 131 | 1- 3 | 18% | -2% | 65,040 | Nati Cash Reg A np. NCR | 1,628,000 1-15-35 122.50 Q .. A 0.76 18% 16% 16% 16% 15,200 |
| 23% | 54% | 23% | 2- 6 | 6% | 7-26 | 17% | -1% | 1,416,400 | Nati Dairy Products np. NPT | 6,263,165 1-2-33 30c Q .. A 1.17 16% 16% 16% 16% 16,200 |
| 25% | 10% | 18% | 7-11 | 1% | 1- 4 | 18% | +3% | | | |
| 2% | 1% | 3% | 28% | 11% | 5 | 1-17 | +2% | 314,000 | Nati Dept St np. NX | 546,672 10-19-30 25c .. A 6.49 24.36 31 28 31 +2% 4,810 |
| 10% | 35% | 31% | 2- 1 | 16% | 7-26 | 28% | +2% | 3,961,800 | Nati Dept Stores 1st pf. NAD | 2,022,083 2- 1-35 50c .. A 4.11 27.24 26 26 27% +1% 47,600 |
| 19% | 5% | 32% | 4-24 | 16% | 1- 4 | 25% | +8% | 38,600 | Nat Distill Fr np. EBK | 114,775 12-13-34 3.50 .. A 4.07 167.45 185 185 -500 |
| 140 | 43% | 14% | 12- 7 | 135 | 2-10 | 16% | +30% | 122,500 | National Lead np. LT | 309,831 12-13-34 1.25 Q .. A 6.90 9.90 155% 153 146% *none |
| 128% | 10% | 146% | 12-26 | 122 | 1-16 | 14% | +1% | 5,700 | National Lead pf. A .. | 123,676 12-15-34 1.75 Q .. A 6.12 17.25 123 122 122 -1% 11,700 |
| 109% | 75% | 125% | 12-15 | 100% | 1- 9 | 12% | +2% | 711,800 | National Pow & Lt np. NPL | 103,277 2- 1-35 1.50 .. A 6.25 12.25 122 122 122 -1% 20,300 |
| 20% | 67% | 15% | 2- 6 | 6% | 11-19 | 7% | -1% | 11,100 | Nat Rys of Mex 2d pf. NPM | 5,468,927 12-1-34 20c Q .. A 0.94 7.72 7 7 -1% 100 |
| 3% | 1% | 4% | 4- 4 | 4% | 1- 5 | 1% | +1% | 33,800 | Nat Rys of Mex 2d pf. NPM | 1,247,437 1-1-31 25c .. A 1.17 16% 16% 16% 16% 16,200 |
| 23% | 1% | 1% | 3- 7 | 1% | 1- 5 | 1% | +1% | | | |
| 55% | 15 | 58% | 2- 5 | 34% | 7-26 | 49% | +1% | 409,800 | National Steel \$25. NAX | 2,156,832 1-31-35 371% Q .. A 2.12 50% 47% 48% 48% 14,200 |
| 60% | 4% | 28% | 4-24 | 10% | 1- 4 | 45% | +1% | 105,900 | National Supply Co \$25. NSC | 382,647 1-5-31 1.00 .. A 12.42 41 44 44 44 3,200 |
| 17 | 17% | 61% | 4-24 | 33% | 1- 4 | 50% | +1% | 122,500 | National Tea np. NTV | 166,212 9-30-31 1.75 .. A 4.87 47 44 44 44 1,100 |
| 27 | 6% | 18% | 2- 1 | 9% | 1- 9 | 10% | +1% | 38,600 | Neisner Bros np. NBB | 206,232 1-1-35 40c .. A 6.47 24.25 24% 24% 24% 1,600 |
| 12% | 1% | 20% | 4-10 | 17% | 1- 9 | 12% | +1% | 4,500 | Newberry (J) Jp. NBB | 385,000 3- 1-35 1.75 Q .. A 4.81 43% 46% 46% 46% 150 |
| 11% | 1% | 12% | 3- 2 | 9% | 1- 9 | 12% | +1% | 70 | N Y Investors np. NYK | 150,000 11-30-31 1.75 .. A 10.67 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80 *none |
| 31 | 5% | 25% | 2-21 | 6% | 3-26 | 8% | +1% | 1,190 | N O Tex & Mex. NEM | 519,347 1-1-31 20c Q .. A 9.30 96 93 93 93 1,700 |
| 11% | 1% | 13% | 3- 6 | 5% | 9-18 | 7% | +1% | 159,800 | N Y Air Brake np. NYA | 260,000 8- 1-31 25c .. A 9.44 28 25% 25% 25% 1,400 |
| 23% | 6% | 28% | 12-28 | 11% | 7-26 | 28% | +1% | 97,800 | N Y N H & H. NHH | 1,571,186 10-1-31 1.00 .. A 11.41 d5.86 81% 7 71% 7 1 -1% 51,000 |
| 34% | 1% | 1% | 2- 5 | 10% | 8- 6 | 20% | -1% | | | |
| 18 | 37% | 25% | 4-24 | 9% | 9-17 | 24% | -1% | 3,368,600 | New York Central np. CN | 4,992,591 11-2-31 1.00 .. A 11.31 37 21% 18% 19% 2 51,000 |
| 15 | 7% | 21% | 4-23 | 16% | 1- 4 | 45% | +1% | 71,800 | N Y C & St L. NCS | 37,661 7- 1-34 1.50 .. A 6.52 13 12% 12% 12% 1 -1% 2,400 |
| 27% | 2% | 22% | 4-23 | 16% | 1- 4 | 50% | +1% | 160,325 | New York Dock np. DK | 369,985 7- 1-34 1.50 .. A 6.49 22 22% 22% 22% 1 -1% 2,300 |
| 34% | 1% | 2% | 3-19 | 5% | 7-31 | 3% | +1% | 23,450 | New York Dock pf. HAR | 100,000 1-2-35 1.25 Q .. A 4.43 8 8 8 8 480 |
| 11% | 6% | 20% | 3-13 | 5% | 2-28 | 12% | +1% | 36,400 | N Y & Har \$50. HAR | 173,121 1-2-35 2.50 S .. A 120% 120% 120% 120% 120% *none |
| 22% | 100 | 139 | 2- 1 | 108% | 9-27 | 114% | -1% | 2,640 | N Y Investors np. NYK | 1,004,424 10-15-30 60c .. A 14.43 96 93 93 93 8,700 |
| 12% | 9% | 99 | 120 | 9% | 9-112 | 9% | -1% | 161,400 | Noranda Mines np. NMM | 100,000 11-30-31 1.75 .. A 10.67 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80 *none |
| 3% | 2% | 3% | 2- 7 | 7% | 2- 7 | 8% | +1% | 808,800 | Norfolk Southern NFT & Western NFT & Western | 1,406,508 12-19-34 2.00 Q .. A 11.41 d5.86 81% 7 71% 7 1 -1% 5,300 |
| 34% | 7% | 75% | 9-16 | 83% | 4-16 | 72% | -1% | 9,800 | Norfolk & Western NFT & Western | 1,571,186 10-1-31 1.00 .. A 11.41 d5.86 81% 7 71% 7 1 -1% 5,300 |
| 177 | 11% | 187 | 7-16 | 181 | 1- 5 | 169 | +1% | | | |
| 56 | 18% | 37% | 2- 5 | 10% | 12-28 | 12% | -1% | 236,300 | N Y N H & H. np. NYH | 490,367 4- 1-32 1.75 .. A 11.12 13% 11% 11% 11% 1,400 |
| 15 | 7% | 22% | 2- 5 | 14% | 7-23 | 14% | -1% | 82,500 | N Y Ont & West. OW | 581,189 1-31-27 1.00 .. A 11.31 5% 5% 5% 5% 800 |
| 3 | 1% | 1% | 1- 8 | 9% | 7-25 | 14% | +1% | 16,700 | N Y Pif np. NYR | 184,330 1-1-31 1.00 .. A 11.23 1% 1% 1% 1% 1,400 |
| 22% | 1% | 22% | 2- 1 | 9% | 7-25 | 14% | +1% | 165,900 | N Y Shipbuilding 7% pf. NSB | 34,500 1- 2-35 10c Q .. A 6.11 8% 8% 8% 8% 260 |
| 11% | 6% | 21% | 3-13 | 5% | 2-28 | 12% | +1% | 3,600 | N Y Steam Sf np. NYSS | 21,510 1- 2-35 1.25 Q .. A 4.43 8% 8% 8% 8% 480 |
| 22% | 31% | 84% | 4-13 | 72% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 4,500 | N Y Steam Sf np. NYSS | 1,000 1- 2-35 1.25 S .. A 120% 120% 120% 120% 120% *none |
| 101% | 70% | 99% | 4-28 | 74% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 161,400 | Noranda Mines np. NMM | 2,233,772 12-20-34 60c .. A 14.43 96 93 93 93 8,700 |
| 110 | 83% | 109% | 5- 9 | 30% | 1-10 | 20% | -1% | 32,800 | Norfolk Southern NFT & Western NFT & Western | 1,406,508 12-19-34 2.00 Q .. A 11.41 d5.86 81% 7 71% 7 1 -1% 5,300 |
| 38% | 17% | 45% | 4-20 | 1% | 7-23 | 1% | +1% | 39,400 | Norfolk & Western NFT & Western | 1,571,186 10-1-31 1.00 .. A 11.41 d5.86 81% 7 71% 7 1 -1% 5,300 |
| 177 | 11% | 187 | 7-16 | 181 | 1- 5 | 169 | +1% | | | |
| 36 | 29 | 40% | 9- 5 | 29% | 12-17 | 29 | -5 | 93,350 | Norfolk & Western Pf. NFT & Western | 1,050 1- 2-35 1.25 Q .. A 11.12 13% 11% 11% 11% 1,400 |
| 17% | 15% | 25% | 2- 5 | 14% | 7-26 | 14% | +1% | 18,200 | North American np. NNA | 606,678 1- 2-35 1.25 Q .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,400 |
| 8% | 1% | 1% | 1- 8 | 9% | 7-25 | 14% | +1% | 181,800 | North Am Aviation \$1. NAV | 343,033 1-25-35 1.25 S .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,400 |
| 30% | 31% | 34% | 4-13 | 72% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 3,600 | North Am Ed 200R. NNG | 367,660 3- 1-35 1.50 Q .. A 16.49 60% 58% 58% 58% 1,600 |
| 50% | 79 | 79 | 4-28 | 74% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 2,500 | North Ger 200R. NNG | 62,675 1-15-35 2.50 S .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 2-27 | 74% | 1- 1 | 20% | +1% | 160,000 | North Central \$50. NNX | 2,479,984 1-15-35 1.25 Q .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 12-22 | 83 | 1- 3 | 20% | +1% | 920,700 | North Central \$50. NNX | 1,000,000 11-30-31 1.25 .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 4-20 | 14% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 2,200 | Northwest Tel \$50. NWT | 2,271,299 1-2-27 1.00 .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 12-22 | 83 | 1- 3 | 20% | +1% | 54,700 | Pacific Gas & Elec \$25. PCG | 400,000 1-15-35 1.25 Q .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 4-20 | 14% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 221,000 | Pacific Gas & Elec \$25. PCG | 215,720 1-2-27 1.00 .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 12-22 | 83 | 1- 3 | 20% | +1% | 54,700 | Pacific Gas & Elec \$25. PCG | 215,720 1-2-27 1.00 .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 4-20 | 14% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 16,800 | Pacific Gas & Elec \$25. PCG | 400,000 1-1-30 1.25 .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 12-22 | 83 | 1- 3 | 20% | +1% | 16,800 | Pacific Gas & Elec \$25. PCG | 400,000 1-1-30 1.25 .. A 11.12 13% 12% 12% 12% 1,600 |
| 76% | 67 | 76 | 4-20 | 14% | 1- 2 | 20% | +1% | 16,800 | Pacific Gas & Elec \$25. PCG | |

tremendous pressure for more than a year. Their abandonment of the gold standard would renew currency disturbance the world over. It might lead to a currency debasement war ending in universal destruction of money standards. International currency stabilization is today what it was when President Roosevelt scuttled it in July, 1933, the one concrete agency of recovery within the power of governments. There is now an opportunity to repair the injury.

Recovery Irresistible

Recovery is inevitable. It is coming, with or without the encouragement of wise governmental action. The great lesson of 1934 is that recovery comes in its own time. It is irresistible, whether retarded by a government that insists on putting empty buckets down empty wells or promoted by wise administration. The one great encouragement to recovery in a bewildered and stricken world is the confidence of the people in the good sense and good faith of their rulers.

No word has been said here about economic planning. None is required. The New Deal has not to this date in 1935 undertaken any economic planning looking toward a changed social order, a redistribution of wealth and income, or a collectivist economy. The measures that have been instituted in the past twenty months have been primarily recovery and relief expedients, admittedly emergency and temporary in character. The reform measures have been minor, and they have been directed not at social change but at specific financial and industrial conditions. Old age pensions, unemployment insurance, pensions for such groups as railway workers, and child labor enactments do not involve radical social reconstruction. They are old and familiar attempts to soften the harshness of our competitive system, not to uproot it.

The nation-wide discussion of such projects as the redistribution of our population, a guarantee of income, the Townsend fantasm, and a hundred billion-dollar program of development of resources is merely a reflection of the spirit of unrest inevitable in depression. There is not visible on the horizon any portent of a radical change in the prevailing economic system. Recovery, which is imminent, will remove both the political reasons and the economic causes which now provoke the proposals for revolutionary change. There is need for regulation and social legislation in certain areas of our economic life. With recovery on the way, there is today less danger of strange and revolutionary mutilation of our present system than there is of a failure to institute those reforms which would make our present order safer, fairer and more enduring. Violent reconstruction of our competitive system in our time is chiefly over the radio.

Climactic Changes in Banking

Continued from Page 83

central "government." In case of trouble solvency will exist by government decree.

The FDIC has apparently seen fit to assume the permanent regulation of interest rates, as is witnessed by its recent order (later rescinded) setting a maximum 2½ per cent rate for all banks.

All power to control domestic mon-

¹ Today, Nov. 24, 1934.

Continued on Next Page

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| High | Low | Range for Year 1934 | Date | Low | Last | Net Chg/e | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | Last Dividend Payable Rate per Share | | Earnings Per Share | | Wk's Range Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | | Wk's Sales | | | | |
|------|-----|---------------------|-------|------|--------|-----------|--------------|----------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|----------|--------------------|----------|---------------------------|------|------------|---------|---------|------|--------|
| | | | | | | | | | | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | | | | | |
| 40% | 4% | 29% | 2-8 | 10% | 7-27 | + 6 | 395,200 | Postal T & C 7% pf. | 305,295 | 1- 2-31 | 1.75 | .8 | .45 | 16% | 13% | 14½- 1% | 5,200 | | | |
| 5% | 5% | 5% | 2-16 | 1% | 7-26 | + 3% | 143,800 | Pressed Stl Car np. | 22,500 | 1- 2-31 | 21% | .2% | 2% | 21% | 21% | + 1% | 1,000 | | | |
| 47% | 1% | 44% | 11-21 | 33% | 6- 2 | + 4% | 53,200 | Pressed Stl Car pf. | 143,595 | 6-30-31 | 1.75 | .. | .. | 14 | 10% | 11½- 1% | 2,300 | | | |
| 110% | 97% | 100% | 4- 1 | 100% | 2-22 | + 10% | 385,700 | Proct & Gamble np. | 6,410,000 | 1-15-35 | 375.00 | Q 5 | .51 | 52% | 48% | + 1% | 12,800 | | | |
| 57% | 32% | 45% | 2- 6 | 25% | 12-21 | + 2% | 8,950 | Proct & Gamble 5% pf. | 171,569 | 12-15-34 | 1.25 | Q 3 | 28.84 | 115% | 115% | + 1% | 10 | | | |
| 88% | 58% | 84% | 2- 6 | 67% | 1- 2 | + 2% | 485,700 | Pub S Cn N J np. | 5,563,193 | 12-31-34 | 70c | Q 12 | 26.52 | 24% | 69% | + 1% | 28,300 | | | |
| 125% | 75% | 97% | 7-11 | 78 | 12-21 | + 7% | 34,800 | Pub S Cn N J 5% pf. | 518,497 | 12-31-34 | 1.25 | Q 12 | 12.67 | 69% | 69% | + 1% | 900 | | | |
| 112% | 84% | 106% | 2-21 | 87% | 12-21 | + 1% | 10,800 | Pub Ser Cn N J 6% pf. | 751,177 | 1-31-35 | 50c | M 12 | 16.27 | 82% | 80% | + 1% | 1,000 | | | |
| 125% | 98% | 119% | 2-17 | 105% | 1-12 | + 6 | 3,600 | Pub Ser Cn N J 7% pf. | 289,080 | 12-15-34 | 1.75 | Q 12 | 16.27 | 91% | 90% | + 1% | 500 | | | |
| 125% | 83% | 104% | 8- 9 | 90 | 1-10 | + 7% | 7,11 | Pub S E & G 5% pf np. | 300,000 | 12-31-34 | 1.25 | Q 1A | 58.62 | 101 | 100% | + 2 | 500 | | | |
| 5% | 5% | 5% | 2-16 | 1% | 7-26 | + 3% | 436,900 | Pullman, Inc. np. | 30,874,729 | 2-15-35 | 75c | Q 1 | .52 | 52% | 48% | + 1% | 23,700 | | | |
| 69% | 30% | 80% | 2- 6 | 49% | 1- 2 | + 3% | 8,950 | Pure Oil Co np. | 3,035,370 | 9- 30-31 | 374.00 | Q 3 | .51 | 52% | 48% | + 1% | 15,800 | | | |
| 25% | 5% | 19% | 2- 5 | 8% | 11-24 | + 1% | 18,960 | Pure Oil Co 8% pf. | 130,000 | 4- 1-33 | 50c | A ad1.52 | 59% | 55% | 44% | + 1% | 1,500 | | | |
| 12% | 3% | 9% | 2- 6 | 4% | 1- 2 | + 1% | 4,064,400 | Purity Bakeries np. | 805,045 | 12- 1-34 | 25c | Q 4W | .13 | 10% | 9% | + 1% | 5,800 | | | |
| 40% | 13% | 56% | 12-31 | 23% | 1- 4 | + 3% | 158,350 | Radio Corp Am np. | 13,101,469 | 1- 1-31 | 9.15 | Q 1 | .15 | 55% | 53% | + 1% | 47,000 | | | |
| 5% | 6% | 12% | 12- 8 | 15% | 1- 4 | + 1% | 1,495,000 | Radio Corp Am of B np. | 492,713 | 4-15-32 | 87½ | Q 9 | 4.32 | 55% | 54% | + 1% | 3,600 | | | |
| 54% | 1% | 4% | 2-17 | 1% | 7-23 | + 1% | 869,000 | Radio-Kelt-Orpheum np. | 1,28,379 | 12-31-34 | 1.75 | Q 12 | 16.27 | 24% | 1% | + 1% | 21,000 | | | |
| 34% | 4% | 24% | 2- 6 | 7% | 1- 9 | + 8% | 5,800 | Rd S III C stks cts. | 6,000 | 1- 2-32 | 17.50 | .. | .. | 9.41 | 4.43 | + 1% | 14,600, | | | |
| 20% | 5% | 23% | 2- 5 | 14% | 7-26 | + 4% | 139,700 | Reading Man np. | RAY | 676,012 | 12-15-34 | 25c | Q 9 | 1.39 | 20% | 19% | + 1% | 1,600 | | |
| 62% | 23% | 56% | 2- 6 | 35% | 8- 12 | + 1% | 32,700 | Reading \$50. | RDG | 1,400,000 | 2-14-55 | 50c | Q 10 | 1.79 | 43% | 42% | + 1% | 200 | | |
| 38% | 25% | 41% | 2- 6 | 14% | 1- 2 | + 1% | 438,370 | Reading 1st of \$50. | RDG | 560,000 | 12-13-34 | 50c | Q 10 | 8.64 | 39 | 38% | + 1% | 15,800 | | |
| 33% | 23% | 39% | 6- 19 | 29% | 1-11 | + 3% | 12,300 | Republic Steel Corp np. | 1,230,000 | 1-10-30 | 10c | Q 10 | 4.65 | 36 | 35% | + 1% | 200 | | | |
| 20% | 5% | 14% | 2- 6 | 5% | 1- 2 | + 1% | 45,500 | Republic Steel cts of dep. | 2,210,000 | 4- 1-31 | 25c | Q 11 | 6.27 | 61% | 6 | + 1% | 400 | | | |
| 4% | 25% | 60% | 4- 28 | 35% | 10- 26 | + 3% | 2,910 | Real Silk Hosiery \$10. | RSH | 100,000 | 1- 1-31 | 1.75 | Q 1 | 1.19 | 51% | 50% | + 1% | 400 | | |
| 18% | 5% | 14% | 6- 2 | 1% | 7-27 | + 1% | 103,400 | Real Silk Hosiery pf. | RIS | 100,000 | 1- 1-31 | 22.500 | 10- 1-30 | 1.75 | Q 1 | 1.14 | 41% | 37% | + 1% | 21,000 |
| 21% | 6% | 12% | 4- 2 | 1% | 7-27 | + 1% | 37,510 | Reis (1st) pf. | RIS | 100,000 | 1- 1-31 | 40c | Q 1 | 1.18 | 24% | 24% | + 1% | 900 | | |
| 11% | 2% | 12% | 2-23 | 6% | 1- 2 | + 3% | 623,800 | Remington-Rand Sl. | RR | 1,290,987 | 1- 1-31 | 40c | Q 1 | 1.14 | 11% | 10% | + 1% | 1,000 | | |
| 37% | 7% | 71% | 12-31 | 32% | 1- 5 | + 7% | 28,800 | Remington-Rand 1st pf. | RR | 1,290,987 | 1- 1-31 | 40c | Q 1 | 1.14 | 11% | 10% | + 1% | 14,600, | | |
| 35% | 8% | 70% | 12-31 | 30% | 1- 8 | + 7% | 6,450 | Remington-Rand 2d pf. | RR | 18,554 | 10- 1-31 | 2.00 | Q 1 | 6.88 | 74 | 70 | + 2% | 130 | | |
| 108% | 97% | 126% | 11-14 | 114% | 2- 6 | + 2% | 40 | Reynolds Man np. | RDY | 2,000,000 | 1- 2-32 | 10c | Q 1 | 1.50 | 3% | 2% | + 1% | 300 | | |
| 6% | 1% | 5% | 2-21 | 2% | 7-26 | + 1% | 438,370 | Reynolds Man np. | RDY | 2,000,000 | 1- 2-32 | 10c | Q 1 | 1.50 | 3% | 2% | + 1% | 13,400 | | |
| 23% | 4% | 25% | 2-23 | 10% | 7-26 | + 1% | 2,248,900 | Republic Steel Corp np. | RBC | 2,039,000 | 8- 1-30 | 10c | Q 1 | 9.40 | 15% | 13% | + 1% | 31,700 | | |
| 54% | 9% | 67% | 3- 9 | 31% | 10-29 | + 2% | 322,500 | Republic Steel cts of dep. | RBC | 2,039,000 | 10- 1-30 | 10c | Q 1 | 9.30 | 45% | 41% | + 1% | 2,700 | | |
| 12% | 2% | 14% | 3-21 | 31% | 12-13 | + 1% | 800 | Revere Corp Am np. | RBC | 2,039,000 | 10- 1-30 | 10c | Q 1 | 9.30 | 45% | 41% | + 1% | 400 | | |
| 12% | 2% | 14% | 3-21 | 31% | 1- 8 | + 2% | 24,200 | Revere Corp & Brass 5%. | RBC | 511,293 | 7-31-34 | 1.35 | Q 1 | 4.44 | 43% | 44% | + 1% | 400 | | |
| 12% | 2% | 14% | 3-21 | 31% | 1- 8 | + 2% | 5,400 | Revere Corp & Brass A \$10. | RBC | 200,025 | 1- 1-31 | 1.00 | Q 1 | 9.20 | 11% | 12% | + 1% | 900 | | |
| 60% | 6% | 65% | 4- 25 | 38% | 10- 26 | + 1% | 6,100 | Reynolds Metals np. | RLM | 100,000 | 11- 1-31 | 1.75 | Q 1 | 9.10 | 10c | 86% | + 1% | 200 | | |
| 21% | 6% | 27% | 4- 26 | 15% | 1- 2 | + 2% | 280,050 | Reynolds Metals np. | RLM | 960,836 | 12- 1-34 | 25c | Q 9 | 1.33 | 24% | 23% | + 1% | 4,700 | | |
| 15% | 8% | 16% | 12- 6 | 6% | 1- 9 | + 7% | 52,800 | Reynolds Spring \$1. | RSA | 148,566 | 12-29-34 | 10c | Q 9 | 1.35 | 14% | 13% | + 1% | 300 | | |
| 62% | 60% | 62% | 11-26 | 57% | 1- 5 | + 1% | 3,272 | Reynolds Tobacco np. | RTE | 1,000,000 | 1- 2-35 | 10c | Q 1 | 6.00 | 60% | 58% | + 1% | 210 | | |
| 54% | 26% | 53% | 12- 5 | 39% | 3-21 | + 5% | 1,038,800 | Reynolds Tobacco E 10%. | RTE | 1,000,000 | 1- 2-35 | 10c | Q 1 | 6.00 | 60% | 58% | + 1% | 210 | | |
| 22% | 14% | 23% | 1-31 | 12% | 12-21 | + 1% | 900 | Rhine West El P 100%RMWE | RWE | 2,840,240 | 2-15-34 | 87c | Q 9 | 1.50 | 15% | 13% | + 1% | 36,800 | | |
| 16% | 6% | 15% | 3- 8 | 5% | 1- 8 | + 1% | 10,900 | Ritter Dent Mfg np. | RDL | 160,000 | 10- 1-30 | 10c | Q 1 | 9.70 | 45% | 41% | + 1% | 7,400 | | |
| 28% | 7% | 33% | 2-26 | 6% | 1- 8 | + 1% | 30,800 | Road Antelope Am sh. | RNO | 325,449 | 7-31-34 | 1.35 | Q 1 | 9.60 | 25% | 24% | + 1% | 3,700 | | |
| 39% | 17% | 39% | 12- 6 | 19% | 2-28 | + 1% | 10,900 | Royal Dutch N Y. | RND | 399,562 | 7-31-34 | 1.35 | Q 1 | 7.35 | 31% | 30% | + 1% | 1,100 | | |
| 15% | 6% | 13%</td | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 | | Range for Year 1934 | | Net | Year's Sales | Stocks and Ticker Abbreviation** | Shares Listed | Last Dividend Payable Rate | Per Share | Earnings Per Share | Wk's Range Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | Wk's Chge | Week's Sales | | | | | |
|--------|--------|---------------------|-------|--------|--------------|----------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|-------|
| High | Low | High | Low | Date | Last | Chge | | | | High | Low | Last | | | | | | |
| 10 1/2 | 1 | 9 1/4 | 2-10 | 2 1/2 | 11-3 | 4 1/4 | - 1% | 223,600 | Thermoid Co \$1.....THR | 256,056 | 5-1-30 | 50c | 9 4.59 | 4 1/4 | 4 | 4 | 500 | |
| 12 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 2-20 | 13 1/2 | 1-2 | 5 1/2 | + 2% | 16,500 | Third Natl Inv \$1.....TNI | 220,000 | 7-1-34 | 140c | 9 4.42 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | - 1% | 400 | |
| 21 1/2 | 6 | 11 | 2-5 | 15 | 8-15 | 5 1/2 | + 2% | 20,900 | Thompson (J R) \$2.....THM | 300,000 | 11-1-34 | 12 1/2c | 9 4.56 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | + 1% | 20,900 | |
| 20 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 20 1/2 | 2-16 | 7-26 | 17 1/2 | + 3% | 328,500 | Thompson Prod np.....THO | 268,160 | 1-2-32 | 30c | 9 1.72 | 17 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 1,900 | | |
| 9 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 1-29 | 1-3 | 7-26 | 2 1/2 | - 1% | 321,100 | Thomp-Starrett np.....TST | 600,000 | 1-2-32 | 6 1/2c | 9 6.38 | 3 1/2 | 3 | 3 | 2,800 | | |
| 30 | 12 | 24 1/2 | 1-30 | 17 | 11-3 | 2 1/2 | - 3% | 6,600 | Thomp-Starrett pf np.....TSP | 63,996 | 10-1-31 | 87 1/2c | 6 0.15 | 22 | 17 1/2 | 18 | none | |
| 11 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 14 1/2 | 4-23 | 8 | 10-24 | 9 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 1,028,600 | Tide Water As np.....TVN | 5,998,953 | 2-16-31 | 30c | 9 .31 | 9 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 14,000 | |
| 65 1/2 | 23 1/2 | 87 | 12-31 | 64 1/2 | 1-4 | 8 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 49,900 | Tide Water Assn pi.....TWA | 636,221 | 12-22-34 | 12c | 9 7.20 | 87 1/2 | 84 | 85 | - 2 | |
| 26 | 9 1/2 | 40 | 4-27 | 24 | 12-13 | 2 1/2 | - 1% | 1,110 | Tide Water Oil np.....TV | 2,191,823 | 10-8-34 | 75c | 9 1.51 | 32 | 27 1/2 | 27 1/2 | 1,100 | |
| 80 | 45 | 100 1/2 | 12-31 | 80 | 1-11 | 100 1/2 | + 20 1/2 | 22,300 | Tide Water Oil np.....TV | 199,446 | 11-15-34 | 25 1/2c | 9 20.58 | 103 | 102 1/2 | 103 | + 1 | |
| 84 | 36 | 85 1/2 | 4-24 | 3 1/2 | 1-4 | 6 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 463,200 | Timk Det Ax \$10.....TDX | 980,186 | 4-1-31 | 20c | 9 11 | 7 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 5,300 | |
| 35 1/2 | 41 | 5 1/2 | 2-5 | 24 | 7-26 | 34 1/2 | + 4 1/2 | 473,500 | Timk Roll Bear np.....TKR | 2,412,957 | 12-5-34 | 150c | 9 1.24 | 36 1/2 | 34 | 34 1/2 | 12,400 | |
| 9 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 2-5 | 5 1/2 | 7-26 | 5 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 1,049,612 | Transamer Corp np.....TA | 23,759,971 | 1-31-35 | 12 1/2c | 9 .56 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 10,200 | |
| 17 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 13 1/2 | 2-17 | 4 1/2 | 7-26 | 7 1/2 | - 1% | 65,400 | Transue & Wms np.....TU | 27,050 | 12-31-31 | 25c | 9 .45 | 8 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 1,000 | |
| 8 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 3 | 3 | 12-27 | 3 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 410,950 | Tri Cont Corp np.....TCL | 2,429,318 | 1-2-35 | 3 1/2c | 9 .38 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 7,700 | |
| 75 | 41 | 78 | 4-20 | 60 1/2 | 1-9 | 72 | + 12 | 15,400 | Tri Cont Corp \$6 cv pf.....TCS | 295,254 | 1-2-35 | 1.50 Q | 9 .75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 100 | |
| 38 1/2 | 20 1/2 | 11-28 | 33 | 1-6 | 41 | 6 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 52,800 | Trico Products np.....TCO | 374,991 | 1-2-35 | 62 1/2c | 9 4.85 | 42 1/2 | 41 1/2 | 41 1/2 | 1,600 | |
| 5 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 12-12 | 1 1/2 | 1-3 | 4 1/2 | + 3 | 62,300 | Truck Trac C np.....TRC | 276,325 | 2-1-31 | 40c | 6 .48 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 600 | |
| 12 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 2-19 | 3 1/2 | 7-23 | 5 1/2 | + 3 1/2 | 201,900 | Truscon Steel \$10.....TUX | 767,156 | 10-15-31 | 15c | 9 .44 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3,900 | | |
| 4 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 4-24 | 1 1/2 | 1-10 | 3 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 51,200 | Twin City Rap Tran np.....TWC | 220,000 | 1-15-31 | 2.00 | 11 .03 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 900 | |
| 15 | 4 | 39 | 4-24 | 6 | 1-12 | 18 1/2 | + 13 1/2 | 17,250 | Twin City Rap Tran pf.....TWC | 30,000 | 1-2-32 | 1.75 | 11 .17 | 23 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 1,500 | |
| 6 1/2 | 4 | 1-15 | 1 | 7-23 | 1 1/2 | - 1% | 64,000 | ULEN & Co np.....ULE | 271,522 | 7-15-31 | 40c | 9 .14 | 2 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 500 | | |
| 39 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 58 1/2 | 12-15 | 3 | 1-5 | 57 1/2 | + 20 | 111,200 | Underwood-Elliott-F np.....UAF | 696,855 | 12-31-34 | 50c | 9 2.58 | 59 1/2 | 58 1/2 | 58 1/2 | 2,700 | |
| 105 | 76 | 128 1/2 | 11-21 | 2 1/2 | 102 | 12 1/2 | + 26 1/2 | 1,860 | Underwood-Elliott-F np.....UAF | 27,050 | 12-31-34 | 25c | 9 .45 | 8 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 1,000 | |
| 60 | 50 | 60 | 2-23 | 39 1/2 | 7-26 | 4 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 116,200 | Un Bag & Paper np.....UP | 150,000 | 10-25-34 | 1.00 | 12 .07 | 60 1/2 | 49 1/2 | 49 1/2 | 4,900 | |
| 51 1/2 | 19 1/2 | 50 1/2 | 1-19 | 35 1/2 | 5-14 | 47 1/2 | - 7 1/2 | 1,193,900 | Un Bag & Paper np.....UP | 9,366,070 | 2-18-32 | 35c | 9 .13 | 48 1/2 | 45 1/2 | 45 1/2 | 23,400 | |
| 23 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 20 1/2 | 2-5 | 11 1/2 | 10-12 | 4 1/2 | + 15 1/2 | 334,700 | Union Pacific.....UP | 2,222,190 | 1-2-31 | 25c | 9 .39 | 38 1/2 | 36 1/2 | 36 1/2 | 5,300 | |
| 132 | 61 1/2 | 133 1/2 | 4-11 | 1 1/2 | 8-8 | 10 1/2 | + 4 1/2 | 264,300 | Union Pacific.....UP | 5,090 | 1-13-34 | 10 1/2 | 10 .58 | 11 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 1,800 | |
| 75 1/2 | 56 | 89 | 7-13 | 7 1/2 | 1-18 | 8 1/2 | + 11 1/2 | 995,431 | Union Pacific pf.....UP | 995,431 | 10-1-34 | 2.00 | 9 14.67 | 88 1/2 | 87 1/2 | 87 1/2 | 1,800 | |
| 22 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 25 1/2 | 12-24 | 15 1/2 | 1-9 | 25 1/2 | + 8 1/2 | 96,020 | Union Tank Car np.....UTX | 1,200,000 | 12-1-34 | 30c | Q 6 .67 | 26 1/2 | 25 1/2 | 25 1/2 | 3,200 | |
| 10 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 12-29 | 8 1/2 | 9-18 | 14 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 568,775 | United Aircraft \$5.....UAR | 2,087,532 | 1-2-35 | 150c | 9 15.4 | 15 1/2 | 13 1/2 | 13 1/2 | 32,800 | |
| 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 9-14 | 5 1/2 | 9-14 | 5 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 277,400 | United Air Lines \$5 cvf.ULT | 1,043,766 | 1-2-35 | 150c | 9 .6 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 14,800 | |
| 17 1/2 | 3 | 17 | 2-6 | 8 | 7-24 | 9 | + 1 1/2 | 16,140 | Unit Am Bosch np.....BOS | 278,399 | 1-2-35 | 150c | 9 .49 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 100 | |
| 27 1/2 | 13 1/2 | 29 1/2 | 4-26 | 21 1/2 | 9-18 | 25 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 121,700 | Unit Bag & Paper np.....UBP | 48,322 | 12-1-34 | 40c | Q 9 .147 | 26 1/2 | 25 1/2 | 25 1/2 | 2,400 | |
| 11 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 120 | 6-30 | 107 | 9-19 | 11 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 2,060 | Unit Bag & Paper np.....UBP | 1,58,818 | 2-1-35 | 60c | Q 9 .17 | 117 1/2 | 117 1/2 | 117 1/2 | 76 | |
| 32 | 10 1/2 | 50 | 12-15 | 32 1/2 | 1-2 | 4 1/2 | + 11 1/2 | 2,76,200 | Unit Carb Co np.....UCB | 39,885 | 1-2-35 | 60c | Q 9 .53 | 47 1/2 | 47 1/2 | 47 1/2 | 4,900 | |
| 14 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 37 1/2 | 2-7 | 21 1/2 | 2-26 | 24 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 2,76,050 | Unit Corp np.....UC | 14,531,004 | 7-1-32 | 10 1/2c | 9 14 | 3 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 20,200 | |
| 40 | 22 1/2 | 37 1/2 | 2-7 | 21 1/2 | 2-26 | 24 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 317,850 | Unit Corp cv np.....UC | 2,489,000 | 1-2-35 | 75c | Q 9 .37 | 26 1/2 | 24 1/2 | 24 1/2 | 12,700 | |
| 12 | 6 | 22 1/2 | 4-28 | 9 1/2 | 1-8 | 13 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 768,100 | United Drug \$5.....UND | 1,400,560 | 1-2-35 | 75c | Q 9 .78 | 13 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 12,200 | |
| 67 | 36 | 107 | 2-11 | 1-24 | 5 1/2 | 7-26 | 5 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 1,020 | United Dwywood \$10.....UDY | 139,183 | 7-1-24 | 150c | 6 .699 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 1,100 |
| 70 | 28 | 75 1/2 | 11-10 | 59 1/2 | 9-18 | 75 1/2 | + 16 1/2 | 1,410 | United Dwywood \$10.....UDY | 45,000 | 1-2-35 | 175c | Q 6 .534 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 100 | |
| 87 | 56 | 77 1/2 | 1-11 | 3 1/2 | 1-10 | 6 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 94,400 | United Elctn np.....UEN | 306,000 | 9-3-32 | 75c | Q 6 .065 | 72 1/2 | 68 1/2 | 68 1/2 | 1,200 | |
| 69 | 23 1/2 | 77 1/2 | 1-11 | 3 1/2 | 1-10 | 6 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 30,800 | United Gas Imp np.....UGI | 2,024,004 | 11-1-35 | 120c | Q 9 .536 | 120 1/2 | 116 1/2 | 116 1/2 | 6,000 | |
| 25 | 12 1/2 | 20 1/2 | 2-6 | 11 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 92,900 | United Gas Imp np.....UGI | 23,249 | 12-31-34 | 30c | Q 9 .72 | 124 1/2 | 123 1/2 | 123 1/2 | 16,200 | |
| 100 | 82 | 92 | 120 | 1-21 | 107 | 9 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 2,030 | United Gas Imp np.....UGI | 765,216 | 12-31-34 | 60c | Q 9 .31 | 90 1/2 | 86 1/2 | 86 1/2 | 800 | |
| 51 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 94 1/2 | 7-18 | 86 | 8-16 | 13 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 19,300 | United Gypsum np.....UG | 120,000 | 7-15-26 | 50c | Q 9 .21 | 21 1/2 | 21 1/2 | 21 1/2 | 9,300 | |
| 11 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 94 1/2 | 7-18 | 86 | 8-16 | 13 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 108,900 | United Gypsum np.....UG | 900,000 | 1-1-32 | 50c | Q 9 . | | | | | |

cerpts therefrom will indicate some of the moot questions which, it is anticipated, will receive active consideration. Following are some of the questions pertaining to money:

In the power over the issuance of currency to be vested in (a) a non-political authority, (b) in the Secretary of the Treasury (as it now is), (c) or in a non-political privately owned but government chartered central bank, or (d) in a government owned and operated central bank?

Is the currency to be redeemable (a) in gold or (b) in silver or (c) in both, or a combination of both?

If the currency is to be redeemable, is it to be redeemable (a) in coin or (b) in bars of bullion or (c) in bullion for export only? Is a fixed ratio to gold to be re-established, and if so, under what conditions? Should one uniform currency be established for the country in place of the various kinds now circulating, and if so, what should it be?

Following are some questions related to a possible rediscount bank and banking generally:

Is the rediscount function of the Federal Reserve System to remain as it is or to be changed? . . . Is the ownership of the Federal Reserve Banks to remain where it is or to be transferred? . . . Is the composition of the Federal Reserve Board to remain as it is or to be changed?

Is there to be a government-owned and operated banking system? . . . If not, what changes are to be made in the private banking system? For example:

(a) Is there to be a unification of the forty-nine different banking systems that we now have?

(b) Is there to be branch banking? If so, is it to be nation-wide, State-wide or regional?

(c) What are to be the capital requirements of a bank in relation to its liabilities?

(d) Are commercial banks to be allowed to take savings accounts?

(e) Are commercial banks to be allowed to do a trust business?

(f) Are commercial banks to be allowed to underwrite new securities, which they are permitted by law to do?

(g) Are savings banks to be compelled to mutualize?

(h) Must savings banks belong to the Federal Reserve System? If not, may they belong to it?

(i) Is there to be a plan of deposit insurance? If so, what plan? What banks are compelled to belong to it?

(j) Can any one become bank officer? If not, what qualifications are to be demanded?

These questions give a good indication of the suggestions which a legislator who is in a unique position to judge, believes will be pressed upon Congress during the coming months.

Deposit Insurance

Congress will have to express itself on the question of deposit insurance before July 1, 1935, when the temporary plan expires. At present, deposits in banks which are members of the FDIC are guaranteed only up to \$5,000 and the assessments which may be made against the banks are limited to one-half of 1 per cent of insured deposits. After July 1 next, unless Congress acts, large deposits will be insured on a percentage basis and the member banks will be subject to unlimited liability. In a special survey made recently for the FDIC by H. L. Eker and approved by Chairman Crowley, the insurance of deposits only up to \$5,000, as at present, and the fixing of a definite premium, payable annually by banks, to build up and maintain a fund to cover losses, are advocated.

Another matter coming up for action during this session of Congress will be the permanent revamping of the law governing the issue of Federal Reserve notes and the collateral back of them. The one-year extension of the Glass-Steagall Act expires this coming March 3, when either a new law or a proclamation by the President extending the life of the act will be necessary. The Glass-Steagall Act gave the Reserve Banks authority to pledge direct obligations of the United States as collateral for that portion of outstanding reserve notes not covered by the 40 per cent gold certificate reserve requirement. Also on March 3 Section 10-B of the Reserve Act will lapse. This

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 | | Range for Year 1934 | | Net | Year's | Stocks and | Shares | Last Dividend | Earnings | Wk's Range | |
|------|-----|---------------------|-------|------|--------|------------|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|----------|
| High | Low | Date | Low | Date | Ch'ge | Sales | Listed | Payable | Per Share | Jan. 7-Jan. 12 | |
| 2774 | 15 | 34% | 12-11 | 27% | + 9 | 4,300 | Wileco-Rich A np.....WLX | 44,030 | 3-31-35 62c Q/A | 7.60 | 34% 34% |
| 11 | % | 9 | 4-11 | 4% | + 1% | 262,500 | Wilson & Co np.....WIL | 44,441 | | 1.28 | 6% 6% |
| 22 | 4 | 32% | 12-13 | 12% | + 29% | 1,087,200 | Wilson & Co A np.....WIL | 313,305 | | 7.18 | 30% 27% |
| 72% | 19 | 105 | 12-13 | 52 | + 41% | 211,200 | Wilson & Co pf..... | 227,233 | 1- 2-35 n1.75 | 1.60 | 100% 96% |
| 50% | 25% | 55% | 12-20 | 41% | + 10% | 925,200 | Woolworth (W) \$10.....Z | 9,750,000 | 3- 1-35 60c Q/A | 21.54 | 51% 51% |
| 39% | 5 | 53% | 12-21 | 31% | + 20% | 106,800 | Worthington Pump ...WPU | 7-15-22 1.50 | 21.76 | 17% 17% | |
| 53 | 14 | 53 | 1-24 | 31% | + 42% | 19,150 | Worthington Pump pf.....WPU | 55,929 | 6 ad3.01 | 43% 40% | |
| 47 | 14 | 42 | 1-24 | 23% | + 5 | 21,500 | Wright Aeronautic pf.....WAC | 103,217 | 1- 2-32 1.50 | 6 ad3.01 | |
| 24 | 6 | 75 | 1-27 | 16% | + 32% | 32,000 | Wright Aeronautic np.....WAC | 599,857 | 11-30-39 50c | 51 | 30% 50% |

50% 34% 76 12-29 54% 1-11 76 + 19% 69,800 Wrigley (W) Jr np.....WWY 2,000,000 1-16-35 50c Q/A 9.09 79% 75 x75 -3% 2,200

23 7 22% 12-10 14 1- 51 21 + 6% 31,300 YALE & T MFG \$25.....YA 486,654 1- 2-35 15c Q/A 9.02 21% 21% + 3% 1,400

7% 2% 21% 2-19 2% 7-26 3% - 359,950 Yellow T & C B \$10.....YC 1,300,000 1- 2-27 15c Q/A 9 ed.49 4% 3% 2% 8,600

42 18 47% 4-26 28 1- 21 41 + 13% 10,780 Yellow Tr & Coach pf..... 150,000 1- 2-28 1.75 9 d1.50 40% 39 38% 50

19% 3% 22% 2-19 12% 7-26 20% + 4% 134,500 Younger Son & Wsp.....YG 1,100,000 1- 2-35 750c Q/A 1.10 22% 18% 19% 3,200

37% 5% 59% 2-17 34 11- 71 4-14 - 563,200 Younger Son & Wsp pf..... 1,200,000 7- 9-31 1.50 9 d1.91 21% 19% 19% 20,200

5 1% 4% 2- 5 1% 7-21 2% - 4,400 ZENITH RADIO np.....ZE 150,000 4- 1-32 3.37% 9 d1.12 52% 48% 51% + 4% 700

9% 3% 7% 2-19 3% 7-26 4% - 539,800 Zonite Products \$1.....ZP 200,000 11- 9-10-32 15c .. 9 d.67 2% 2% 2% 400

845,556 9-10-32 15c .. 9 d.67 2% 2% 2% 400

15,400

STOCKS REMOVED FROM LIST IN 1934

| 1933 Range. | STOCK. | 1934 Range. | Net | 1933 Range. | STOCK. | 1934 Range. | Net | Year's Sales. |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|---------------|
| High. Low. | | High. Date. Low. Date. Last. Chge. | Sales. | High. Low. | | High. Date. Low. Date. Last. Chge. | Sales. | |
| 31 7% 10% Am Ag Chem Conn pf.. | 40 | 8-27 35% 8-17 40 + 9% | 300 | 21 7% Mesta Machine, old..... | 94% 11-24 18% 1- 4 33% | 32% 32% + 16% | 177,400 | |
| 7% 1% Armour of Illinois, A.... | 8 4-13 | 41% 1- 3 5% + 1 | 1,185,200 | 83 25% Monsanto Chemical, old..... | 94% 4- 4 7% 3-26 93 | +11 | 44,400 | |
| 5 6% Armour of Illinois, I pf rcts | 7% 3% 4-18 | 21% 1- 6 2% + 3% | 424,400 | 8% 1/4 National Surety | 2% 1- 2 2 1- 2 2 | .. | 1,600 | |
| 9% 3/4 Art Metal Const. | 9% 4-23 | 4% 7-27 5% + 1% | 9,830 | 49 4/6% Pitts, McI & Y..... | 49% 3-21 49 3-21 49 | 250 | 3,600 | |
| 3/4 Art Metal Appar. Ind. | 3/4 2-15 | 1/2 7-13 1% - 3% | 43,800 | 22 7% Producers Pipe Line..... | 20-20 13 7-27 17 | + 2% 2% 6,000 | 612,000 | |
| 5/4 Butte Copper Super..... | 5/4 1-18 | 1/2 7-13 1% - 3% | 22,500 | 13 2% Producers & Refiners pf..... | 13-13 1/2 2 1/2 2 1/2 | .. | 65,000 | |
| 1 1/2 Chi. St Paul M & O. | 6% 4-7 | 1/2 9-25 1% - 4% | 1,080 | 10% 2 Missouri Ins of Am..... | 10% 2- 6 6% 1- 3 8 + 4 | 116,050 | | |
| 12 2% Chi. St Paul M & O. pf | 11% 2-15 | 10% 10- 2 4 + 1% | 740 | 3% 1/4 Seneca Copper | 2 2-22 1/2 9-13 3% 3% 78,600 | 1,650 | | |
| 75% 35% Continental Can, old..... | 96% 10-24 | 80% 8-14 88% + 13% | 334,400 | 46% 1/4 Spang, Chalfant | 46% 4-23 7 1-22 81% + 18% | 2,885,300 | | |
| 5% 2/4 Denbham Sec, Ltd..... | 2% 1-26 | 1/2 3- 3 2% + 1% | 240 | 43 14% Van Raalte pf sta..... | 57% 2- 1 8 7-24 13% + 15% | 1,830 | | |
| 51% 34% Eitingon-Schild, old..... | 2% 1-20 | 1/2 5- 5 1% + 1% | 41,500 | | | | | |
| 24% 4% Eitingon-Schild pf..... | 34% 1-26 | 25% 1-17 32% + 8% | 1,700 | | | | | |
| 2% 2% Fairbanks Co ctfs..... | 2% 4-4 | 1/2 7-26 1% + 1% | 2,200 | | | | | |
| 6% 2% Fairbanks Co pf ctfs..... | 5% 4-18 | 3% 2-14 1% + 1% | 2,584 | | | | | |
| 5% 2% Fifth Avenue Bus..... | 11% 2-18 | 3% 2-18 1/2 + 1% | 2,580 | | | | | |
| 83% 24% Industrial Rayon..... | 96% 1-24 | 72% 7 8 8 15% 800 | 1,520,800 | | | | | |
| 5% 4% Insuransh (Del)..... | 2% 6-6 | 1% 2- 6 1% + 1% | 2,100 | | | | | |
| 10% 5% Interboro Rapid Tr c o d..... | 12% 11-21 | 6% 5-11 12% + 1% | 10,200 | | | | | |
| 21% 2% International Paper pf..... | 23 4-24 | 10% 7-27 12% + 1% | 5,880 | | | | | |
| | 33 5- 2 | 20% 8-25 20% - 39% | 290 | | | | | |

Earnings per share as reported by Standard year. Full face—A—Calendar year 1934 Blank means figures not available.

Full face—1 to 13—Number of months covered by latest interim report.

a—On all classes of preferred.

b—Parent company only.

c—On common and Class B combined.

d—Deficit.

e—Class A and B stocks combined.

f—Plus 2% semi-annually in stock.

g—On common and preferred combined.

h—On common and preferred combined.

i—Ex dividend.

Statistics Company of New York: Light face—A—Calendar year 1933 or corresponding fiscal or corresponding fiscal year.

i—Before depletion. j—Preliminary.

k—One-quarter share of Radio.

l—Payable in scrip.

m—Adjusted.

n—Partly cumulative.

o—Special.

p—On old and new stock combined.

q—1 share Mission Corp. for 25 Standard Oil N. J.

r—Amount varies.

s—Plus scrip.

t—On common and ctfs. combined.

u—Weeks.

y—1/3 shares Nevada Cons.

z—10 share New Tran. & West.

*Figures under high and low column represent asked and bid prices of Jan. 12.

**Stocks of no par value are indicated by (np); all other stocks have par values of \$100 except otherwise indicated.

†Partly extra.

||Plus stock.

††On out-of-town market.

‡Payable in cash or stock.

§Payable in stock.

||Payable in stock.

|||Payable in stock.

1934 Price Range of Over-the-Counter Trading

NEW YORK BANKS.

Manhattan and Bronx.

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|---------------------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Bank of Manh'tan Co (14%) | 21 1/2 | 23 | 33 1/2 19 1/2 |
| Blk of Yrkt (50c.) | 32 1/2 | 37 | 33 20 |
| Chase (1.40) | 24 | 25 1/2 | 31 19 1/2 |
| City (1) | 21 1/2 | 23 | 32 19 1/2 |
| Commercial (8%) | 128 | 130 | 153 118 |
| Fifth Av (34%) | 965 | 1045 | 1120 840 |
| First (100) | 1480 | 1520 | 1720 1170 |
| National Bronx | 15 | 20 | 25 15 |
| Nati Safety (25c) | 8 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 8 4 |
| Penn Exchange | 8 | 9 | 10 4 1/2 |
| Public (14%) | 30 | 32 | 35 19 1/2 |
| Sterling | 18 1/2 | 19 1/2 | 22 13 |
| Trade | 13 | 15 | b18 12 1/2 |
| Yorkville | 25 | 35 | 30 20 |

*Includes extras.

Range prior to capital change: a—137, 115%; Jan. 30; b—28, 20, Oct. 30.

OUT-OF-TOWN BANKS.

PHILADELPHIA.

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|-----------------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Cent Penn Nat. | 26 | 27 1/2 | 27 19 |
| Cit Nat Bank | 18 | 20 | 26 1/2 11 |
| Corn Exchange | 32 1/2 | 34 | 36 24 1/2 |
| First Natl | 243 | 250 | 275 180 |
| Market St Nat | 200 | 305 | 295 245 |
| Nat Bk German | 66 | 68 | 69 43 |
| Philadelphia | 68 | 68 | 69 43 |
| Second National | 13 | 14 1/2 | 15 10 1/2 |
| Tradesmen's | 112 | 117 | 118 95 |

TRUST COMPANIES

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|----------------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Fidelity Phila | 315 | 323 | 327 258 |
| Finance Co Pa | 195 | 203 | 220 192 |
| Frankford | 27 | 27 | 23 |
| Girard | 84 | 88 | 94 64 1/2 |
| Industrial | 51 1/2 | 10 | 11 1/2 8 1/2 |
| Ninth Bk & Tr | 8 | 9 | 13 7 1/2 |
| North Phila | 62 | 67 | 66 58 |
| Northern | 455 | 475 | 455 320 |
| Pennsylvania | 26 | 27 1/2 | 32 22 1/2 |
| Penn W & S D | 40 | 50 | 45 40 |
| Provident | 403 | 413 | 405 308 |
| R E Land Title | 5 | 5 1/2 | 12 4 1/2 |
| R E Trust | 67 | 71 | 68 56 |

CHICAGO.

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|-------------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Bankers (3) | 52 1/2 | 54 1/2 | 67 1/2 48 |
| Banka Com Ital | 140 | 150 | 146 140 |
| Blk of N Y T (14) | 321 | 328 | 379 271 |
| Bank of Sicily | 10 | 12 | 10 10 |
| Brown | 5 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 7 4 |
| Cen Harvey (6) | 108 | 107 | 135 100 |
| Chemical (1.80) | 38 1/2 | 40 1/2 | 41 1/2 29 1/2 |
| Clinton (12.50) | 40 | 45 | 40 37 |
| Colonial new | 9 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 15 7 |
| Continental (80c) | 11 1/2 | 13 | 14 1/4 10 1/4 |
| Corn Exch (3) | 43 1/2 | 44 1/2 | 58 40 1/2 |
| Empire (1) | 17 | 18 | 20 1/2 15 |
| Fulton (12) | 235 | 250 | 250 200 |
| Government (20) | 302 | 302 | 321 249 |
| Irving (1) | 14 | 15 | 19 1/2 13 |
| Lawyers Co (2.40) | 40 | 42 | 44 28 1/2 |
| Manufacturers (1) | 20 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 23 1/2 14 1/2 |
| New York (5) | 95 | 98 | 108 75 1/2 |
| Title Guarantee | 4 | 5 | 14 1/2 3 1/2 |
| Underwriters | 60 | 70 | 65 40 |
| Un States (+70) | 1575 | 1625 | 1780 1445 |

*Includes extras.

Brooklyn. Brooklyn (4) 79 84 114 66
Kings Co (80) 1735 1785 1825 1735

TITLE AND MORTGAGE.

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|---------------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Bond & Mtge | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1 1/4 1/4 |
| Lawyers Mtge | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1 1/4 1/4 |
| Lawyers T & G | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 1/4 |

INSURANCE COMPANIES.

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|-----------------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Aetna C & S (12%) | 57 | 59 | 57 1/2 46 1/2 |
| Aetna Fire (1.60) | 47 1/2 | 49 1/2 | 47 1/2 29 1/2 |
| Aetna Life (150c.) | 17 1/2 | 19 | 21 1/2 14 |
| Agricultural (2.60) | 62 | 64 | 64 46 1/2 |
| Am Alliance (1) | 20 1/2 | 22 | 22 1/4 14 |
| Am Equi (25c) | 20 1/2 | 23 | 23 1/4 13 |
| Am Home (10c) | 9 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 9 1/2 7 1/2 |
| Am Reins (2.50) | 53 | 55 | 53 32 |
| Am Reserve (1) | 21 | 22 1/2 | 21 1/2 10 1/2 |
| Am Surety (1) | 28 1/2 | 30 | 31 1/2 13 1/2 |
| Automobile (1) | 23 1/2 | 25 1/2 | 24 1/2 18 |
| Baltimore Amer | 4 | 5 | 4 1/2 2 |
| Bkrs & St (3) | 70 1/2 | 74 | 70 1/2 37 |
| Boston (16) | 543 | 570 | 543 385 |
| Camden Fire (1) | 9 | 20 | 12 1/2 7 1/2 |
| Carolina (1) | 22 | 23 1/2 | 22 1/2 13 1/2 |
| City of New York (10) | 202 | 209 | 202 109 |
| Conn Gen (80c.) | 25 1/2 | 28 | 31 1/2 23 1/2 |
| Cont Gas (60c.) | 12 1/2 | 13 | 15 1/2 9 1/2 |
| Eagle Fire | 2 | 3 | 2 1/2 1 1/2 |
| Emp Reins (1.60) | 27 1/2 | 30 | 27 1/2 20 |
| Excess (50c.) | 13 | 14 | 15 8 1/2 |
| Federal P (12%) | 69 1/2 | 74 | 72 49 |
| Fid & Del (50c.) | 42 1/2 | 43 1/2 | 43 1/2 37 1/2 |
| Firemen's Newark | 54 | 74 | 74 45 |
| Franklin (1.10c.) | 24 | 25 1/2 | 24 1/2 14 1/2 |
| Gen Alliance (15c.) | 9 1/2 | 11 | 11 1/2 6 1/2 |
| Georgia Home (1) | 22 | 24 | 23 12 1/2 |
| Glen Falls (1.60) | 33 1/2 | 35 1/2 | 34 1/2 24 1/2 |
| Globe & Rep. | 8 1/2 | 10 | 11 1/4 7 1/2 |
| Globe & Rutgers | 35 | 38 | 55 32 |
| Great Amer (1) | 20 1/2 | 22 1/4 | 21 1/4 14 1/2 |
| Great Amer Ind | 17 1/2 | 18 | 18 1/2 13 1/2 |
| Halifax P (80c.) | 35 1/2 | 36 1/2 | 37 1/2 27 1/2 |
| Hart F (50c.) | 21 1/2 | 23 1/2 | 23 1/2 15 1/2 |
| Hart S B (12.80) | 70 1/2 | 72 1/2 | 71 1/2 44 |
| Hartford F (2) | 55 1/2 | 57 1/2 | 58 1/2 38 1/2 |
| Home (+1.15) | 27 1/2 | 28 1/2 | 28 1/2 16 1/2 |
| Home Fire Sec. | 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 1/2 |
| Homestead F (100) | 19 1/2 | 21 | 20 1/2 8 1/2 |
| Import & Export | 5 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 8 1/2 3 1/2 |
| Knickerbocker | 9 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 12 1/2 7 1/2 |
| Maryland Cas | 1 1/2 | 2 | 2 1/2 1 |
| Mass Bonding | 13 | 14 | 14 11 |
| Merchants F (1) | 32 | 34 | 32 23 |
| Merch & Mfr F | 4 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 5 1/2 4 1/2 |
| Nat Casualty | 6 | 7 1/2 | 8 1/2 3 1/2 |
| Nat Fire (2) | 55 1/2 | 57 1/2 | 58 1/2 40 1/2 |
| Nat Life (25c) | 6 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 9 1/2 3 1/2 |
| Nat Univ Fire (1) | 112 | 123 | 123 50 |
| New Am Cas | 5 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 12 1/2 5 1/2 |
| New Bruns F (1) | 24 1/2 | 26 1/2 | 26 1/2 15 1/2 |
| New Eng (50c.) | 13 | 13 | 13 8 |
| New Hamp (1.50) | 41 1/2 | 44 1/2 | 43 1/2 30 |
| New Jersey (1.60) | 35 | 38 | 38 18 |
| N Y Fin (15c.) | 124 | 144 | 13 1/2 7 1/2 |
| North Riv (85c.) | 22 1/2 | 24 | 23 1/2 14 1/2 |
| Northern (3) | 74 1/2 | 75 | 74 44 |
| North Fire (8) | 112 | 116 | 118 79 |
| Phoenix Fire (2) | 75 | 82 | 83 39 |
| Preferred Accid. | 10 1/2 | 12 | 11 1/2 7 |
| Prov Wash (11.10c.) | 30 1/2 | 32 1/2 | 31 1/2 20 1/2 |
| Rossia (40c.) | 8 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 9 1/2 8 |
| St Paul F & M (6) | 170 | 173 | 172 112 |
| Seaboard Surety | 13 1/2 | 14 1/2 | 13 1/2 12 |
| Security (40c.) | 21 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 22 1/2 9 1/2 |
| Southern Fin (1) | 100 | 103 | 103 74 |
| Stuyvesant | 2 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 4 2 |
| Sun Life C Can. | 320 | 332 | 502 305 |
| Travelers (16) | 414 | 424 | 450 325 |
| U S Fire (1.70c.) | 45 1/2 | 47 1/2 | 45 1/2 34 1/2 |
| U S Fid & Guar. | 5 | 6 | 6 1/2 3 1/2 |
| Westchester F (14.00) | 28 1/2 | 29 1/2 | 29 1/2 17 1/2 |

*Includes extras.

a Range prior to capital change: July 6, 8 1/2, 6.

OUT-OF-TOWN BANKS.

PHILADELPHIA.

| | Dec. 31. | Bid. Price. | Range, 1934. |
|----------------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| | Bid. | Ask. | High. Low. |
| Cent Penn Nat. | 26 | 27 1/2 | 2 |

PUBLIC UTILITY SECURITIES

| | Dec. 31. | Range, 1934. | Dec. 31. | Range, 1934. | | | |
|--|------------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------|---------------------|-----|------------|
| | Bid. Ask. | Bid. Price. | Bid. Ask. | Bid. Price. | | | |
| | High. Low. | High. Low. | High. Low. | High. Low. | | | |
| Stand G & E 6s. '35 | 67 1/2 68 | 32 1/2 43 | Kress (S H) pf (6c) | 11 1/2 12 | 11 1/2 9 1/2 | | |
| Do 6s. gold deb. '51 | 38 1/2 39 | 59 32 1/2 | Law For Cem. | 15 17 | 15 7 | | |
| Do 6s. gold deb. '66 | 37 1/2 38 | 58 1/2 32 | Lord & T 1st pf (6) | 98 | 98 7/8 | | |
| U El N J 4s. '49 | 108 | 108 97 | Do 2d pf (8) | 100 | 100 7/8 | | |
| Wis-Min L&P 5s. '44 | 93 1/2 | 93 1/2 94 | Manufactur Pub | 5 1/2 6 | 5 1/2 2 1/2 | | |
| Wis Pub Sv 5s. '42 | 101 1/2 | 104 1/2 90 | Merck pf (8) | 38 | 40 1/2 17 1/2 | | |
| Do 1st ref 5 1/2s. '98 | 94 | 97 1/2 98 1/2 | Merck & Co., Inc. | 23 | 23 19 | | |
| Do 1st ref 6s. '52 | 97 1/2 | 99 1/2 98 1/2 | Do 8% pf | 112 114 | 112 112 | | |
| Do 1st ref 6s. '52 due to default on interest. | 77 | | Do pf (8) | 145 | 104 | | |
| *Selling flat due to default on interest. | | | | | Mock J & V pf (7) | 70 | 70 55 |
| Tel. and Tel. Stocks. | | | | | Murphy (G C) pf (8) | 107 | 107 1/2 90 |
| Am Dis T N J (4) | 71 | 74 62 | Nat Casket (3) | 53 | 58 25 | | |
| Do pf (7) | 112 | 113 1/2 112 1/2 | Do 10% pf | 107 1/2 | 107 1/2 87 | | |
| Emp & Bay T (4) | 58 | 58 37 | Do 12% pf | 40 | 40 1/2 8 | | |
| Franklin T (2.50) | 37 | 41 37 1/2 | Do 14% pf | 24 | 24 1/2 13 | | |
| Lincoen T (7) | 87 | 81 81 | Do 15% pf | 18 1/2 | 21 15 1/2 | | |
| Lincoen T & T (7) | 89 | 90 1/2 80 | Do 16% pf | 88 | 90 7/8 78 1/2 | | |
| Mount S T & T (8) | 104 | 108 109 1/2 | Do 17% pf | 87 | 90 1/2 87 | | |
| N Y Mutual (1/2) | 21 1/2 | 25 22 1/2 | Do 18% pf | 33 | 34 1/2 34 | | |
| N W B T pf (6.50) | 110 1/2 | 113 111 1/2 | Do 19% pf | 40 | 40 1/2 38 | | |
| Pac & A U S (1) | 15 | 17 16 | Do pf | 41 1/2 | 41 1/2 25 | | |
| Peninsula T | 1 1/2 | 6 1/2 9 1/2 | Rubberoid Co. (1/14) | 90 | 90 1/2 85 | | |
| Do pf. A (7) | 108 | 104 101 1/2 | Savannah Sug (6) | 105 1/2 | 105 1/2 95 | | |
| Buch 100% pf (6.50) | 108 | 104 101 1/2 | Sciff Co pf (7) | 94 | 94 28 71 1/2 | | |
| So El At (2.25) | 17 1/2 | 21 15 | Scovil Mfg (1) | 19 1/2 | 21 28 16 | | |
| So N E T & T (6) | 104 1/2 | 106 1/2 110 | Shaw Mfg (1/4) | 23 1/2 | 24 1/2 15 1/2 | | |
| Wis Tel pf. A (7) | 111 | 115 111 1/2 | Stand Srew (4) | 69 1/2 | 70 1/2 64 1/2 | | |

INDUSTRIAL ISSUES.

| | Dec. 31. | Range, 1934. | Dec. 31. | Range, 1934. | |
|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------------------|--------------|-----------|
| | Bid. Ask. | Bid. Price. | Bid. Ask. | Bid. Price. | |
| | High. Low. | High. Low. | High. Low. | High. Low. | |
| Am Book (4) | 57 1/2 60 1/2 | 59 40 | Am Meter (5) | 91 102 | 91 102 |
| Am Hardware (1) | 20 1/2 21 1/2 | 22 1/2 18 | Am Type Fe (6) | 37 31 | 33 38 |
| Am Hard Rubber | 4 | 7 10 | Am Water Fd (7) | 42 44 | 44 70 |
| Am Meter | 11 1/2 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 10 | Bear Min-Hud Riv B 76 1/2 | 74 1/2 | 80 68 |
| Am Manufacturing | 1 1/2 2 1/2 | 3 1/2 1 | Butterick Pub (1/14) | 28 40 | 25 1/2 |
| Do pf (5) | 44 | 49 59 | Chi St Yds 5s. '61 | 91 91 | 91 65 1/2 |
| Babcock & W (400) | 36 1/2 37 1/2 | 49 18 | Do Rock Oil 7s. '37 | 38 | 40 48 1/2 |
| Bancroft (J) | 1 | 3 3/4 | Do Off Bluff Deb 5s. '52 | 46 1/2 | 48 1/2 44 |
| Do pf | 14 | 20 24 | Do 10% pf | 56 | 54 1/2 |
| Bohack (H C) pf (1.75) | 61 | 67 75 | Do 12% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Bon Ami, B (12) | 42 | 45 42 | Do 14% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Brunswick-Balke-Col pf. | 56 | 56 45 | Do 16% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Bunker & Sullivan M&C | 28 | 31 31 | Do 18% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Carnegie | 12 1/2 14 1/2 | 22 1/2 15 | Do 20% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do pf (7) | 98 | 102 119 | Do 22% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Carnation pf (7) | 102 1/2 | 103 1/2 | Do 24% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Clinchfield Coal pf. | 32 | 32 24 | Do 26% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Colts P F (1/14) | 23 1/2 | 24 1/2 27 1/2 | Do 28% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Column A. A new. | 23 1/2 24 1/2 | 24 1/2 20 1/2 | Do 30% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| De B. new. | 23 1/2 24 1/2 | 24 1/2 20 1/2 | Do 32% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Crowell Pub (1) | 20 | 21 24 | Do 34% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do pf (7) | 50 | 52 48 | Do 36% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Diam S (8%) | 70 | 70 51 | Do 38% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Dictaph Co (2/4) | 21 1/2 24 1/2 | 24 1/2 21 | Do 40% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Dixon (J B) Cruc (2) | 32 | 32 24 | Do 42% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Douglas Shoe pf. | 17 | 19 26 | Do 44% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Draper Co (14.40) | 58 | 61 60 | Do 46% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| East P Rico Sug. | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 3 1/2 | Do 48% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do pf | 3 | 5 6 7 | Do 50% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Fajardo Sugar | 75 | 103 102 | Do 52% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Farm Boro Corp. | 20 1/2 22 1/2 | 24 1/2 18 | Do 54% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Flour Mills Am. | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 3 1/2 | Do 56% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Franklin Ry Sup. | 10 | 15 15 | Do 58% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| GT Nor Pap (1) | 24 | 25 1/2 25 1/2 | Do 60% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| GT Nor Pap (1) | 24 | 25 1/2 25 1/2 | Do 62% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Herring H Safe | 11 | 14 1/2 22 | Do 64% pf | 54 | 54 1/2 |

*Includes extras.
a Range prior to capital change. Dec. 12, 36, 27.

Bonds.

| INDUSTRIALS AND RAILROADS. | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------|---------|--------|------------|
| Adams Exp 4s. '47 | 83 | 85 85 | 59 1/2 | |
| Am Meter 6s. '45 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 102 1/2 |
| Am Tobacco 4s. '51 | 102 1/2 | 102 1/2 | 98 | |
| Am Type Fe 4s. '51 | 37 | 31 | 33 | 38 42 |
| Am Water Fd 7s. '42 | 42 | 44 | 44 | 44 70 |
| Bear Min-Hud Riv B 76 1/2 | 74 1/2 | 74 1/2 | 74 1/2 | 74 1/2 |
| Butterick Pub 6s. '61 | 1936 | 28 | 40 | 25 1/2 |
| Chi St Yds 5s. '61 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 65 1/2 |
| Do Rock Oil 7s. '37 | 38 | 40 | 40 | 48 1/2 |
| Do Off Bluff Deb 5s. '52 | 46 1/2 | 48 1/2 | 48 1/2 | 48 1/2 |
| Do 10% pf | 56 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 12% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 14% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 16% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 18% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 20% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 22% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 24% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 26% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 28% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 30% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 32% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 34% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 36% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 38% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 40% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 42% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 44% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 46% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 48% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 50% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 52% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 54% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 56% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 58% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 60% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 62% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 64% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 66% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 68% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 70% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 72% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 74% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 76% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 78% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 80% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 82% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 84% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 86% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 88% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 90% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 92% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 94% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 96% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 98% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |
| Do 100% pf | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 1/2 |

Disparities in Price Levels the Root Cause of the Stagnation in Building

Continued from Page 107

the lowest rates of interest. But the situation changes with the return of confidence. If the construction industry expects to secure new private capital, it must offer reasonably attractive returns plus reasonable security.

The debt burden is already being voluntarily lightened in many cases. Savings banks particularly have taken the initiative in this matter. Many a hard-pressed home owner has recently rubbed his eyes on opening a letter from his bank telling him the rate of interest on his mortgage has been reduced. The savings banks are able to do this because they have cut their depositors' interest. The building and loan associations, some of which paid amazingly high interest to their members in the boom, are cutting the interest drastically. The life insurance companies are cutting the premium interest.

Innocent Suffer With the Guilty

In this way the debt load is being lightened and will be lightened much more if interest rates decline still further. That, of course, is the settled policy of the Federal Government. In its own interest, it is necessary to lighten the load of the debt. The unemployment of capital makes it easy to hold down the wages of capital. Savings bank rates may sink as low as even 1 per cent if sufficient employment for capital is not found. It is a situation reminiscent of older countries that no longer grow fast. But in this country it can be looked upon partly as a corrective process. New mortgages paying even a

low rate will look attractive if the general interest rate level is very low and building activity will develop as a result. This has also been the attitude of the English authorities.

Second Mortgages Abolished

Under the new Housing Act, junior mortgages are abolished. There is only one mortgage on which up to 80 per cent of a carefully appraised value can be borrowed. The objection has frequently been raised that the first mortgagee in effect takes over the risk formerly carried by the second and even third mortgagees without getting the very high rates of interest that the latter two formerly demanded for carrying the risk. But the point is precisely that the Housing Act aims very greatly to reduce this risk through insurance, amortization and appraisal so that the former high interest rates may no longer be required to attract capital.

The monthly amortization feature of the new Housing Act puts the entire matter of home building on a partial pay-as-you-go basis. Such payments, beginning with the first month, continuously lighten the debt burden

Bond Transactions—1934—N. Y. Stock Exchange

| | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Total bond sales 1934..... | \$3,729,460,500 |
| Total bond sales 1933..... | 3,366,402.950 |
| Total bond sales 1932..... | 2,971,965,650 |
| Total bond sales 1931..... | 3,075,347,100 |

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BONDS.
(Figures after decimals represent cents.)

| UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BONDS. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---------|--------|----------|-------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
| (Figures after decimals represent 32ds of 1 per cent.) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1933 Range. High. Low. | | BOND. | | Range for Year 1934. | | | | Net Chg. | | Years Sales. | |
| High. | Low. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Chg. | High. | Low. | Chg. | Years |
| 103.20 | 99.00 | LIBERTY | 3 1/8s, 1932-47 | 104.18 | July 12 | 100.4 | Jan. 10 | 103.18 | +3.00 | \$19,903,000 | |
| 102.24 | 99.28 | LIBERTY | 3 1/8s, reg. | 104.2 | June 20 | 100.6 | Jan. 12 | 103.12 | +3.10 | 40,000 | |
| 102.17 | 101.00 | Liberty | 1st 4s, 1932-47 | 103.8 | May 16 | 100.17 | Jan. 18 | 102.2 | +1.14 | 40,000 | |
| 102.00 | 101.16 | Liberty | 1st 4s, reg. | 100.00 | Jan. 8 | 100.00 | Jan. 8 | 100.00 | +1.00 | 10,000 | |
| 103.4 | 99.28 | Liberty | 1st 2d 4 1/2s, 1932-47 | 102.31 | Dec. | 102.16 | Apr. 9 | 102.23 | +.23 | 62,000 | |
| 103.00 | 99.26 | Liberty | 1st cv 4 1/2s, 1932-47 | 104.12 | May 7 | 101.6 | Jan. 10 | 103.17 | +1.31 | 9,582,000 | |
| 103.30 | 100.12 | Liberty | 1st cv 4 1/2s, reg. | 104.4 | Mar. 3 | 101.2 | Jan. 11 | 103.14 | +2.8 | 114,700 | |
| 102.4 | 101.00 | Liberty | 4th 4 1/2s, 1933-38, 3d called | 104.10 | May 7 | 101.23 | Jan. 9 | 103.23 | +1.27 | 25,676,500 | |
| 103.24 | 100.8 | Liberty | 4th 4 1/2s, reg. | 102.16 | Oct. 13 | 101.26 | Dec. 31 | 101.28 | | 2,221,000 | |
| 101.29 | 100.28 | Liberty | 4th 4 1/2s, reg. 3d ca. 102.9 | 104.6 | May 7 | 101.19 | Jan. 10 | 103.21 | +1.30 | 498,000 | |
| 101.25 | | Liberty | 4th 4 1/2s, reg. 3d ca. 102.9 | 104.7 | Oct. 16 | 101.25 | Dec. 24 | 101.25 | | 157,000 | |
| 111.4 | 103.14 | TREASURY | 4 1/2s, 1947-52 | 114.1 | July 23 | 104.21 | Jan. 11 | 112.11 | +6.13 | 90,600 | |
| 107.14 | 104.28 | Treasury | 4 1/2s, reg. | 113.25 | July 18 | 105.11 | Jan. 21 | 113.7 | +6.15 | 24,382,400 | |
| 07.00 | 99.31 | Treasury | 4s, 1944-54 | 109.23 | July 12 | 101.21 | Jan. 10 | 108.27 | +5.95 | 37,540,500 | |
| 05.17 | 102.7 | Treasury | 4s, reg. | 108.16 | July 23 | 101.26 | Jan. 10 | 107.19 | +4.27 | 141,000 | |
| 05.00 | 108.14 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1946-56 | 108.2 | July 11 | 100.8 | Jan. 10 | 106.31 | +5.6 | 30,313,000 | |
| 02.27 | 97.4 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1946-56, reg. | 107.25 | July 19 | 100.28 | Jan. 11 | 107.8 | +6.14 | 12,600 | |
| 02.18 | 98.11 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1943-47 | 105.18 | July 12 | 98.23 | Jan. 11 | 103.31 | +4.23 | 23,276,000 | |
| 02.29 | 98.00 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1940-43 | 105.26 | July 11 | 98.30 | Jan. 11 | 103.24 | +4.19 | 82,700 | |
| 02.10 | 99.3 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1940-43, reg. | 104.17 | July 6 | 99.12 | Jan. 11 | 104.13 | +4.25 | 16,778,000 | |
| 02.25 | 96.31 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1941-43 | 105.20 | July 11 | 98.20 | Jan. 11 | 104.11 | +5.8 | 84,000 | |
| 02.8 | 98.28 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1941-43, reg. | 104.17 | June 7 | 100.24 | Feb. 10 | 104.13 | +4.31 | 32,883,500 | |
| 01.24 | 97.31 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1944-46, reg. | 104.10 | July 11 | 99.24 | Sept. 12 | 104.19 | +3.23 | 16,000 | |
| 01.24 | | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1944-46, reg. | 102.29 | June 20 | 101.12 | Nov. 8 | 102.29 | | 73,541,000 | |
| 1.5 | 98.8 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1941 | 105.19 | July 11 | 97.27 | Jan. 11 | 104.18 | +5.20 | 76,657,000 | |
| 38.00 | 98.25 | Treasury | 4 1/2s-3 1/2s, 1943-45 | 104.24 | July 11 | 97.26 | Jan. 11 | 104.16 | | 19,000 | |
| 0.21 | 94.16 | Treasury | 4 1/2s-3 1/2s, 43-45, reg. | 103.22 | July 5 | 98.00 | Jan. 9 | 102.30 | +3.22 | 73,106,000 | |
| 13.25 | 98.28 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1946-49 | 103.19 | July 19 | 95.18 | Jan. 10 | 102.23 | +3.25 | 164,700 | |
| 0.13 | 93.12 | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1946-49, reg. | 103.00 | July 10 | 97.4 | Jan. 11 | 101.28 | +6.2 | 57,654,000 | |
| 0.00 | 93.12 | Treasury | 3s, 1951-55 | 102.14 | July 11 | 93.18 | Jan. 10 | 101.04 | +4.00 | 40,000 | |
| | | Treasury | 3s, 1951-55, reg. | 100.30 | May 11 | 97.09 | Feb. 2 | 100.30 | +6.15 | 80,352,700 | |
| | | Treasury | 3s, 1946-48 | 102.11 | July 11 | 97.26 | Sept. 18 | 100.13 | +6.3 | 368,500 | |
| | | Treasury | 3 1/2s, 1949-52 | 101.20 | Dec. 19 | 101.5 | Dec. 15 | 101.19 | | 67,614,000 | |
| | | FED FARM MTG | 3 1/2s, '64 | 102.24 | July 21 | 98.00 | Sep. 18 | 101.16 | | 1,141,600 | |
| | | Fed Farm Mtg | 3s, 1949 | 101.7 | June 15 | 94.27 | Sep. 12 | 99.21 | | 18,083,300 | |
| | | HOME OWN LOAN | 4s, '51 | 101.28 | June 1 | 94.26 | Sep. 12 | 100.31 | | 37,468,500 | |
| | | Home Own Loan | 4s, '51, reg. | 101.00 | June 19 | 98.25 | Aug. 21 | 99.3 | | 84,102,000 | |
| | | Home Own Loan | 3s, 1952 | 101.7 | June 15 | 94.26 | Sep. 12 | 99.24 | | 8,000 | |
| | | Home Own Loan | 3s, '52, reg. | 100.5 | July 31 | 95.00 | Sept. 12 | 96.00 | | 97,706,100 | |
| | | Home Own Loan | 2 1/2s, 1946 | 96.2 | | | | | | | |

Nov. 20. 18

| FOREIGN BONDS. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|------|-----------|-------------|--|--|--|--|
| 33% | 10% | ABITIBI P & P 5s, 1953..... | 48% | May 2 | 18½ | Jan. 2 | 34 | +15% | \$1,984,000 | | | | |
| 11½% | 92 | Adriatic Elec 7s, 1952..... | 110 | Mar. 22 | 90½ | June 16 | 96½ | + 1% | 967,000 | | | | |
| 78½% | 63 | Akershus 5s, 1963..... | 91 | Dec. 14 | 66½ | Jan. 3 | 91 | +24 | 726,000 | | | | |
| 62% | 50 | Alpine Mont S 7s, 1955..... | 95 | Dec. 3 | 56½ | Jan. 5 | 94½ | +40% | 322,000 | | | | |
| 20% | 7 | Antioquia 7s, A, 1945..... | 17½ | Feb. 19 | 8½ | Jan. 2 | 11½ | + 3% | 246,000 | | | | |
| 20% | 6½ | Antioquia 7s, B, 1945..... | 17 | Feb. 19 | 9½ | Jan. 10 | 11½ | + 3% | 26,000 | | | | |
| 20% | 6 | Antioquia 7s, C, 1945..... | 17 | Feb. 19 | 9½ | Jan. 11 | 11½ | + 4% | 140,000 | | | | |
| 17½% | 6 | Antioquia 1st 7s, 1957..... | 17½ | Feb. 19 | 8½ | Jan. 2 | 11½ | + 4 | 169,000 | | | | |
| 18% | 5 | Antioquia 2d 7s, 1957..... | 14½ | Feb. 19 | 7½ | July 2 | 10½ | + 3% | 172,000 | | | | |
| 18% | 4½ | Antioquia 3d 7s, 1957..... | 14½ | Mar. 5 | 8 | Jan. 4 | 9½ | + 3 | 249,000 | | | | |
| 91½% | 7½ | Antwerp 5s, 1958..... | 102½ | Sep. 12 | 82½ | Jan. 2 | 98½ | +14½ | 562,000 | | | | |
| 92 | 49% | Argentine 5s, 1945..... | 101½ | Sep. 22 | 80½ | Jan. 2 | 98 | +18½ | 1,117,000 | | | | |
| 69½% | 38 | Argentine 5½s, 1962..... | 91½ | Dec. 20 | 47½ | Jan. 2 | 90 | +42 | 2,460,000 | | | | |
| 75½% | 40% | Argentine 6s, A, 1957..... | 94½ | Dec. 18 | 53 | Jan. 4 | 94½ | +11½ | 4,682,000 | | | | |
| 75½% | 41 | Argentine 6s, B, 1958..... | 95 | Dec. 18 | 53½ | Jan. 4 | 94½ | +39½ | 4,221,000 | | | | |
| 75% | 41 | Argentine 6s, June, 1959..... | 95 | Dec. 18 | 53½ | Jan. 4 | 94½ | +39½ | 3,750,000 | | | | |
| 75% | 40% | Argentine 6s, Oct., 1959..... | 94½ | Dec. 20 | 53 | Jan. 5 | 94½ | +41 | 3,697,000 | | | | |
| 75% | 40% | Argentine 6s, May, 1960..... | 94½ | Dec. 19 | 53½ | Jan. 4 | 94½ | +40 | 4,582,000 | | | | |
| 75% | 41 | Argentine 6s, Sep., 1960..... | 94½ | Dec. 18 | 53½ | Jan. 4 | 94½ | +42½ | 4,666,000 | | | | |
| 75% | 40% | Argentine 6s, Oct., 1960..... | 94½ | Dec. 29 | 53½ | Jan. 2 | 94½ | +59½ | 3,824,000 | | | | |
| 75% | 41 | Argentine 6s, Feb., 1961..... | 94½ | Dec. 21 | 52½ | Jan. 5 | 94½ | +17½ | 3,619,000 | | | | |
| 83½% | 68½% | Australia 4½s, 1956..... | 94½ | Dec. 20 | 52½ | Jan. 5 | 94½ | +39 | 2,529,000 | | | | |
| 90 | 72½% | Australia 5s, 1957..... | 97½ | Dec. 19 | 53 | Jan. 3 | 96½ | +13½ | 8,020,000 | | | | |
| 63% | 42% | Australia 7s, 1955..... | 102½ | Dec. 20 | 89 | Jan. 4 | 101½ | +12½ | 9,872,000 | | | | |
| 63% | 42% | Austrian 7s, 1943..... | 102½ | Dec. 20 | 88½ | Jan. 4 | 101½ | +12½ | 6,467,000 | | | | |
| 63% | 42% | Austrian 7s, 1957..... | 102½ | Nov. 30 | 91½ | Jan. 5 | 101½ | +9½ | 4,821,000 | | | | |
| 104 | 90% | BATAVIA P 4½s, 1942..... | 116 | Jan. 25 | 102½ | Jan. 2 | 110 | + 7% | 2,297,000 | | | | |
| 69 | 30 | Bavaria S 6½s, 1945..... | 59½ | Feb. 2 | 26½ | Sep. 12 | 31 | -12½ | 1,467,000 | | | | |
| 98 | 86½ | Belgium 6s, 1955..... | 104 | Apr. 24 | 94 | Jan. 2 | 103½ | + 8 | 1,996,000 | | | | |
| 102½% | 88½ | Belgium 6½s, 1949..... | 105 | Apr. 24 | 95 | Jan. 2 | 102½ | + 8½ | 3,226,000 | | | | |
| 108½% | 92½ | Belgium 7s, 1955..... | 111½ | Dec. 27 | 99 | Jan. 3 | 111½ | +13½ | 2,960,000 | | | | |
| 107½% | 91 | Belgium 7½s, 1956..... | 106½ | Apr. 18 | 95½ | Jan. 3 | 106½ | +10½ | 2,303,000 | | | | |
| 90% | 62½ | Bergen 5s, 1960..... | 92 | Dec. 22 | 66½ | Jan. 2 | 91 | +27 | 1,860,000 | | | | |
| 88½% | 65 | Bergen 5s, 1949..... | 96½ | Dec. 1 | 68 | Jan. 5 | 96½ | +29 | 672,000 | | | | |
| 60 | 25½ | Berlin 6½s, 1950..... | 52 | Feb. 1 | 22 | Oct. 4 | 27½ | - 6½ | 587,000 | | | | |
| 57 | 24½ | Berlin 6s, 1958..... | 49½ | Mar. 2 | 20½ | Sep. 17 | 26½ | - 5½ | 2,390,000 | | | | |
| 70½% | 32% | Berlin Elec 6½s, 1951..... | 85½ | Jan. 20 | 27½ | Sep. 15 | 36½ | -21½ | 2,664,000 | | | | |
| 64½% | 28% | Berlin Elec 6s, 1955..... | 65½ | Jan. 19 | 24 | Sep. 11 | 29½ | -23½ | 2,765,000 | | | | |
| 69½% | 32 | Berlin Elec 6½s, 1959..... | 67 | Jan. 19 | 25½ | Sep. 13 | 31½ | -25 | 2,787,000 | | | | |
| 63% | 28% | Berlin El Ry 6½s, 1956..... | 24 | Feb. 14 | 27½ | Sep. 14 | 33½ | -11½ | 2,471,000 | | | | |
| 30 | 15 | Bogota 8s, 1945..... | 24 | Feb. 16 | 17½ | Apr. 26 | 17½ | - 1 | 864,000 | | | | |
| 13½% | 3½ | Bolivia 7s, 1958..... | 10½ | Feb. 19 | 5½ | July 27 | 5½ | + ½ | 2,200,000 | | | | |
| 13½% | 3½ | Bolivia 7s, 1969..... | 10½ | Feb. 19 | 5½ | July 27 | 5½ | + ½ | 2,308,000 | | | | |
| 15 | 4 | Bolivia 8s, 1947..... | 11½ | Feb. 16 | 6 | Dec. 19 | 6 | + ½ | 2,239,000 | | | | |
| 39 | 15% | Brazil 6½s, 1926-57..... | 37 | Sep. 21 | 20½ | Jan. 2 | 31½ | +11½ | 3,442,000 | | | | |
| 39 | 14% | Brazil 6½s, 1927-57..... | 36½ | Sep. 21 | 20½ | Jan. 2 | 31½ | +11½ | 2,987,000 | | | | |
| 43 | 16% | Brazil 8s, 1941..... | 41½ | Oct. 15 | 22½ | Jan. 4 | 39½ | +16½ | 3,115,000 | | | | |
| 36½% | 12½% | Brazil Cent Ry 7s, 1952..... | 38½ | Oct. 15 | 20½ | Jan. 1 | 31½ | +11½ | 2,967,000 | | | | |
| 72½% | 72 | Breda Ernesto 7s, 1954..... | 89 | Apr. 11 | 68 | July 27 | 81½ | - ½ | 248,000 | | | | |
| 34½% | 16 | Bremen State 7s, 1935..... | 63½ | Mar. 9 | 29 | Aug. 13 | 33½ | -19½ | 603,000 | | | | |
| 75 | 65 | Brisbane 5s, 1957..... | 96 | Dec. 20 | 73½ | Jan. 2 | 95 | +22½ | 2,145,000 | | | | |
| 84 | 70% | Brisbane 6s, 1950..... | 101½ | Dec. 19 | 83 | Jan. 3 | 100½ | +17½ | 1,579,000 | | | | |
| 75 | 63½% | Brisbane 6s, 1958..... | 96½ | Dec. 20 | 73 | Jan. 2 | 95 | + 2½ | 1,692,000 | | | | |
| 35% | 24½ | Budapest 6s, 1962..... | 46½ | Mar. 13 | 31½ | Jan. 2 | 45½ | +14 | 950,000 | | | | |
| 42½% | 16 | Budap 6s, '62, unmat coup on..... | 32½ | Dec. 31 | 24 | July 31 | 32½ | + ½ | 120,000 | | | | |
| 20% | Buenos Aires 6s, '61 (Prov.) | 72 | Dec. 14 | 30½ | Jan. 4 | 70 | + 3½ | 2,303,000 | | | | | |
| 39½% | 21 | Buenos Aires 6s, '61 (Prov.) | 63 | Dec. 21 | 26½ | Jan. 4 | 61½ | +35½ | 1,888,000 | | | | |
| 41½% | 21 | Buenos Aires 6s, '61 (Prov.) | 64½ | Dec. 20 | 27 | Jan. 4 | 61½ | +40 | 1,140,000 | | | | |
| 64 | 37 | Buenos Aires 6s, '55 (City) | 91 | Dec. 21 | 46½ | Jan. 9 | 88½ | +41 | 1,620,000 | | | | |
| 57½% | 36 | Buenos A 6s, April, '60 (City) | 83 | Oct. 17 | 47 | Jan. 23 | 83½ | +39½ | 228,000 | | | | |
| 64 | 34½ | Buenos A 6s, Oct. '60 (City) | 53½ | Dec. 14 | 45½ | Jan. 16 | 83½ | +41 | 116,000 | | | | |
| 23½% | 14 | Bulgaria 7s, '67 | 25 | Nov. 16 | 18 | Nov. 22 | 21 | + 1% | 426,000 | | | | |
| 27½% | 18% | Bulgaria 7½s, 1968, coups off | 26½ | Nov. 14 | 15½ | Nov. 22 | 19½ | - 7½ | 161,000 | | | | |
| | | Bulgaria 7½s, '68, coups off | 26½ | Oct. 24 | 17½ | Aug. 30 | 18½ | - 7½ | 242,000 | | | | |
| | | | 22½ | | 16½ | Aug. 11 | 19 | - 7½ | 151,000 | | | | |

| 1933 Range. High. Low. | | BOND. | | Range for Year 1934. High. Date. Low. Date. | | Last. Net Chge. | | Year Sales | |
|------------------------------|---|--|-------------------|---|-------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------|--|
| 24 | 100% | CALDAS 7% ^s , 1946. | 100% ^s | 18% Feb. 2 | 10% Jan. 2 | 2 | 14 + 3% | 834,000 | |
| 102% | 93% | Canada 4% ^s , 1936. | 105% | July 14 | 100% Jan. 3 | 3 | 103% + 2% | 2,373,000 | |
| 92% | 79% | Canada 4s, 1960. | 105% | Dec. 18 | 92 Jan. 8 | 105 | +13 | 2,636,000 | |
| 105% | 91% | Canada 5s, 1952. | 113 | Dec. 14 | 103% Jan. 2 | 112 | + 8% | 2,201,000 | |
| 86 | 64% | Carlsbad 8s, 1954. | 80% | Feb. 7 | 56% Oct. 16 | 62% | - 6% | 249,000 | |
| 21% | 8% | Cauca Valley 7% ^s , 1946. | 19% | Feb. 5 | 10% July 26 | 14 | + 3 | 628,000 | |
| 17% | 5% | Chile 6s, 1960. | 17% | Sept. 21 | 7% Jan. 2 | 13% | + 6% | 3,685,000 | |
| 17% | 4% | Chile 6s, 1961. | 17% | Sept. 21 | 7 Jan. 2 | 13% | + 6% | 3,362,000 | |
| 17% | 4% | Chile 6s, 1961, Jan. | 17% | Sept. 21 | 7 Jan. 4 | 13% | + 6% | 2,377,000 | |
| 17% | 5% | Chile 6s, 1961, Sept. | 17% | Sept. 21 | 7% Jan. 4 | 14 | + 6% | 2,778,000 | |
| 17% | 5% | Chile 6s, 1962. | 17% | Sept. 22 | 7% Jan. 3 | 13% | + 6% | 2,106,000 | |
| 17% | 5% | Chile 6s, 1963. | 17% | Sept. 22 | 7% Jan. 3 | 13% | + 6% | 2,297,000 | |
| 21 | 5% | Chile 7s, 1942. | 18% | Sept. 22 | 7% July 24 | 16 | + 7% | 2,166,000 | |
| 17% | 6% | Chile Mtg Bank 6s, 1961. | 17% | Sept. 21 | 8% Jan. 2 | 12% | + 5% | 1,400,000 | |
| 16% | 6% | Chile Mtg Bank 6s, 1962. | 16% | Sept. 21 | 8 Jan. 2 | 12% | + 5% | 1,315,000 | |
| 18 | 7% | Chile Mtg Bank 6% ^s , 1957. | 17% | Sept. 22 | 9% Jan. 8 | 13 | + 5 | 1,125,000 | |
| 20% | 9% | Chile Mtg Bank 6% ^s , 1961. | 18% | Feb. 3 | 10 Jan. 4 | 14% | + 4% | 984,000 | |
| 15% | 4% | Chilean M L 7s, 1960. | 12% | Sept. 21 | 7 Jan. 5 | 9% | + 4% | 698,000 | |
| 30% | 12% | Chinese Rys 5s, 1951. | 44% | Dec. 28 | 27% Jan. 11 | 44% | + 19% | 396,000 | |
| 90 | 75 | Christiania 6s, 1954. | 99 | Nov. 24 | 81% Jan. 24 | 99 | + 23% | 236,000 | |
| 57% | 22% | Cologne 6% ^s , 1950. | 50 | Feb. 4 | 22 Oct. 3 | 27 | + 6% | 377,000 | |
| 49% | 16% | Colombia 6s, 1961, Jan. | 40% | Dec. 20 | 21 Jan. 21 | 38 | + 17 | 3,180,000 | |
| 49 | 16% | Colombia 6s, 1961, Oct. | 39% | Dec. 20 | 21% Jan. 2 | 37% | + 17% | 3,053,000 | |
| 36% | 17% | Col Ag Bank 6s, 1948. | 38 | Oct. 16 | 15% Jan. 8 | 36% | + 16% | 619,000 | |
| 28 | 17 | Col Ag Bk 6s '48, Apr cp ont | 33 | Sept. 3 | 22 Jan. 2 | 32% | + 16% | 15,000 | |
| 37% | 17% | Col Ag Bank 6s, 1947. | 35 | Nov. 19 | 27 Nov. 1 | 34 | - 17% | 115,000 | |
| 25 | 18% | Col A Bk 6s '47, Feb coup ont | 35 | Nov. 19 | 20 Jan. 11 | 33% | + 14% | 928,000 | |
| 36 | 14 | Col Mtg Bank 6% ^s , 1947. | 27 | Sept. 21 | 15 Jan. 2 | 23% | + 8% | 865,000 | |
| 37% | 12 | Col Mtg Bank 7s, 1946. | 26% | Sept. 20 | 15% Jan. 4 | 23% | + 8% | 629,000 | |
| 37% | 14 | Col Mtg Bank 7s, 1947. | 27% | Sept. 19 | 15 Jan. 2 | 23% | + 8% | 522,000 | |
| 69 | 55% | Copenhagen 4% ^s , 1953. | 59% | Dec. 14 | 59% Jan. 5 | 88% | + 28 | 2,477,000 | |
| 73% | 58% | Copenhagen 5s, 1952. | 95 | Dec. 13 | 63% Jan. 4 | 97% | + 26% | 2,355,000 | |
| 56 | 65% | Copenhagen Tel 5s, 1954. | 96% | Nov. 22 | 75% Jan. 9 | 96 | + 20 | 1,447,000 | |
| 23% | 10% | Cordoba 7s, 1942 (Prov.). | 78 | Dec. 29 | 25% Jan. 10 | 75 | + 40% | 2,110,000 | |
| 40 | 10% | Cordoba 7s, 1957, stpd. | 49% | Dec. 3 | 14% Jan. 8 | 47 | + 32 | 1,486,000 | |
| 40 | 24% | Cordoba 7s, 1937 (City). | 45 | Dec. 3 | 37% Nov. 3 | 43% | + 6% | 687,000 | |
| 30% | 23% | Costa Rica 7s, 1951, Nov. | 50% | Dec. 10 | 29% Mar. 2 | 50% | + 17% | 462,000 | |
| 23 | 14 | Costa Rica 7s, A, 1951, May. | 40% | Sept. 26 | 30 Jan. 6 | 40% | + 10% | 368,000 | |
| 90 | 61% | Cuba 4% ^s , 1949. | 28% | Nov. 16 | 18% Jan. 12 | 25 | + 5 | 421,000 | |
| 88% | 88% | Cuba 5s, 1904-44. | 89 | Oct. 23 | 62% Jan. 12 | 85 | + 21 | 686,000 | |
| 80 | 80 | Cuba 5s, 1914-49. | 99% | July 9 | 74% Jan. 4 | 96 | + 22% | 321,000 | |
| 89% | 89% | Cuba 5s, 1945. | 95% | May 17 | 93 Jan. 11 | 86% | + 2% | 211,000 | |
| 13% | 61% | Cuba 5s, 1953. | 41% | Jan. 25 | 22% Dec. 26 | 24% | + 3% | 2,002,000 | |
| 24% | 61% | Cuban 5s, 1953. | 84% | Apr. 6 | 61% Jan. 9 | 77 | + 8% | 1,982,000 | |
| 10 | 77% | Cundinamarca 6% ^s , 1959. | 18% | Feb. 6 | 10% July 16 | 14% | + 3% | 1,417,000 | |
| 0 | 77% | Czechoslovak 8s, 1951. | 101 | Mar. 15 | 88 Jan. 6 | 98% | + 13% | 1,562,000 | |
| 0 | 77% | Czechoslovak 8s, 1952. | 101 | Mar. 16 | 90 Jan. 10 | 97% | + 12% | 1,481,000 | |
| 7% | 58% | DENMARK 4% ^s , 1962. | 93% | Dec. 19 | 71 Jan. 2 | 93 | + 22 | 6,019,000 | |
| 69 | Denmark 5% ^s , 1955. | 99% | Dec. 15 | 83% Jan. 2 | 99% | + 15% | 4,062,000 | | |
| 75 | Denmark 6s, 1942. | 103 | Nov. 16 | 86% Jan. 2 | 102% | + 15% | 5,725,000 | | |
| 60 | Deutsche Bk 5% ^s , 1935, ctfs, stpd. | 77% | Mar. 13 | 48% Dec. 3 | 54 | - 16% | 461,000 | | |
| 40 | Dominican 1st 5% ^s , 1942. | 70 | Aug. 22 | 43% Jan. 4 | 65% | + 23% | 291,000 | | |
| 35% | Dominican 1st 5% ^s , 1940. | 67 | Aug. 17 | 36 Jan. 9 | 58% | + 22 | 168,000 | | |
| 35 | Dominican 2d 5% ^s , 1940. | 67 | Aug. 17 | 37 Jan. 3 | 58 | + 22 | 192,000 | | |
| 27 | Dresden 7s, 1945. | 58% | Mar. 9 | 31% Dec. 18 | 35 | - 10 | 376,000 | | |
| 31% | EL P, GERMANY, 6% ^s , '50. | 69% | Jan. 23 | 32 Nov. 21 | 35% | - 20% | 2,565,000 | | |
| 30 | EL Pow, Germany, 6% ^s , '53. | 69% | Jan. 23 | 32 Nov. 21 | 35% | - 19% | 2,229,000 | | |
| 26 | El Salvador 8s, 1948. | 65% | Nov. 5 | 48% Jan. 17 | 65% | + 23 | 219,000 | | |
| 32% | El Salvador 8s, 1948, ctfs. | 56% | Dec. 11 | 38 Jan. 4 | 56% | + 19% | 111,000 | | |
| 42% | Estonia 7s, 1967. | 58% | Mar. 19 | 57% Jan. 18 | 85 | + 27% | 128,000 | | |
| 93% | FIAT deb 7s, 1946. | 104% | Sep. 28 | 95 Dec. 19 | 95 | - 5% | 421,000 | | |
| 54 | Finland 5% ^s , 1958. | 100% | Nov. 23 | 76 Jan. 2 | 100% | + 24% | 1,982,000 | | |
| 58% | Finland 6s, 1945. | 105 | Nov. 16 | 79 Jan. 3 | 104 | + 24 | 1,871,000 | | |
| 57 | Finland 6s, 1956. | 103% | Nov. 15 | 78% Jan. 2 | 101% | + 20% | 1,492,000 | | |
| 59% | Finland 7s, 1950. | 102% | Oct. 26 | 86% Jan. 3 | 100% | + 13% | 1,588,000 | | |
| 55% | Finnish 6% ^s , A, 1954. | 101 | Dec. 6 | 77 Jan. 3 | 100% | + 25% | 904,000 | | |
| 55 | Finnish 6% ^s , B, 1954. | 101 | Dec. 6 | 77 Jan. 3 | 101% | + 25% | 872,000 | | |
| 94 | Frameric Ind 7% ^s , 1942. | 110 | May 19 | 102% Jan. 10 | 106% | + 5% | 291,000 | | |
| 113 | French Govt 7s, 1949. | 48 | Feb. 2 | 20 Sep. 15 | 25% | - 3% | 2,220,000 | | |
| 113 | French Govt 7s, 1941. | 18% | Aug. 18 | 12% Feb. 6 | 18% Feb. 7 | - 26% | 8,215,000 | | |
| 35% | GELSENKIRCHEN 6s, 1934. | 80 | Feb. 14 | 46% Sep. 13 | 64% | - 3% | 1,678,000 | | |
| 32% | German C Ag A 6s, '60, July. | 89 | Jan. 8 | 26 Sep. 6 | 6 | - 12 | 5,846,000 | | |
| 35% | German C Ag A 6s, '60, Oct. | 89 | Jan. 8 | 26% Sep. 5 | 5% | - 11% | 4,414,000 | | |
| 41 | German C Ag A 6s, 1938. | 70 | Jan. 8 | 27% Sep. 6 | 54 | - 7% | 2,493,000 | | |
| 26% | German Con Ag 6s, 1958. | 71% | Jan. 8 | 29% Sep. 14 | 55 | - 15% | 2,334,000 | | |
| 25 | German Gen Elec 6s, 1948. | 62% | Jan. 8 | 23% Sep. 15 | 40% | + 3 | 2,457,000 | | |
| 25% | German Gen Elec 7s, 1945. | 65 | Mar. 15 | 32% Sep. 11 | 40% | + 10% | 2,469,000 | | |
| 25% | German Gen Elec 6% ^s , 1940. | 63% | Jan. 9 | 32% Sep. 14 | 40 | - 10% | 2,009,000 | | |
| 35% | German Govt 5% ^s , 1955. | 67% | Feb. 3 | 23 Nov. 22 | 28% | - 26% | 2,208,000 | | |
| 37 | Good Hope Stl & I 7s, 1945. | 67% | Feb. 3 | 31% Oct. 6 | 41 | - 36% | 16,188,000 | | |
| 45 | Graz 8s, 1954. | 109 | Dec. 12 | 57% Jan. 3 | 105 | + 45% | 14,272,000 | | |
| 45 | Graz 8s, '54, unmat coup on | 86 | Nov. 30 | 62 Mar. 27 | 84 | - | 783,000 | | |
| 101% | Grt Britain & Irl 5% ^s , 1937. | 124% | Jan. 3 | 111% Feb. 6 | 114 | - 9 | 110,000 | | |
| 72% | Grt Britain & Irl 4% ^s , 1990. | 120% | Nov. 15 | 100 Feb. 12 | 118% | + 2% | 15,201,000 | | |
| 31 | Grt C El P Japan 7s, 1944. | 88% | Nov. 23 | 68% Jan. 26 | 87 | + 18% | 1,499,000 | | |
| 14% | Greece 6s, 1968. | 122 | Dec. 22 | 65% Jan. 26 | 79 | + 12% | 1,287,000 | | |
| 17 | Greek Gov 7s, 1964. | 122 | Dec. 17 | 12% Jan. 10 | 30% | + 10% | 366,000 | | |
| 38 | Greek Gov 7s, 1964. | 122 | Dec. 17 | 22 Jan. 15 | 38 | + 12% | 237,000 | | |
| 67 | HAITI 6s, 1952. | 84% | Dec. 11 | 74% Jan. 20 | 84 | + 8 | 429,000 | | |
| 25 | Hamburg St 6s, 1946. | 58% | Feb. 2 | 20% Sep. 15 | 26% | - 13% | 283,000 | | |
| 29 | Hansa S 6s, 1939. | 57% | June 7 | 32% Dec. 6 | 38 | - 7% | 206,000 | | |
| 23 | Heidelberg 7% ^s , 1950. | 44 | Feb. 1 | 15 Aug. 31 | 25% | - 6% | 261,000 | | |
| 47 | Heisingers 6% ^s , 1960. | 101% | Dec. 21 | 72% Jan. 2 | 101% | + 29% | 311,000 | | |
| 39 | Harp Min 6s, 1949, w. w. | 70% | May 29 | 36% Nov. 14 | 35 | - 13 | 432,000 | | |
| 17% | Holland-Am 6s, 1947. | 18% | Oct. 9 | 12% Dec. 19 | 12% | - 26% | 47,000 | | |
| 15% | Hung Con M 7% ^s , 1945. | 44% | Mar. 13 | 28% Jan. 5 | 39 | + 11 | 687,000 | | |
| | Hung Con M 7% ^s , '45, unmat coup on | 30 | Dec. 11 | 25 Apr. 25 | 30 | - | | | |
| 19 | Hung Con M 7s, 1946. | 45 | Mar. 10 | 30% Jan. 3 | 38 | + 7% | 142,000 | | |
| | Hung Con M 7s, 1946, unmat coup on | 30 | Dec. 10 | 25 Apr. 25 | 30 | - | 510,000 | | |
| 24 | Hung L M 7% ^s , A, 1961. | 50% | May 4 | 32% Jan. 11 | 45% | + 15% | 110,000 | | |
| 23% | Hung L M 7% ^s , B, 1961. | 50% | May 4 | 34% Jan. 3 | 46 | + 16% | 217,000 | | |
| 31% | Hungary 7% ^s , 1944. | 43 | Oct. 29 | 31% Jan. 9 | 42% | + 9% | 243,000 | | |
| 31% | Hungary 7% ^s , 44, Feb. coup on | 43 | Dec. 24 | 39% Oct. 30 | 42% | - | 281,000 | | |
| 26% | ILSEDER STL 6s, 1948. | 59% | Jan. 22 | 34% Oct. 10 | 37% | - 15% | 317,000 | | |
| 76% | Irish Free St 5s, 1960. | 116 | Jan. 15 | 108% Sep. 26 | 111 | - 5 | 411,000 | | |
| 89% | Ital Crd P W 7s, A, 1937. | 100 | Apr. 10 | 93% June 13 | 96 | + 1% | 2,688,000 | | |
| 82 | Ital Crd P W 7s, B, 1947. | 100 | Feb. 13 | 84% Dec. 28 | 84% | - 6% | 2,728,000 | | |
| 73 | Ital P U Crd 7s, 1952. | 103 | Feb. 13 | 76% June 20 | 81 | - 5 | 3,491,000 | | |
| 86 | Italy 7s, 1951. | 102 | Feb. 6 | 89% Sep. 19 | 91% | - 8% | 5,350,000 | | |
| 35% | JAPAN 5% ^s , 1965. | 86 | Apr. 17 | 73% Jan. 2 | 81% | + 7% | 4,324,000 | | |
| 45% | Japan 6% ^s , 1964. | 96% | Apr. 17 | 84% Sep. 5 | 95% | + 9% | 4,925,000 | | |
| 12 | Jugo Mtg Bk 7s, 1957. | 42% | May 2 | 23% July 2 | 38 | + 3% | 336,000 | | |
| | Jugo Mtg Bk 7s, '57, unmat coup on | 27 | Apr. 6 | 15% July 13 | 23 | - | 72,000 | | |
| | Jugo M Bk 7s, '57, Oct. coup on | 21 | Dec. 12 | 13% June 19 | 21 | - | 61,000 | | |
| 13% | KARSTADT 6s, 1943. | 36% | June 7 | 19 Jan. 2 | 30 | + 11% | 611,000 | | |
| 13 | Karstadst 6s, 1943, ct. | 32 | June 28 | 16% Feb. 2 | 30 | - | | | |
| 10 | Kreuger & Co 11% ^s , 1937. | 32 | June 28 | 16% Feb. 2 | 30 | - | | | |

Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 Range. | | Range for Year 1934. | | | | | | | 1933 Range. | | Range for Year 1934. | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|-------------|---------------|---------|--|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----------|
| High. | Low. | BOND. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | High. | Low. | BOND. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | |
| 64 | 29% | LEIPZIG 7s, 1947. | ↑ 65% | May 31 | 30% | Sep. 17 | 37% | + 3% | 659,000 | 50% | 24% | Silesian Bk 6s, 1947. | ↑ 69 | Jan. 25 | 33 | Sep. 6 | 50% + 1/4 | 470,000 | | |
| 92 | 74% | Lombard El 7s, 1952. | 98 | May 7 | 74 | Sep. 13 | 80 | - 11 | 241,000 | 59% | 26% | Silesia Elec 6 1/2s, 1946. | ↑ 68% | Feb. 15 | 26 | Sep. 19 | 30 - 12% | 875,000 | | |
| 60% | 47% | Low Austria 7 1/2s, 1950. | ↑ 104 | Nov. 30 | 60 | Jan. 5 | 103 1/2 | + 50% | 816,000 | 52% | 40 | Silesia Prov 7s, 1958. | ↑ 71 | May 11 | 52 | Jan. 3 | 68 + 1/2 | 1,527,000 | | |
| .. | .. | Low Austria 7 1/2s, '50, unmat coup on. | .. | .. | 63 | Apr. 6 | 50 | Feb. 20 | 63 | .. | 154% | 100 | Soissons 6s, 1936 | ↑ 174% | Sep. 26 | 150 | Jan. 1 | 8 173% + 23% | 201,000 | |
| 54 | 42 | Low A Hy E 6 1/2s, 1944. | ↑ 97% | Dec. 5 | 51 | Jan. 3 | 95% | + 44 | 892,000 | .. | .. | Styrax 7s, 1946. | ↑ 95% | Dec. 6 | 55 | Jan. 1 | 92% + 39 | 275,000 | | |
| 23 | 7% | MEDELLIN 6 1/2s, 1954. | .. | 16% | Feb. 5 | 84 | July 31 | 10% + 2 1/2 | 221,000 | .. | 82 1/4 | Sydney 5 1/2s, 1955. | ↑ 100 | Dec. 29 | 80 | Jan. 2 | 99% + 20% | 1,591,000 | | |
| 120% | 87 | Merid Elec 7s, A, 1957. | .. | 116 | Mar. 19 | 91% | July 13 | 94% + 3% | 293,000 | 69% | 33% | TAIWAN EL 5 1/2s, 1971. | ↑ 75 | Dec. 3 | 61 | Jan. 2 | 74% + 13 | 1,460,000 | | |
| 81 | 65% | Met Water 5 1/2s, 1950. | .. | 99% | Dec. 6 | 80 | Jan. 1 | 99% + 20% | 660,000 | 61 | 41 | Toho El Pow 7s, 1955. | ↑ 95% | July 31 | 80 | Jan. 2 | 89% + 9 1/2 | 602,000 | | |
| 6 1/2 | 2% | Mex Irr 4 1/2s, 1943, asst. | .. | 9% | Oct. 18 | 4% | Jan. 19 | 7% + 4 1/2 | 128,000 | 74 | 26 | Tokio 5s, 1952. | ↑ 73% | Jan. 2 | 65 | Sep. 4 | 72% + 1/2 | 914,000 | | |
| 6% | 4 | Mex Irr 4 1/2s, 1943. | .. | 5% | Aug. 31 | 5% | Aug. 15 | 5% | 10,000 | 73 | 33% | Tokio 5s, 1961. | .. | 77 | Dec. 5 | 61 | Sep. 12 | 75 + 13% | 1,887,000 | |
| 10% | 3% | Mexico 5s, 1945. | .. | 13 | Oct. 19 | 6% | June 26 | 9% + 3 | 182,000 | 68 | 30 | Tokio 7s, 1947. | ↑ 79% | Nov. 14 | 63% | Jan. 26 | 76% + 12% | 5,346,000 | | |
| 3% | 3% | Mexico 5s, 1945, asst, sm'll. | .. | 10 | Sep. 19 | 6% | July 26 | 10% + 4% | 121,000 | 18 | .. | Tolima 7s, 1957. | ↑ 93% | Nov. 13 | 67 | Jan. 1 | 91 + 24% | 440,000 | | |
| 8% | 5% | Mexico 5s, 1945, asst 1. | .. | 13 | Oct. 19 | 7% | May 16 | 9% + 4% | 198,000 | 63 | 43% | Tyrol Hydro El 7s, 1952. | ↑ 83% | Dec. 5 | 45 | Jan. 3 | 83 + 38% | 466,000 | | |
| 7% | 2% | Mexico 4s, 1910-45, asst s. | .. | 9% | Sep. 19 | 4% | May 15 | 5% + 3% | 206,000 | 63 1/2 | 45% | Tyrol Hydro El 7s, 1955. | .. | 104 | Jan. 13 | 48 | Jan. 3 | 88 + 40% | 460,000 | |
| 8 | 2% | Mexico 4s, 1910-45, asst 1. | .. | 9% | Oct. 19 | 5% | May 24 | 5% + 1 1/2 | 128,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 8 | 2 1/2% | Mexico 4s, 1945, asst. | .. | 9% | Oct. 20 | 4% | Jan. 1 | 2% + 3% | 115,000 | 78 | 37% | UJIGAWA E P 7s, 1945. | .. | 89 | Nov. 21 | 73% | Jan. 2 | 87 + 13% | 770,000 | |
| .. | .. | Mexico 4s, 1945. | .. | 7% | Oct. 19 | 4% | July 12 | 7% + 3% | 28,000 | 95% | 75 | Unit S S Open 6s, 1937. | .. | 98 | Apr. 16 | 90% | Jan. 25 | 98 - 3 | 180,000 | |
| 10% | 3% | Mexico 6s, 1933, asst s. | .. | 11% | Oct. 18 | 5% | Aug. 2 | 8% + 2% | 49,500 | 59% | .. | Uni Stl Wk 6 1/2s, A, 1947. | .. | 67 | Jan. 24 | 23 | Sep. 10 | 35% - 15% | 2,961,000 | |
| 11% | 3% | Mexico 6s, 1933, asst 1. | .. | 11% | Feb. 26 | 8% | Jan. 8 | 11% + 4 | 47,000 | 60% | .. | Uni Stl Wk 6 1/2s, A, 1951. | .. | 66% | Jan. 22 | 26 | Sep. 10 | 35% + 17 | 3,318,000 | |
| 67% | 30 | Miaq Mill M 7s, 1956. | .. | 78 | Mar. 2 | 4% | Aug. 11 | 48 + 2 | 41,000 | 108% | .. | Unterelbe P L 6s, 1953. | .. | 125% | Dec. 6 | 107 | Jan. 1 | 119 + 12% | 190,000 | |
| 90 | 74 | Milan 6 1/2s, 1952. | .. | 51% | Feb. 14 | 79 | Sep. 12 | 83% + 2% | 3,560,000 | 66% | .. | Upper Austria 7s, 1945. | .. | 104 | Oct. 30 | 62 | Jan. 1 | 102 + 39% | 148,000 | |
| 36 | 12 | Minas Geraes 6 1/2s, 1958. | .. | 24 | Feb. 3 | 17 | Jan. 1 | 20% + 2% | 1,788,000 | 63 1/2 | 49 | Up Aus 7s, '45, unmat cp on. | .. | 82% | Dec. 29 | 70 | Dec. 22 | 82% + 4% | 4,000 | |
| .. | .. | Minas Geraes 6 1/2s, '58, Sept | .. | .. | 23 | Oct. 3 | 18% | Dec. 6 | 19% .. | 127,000 | 54 | 41 1/2 | Up Aus 6 1/2s, '57, unmat cp on. | .. | 70 | Oct. 25 | 70 | Oct. 25 | 70 + 4% | 190,000 |
| .. | .. | Minas Geraes 6 1/2s, '59, Sept | .. | .. | 22 1/2 | Oct. 10 | 18% | Dec. 20 | 19% + 2% | 219,000 | 40% | .. | Uruguay 6s, 1960. | .. | 44 | Sep. 20 | 27 | July 27 | 39% + 8% | 2,347,000 |
| 36 | 11% | Minas Geraes 6 1/2s, 1959. | .. | 24 1/2 | Oct. 7 | 17 | June 12 | 19% + 2 1/2 | 1,626,000 | 40% | .. | Uruguay 6s, 1964. | .. | 44 | Sep. 20 | 29 | Jan. 8 | 39% + 7% | 901,000 | |
| 99 | 87 | Montecantini 7s, 1937. | .. | 98 1/2 | Feb. 23 | 89% | Dec. 31 | 89% - 8 1/2 | 1,420,000 | 50% | 21 1/2 | .. | Uruguay 8s, 1946. | .. | 46 | Feb. 3 | 34 1/2 | Jan. 10 | 45 + 9 | 530,000 |
| 42% | 12% | Montevideo 7s, 1952. | .. | 45 | Nov. 17 | 27 | Jan. 9 | 41% + 4 | 1,215,000 | .. | .. | YOKOHAMA 6s, 1961. | .. | 82 | Dec. 31 | 66 | Feb. 15 | 81% + 16% | 1,248,000 | |
| 33% | 11 | Montevideo 6s, 1959. | .. | 36 1/2 | Dec. 21 | 28 1/2 | Jan. 9 | 36% + 9% | 1,321,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 88% | 71% | N S WALES 5s, 1957. | 101% | Dec. 20 | 85 | Jan. 4 | 100% | + 14% | 3,529,000 | 68% | 94% | VENET MG B 7s, 1952. | .. | 109 | Jan. 4 | 89% | Oct. 7 | 89% - 20% | 160,000 | |
| 88% | 71 | N S Wales 5s, 1958. | 101 | Dec. 19 | 85 1/2 | Jan. 5 | 100 | + 14 | 4,304,000 | .. | .. | Vienna 6s, 1952. | .. | 99% | Dec. 21 | 58 | Jan. 2 | 99% + 44% | 1,148,000 | |
| 134% | 98% | Nord Rys 6 1/2s, 1950. | 171% | June 26 | 128 | Jan. 2 | 167% | + 42% | 1,871,000 | 48% | 45 | Vienna 6s, 1952, unmat cp on. | .. | 82% | Dec. 14 | 71% | Nov. 21 | 82% .. | 28,000 | |
| 60 | 28% | Nor Ger Lloyd 6s, 1947. | .. | 73 | Apr. 6 | 45 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 62 + 18 | 2,562,000 | 52 1/2 | 35 | WARSAW 7s, 1958. | .. | 68% | Mar. 7 | 53 | Jan. 3 | 65 + 13 | 1,771,000 | |
| .. | .. | Nor Ger Lloyd 6s, 1947, new. | .. | 49 | Aug. 18 | 36% | Dec. 4 | 43% .. | 428,000 | 57 1/2 | 66 | Westphal El P 6s, '53. | .. | 68% | Mar. 10 | 53 | Jan. 20 | 34% - 11% | 4,251,000 | |
| 92% | 73 | Norway 5s, 1963. | .. | 98 | Dec. 29 | 80% | Jan. 2 | 98 + 17 | 2,227,000 | .. | .. | Wuert' mb'g El 7s, '56. | .. | 60 | Feb. 14 | 33 | Dec. 26 | 33% - 10% | 678,000 | |
| 94% | 75 | Norway 6s, 1963. | .. | 100 | Nov. 15 | 93% | Jan. 2 | 99 + 17 | 3,146,000 | 74 | 35% | YOKOHAMA 6s, 1961. | .. | 82 | Dec. 31 | 66 | Feb. 15 | 81% + 16% | 1,248,000 | |
| 98% | 81% | Norway 6s, 1944. | .. | 104% | Nov. 27 | 90% | Jan. 4 | 104% + 12 | 2,126,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 98% | 81% | Norway 6s, 1952. | .. | 102 | Oct. 10 | 89% | Jan. 2 | 101 + 12% | 2,167,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 81% | 63% | Nor Hy El 5 1/2s, 1937. | .. | 50 | Jan. 15 | 77% | Sep. 8 | 88 + 11 | 1,263,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 81% | 63% | Pto Aleg 7 1/2s, 1966. | .. | 25 | Oct. | 21 | Sep. 21 | 83% + 21% | 967,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 88% | 84% | Pirelli 7s, 1952. | 105 1/2 | Dec. 6 | 100 | June 27 | 104% | + 3 | 216,000 | 99% | 80 | ABRAH'M & STR 5 1/2s, 1943. | 105% | Nov. 28 | 93 | Jan. 5 | 103% + 10 | \$1,074,000 | | |
| 62% | 52% | Poland 6s, 1940. | 79 | May 15 | 59 | Jan. 3 | 73% + 13% | 2,245,000 | 89% | 75 | Adams Express 4s, 1948. | .. | 89 | Dec. 16 | 62 | Jan. 2 | 86 + 25 | 622,000 | | |
| 52% | 52% | Poland 7s, 1947. | .. | 133% | Oct. 18 | 88 | Jan. 2 | 114% + 26% | 2,637,000 | 90% | .. | Alabama Gt South 4s, 1943. | 104% | Aug. 31 | 94 | Jan. 18 | 103 + 17 | 61,000 | | |
| 51% | 51% | Poland 8s, 1950. | 90 | May 9 | 69 | Jan. 3 | 89 + 19% | 2,143,000 | 77 1/2 | 62 | Alabama Gt Ss gtd 3 1/2s, 1946. | 106% | Dec. 24 | 85 | Jan. 13 | 97% + 10% | 193,000 | | | |
| 74% | 59 | Pernambuco 7s, 1947. | .. | 18 1/2 | Oct. 1 | 11 | 10% | Jan. 9 | 16% + 7 1/2 | 342,000 | 89 | Albany Pen W P 6s, 1948. | .. | 70 | Aug. 23 | 53 | Jan. 13 | 64% + 8 1/2 | 354,000 | |
| 30% | 21 | Pernambuco 7s, 1947, Sept cp off | .. | 17 1/2 | Sep. 1 | 15 | Dec. 29 | 15% + 5% | 78,000 | 85 | Albany Pen W P 6s, 1948. | .. | 89 | Dec. 31 | 51 | Jan. 13 | 75% + 21 1/2 | 7,886,000 | | |
| 14% | 3% | Peru 6s, 1960. | .. | 14 | Feb. 16 | 5% | Jan. 2 | 9 + 2% | 3,425,000 | 60 | Allegany Corp 5s, 1949. | .. | 89 | Dec. 17 | 50 | Jan. 1 | 94% + 13% | 5,594,000 | | |
| 14% | 3% | Peru 6s, 1961. | .. | 14 | Feb. 17 | 6% | Jan. 2 | 9% + 1% | 3,320,000 | 58 1/2 | .. | Allegany Corp 5s, 1950. | .. | 89 | Dec. 18 | 50 | Jan. 1 | 94% + 20% | 1,065,000 | |
| 16% | 6 | Peru 7s, 1959. | .. | 17 1/2 | Sep. 21 | 8 | Sep. 21 | 8% + 5% | 2,119,000 | 60 | Allegany Corp 5s, 1950, 50, cft's, 15 1/2% | .. | 89 | Dec. 19 | 50 | Jan. 1 | 94% + 21 1/2 | 1,065,000 | | |
| 102% | 21 | Pirelli 7s, 1952. | 105 1/2 | Dec. 6 | 100 | June 27 | 104% | + 3 | 216,000 | 60 | Allegany Corp 5s, 1950, 50, cft's, 15 1/2% | .. | 89 | Dec. 20 | 50 | Jan. 1 | 94% + 21 1/2 | 1,065,000 | | |
| 21 | 21 | Pirelli 7s, 1955. | .. | 123 1/2 | Jan. 4 | 5 | 157% | + 42% | 1,886,000 | 60 | Allegany Corp 5s, 1950, 50, cft's, 15 1/2% | .. | 89 | Dec. 21 | 50 | Jan. 1 | 94% + 21 1/2 | 1,065,000 | | |
| 14% | 3% | Pernambuco 7s, 1947. | .. | 18 | Mar. 2 | 9 | 10% | Jan. 1 | 16% + 7 1/2 | 342,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 14% | 3% | Pernambuco 7s, 1947, Sept cp off | .. | 17 1/2 | Sep. 1 | 15 | Dec. 29 | 15% + 5% | 78,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 14% | 3% | Pto Aleg 7 1/2s, 1961, June cp off | .. | 25 | Oct. | 21 | Sep. 21 | 19% + 4% | 96,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 30% | 30% | Pto Aleg 8s, 1961, June cp off | .. | 23 | Sep. 20 | 21 | Sep. 20 | 20% + 4% | 740,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| 99% | 77% | Prague (Greater) 7s, 1952. | 100% | Dec. 20 | 29 | Jan. 3 | 100% | + 17% | 215,000 | 107 1/2 | 99 | Prague (Greater) 7s, 1952. | .. | 107% | May 31 | 102 | Dec. 20 | 102% + 4% | 4,297,000 | |
| 63% | 28% | Prussia 6 1/2s, 1951. | .. | 58% | Feb. 2 | 24 1/2 | Sep. 12 | 28% + 15% | 2,164,000 | 109 1/2 | 99 | Prussia 6 1/2s, 1951. | .. | 107% | May 31 | 102 | Dec. 20 | 102% + 4% | 4,297,000 | |
| 63% | 28% | Prussia 6s, 1952. | .. | 57 1/2 | Feb. 2 | 23 | Sep. 12 | 27% + 15% | 2,889,000 | 107 1/2 | 93 | Prussia 6s, 1952. | .. | 107% | May 31 | 102 | Dec. 20 | 102% + 4% | 4,297,000 | |
| 95 | 78 | QUEENSLAND 6s, 1947. | 107 1/2 | Dec. 18 | 94 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 106 | + 12 | 2,251,000 | 107 1/2 | 92 | Prussia 6s, 1952. | .. | 107% | May 31 | 1 | | | | |

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Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 Range— | | | | | | | | | | | | 1934 Range— | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|------|------------------------|-----------|-------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|--------|------------|---------|-------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--|
| High. | Low. | BOND. | | High. | Low. | Date. | Range | Net | Year's | High. | Low. | BOND. | | High. | Low. | Date. | Range | Net | Year's | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | Sales. | | | | | | | | | | Sales. | | | | |
| 93 | 53 | Boston & Me 5s. | 1967 | 90% | Apr. 12 | 64% | Nov. 13 | 74% | + 2% | 4,183,000 | 20% | 15 | Chi, R I & P 4½s, '52, cts. | 28 | Apr. 10 | 15 | Nov. 23 | 16 | — 4 | 332,000 | | | |
| 78% | 48 | Bost & Me 4½s. | J. 1961 | 84% | Apr. 13 | 60% | Nov. 15 | 70% | + 2% | 2,546,000 | 28 | 6 | Chi, R I & P 4½s, '60, cts. | 18 | Feb. 19 | 15% | Dec. 27 | 6% | + 3 | 5,108,000 | | | |
| 83% | 54% | Bost & Me 5s. | 1955 | 90 | Apr. 11 | 65% | Nov. 5 | 74 | + 2 | 2,470,000 | — | — | C, R I & P 4½s, '60, cts. | 15 | Feb. 10 | 15 | Feb. 10 | 15 | — | 1,000 | | | |
| 68% | 50 | Bost & N Y A L 4s. | 1955 | 73% | Feb. 21 | 37 | Dec. 28 | 39 | + 13% | 840,000 | 72% | 46 | C, St L & N O Memphis 4s, '51 | 86% | Apr. 16 | 63% | Jan. 5 | 81% | + 20% | 278,000 | | | |
| 27% | 5 | Bot Cons M 6½s. | 1934 | 18 | 25 | Apr. 28 | 94% | Oct. 27 | 13 | + 1 | 711,000 | 73% | 36 | Chi, T H & S 1st 5s. | 1960 | 80 | Apr. 13 | 45 | Nov. 17 | 53% | + 1% | 1,066,000 | |
| 20% | 4% | Bot Cons M 6½s. | 1934 | ctfs. | 20 | 28 | 75% Aug. 24 | 10 | + 14% | 298,000 | 64% | 14% | Chi, T H & S inc 5s. | 1960 | 62 | Apr. 17 | 25% | Nov. 23 | 32 | + 12 | 1,273,000 | | |
| — | — | Bow Bilt Hot A 5s. | 1943 | 34 | stp. | 41 | Dec. 20 | 45% | + 2% | 2,000 | 102 | 91 | Chi Un Station 4½s, A. | 1963 | 108% | Nov. 1 | 100% | Jan. 8 | 108% | + 8% | 1,980,000 | | |
| 11 | 2% | Bwy 7th Av 5s. | 1943 | 18 | 10% | Sep. 18 | 95% | Jan. 15 | 97% | + 2% | 88,000 | 106% | 95 | Chi Un Station 5s, B. | 1963 | 110% | Nov. 2 | 105% | Jan. 6 | 110 | + 4% | 510,000 | |
| 76 | 65% | Bklyn City R R 5s. | 1941 | 89% | Dec. 8 | 72 | Jan. 11 | 89 | + 16 | 366,000 | 103% | 92 | Chicago Un Station 5s. | 1944 | 108% | Nov. 2 | 97% | Jan. 2 | 107 | + 10 | 949,000 | | |
| 108 | 100% | Bklyn Edis 5s. | A. 1949 | 110% | Dec. 12 | 105% | Jan. 18 | 109 | + 2% | 1,039,000 | 114 | 103% | Chi Un Station 6½s, C. | 1963 | 115% | Nov. 16 | 111% | Jan. 12 | 113% | + 1% | 2,286,000 | | |
| 108 | 100 | Bklyn Edis 5s. | E. 1952 | 110% | Dec. 21 | 21 | 105% | Jan. 5 | 108% | 1,690,000 | 80% | 59% | Chicago & W I cons 4s. | 1952 | 93 | July 12 | 72% | Jan. 2 | 91% | + 19% | 6,847,000 | | |
| 96% | 84% | Bklyn M T 6s. | A. 1968 | 104% | Nov. 26 | 93% | Jan. 6 | 104% | + 11% | 12,924,000 | 95 | 66% | Chi & W I 5½s. | 1962 | 104% | June 19 | 84% | Jan. 8 | 102% | + 16% | 2,438,000 | | |
| 60 | 57 | Bklyn Q C & C cons 5s. | 1951 | 67 | June 15 | 52% | Nov. 20 | 56% | + 24 | 41,000 | 55% | 25 | Childs Co 5s. | 1943 | 65 | Feb. 17 | 41 | July 27 | 62 | + 19 | 2,400,000 | | |
| — | — | Bklyn Q C & S 1st 5s. | 1950 | 67 | July 18 | 57% | Feb. 18 | 63 | + 13 | 11,000 | 71% | 27 | Chile Cop deb 5s. | 1947 | 87 | July 12 | 56 | Jan. 2 | 79 | + 23 | 5,181,000 | | |
| 87 | 72% | Bklyn Un El 5s. | 1950 | 101 | 29 | 75% | Jan. 4 | 101 | + 25 | 2,011,000 | 63 | 40 | Choc, Ok & G cons 5s. | 1952 | 62 | Mar. 15 | 36 | Dec. 5 | 37 | + 7 | 111,000 | | |
| 112 | 101% | Bklyn Un Gas 5s. | 1945 | 115% | Dec. 13 | 106% | Jan. 8 | 114% | + 7% | 819,000 | 100 | 87% | Cin, Gas, El 4s, A. | 1968 | 104% | Dec. 13 | 92 | Jan. 2 | 104 | + 12 | 2,789,000 | | |
| 117% | 105% | Bklyn Un Gas ref 6s. | 1947 | 123% | Dec. 19 | 110% | Jan. 2 | 123% | + 14% | 57,000 | 93 | 85 | Cin, H & D 24 4½s. | 1937 | 103% | Nov. 20 | 96 | Feb. 15 | 103% | + 10% | 125,000 | | |
| 158 | 158 | Bklyn Un gas 5½s. | 1936 | 158 | Feb. 6 | 158 | Feb. 6 | 158 | + 0% | 9,000 | 99% | 92 | Cin, I, St L & C 4s. | 1936 | 104% | Oct. 13 | 99 | Jan. 12 | 103% | + 5% | 110,000 | | |
| 105 | 93 | Bklyn Un Gas 5s. | 1950 | 105% | July 13 | 98 | Jan. 2 | 103% | + 5% | 911,000 | 96 | 82 | Cin, Leb & N gtd 4s. | 1942 | 101 | Oct. 18 | 95 | Jan. 16 | 100% | + 14% | 19,000 | | |
| 107% | 97% | Bklyn Un Gas 5s. | B. 1957 | 110% | Dec. 5 | 50 | Jan. 10 | 108% | + 3% | 704,000 | 107 | 96% | Cin Un Term 5s. | 1957 | 114% | Dec. 27 | 104% | Jan. 9 | 113% | + 8% | 1,811,000 | | |
| 94% | 84% | Brun & West 4s. | 1938 | 101% | Dec. 27 | 87% | Jan. 10 | 101% | + 8% | 92,000 | 102 | 93 | Cin Un Term 4½s. | 2020 | 104% | Dec. 17 | 100% | Jan. 9 | 109% | + 8% | 859,000 | | |
| 105% | 96% | Buff Gen El 4½s. | B. 1981 | 106% | Dec. 19 | 99 | Jan. 5 | 104% | + 9% | 1,169,000 | 107% | 94% | Cin Un Term 5s. | 2020 | 112% | Nov. 26 | 104% | Jan. 10 | 127% | + 7% | 979,000 | | |
| 68 | 33% | B. R & P con 4½s. | 1957 | 80% | Apr. 17 | 58% | Sep. 18 | 68% | + 6% | 3,052,000 | 38 | 38 | Clear Bit Coal 4s. | 1940 | 65% | June 12 | 52% | June 11 | 65% | + 2% | 3,000 | | |
| 100% | 82 | C. R & P 5s. | 1937 | 106 | Dec. 1 | 97 | Jan. 4 | 105% | + 10% | 188,000 | 85 | 72 | Clear & M 1st 5s. | 1943 | 103% | June 22 | 56% | Mar. 1 | 100% | + 21% | 11,000 | | |
| 70% | 26% | Burr, C R & N col 5s. | 34. | 48% | Feb. 6 | 19 | Dec. 27 | 20 | + 14% | 189,000 | 85 | 70 | C. C. C & S L gen 4s. | 1938 | 99 | June 29 | 75% | Jan. 11 | 96% | + 22% | 832,000 | | |
| 35 | 29 | Burr, C R N col 5s. | 34, ctfs. | 40 | Apr. 11 | 20 | Dec. 19 | 20 | + 9 | 12,000 | 96 | 55 | C. C. C & S L ref 6s. | C. '41 | 100% | Aug. 2 | 80 | Jan. 10 | 98% | + 22% | 24,000 | | |
| 67% | 39 | Bush Ter 1st 4s. | 1952 | 78 | Dec. 29 | 50 | Apr. 24 | 78 | + 34% | 171,000 | 82 | 49 | C. C. C & S L ref 6s. | D. '63 | 91% | Apr. 17 | 74% | Jan. 15 | 83 | + 10 | 105,000 | | |
| 33% | 5 | Bush Ter cons 5s. | 1955 | 48 | Dec. 31 | 32 | Jan. 12 | 48 | + 32% | 1,305,000 | 82% | 47 | C. C. C & S L ref 4½s. | E. '77 | 82 | Mar. 17 | 64 | Jan. 8 | 73% | + 7% | 5,243,000 | | |
| 64% | 19 | Bush Ter 5s. | 1960 | 61 | Dec. 13 | 36% | Aug. 20 | 57% | + 11% | 709,000 | 77% | 37 | C. C. C & S L ref 4½s. | E. '77 | 82 | Mar. 17 | 64 | Jan. 8 | 73% | + 7% | 5,243,000 | | |
| 74% | 37 | By-Prod Coke 5½s. | 45% | 88 | Mar. 16 | 61% | Jan. 8 | 77% | + 14% | 494,000 | 95 | 85 | C. C. C & S L Cairo div 5s. | 1939 | 104% | June 19 | 92 | Jan. 3 | 104 | + 12 | 317,000 | | |
| 106% | 100 | CAL G & E ref 5s. | 37 | 108% | Nov. 16 | 103% | Jan. 12 | 107% | + 5% | 358,000 | 90 | 58 | C. C. C & S L C. W & E 4s. | 91 | 92 | July 12 | 68 | Jan. 12 | 87% | + 19% | 175,000 | | |
| 92% | 62% | Cal Pack 5s. | 1940 | 104% | Dec. 8 | 86% | Jan. 3 | 103% | + 17% | 2,353,000 | 93 | 85 | C. C. C & S L Sp & C div 4s. | 40 | 99 | Apr. 26 | 92 | Jan. 11 | 99 | + 10 | 16,000 | | |
| 100% | 84% | Cal Pet 5½s. | 1938 | 104% | July 1 | 99% | Jan. 2 | 103% | + 3% | 1,154,000 | 76 | 72 | C. C. C & S L W V Val 4s. | 1940 | 96 | Dec. 19 | 73% | Jan. 30 | 95 | + 21% | 60,000 | | |
| 97 | 81% | Cal Pet 5s. | 1939 | 103 | May 9 | 96% | Jan. 2 | 102% | + 5% | 668,000 | 99 | 97 | C. I. & M gtd 4s. | 1935 | 102% | Sept. 21 | 99% | Feb. 14 | 101 | + 2 | 31,000 | | |
| 97 | 78% | Canada Sou 5s. | A. 1932 | 109% | Aug. 8 | 92 | Jan. 9 | 109 | + 17 | 1,296,000 | 101% | 96 | Clev & Mtd 4s. | 1935 | 100% | July 19 | 82 | Jan. 2 | 90 | + 13% | 3,267,000 | | |
| 105% | 79% | Can Nat 4s. | 1951 | 115% | Dec. 17 | 100% | Feb. 2 | 113% | + 12% | 4,297,000 | 91 | 91 | Clev & Pitts 4½s. | A. 1942 | 101% | May 21 | 101% | May 21 | 101% | + 1% | 2,000 | | |
| 101 | 79% | Can Nat 4s. | 1954 | 106% | Aug. 13 | 98% | Jan. 2 | 103% | + 5 | 1,579,000 | 91 | 84 | Clev & Pitts 3½s. | C. 1948 | 101% | Oct. 23 | 101% | Oct. 23 | 101% | + 0% | 8,000 | | |
| 106 | 80% | Can Nat 4s. | 1956 | 114% | Dec. 17 | 100 | Feb. 3 | 114% | + 14% | 3,586,000 | 87 | 70 | Clev Short L 4½s. | 1961 | 104% | Dec. 24 | 82 | Jan. 18 | 104% | + 30% | 666,000 | | |
| 101% | 79% | Can Nat 4s. | 1957 | 114% | Dec. 17 | 98% | Feb. 2 | 113% | + 14% | 3,787,000 | 77 | 49% | Clev Un Term 4½s. | 1977 | 96 | July 25 | 75 | Jan. 8 | 90 | + 13% | 3,267,000 | | |
| 105% | 79% | Can Nat 4s. | 1968 | 109% | Nov. 9 | 99% | Feb. 2 | 104% | + 5% | 3,121,000 | 90 | 60% | Clev Un Term 5½s. | A. 1972 | 104% | June 21 | 84% | Jan. 2 | 101% | + 16% | 2,190,000 | | |
| 108% | 84% | Can Nat 5s. | 1955 | 105% | Dec. 17 | 105 | Jan. 19 | 117 | + 11% | 2,857,000 | 71 | 54 | Clev Un Term 5s. | B. 1973 | 100% | July 19 | 82 | Jan. 2 | 96% | + 14 | | | |

Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| Range for Year 1934. | | | | | | | | | | Range for Year 1934. | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|--------|--------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|---------------|
| High. | Low. | BOND. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | High. | Low. | BOND. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. |
| 21 1/4 | 3 1/4 | Fla E C Ry 5s, 1974. | * 19 | Feb. 16 | 6 1/2 | July 28 | 11 1/2 | + 1/4 | 2,891,000 | 93 | 7 1/4 | Ky Cent 4s, 1987. | 106 | Dec. 28 | 90 1/2 | Jan. 5 | 106 | + 16 | 215,000 |
| 21 | 2 | Fla E C Ry 5s, 1974, cts. | * 17 1/2 | Feb. 16 | 5 1/2 | Sep. 18 | 11 1/2 | + 1/4 | 1,924,000 | 75 | 57 | Ky & I Term 4 1/2s, '61. | 95 1/2 | July 9 | 80 | Feb. 2 | 95 | + 20 | 78,000 |
| 11 1/2 | 3 1/2 | Fonda, J&G 4 1/2s, '52, filed. | * 15 | Apr. 30 | 7 | Aug. 17 | 7 | + 1/2 | 28,000 | .. | .. | Ky & I Term 4 1/2s, '61, plain. | 99 | Oct. 26 | 93 | June 5 | 97 | + 8 | 15,000 |
| 8 | 2 1/2 | Fonda, J&G 4s, 1982, filed. | * 3 | Sep. 15 | 2 | Oct. 31 | 3 1/2 | + 1/2 | 18,000 | .. | .. | Ky & I Term 4 1/2s, '61. | 92 | July 11 | 73 | Jan. 12 | 91 | + 7 | 81,000 |
| 99 | 88 | Ft S Un Dep 4 1/2s, 1941. | 100 | Nov. 16 | 83 | Feb. 14 | 100 | + 13 | 49,000 | 108 | 101 | Kings Co E L & P 5s, 1937. | 108 1/2 | July 18 | 104 | Jan. 2 | 108 1/2 | + 4 1/2 | 144,000 |
| 53 | 10 1/2 | Ft W & Den C 5 1/2s, 1961. | 105 1/2 | Dec. 26 | 96 1/4 | Jan. 3 | 105 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 58,000 | 135 | 115 1/2 | Kings Co E L & P pur mon 6s, 1997. | 145 | July 20 | 122 | Jan. 4 | 145 | + 23 1/2 | 198,000 |
| .. | .. | Fran Sug 7 1/2s, 1942. | * 41 | Feb. 9 | 16 1/2 | Nov. 14 | 25 1/2 | + 5 1/2 | 399,000 | 77 1/2 | 66 | Kings Co Elev 4s, 1949. | 95 1/2 | July 24 | 75 | Jan. 11 | 94 | + 19 | 2,494,000 |
| 80 | 66 | GALVESTON H&H 5 1/2s, '38. | 91 1/2 | Apr. 25 | 72 | Dec. 19 | 81 | + 23 | 97,000 | 96 | 99 | Kings Co L 1st ref 5 1/2s, 1954. | 111 | Dec. 5 | 103 1/2 | Feb. 5 | 111 | + 7 1/2 | 56,000 |
| 105 | 103 | Gannett 6s, 1943. | 101 1/2 | Dec. 6 | 79 1/4 | Jan. 16 | 101 1/2 | + 24 1/2 | 413,000 | 98 1/2 | 99 | Kings Co L 1st ref 5 1/2s, 1954. | 120 | Mar. 15 | 108 | Jan. 4 | 119 1/2 | + 12 1/2 | 78,000 |
| 87 | 73 1/2 | Gas & El Berg 5s, 1949. | 112 | Sep. 28 | 104 | Feb. 8 | 112 | + 8 1/2 | 11,000 | .. | .. | Kinney (G R) 7 1/2s, 1936. | 106 | Oct. 15 | 81 1/2 | Jan. 18 | 95 1/2 | + 18 1/2 | 125,000 |
| 103 1/2 | 97 | Gen Am Inv 5s, 1952. | 100 | Dec. 20 | 79 1/2 | Jan. 3 | 98 1/2 | + 18 1/2 | 2,012,000 | 101 1/2 | 75 | LACk S 1st 5s, A, 1950. | 108 1/2 | July 14 | 97 | Jan. 5 | 104 | + 11 1/2 | 867,000 |
| 75 1/2 | 66 | Gen Baking 5 1/2s, 1940. | 105 1/2 | Apr. 16 | 102 | Jan. 5 | 102 1/2 | + 1/2 | 228,000 | 97 1/2 | 79 1/2 | Laclede Gas 5 1/2s, C, 1953. | 69 1/2 | Apr. 23 | 50 | Jan. 10 | 63 | + 11 1/2 | 2,137,000 |
| 102 1/2 | 96 | Gen Cable 5 1/2s, 1947. | 89 1/2 | Dec. 17 | 59 | Jan. 2 | 87 1/2 | + 28 | 2,106,000 | 70 | 46 1/2 | Laclede Gas 5 1/2s, D, 1960. | 69 1/2 | Apr. 23 | 50 | Jan. 9 | 63 | + 16 1/2 | 1,114,000 |
| 105 | 104 | Gen Pet 5s, 1940. | 105 1/2 | Dec. 6 | 100 | Jan. 6 | 105 1/2 | + 5 1/2 | 155,000 | .. | .. | L Erie & W 1st 5s, 1937. | 102 1/2 | Dec. 13 | 83 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 102 | + 25 | 878,000 |
| 85 | 47 | Gen St C 5 1/2s, 1949. | 90 | July 20 | 68 1/2 | Jan. 4 | 89 | + 20 1/2 | 2,804,000 | 69 | 46 | L Erie & W 2d 5s, 1941. | 95 | Apr. 25 | 50 | Jan. 13 | 93 | + 32 | 196,000 |
| 89 | 71 1/2 | Gen Pub Svc 5 1/2s, 1939. | 95 1/2 | July 12 | 76 | Jan. 8 | 93 | + 14 | 593,000 | 93 | 58 | Lake S & M 5 1/2s, 1997. | 98 | June 9 | 81 | Jan. 5 | 97 1/2 | + 15 1/2 | 1,893,000 |
| 94 1/2 | 1 | Gen Thea Eq 6s, 1940. | 11 1/2 | Feb. 19 | 3 1/2 | Jan. 5 | 9 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 7,607,000 | 78 1/2 | 55 | Lautario Nit 6s, 1954. | * 19 | Apr. 9 | 5 1/2 | Jan. 4 | 94 | + 3 1/2 | 14,447,000 |
| 73 1/2 | 68 | Goodly T & R 5s, 1957. | 105 | Dec. 31 | 89 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 105 | + 15 | 14,265,000 | 55 | 21 1/2 | Leh C & N 4 1/2s, A, 1954. | 102 1/2 | Dec. 21 | 81 | Jan. 5 | 102 | + 24 1/2 | 510,000 |
| 27 | 5 1/2 | Ga. & Als 5s 1945. | * 26 | Feb. 14 | 14 1/2 | Aug. 15 | 17 1/2 | + 3 1/2 | 145,000 | 91 1/2 | 77 1/2 | Leh C & N 4 1/2s, C, 1954. | 102 | Nov. 27 | 80 | Jan. 3 | 102 | + 22 | 310,000 |
| 26 1/2 | 18 | Ga. C & N 1st 6s, '34. | * 30 | July 30 | 20 1/2 | Jan. 12 | 24 | + 3 1/2 | 43,000 | 91 | 57 | Leh Val Coal 6s, 1938. | 97 | Apr. 30 | 81 1/2 | Jan. 9 | 95 1/2 | + 14 | 238,000 |
| 50 | 23 1/2 | Ga. Mid Ry 1st 3s. | 60 | Apr. 27 | 12 | Jan. 12 | 48 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 154,000 | 82 | 57 | Leh Val Coal 6s, 1964. | 71 1/2 | Dec. 20 | 42 1/2 | Jan. 19 | 70 | + 30 | 125,000 |
| 75 1/2 | 33 1/2 | Goodrich 6s, 1945. | 94 1/2 | Dec. 31 | 72 | Jan. 9 | 94 1/2 | + 20 1/2 | 9,626,000 | 55 | 20 | Leh Val Coal 5s, 1954. | 71 1/2 | Dec. 18 | 40 | Jan. 4 | 71 | + 31 | 158,000 |
| 97 | 62 | Goodrich 6 1/2s, 1947. | 109 | Dec. 31 | 95 | Jan. 20 | 109 | + 15 | 5,470,000 | 55 | 18 1/2 | Leh Val Coal os, 1974. | 71 1/2 | Dec. 18 | 40 | Jan. 9 | 70 | + 30 | 190,000 |
| 91 1/2 | 68 | Goddoy T & R 5s, 1957. | 105 | Dec. 31 | 89 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 105 | + 15 | 14,265,000 | 50 | 45 | Leh Val Coal 5s, 1944. | 91 | Jan. 30 | 79 1/2 | Jan. 3 | 90 1/2 | + 13 1/2 | 180,000 |
| 90 | 74 1/2 | Gotham S 6s, 1936. | 97 1/2 | Dec. 19 | 95 1/2 | July 16 | 96 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 228,000 | 50 | 46 | Leh Val Har 5s, 1954. | 103 1/2 | July 16 | 82 1/2 | Jan. 3 | 101 1/2 | + 22 1/2 | 596,000 |
| 20 | 4 1/2 | Gould Coup 6s, 1940. | * 22 | Oct. 11 | 87 1/2 | Jan. 11 | 182 1/2 | + 10 1/2 | 884,000 | 90 | 79 | Leh Val N Y gd 4 1/2s, 1940. | 100 1/2 | July 24 | 83 1/2 | Jan. 12 | 98 1/2 | + 19 | 731,000 |
| 96 1/2 | 84 | Gr R & in ext 4 1/2s, 1941. | 104 1/2 | Aug. 1 | 102 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 106 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 3,078,000 | 62 | 25 | L V (Pa) cons 4s, 2003. | 68 | Apr. 13 | 40 1/2 | Nov. 22 | 47 1/2 | + 1/2 | 3,952,000 |
| 106 1/2 | 96 1/2 | Gr Trunk of Can 7s, 1940. | 109 | Mar. 22 | 105 | Jan. 2 | 106 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 3,078,000 | 64 1/2 | 25 | L V (Pa) cons 4 1/2s, 2003. | 74 1/2 | Apr. 17 | 45 | Nov. 21 | 51 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 1,032,000 |
| 104 1/2 | 90 1/2 | Gr Trunk 6s, 1936. | 109 | July 19 | 102 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 106 1/2 | + 4 1/2 | 2,881,000 | 64 1/2 | 20 | Leh Val Coal os, 1974. | 83 | Apr. 20 | 47 1/2 | Nov. 22 | 57 | 1,402,000 | |
| 87 | 66 1/2 | Gt N Ry ref 4 1/2s, A, 1961. | 100 | Dec. 20 | 78 | Jan. 2 | 92 1/2 | + 5 1/2 | 13,865,000 | 68 1/2 | 20 | Leh Val Coal 5s, 1944. | 91 | Jan. 30 | 79 1/2 | Jan. 3 | 90 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 2,224,000 |
| 83 1/2 | 39 | Gt N Ry ref 4 1/2s, B, 1952. | 99 | Apr. 12 | 75 1/2 | Jan. 25 | 86 | + 2,000 | 100 1/2 | 80 | Leh & N Y 1st 4s, 1945. | 83 | Apr. 21 | 57 | Jan. 2 | 70 1/2 | + 15 1/2 | 386,000 | |
| 77 1/2 | 40 1/2 | Gt N Ry gen 5s, C, 1973. | 92 1/2 | Apr. 27 | 68 1/2 | Jan. 8 | 82 1/2 | + 11 1/2 | 2,784,000 | 102 1/2 | 17 | Liggett & My 7s, 1944. | 113 | Dec. 27 | 119 1/2 | Jan. 5 | 121 | + 11 1/2 | 1,129,000 |
| 74 | 37 | Gt N Ry gen 4 1/2s, E, 1977. | 86 1/2 | Apr. 13 | 64 1/2 | Jan. 13 | 76 | + 6 1/2 | 6,009,000 | 117 | 102 | Liggett & My 5s, 1951. | 119 | Dec. 19 | 106 | Jan. 4 | 118 | + 12 | 1,069,000 |
| 74 | 34 | Gt N Ry gen 4 1/2s, E, 1977. | 86 1/2 | Apr. 13 | 64 1/2 | Jan. 13 | 76 | + 6 1/2 | 6,009,000 | 117 | 102 | Little Miami 4s, 1962. | 100 1/2 | June 20 | 95 | Jan. 4 | 100 1/2 | + 18 1/2 | 2,528,000 |
| 32 | 29 | Green Bay deb ctfs, A. | * 38 | July 23 | 26 | Feb. 15 | 38 1/2 | + 8 1/2 | 7,000 | 89 | 48 | Loew's 6s, 1941. | 105 1/2 | Dec. 21 | 85 | Jan. 2 | 105 1/2 | + 19 1/2 | 185,000 |
| 10 | 3 1/2 | Green Bay deb ctfs, B. | * 8 | Feb. 19 | 3 | Dec. 17 | 3 | - 1/2 | 448,000 | 101 | 90 | Long Dock 6s, 1935. | 104 1/2 | Dec. 7 | 99 | Jan. 17 | 103 | + 4 | 293,000 |
| 56 | 46 1/2 | Gulf & S 1 ref 5s, 1952. | 57 | Oct. 27 | 55 | Feb. 24 | 57 | + 2 | 7,000 | 99 1/2 | 90 | Long Is gen 4s, 1938. | 105 1/2 | Dec. 31 | 99 1/2 | Jan. 3 | 105 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 148,000 |
| 55 | 42 1/2 | Gulf & S 1 ref 5s, 1952. | 70 | Feb. 27 | 57 | Jan. 16 | 70 | + 15 | 18,000 | 95 1/2 | 87 | Long Is unif 4s, 1949. | 105 1/2 | July 16 | 95 | Jan. 25 | 103 1/2 | + 12 1/2 | 678,000 |
| 82 | 42 | Gulf Sta St 5 1/2s, 1942. | 94 | Dec. 21 | 71 | Jan. 3 | 92 1/2 | + 21 | 1,204,000 | 99 1/2 | 87 | Long Is deb 5s, 1937. | 104 1/2 | July 25 | 93 1/2 | Jan. 5 | 103 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 224,000 |
| 68 | 22 1/2 | Gulf. M & N 5 1/2s, 1950. | 86 1/2 | Apr. 20 | 58 | Dec. 4 | 64 1/2 | + 4 1/2 | 473,000 | 95 1/2 | 79 1/2 | Long Is ref 4s, 1949. | 104 1/2 | July 1 | | | | | |

Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 Range— High. Low. | | BOND. | | Range for Year 1934— High. Date. Low. Date. | | Net Last. Chge. | | Year's Sales. | | 1933 Range— High. Low. | | BOND. | | Range for Year 1934— High. Date. Low. Date. | | Net Last. Chge. | | Year's Sales. | |
|---------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------|---------|--|--------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|---------|------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|--|---------|--------------------|------------|------------------|--|
| 24 | 4 1/4 | Mob & Ohio 5s, 1938. | * 23 | Feb. 23 | 8 | Sep. 13 | 8 1/2 — 1/4 | 505,000 | ... | No Ohio 1st 5s, 1945, ctfs std. | * 8 | 52 | Apr. 7 | 34% | Jan. 19 | 48 | ... | 21,000 | |
| 37 | 7 1/2 | Mob & Oh Mont 5s, 47* 27 | Feb. 19 | 14% Sep. 22 | 15% | — 1/2 | 178,000 | 107% | 74% | No Ohio T & L 6s, 1947. | 105% | July 18 | 74% | Jan. 6 | 105 | +30 | 990,000 | | |
| 62 | 70 | hawk & M 4s, 1991. | 56 | July 27 | 78 | Sep. 17 | 82% — 1/2 | 31,000 | 62 | No Pac gen 3s, 2047. | 73% | Dec. 27 | 60 | Jan. 8 | 8 | 73 1/2 + 12% | 4,902,000 | | |
| 75% | 79 1/2 | Mont Cent 5s, 1937. | 102% | July 16 | 81 | Jan. 3 | 100% — 1/2 | 774,000 | 48 | No Pac 4s, 1997. | 103% | Dec. 20 | 83 | Jan. 4 | 102 | +18% | 5,773,000 | | |
| 94 | 87 | Mont Cent 6s, 1937. | 103% | July 25 | 87 | Jan. 17 | 102% — 1/2 | 973,000 | 89% | No Pac 4 1/2s, 2047. | 90% | Apr. 20 | 73 | Sept. 19 | 89 | +18% | 1,291,000 | | |
| 93 | 60 | Mont Pow ref 5s, 1943. | 100% | June 13 | 79 | Jan. 3 | 93% — 1/2 | 2,750,000 | 78% | No Pac 5s, C, 2047. | 97% | Apr. 14 | 76 | Jan. 6 | 92 | +15% | 903,000 | | |
| 78 | 45 | Mont Pow 5s, A, 1962. | 81% | Apr. 26 | 53 | Jan. 5 | 65 — 1/2 | 802,000 | 84 | No Pac 5s, C, 2047. | 97% | Apr. 14 | 76 | Jan. 6 | 92 | +18% | 1,690,000 | | |
| 99% | 78% | Mont Tram 5s, 1941. | 103% | Aug. 22 | 95 | Jan. 20 | 100% — 1/2 | 703,000 | 83 | No Pac 5s, D, 2047. | 97 | Apr. 14 | 75 | Jan. 2 | 92 | +18% | 1,690,000 | | |
| 68% | 57% | Mont Tram 4% 5s, 1955. | 76 | June 5 | 72 | Nov. 16 | 72% — 1/2 | 9,000 | 92% | No Pac 6s, 2047. | 103 | Apr. 13 | 85 | Sep. 17 | 98 | +11% | 10,454,000 | | |
| 74 1/2 | 59 1/2 | Mont Tram gen & ref 5s, A, '55. | 82% | Apr. 23 | 74 | Oct. 10 | 76% — 1/2 | 31,000 | 100 | No Ry Cal 5s, 1938. | 105 | Dec. 27 | 100 | Jan. 17 | 105 | +5 | 6,000 | | |
| 74 1/2 | 68% | Mont Tram gen & ref 5s, B, '55. | 74 | Jan. 5 | 74 | Jan. 5 | 1/2 | 2,000 | 104% | N Sts Pw 1st 5s, A, 1941. | 105% | July 26 | 89 | Jan. 10 | 103 | +12% | 3,173,000 | | |
| 74 1/2 | 66% | Mont Tram 5s, D, 1955. | 85 | Mar. 13 | 79 | Nov. 14 | 79 — 1/2 | 3,000 | 106 1/2 | N Sts Pw 1st 5s, B, 1941. | 107 1/2 | July 12 | 94 | Jan. 8 | 106 | +10% | 1,084,000 | | |
| 91 1/4 | 81 | Mor & Co 4 1/2s, 1939. | 102 | Dec. 20 | 84 | Jan. 2 | 102 — 1/2 | 1,796,000 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | | |
| 70 | 70 | Mor & Esx 3 1/2s, 2000. | 93% | Dec. 28 | 74 | Jan. 29 | 93% — 1/2 | 4,101,000 | 58% | OGDEN L C 4s, 1948. | 72 | Apr. 4 | 48 | Oct. 9 | 49 | — 17% | 296,000 | | |
| 82 | 60 | Mor & Esx 4 1/2s, 1955. | 97% | July 16 | 73 | Jan. 2 | 95% — 20% | 2,220,000 | 104 | Ohio Pub Ser 7s, 1947. | 108 | Nov. 23 | 78 | Jan. 8 | 108 | +29% | 480,000 | | |
| 86 1/2 | 67 1/2 | Mor & Esx 5s, 1955. | 103 | June 29 | 77 | Jan. 11 | 100% — 23% | 1,940,000 | 105 | Ohio Pub Ser 7 1/2s, 1946. | 110 | Aug. 4 | 89 | Jan. 15 | 109 | +18% | 678,000 | | |
| 107 1/2 | 94 1/2 | Mut Fuel Gas 5s, 1947. | 105% | Aug. 13 | 95 | Jan. 25 | 104% — 7/4 | 218,000 | 93% | Ohio Rv RR 1st 5s, 1936. | 104% | Nov. 2 | 100 | Feb. 16 | 103 | +10% | 90,000 | | |
| 93 1/2 | 75 | Mut Un Tel 5s, 1941. | 103% | Mar. 14 | 97 | Feb. 5 | 102% — 12% | 112,000 | 91 | Ohio Rv RR gen 5s, 1937. | 104 | Aug. 2 | 89 | Jan. 2 | 103 | +16% | 105,000 | | |
| 94 | 69 | Murray Body 6 1/2s, 1934. | 110 1/2 | Dec. 31 | 86 | Oct. 19 | 102 — 1/2 | 995,000 | 35 | Old Ben C 1st 5s, 1944. | 114 | Feb. 23 | 101 | Jan. 17 | 112 | +11% | 106,000 | | |
| 75 | 40 | NAMM & SONS 6s, 1943. | 77% | Feb. 6 | 60 | Jan. 4 | 73 — 10% | 142,000 | 101 | Ont Pw Niag 5s, 1943. | 110% | July 14 | 101 | Jan. 2 | 109 | +8% | 550,000 | | |
| 186 1/2 | 60 | Nash, C & STL 4s, 1978. | 95% | July 12 | 82 | Jan. 16 | 95 — 15% | 392,000 | 98 | Ont Transm 1st 5s, 1945. | 112 | Dec. 20 | 101 | Jan. 17 | 112 | +11% | 98,000 | | |
| 59 1/2 | 51 | Nas El con 4td 5s, 1951. | 62 1/2 | Apr. 27 | 52 | Nov. 1 | 61 — 7 | 894,000 | 107 | Ohio Pub Ser 7 1/2s, 1946. | 109 | Oct. 21 | 103 | Mar. 12 | 104 | +10% | 678,000 | | |
| 70 | 53 | Nat Acme 6s, 1942. | 86 | Apr. 21 | 61 | Jan. 19 | 85% — 15% | 38,000 | 107 1/2 | Ohio Rv RR 1st 5s, 1936. | 104% | June 27 | 87 | Jan. 6 | 100 | +10% | 673,000 | | |
| 96 | 74 1/2 | Nat Dairy 5 1/2s, 1948. | 103 | Nov. 28 | 78 | Jan. 2 | 102% — 23% | 11,825,000 | 93% | Pac Mo 2d 5s, 1938. | 100% | Apr. 24 | 84 | Jan. 8 | 97 | +10% | 198,000 | | |
| 4 | 1 | N Ry M 4 1/2s, 1957, asst. | * 6% | Oct. 19 | 24 | Jan. 11 | 3% — 1/2 | 1,540,000 | 46 | Pac Mo 2d 5s, 1938. | 100% | Apr. 24 | 84 | Jan. 8 | 97 | +10% | 198,000 | | |
| 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | N Ry M 4 1/2s, 1957, Jan cou on 3%. | 7% | Sep. 3 | 7 | 3% — 1/2 | 1,000 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | | |
| 4 1/2 | 1 | N Ry M 4 1/2s, 1977, asst. | * 6% | Oct. 26 | 24 | Jan. 18 | 3% — 1/2 | 114,000 | 38 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | | |
| 5 | 1% | N Ry M 4 1/2s, 1926, asst. | * 9% | Sep. 20 | 24 | Jan. 18 | 6% — 4% | 598,000 | 88 1/2 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | | |
| 4 | 1 | N Ry M 1st 4s, 1951, asst. | * 6% | Oct. 19 | 24 | Jan. 3 | 3% — 1/2 | 1,588,000 | 107 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | | |
| 95 1/2 | 60 | Nat Steel 5s, 1956. | 107% | Dec. 17 | 91 | Jan. 2 | 106% — 16% | 7,599,000 | 93 1/2 | Pac Mo 2d 5s, 1938. | 100% | Apr. 24 | 84 | Jan. 8 | 97 | +10% | 198,000 | | |
| 89 | 65 | Newberry (JJ) 5 1/2s, 1940. | 105% | Nov. 5 | 88 | Jan. 3 | 103% — 16% | 1,879,000 | 107 1/2 | Pac T & T 1st 5s, 1937. | 108 1/2 | Aug. 29 | 104 | Jan. 5 | 107 | +2 | 1,454,000 | | |
| 79 | 101 1/2 | Newark C Gas 5s, 1948. | 113% | Dec. 3 | 73 | Jan. 6 | 113 — 9% | 129,000 | 108 1/2 | Pac T & T 1st 5s, 1937. | 109 1/2 | Aug. 29 | 104 | Jan. 5 | 111 | +5% | 814,000 | | |
| 83 | 61 1/2 | New Eng RR 4s, 1945. | 85 | June 7 | 66 | Jan. 16 | 71% — 10% | 92,000 | 94 | Pac & T II 4 1/2s, 1955. | 105 | Oct. 25 | 100 | Mar. 12 | 104 | +10% | 87,000 | | |
| 83 | 68 | New Eng RR con 5s, 1945. | 92 1/2 | July 16 | 77 | Oct. 5 | 83% — 6% | 36,000 | 39 1/2 | Pan Am P Cal 6s, 1940, 40, cfts | 84 1/2 | Apr. 24 | 28 | Jan. 12 | 39 | +13% | 860,000 | | |
| 100 | 100 | New E & T 1st 4s, 1952. | 116 | Dec. 13 | 105% | Jan. 2 | 115% — 9% | 1,118,000 | 38 1/2 | Pan Am P Cal 6s, 1940, 40, cfts | 84 1/2 | Apr. 24 | 28 | Jan. 12 | 39 | +13% | 860,000 | | |
| 107 1/2 | 96 1/2 | New E & T 4 1/2s, 1961. | 112% | Dec. 10 | 101 | Jan. 2 | 112% — 10% | 1,308,000 | 38 1/2 | Parm Bwy 5 1/2s, 1951, ctfs | 47 | May | 50 | Jan. 2 | 45 | +15% | 1,881,000 | | |
| 96 | 88 1/2 | New Jer June 4s, 1986. | 92 | June 23 | 82 | Jan. 31 | 91% — 13% | 13,000 | 38 | Parm Bwy 5 1/2s, 1951, ctfs | 47 | May | 50 | Jan. 2 | 45 | +15% | 506,000 | | |
| 96 | 88 1/2 | New Jer P & L 4 1/2s, 1960. | 94% | Dec. 10 | 69 | Jan. 5 | 93% — 23% | 1,961,000 | 35 | Par F L 6s, 47, filed. | 65 1/2 | Dec. 13 | 82 | Jan. 2 | 62 1/2 | +32% | 4,185,000 | | |
| 70 | 30 | New Or Gt No Ry 5s, A, '83 | 77 | April 23 | 514 | Dec. 4 | 57 | 844,000 | 34 1/2 | Par F L 6s, 47, filed. | 65 1/2 | Dec. 13 | 82 | Jan. 2 | 62 1/2 | +32% | 3,104,000 | | |
| 64 1/2 | 38 | New Or Pb 5s B, 1952. | 52 | Dec. 19 | 52 | Jan. 18 | 52% — 4% | 95,000 | 38 | Par Pbx 5 1/2s, 1950, filed. | 65 1/2 | Dec. 13 | 82 | Jan. 2 | 62 1/2 | +32% | 6,347,000 | | |
| 65 | 38 | New Or Pb 5s B, 1955. | 65 | April 25 | 40 | Jan. 2 | 85% — 15% | 3,295,000 | 35 | Par Pbx 5 1/2s, 1950, filed. | 65 1/2 | Dec. 13 | 82 | Jan. 2 | 62 1/2 | +32% | 8,582,000 | | |
| 75 | 48 | New Or Ter 1st 4s, 1953. | 90 | July 24 | 62 | Jan. 9 | 83 — 22% | 719,000 | 35 | Parkeleee 6s, 1944. | 100% | Apr. 24 | 84 | Jan. 8 | 97 | +10% | 150,000 | | |
| 34 | 14 | New O. T & M 4 1/2s, '56. | 56 | Sept. 31 | 21 | Dec. 15 | 15% — 7/2 | 848,000 | 106 1/2 | Pat & Pass G 5s, 1949. | 111 1/2 | Oct. 13 | 103 1/2 | Jan. 8 | 111 | +9% | 71,000 | | |
| 35 1/2 | 14 | New O. T & M 5s, 1954. | 52 | Dec. 2 | 32 | Feb. 1 | 15% — 5/2 | 1,305,000 | 95 1/2 | Pathe Exch 7s, 1937. | 102 1/2 | Dec. 31 | 85 | Jan. 8 | 102 | +17% | 900,000 | | |
| 36 | 14 1/2 | New O. T & M 5s, 1956. | 53 | Feb. 16 | 18 1/2 | Aug. 17 | 23 — 4% | 413,000 | 85 1/2 | Penn R R 3 1/2s, A, 1937. | 101 1/2 | Dec. 18 | 94 | Jan. 5 | 101 | +6% | 34,000 | | |
| 36 1/2 | 14 1/2 | New O. T & M 5 1/2s, 1954. | 53 | Feb. 1 | 17 | Sept. 17 | 26 — 6 | 1,486,000 | 85 1/2 | Penn R R 3 1/2s, B, 1941. | 94 | July 31 | 86 | Jan. 2 | 98 | +15% | 20,000 | | |
| 93 1/2 | 90 | New & C Bdg 4 1/2s, 1945. | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|------|---|--------------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------|--|---|-------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|-----------|------|-----------|-------|-------|--------------|--|--|
| 1933 Range | | Range for Year 1934 | | | Net Chge. | | | Year's Sales | | | 1933 Range | | Range for Year 1934 | | | Net Chge. | | | Year's Sales | | |
| High. | Low. | BOND. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Chge. | Year's Sales | High. | Low. | BOND. | High. | Date. | Low. | Date. | Last. | Chge. | Year's Sales | | |
| 101 | 97% | Richmond Term Ry 5s, 1952-104% | Dec. 18 | 99% | Jan. 18 | 104% + 5% | 15,000 | 107% | 95 | Union Pacific 1st ref 5s, 2008, 118 | Dec. 31 | 102% Jan. 2 | 118 + 15% | 1,029,000 | | | | | | | |
| 85 | 63 | Rio Grande June 5s, 1939... 96% | July 24 | 73 | Jan. 4 | 95 + 20% | 77,000 | 103% | 95 | United Biscuit 6s, 1942... 107% | June 14 | 102% Jan. 15 | 105% + 2% | 584,000 | | | | | | | |
| 1% | 1% | Rio Grande South 4s, 1940... 1% Dec. 13 | 1% Dec. 13 | 1% + 2% | 8,000 | 71% | 43 | United Drug 5s, 1953... 100% | July 6 | 60 Jan. 2 | 90 + 30 | 4,817,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 87 | 55 | Rio Grande Wn 1st 4s, 1939+ 93% Apr. 27 | 68 | Jan. 25 | 77% + 5% | 1,528,000 | 101% | 96 | United N J RR & C 4s, 1944... 107% | July 26 | 100% Jan. 2 | 106% + 5% | 44,000 | | | | | | | | |
| 64% | 25% | Rio Gde Wn col 4s, A, 1949... 67% June 28 | 40 | Oct. 1 | 45 + 3 | 1,575,000 | 22% | 14 | United Rys of St L 4s, 1934+ 30 | Dec. 12 | 17 Jan. 12 | 30 + 14% | 134,000 | | | | | | | | |
| 99% | 89% | Rochester G & E 4% ^{1/2} , D '77, 107 | Dec. 5 | 86 | Jan. 2 | 107 + 16% | 52,000 | 75 | U S Rubber 5s, 1947... 91% Dec. 4 | 68 Jan. 8 | 90% + 22% | 7,347,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 105% | 89% | Rochester G & E 5s, 1962, 104% Nov. 1 | 94 | Jan. 9 | 107 + 8% | 1,456,000 | 32 | 10 | Univ Pipe & R 6s, 1936... 33% Apr. 25 | 15 Jan. 23 | 62 + 24% | 354,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 107% | 96 | Rochester G & E 5% ^{1/2} , 1948, 110 | Oct. 27 | 99% | Jan. 9 | 108% + 7% | 444,000 | 73 | 50% Utah Light & T 5s, A, 1944... 75% Apr. 26 | 57% Jan. 5 | 65 + 7 | 1,889,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 38% | 11 | R I, Ark & L 1st 4% ^{1/2} , 1934+ 25% Feb. 5 | 8 | Aug. 9 | 12% + 3% | 1,426,000 | 79 | 52% Utah Power & Light 5s, 1944... 81% Apr. 19 | 60% Jan. 9 | 69 + 5 | 3,424,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 57% | 40 | Rutland Can 4s, 1949... 72 Apr. 4 | 47 | Jan. 8 | 47% + 4% | 102,000 | 105% | 99% | Utica Elec Lt & P 5s, 1950... 110% Sep. 13 | 109 Sep. 5 | 110 + 4% | 2,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 64 | 35% | Rutland R R 4% ^{1/2} , 1941... 78% Apr. 23 | 51 | Nov. 16 | 51 - 1 | 305,000 | 37 | 12 | Utilities P & L 5s, 1950... 18% Apr. 26 | 18% Jan. 6 | 22% + 1% | 12,244,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 93 | 70 | ST JOSEPH & GR 1 4s, 1947, 104% Dec. 19 | 86 | Jan. 3 | 104 + 15% | 347,000 | 41 | 13% | Utilities Pow & Lt 5% ^{1/2} , 1947 41% Apr. 26 | 22% Jan. 8 | 26% + 2% | 801,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 94 | 70 | St Jos Ry, L H & P 5s, 1937, 96% Dec. 12 | 72 | Jan. 8 | 94% + 22% | 473,000 | 81 | 34% | VANADIUM cv 5s, 1941... 89% Apr. 23 | 62 Jan. 4 | 88% + 27 | 1,981,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 116 | 81 | St Joseph Lead 5% ^{1/2} , 1941... 114% Apr. 2 | 105% | Feb. 27 | 110% + 2% | 2,396,000 | 85 | 85 | Vandalia 4s, A, 1955... 102% Apr. 17 | 99 Feb. 15 | 102 + 17 | 14,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 61 | 35% | St L. I. M & S R 4s, 1933+ 67% July 25 | 52 | Aug. 20 | 58 + 20% | 5,022,000 | 85 | 85 | Vandalia 4s, B, 1957... 101% Oct. 31 | 97% Jan. 22 | 101% + 5% | 30,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 65 | 64 | St Law & Ad 1st 5s, 1996... 95% July 23 | 77 | Feb. 17 | 85 + 20% | 74,000 | 96% | 96 | Va Elec & Pow cv 5% ^{1/2} , 1942-110% Dec. 21 | 96 Jan. 15 | 110% + 13% | 724,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 70 | 65 | St Law & Ad 6s, 1996... 93% July 18 | 79% Feb. 2 | 85 + 15% | 33,000 | 105% | 95 | Va Elec & Pow ref 5s, 1954... 106% Dec. 27 | 101% June 28 | 106% + 13% | 702,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 50 | 30% | St L R M & P 5s, 1955... 61 May 2 | 37% Jan. 3 | 57 + 20% | 76,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 656,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 30% | 8% | St Louis-San Fran 4s, A, 50% Feb. 5 | 12% Nov. 20 | 16% + 2% | 4,236,000 | 65 | 47% | Va Iron, C & C 1st 5s, 1949... 65% Mar. 19 | 52 Oct. 4 | 55% + 5% | 71,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30 | 8% | St Louis-San Fran 4s, A, 50% Feb. 16 | 11% Nov. 22 | 12% + 1% | 1,597,000 | 100 | 80 | Virginia Mid gen 5s, 1936... 103% Aug. 7 | 98% Jan. 2 | 103 + 4% | 143,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29% | 6% | St Louis-San Fran 4s, A, 50% Feb. 5 | 9% Nov. 22 | 14 + 1% | 5,446,000 | 94% | 84 | Virginia Rwy 4% ^{1/2} , B, 1962... 105% Dec. 14 | 90 Jan. 15 | 105% + 20% | 716,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 26% | 6% | St L-San F 4s, B, 50% Feb. 5 | 9% Nov. 21 | 13% + 1% | 4,038,000 | 101% | 78 | 84 | Virginia Rwy 5s, A, 1962... 112% Dec. 31 | 95% Jan. 16 | 112 + 11% | 3,011,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 33 | 10 | St Louis-San F 5s, B, 1950+ 30% Feb. 6 | 12% Nov. 21 | 16% + 3% | 1,284,000 | 70 | 36% | Virginia S W on 5s, 1958... 87% Apr. 25 | 67 Jan. 6 | 81% + 15% | 860,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30% | 9% | St Louis-San F 5s, B, 50% Feb. 6 | 11% Nov. 19 | 15% + 2% | 624,000 | 85 | 60 | Virginia S W 1st 5s, 2003... 97% July 19 | 75% Jan. 10 | 95 + 19 | 81,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 65 | 28% | St Louis, P & N W 5s, 1948, 82% Apr. 11 | 55 Dec. 5 | 55 - 5% | 857,000 | 5 | 1% | V Cruz & P 1st 4% ^{1/2} , 34%, ass* 6 Sep. 19 | 2% Jan. 6 | 4% + 2% | 398,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 72% | 49 | St Louis-Southw 1st 4s, 1981 May 7 | 64% Jan. 2 | 77 + 11% | 727,000 | .. | .. | VC & P 1st 4% ^{1/2} , 34%, ass* 3% May 4 | 3 Sep. 21 | 3 + 10,000 | .. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 53% | 12 | St Louis-Southw 2d 4s, 1981 May 7 | 63% Feb. 26 | 42% + 16% | 178,000 | 18% | .. | Venturites Sug 1st 7s, 12% Apr. 13 | 3% Jan. 4 | 4% + 3% 317,000 | .. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 56 | 12 | St L Southw gen ref 5s, '90% Feb. 6 | 36% Nov. 22 | 38 + 6% | 1,442,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | | | | | | | | | |
| 67% | 19 | St L Southw 1st term 5s, '92% Feb. 5 | 47% Dec. 26 | 50% + 2% | 1,445,000 | 32% | 4 | WABASH 4% ^{1/2} , 1978... 28% Apr. 26 | 13% Nov. 20 | 19 + 1% | 2,003,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 51 | 42 | St Paul Ry C 5s, 1937... 82 Apr. 27 | 45% Jan. 15 | 76 + 31 | 93,000 | 14 | 11 | Wabash 4% ^{1/2} , 1978, 1978... 25% Apr. 21 | 14 Dec. 24 | 17% + 3% | 211,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 61 | 50 | St Paul Ry C 5s, 1937, gtd... 45% Apr. 30 | 45% Jan. 23 | 75 + 23 | 34,000 | 45 | 43 | Wabash 1st 5s, 1939... 95% Apr. 20 | 74 Jan. 5 | 93 + 18% | 2,355,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 80% | 70 | St Paul & Duluth 4s, 1968... 100% July 12 | 84% Feb. 13 | 100 + 25 | 23,000 | 70 | 33 | Wabash 2d 5s, A, 1957... 83% Apr. 24 | 56% Jan. 3 | 73% + 18% | 1,091,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 62% | 20 | St Paul K C S L 4% ^{1/2} , 1941... 37% Feb. 21 | 13% Dec. 21 | 17% + 7% | 1,154,000 | 32 | 5% | Wabash 5s, B, 1976... 28% Apr. 26 | 13 Aug. 9 | 18% + 1% | 2,118,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 100% | 92% | St Paul, M & M 5s, 1943, ext. 107% Dec. 10 | 97% Jan. 2 | 106% + 10% | 4,672,000 | 11 | 11 | Wabash 5s, B, 1976... 24% Apr. 20 | 14 Sep. 11 | 15% + 4% | 45,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 96 | 75 | St P. M & M Mont ext 4s, 37, 102% Dec. 20 | 94% Jan. 17 | 102% + 11% | 470,000 | 32 | 4% | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 28% Apr. 20 | 13 Aug. 13 | 19 + 1% | 2,509,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 90 | 70 | St P. M & M Pac ext 4s, 40, 104% Dec. 31 | 89% Jan. 22 | 100% + 13% | 183,500 | .. | .. | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 23% Apr. 7 | 13 Dec. 13 | 15% + 15% | 37,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 83 | 54 | St P. M & M E Minn 4s, '48, 100% Dec. 10 | 89% Jan. 10 | 100% + 9% | 46,000 | 11 | 11 | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 29% Apr. 26 | 13 Nov. 21 | 19 + 1% | 2,892,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 58 | 45 | St P. M & M E Gr Tr 4% ^{1/2} , 76% May 4 | 50 Nov. 19 | 50 + 5 | 38,000 | 48 | 27% | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Sep. 25 | 17 + 6 | 46,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 104 | 89 | St Paul Un Dref 5s, 1941, 1972-114% Dec. 21 | 101% Jan. 10 | 114 + 10% | 900,000 | .. | .. | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Sep. 25 | 17 + 6 | 46,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 80% | 54 | St Paul Ant & A Pass 4s, 1943, 85% June 6 | 60% Jan. 19 | 60% + 30% | 727,000 | 55 | 35 | Wabash Omaha div 3% ^{1/2} , 1941... 83% Apr. 24 | 56% Jan. 3 | 73% + 18% | 1,091,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 92% | 72 | St Paul, San Antonio Pub Ss, A, '52, 101% Dec. 6 | 71% Jan. 19 | 80 + 7% | 216,000 | 63 | 41 | Wabash Des Moines 4s, 1939... 85% July 11 | 45 Jan. 15 | 55 + 5% | 2,118,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 100% | 82 | St Paul, F. P. & P. 5s, 1942... 107% Dec. 11 | 97% Jan. 11 | 97 + 11% | 470,000 | 76 | 62 | Wabash Tol & Chi 5s, 1941... 110% July 13 | 70 Jan. 15 | 50 + 10% | 84,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40 | 25 | Stulco 6% ^{1/2} , A, 1946... 41% Feb. 6 | 35% Mar. 3 | 39 + 1 | 23,000 | 43 | 5% | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Nov. 21 | 19 + 1% | 2,892,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 43 | 28 | Stulco 6% ^{1/2} , B, 1946, stdp... 41% May 8 | 30% Jan. 23 | 37 + 10% | 46,000 | 10 | 10 | Wabash 5s, D, 1980... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Nov. 21 | 19 + 1% | 2,892,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 58% | 35 | Stulco 6% ^{1/2} , B, 1946, stdp... 41% May 7 | 30% Dec. 11 | 37 + 1 | 23,000 | 25 | 12% | Walworth 6s, 1925, 1925, 1925... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Nov. 21 | 19 + 1% | 220,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 98% | 90 | Sciotto V & N E 4s, 1989... 107% Dec. 8 | 97% Jan. 2 | 107% + 10% | 211,000 | 38% | 35 | Walworth 6s, 1925, 1925, 1925... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Nov. 21 | 19 + 1% | 220,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 31 | 1% | Seab'd A L 4s, 1950... 11% Feb. 6 | 16% Dec. 17 | 16% + 1% | 42,000 | 100% | 35 | Walworth 6s, 1925, 1925, 1925... 25% Apr. 25 | 12% Nov. 21 | 19 + 1% | 220,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 19 | 6% | Seab'd A L 4s, 1950, 1940... 11% Feb. 6 | 17% Dec. 24 | 17 + 1% | 21,000 | 75% | 35 | Warner-Quin 6s, 1939... 48% Apr. 13 | 28 Nov. 21 | 26% + 3% | 1,190,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 26% | 5% | Seab'd A L 4s, 1950, stdp... 11% Feb. 5 | 16% Apr. 21 | 16% + 2% | 494,000 | 50 | 30% | Warner-Quin 6s, 1939... 48% Apr. 13 | 28 Nov. 21 | 26% + 3% | 1,190,000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23% | 9% | Seab'd A L 4s, 1950, stdp... 11% Feb. 5 | 16% Apr. 21 | 16% + 1% | 394,000 | 52 | 30% | Warren Br 1st 5s, 1941... 63% | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Bond Transactions—1934—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| 1933 Range. High. Low. | | BOND. | | Range for Year 1934. High. Date. Low. Date. Last. | | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | 1933 Range. High. Low. | | BOND. | | Range for Year 1934. High. Date. Low. Date. Last. | | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------|------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---------|-----------|---------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|--|--------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|---------|
| 33 1/2 | 26 | URUGUAY | 6s. '60, coups on ^t 40 | Feb. 5 | 27 1/2 | Jan. 9 | 33 | .. | 1,190,000 | 75 | 64 1/2 | KEYSTONE TEL | 5s. 1935.. | 88 | July 31 | 102 | Sep. 15 | 102 | +30% | 16,000 |
| 32 1/2 | 26 | Uruguay | 6s. '64, coups on ^t 40 | Feb. 5 | 27 1/2 | Jan. 9 | 33 | .. | 984,000 | 101 1/2 | 97 | LONG ISLAND | deb 5s. 1934. | 100 1/2 | Feb. 5 | 100 1/2 | Jan. 30 | 100% - % | 42,000 | |
| 38 | 31 1/2 | Uruguay | 8s. '46, Feb coup on ^t 40 | Jan. 31 | 33 1/2 | Jan. 10 | 40 | .. | 48,000 | 97 1/2 | 79 1/2 | Laclede Gas | 5s. 1934, ctfs. ^t 97 1/2 | July 19 | 85 | Apr. 10 | 92 | .. | 392,000 | |
| .. | .. | Uruguay | 8s. '46, Aug coup on ^t 40% | Feb. 1 | 33 | Apr. 5 | 36 1/2 | .. | 122,000 | 100 | 101 1/4 | MAHONING RYS | 5s. 1934.. 101 | Jan. 7 | 100 1/4 | Feb. 3 | 101 | + 1 | 6,000 | |
| .. | .. | VIENNA | 6s. '52, Nov coup on ^t 76 | Nov. 7 | 72 | Nov. 1 | 76 | .. | 11,000 | 100 | 70 | Manitoba S W C | 5s. 1934.. 105 | May 9 | 99 | Jan. 8 | 104 1/4 | + 4% | 47,000 | |
| DOMESTIC BONDS. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 99% | 60 | A.M. METALS | 5 1/2s. 1934.. 100% | Feb. 9 | 99 | Jan. 10 | 99 1/2 | + 1/2 | \$1,708,000 | 70 1/2 | 60 | POCAH CON | COLL 5s. 1957 | 88 | May 10 | 67 1/2 | Jan. 29 | 81 | + 20 | 102,000 |
| 95 | 70 1/2 | Am Cyanamid | 5s. 1942.. 103 1/2 | Apr. 18 | 93 1/2 | Jan. 9 | 102 1/2 | + 7 1/2 | 978,000 | 70 1/2 | 94 | SAV. FLA. & W | 5s. 1934.. 100 | Mar. 1 | 99 1/2 | Jan. 17 | 100 | .. | 12,000 | |
| 67 | 21 | Am Type Founders | 8s. '40.. 108 | Feb. 20 | 24 1/2 | Jan. 4 | 32 | + 9 | 230,000 | 100 | 95 | Sav. Fla. & W | 1st 6s. 1934.. 100 | Feb. 10 | 100 | Jan. 5 | 100 1/2 | + 1/2 | 6,000 | |
| 98 1/2 | 74 1/2 | Am Water Works | 5s. 1934.. 118 | Feb. 8 | 96 1/2 | Jan. 4 | 101 | + 3 1/2 | 12,434,000 | 101 | 63 1/2 | Shell Un Oil | 5s. 1949, w. w. ^t 102 1/2 | Oct. 19 | 89 1/2 | Jan. 9 | 102 1/2 | + 12 1/2 | 4,764,000 | |
| .. | .. | Am Wat Wks | 5s. A. '44, rets. 108% | Mar. 14 | 104 1/2 | Mar. 22 | 107 | .. | 2,828,000 | 101 | 67 1/2 | Southern Pacific | cv 5s. 1934.. 100 | Apr. 11 | 92 1/2 | Jan. 2 | 99 1/2 | + 6 1/2 | 520,000 | |
| .. | .. | Am Wat Wks | 5s. B. '44, rets. 108% | Mar. 14 | 104 | Mar. 27 | 106 1/2 | .. | 1,404,000 | 93 1/2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| .. | .. | BKLYN M T | 6s. A. 1949.. 100% | Aug. 8 | 98 | Sep. 27 | 99 | .. | 501,000 | 102 | 98 1/2 | UN OIL CAL | 5s. C. 1935.. 101 | Jan. 15 | 100 1/2 | Mar. 16 | 100 1/2 | + 1/4 | 109,000 | |
| 104% | 101 | CORN PROD | REF 5s. 1934.. 101% | Jan. 17 | 100 1/2 | Mar. 23 | 100 1/2 | - 1/2 | 56,000 | 103 | 97 1/2 | VA RY & P | 5s. 1934.. 110 | Apr. 14 | 99 | Jan. 4 | 100 1/2 | + 1/2 | 3,743,000 | |
| 80% | 85 | DOLD (JACOB) | 6s. 1942.. 93 | Apr. 18 | 79 1/2 | Jan. 3 | 91 1/2 | + 11 1/2 | 499,000 | 21 | 10 1/2 | Victor Fuel | 5s. 1953.. 20 | Sep. 25 | 18 1/2 | July 24 | 20 | + 7 | 827,000 | |
| 101 | 81 | FED METALS | 7s. 1939.. 106 | May 25 | 101 | Jan. 5 | 102 1/2 | + 2 | 299,000 | 43 | 8 1/2 | WALWORTH | 6s. A. '45, w. 35 | Apr. 18 | 35 | Apr. 18 | 35 | - 1 | 1,000 | |
| 104% | 100% | HUMBLE O & R | 5s. 1937.. 100% | Jan. 2 | 100 | Oct. 29 | 100 1/2 | - 3 1/2 | 1,172,000 | 40 | 12 1/2 | Warner Co | 6s. 1944.. 40 | Feb. 16 | 20 | Mar. 31 | 22 | + 6 | 28,000 | |
| .. | .. | Warner Co | 6s. 1944.. 40 | Jan. 10 | 29 | June 21 | 16 | .. | .. | 12 1/2 | Warner Co | 6s. 1944.. 40 | June 21 | 16 | Jan. 10 | 29 | + 13 | 56,000 | | |

Transactions on the N. Y. Curb Exchange—1934

| | |
|------------------------|-------------|
| Total stock sales 1934 | 60,050,695 |
| Total stock sales 1933 | 100,916,602 |
| Total stock sales 1932 | 57,055,668 |
| Total stock sales 1931 | 109,812,465 |

Stocks and bonds marked with an asterisk are fully listed on the Curb Exchange; others are dealt in as unlisted issues.

| Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. |
|------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|-----------|---------------|
| *ACETOL PROD. A. | 7 | 2 1/2 | 3 1/2 | - 1/2 | 2,500 |
| Acme Wire, v t c. | 11 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 8 | + 1/2 | 2,600 |
| Adams Mill 1st pf (7) | 103 1/2 | 73 | 102 1/2 | + 29 1/2 | 4,735 |
| *Aero Supply Mfg. A. | 12 1/2 | 7 | 7 1/2 | + 1/2 | 1,300 |
| *Aero Supply Mfg. B. | 4 | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 | + 1/2 | 42,700 |
| *Agfa Ansco | 4 1/2 | 3 | 4 | - 1/2 | 8,900 |
| Ainsworth Mfg Corp (k1/4) | 21 | 10 | 18 1/2 | + 10 1/2 | 22,100 |
| *Air Inv. Inc. | 3 | 1 1/2 | 1 | - 1/2 | 19,100 |
| Air Inv. Inc. war. | 2 1/2 | 9 | 14 | + 1 1/2 | 12,200 |
| *Air Inv. Inc. cv pf. | 21 1/2 | 8 | 14 | + 1 1/2 | 5,000 |
| Aia Gr. Sc. (k2). | 63 1/2 | 39 | 40 | .. | 4,000 |
| Aia Pwr pf (6) | 52 1/2 | 32 1/2 | 37 1/2 | + 12 1/2 | 1,660 |
| Aia Pwr pf (7) | 58 1/2 | 31 1/2 | 39 1/2 | + 11 | 4,460 |
| Algoona Consol. Ltd. | 7 1/2 | 5 | 5 | - 1/2 | 2,800 |
| Alliance Investment | 2 | 1 1/2 | 1 | - 1/2 | 1,209 |
| *Allied Int. Inv. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2,200 |
| *Allied Int Inv cv pf. | 9 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 8 1/2 | - 1/2 | 175,200 |
| Allied Mills, Inc. | 14 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 14 1/2 | + 6 | 98,000 |
| Aluminum Co of A. | 85 1/2 | 43 | 50 | - 24 1/2 | .. |
| Alum Co of A pf (1/2) | 78 | 60 | 73 1/2 | + 7 1/2 | 21,300 |
| Alum Goods Mf (40c) | 11 1/2 | 8 | 10 | + 1 | 9,100 |
| *Alum Indus. Inc. | 13 | 8 | 8 | - 1 | 400 |
| Aluminum, Ltd. | 36 | 18 1/2 | 20 | - 9 | 9,100 |
| Alum, Ltd. cu pf. | 60 | 37 | 57 | + 17 1/2 | 7,450 |
| Alum, Ltd. C. war. | 10 | 3 | 5 | - 2 | 746 |
| Alum, Ltd. D. war. | 12 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 7 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 426 |
| *Am Beverage Corp. | 3 1/2 | 1 | 1 | - 1/2 | 27,900 |
| Am Book Co (4). | 60 | 48 | 58 1/2 | + 15 1/2 | 1,370 |
| *Am. Brit & Cont. | 1 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | .. |
| Am Capital A. | 2 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | 2,200 |
| Am Capital B. | 2 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | 12,100 |
| Am Capital pf (m3). | 21 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 18 | - 1 | 6,000 |
| Am Capl pf (5 1/2) | 68 1/2 | 58 | 68 | + 9 | 1,250 |
| *Am Cigar Co (10). | 140 | 138 | 140 | .. | 75 |
| *Am Cit P & L A (3). | 34 1/2 | 23 1/2 | 31 | + 5 | 13,800 |
| *Am C. C. P & L B (k10c). | 4 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | 109,035 |
| Am Cyanamid. B (k25c). | 21 | 18 | 21 | + 4 1/2 | 1,100 |
| Am Cyanamid. B (k25c). | 22 1/2 | 14 1/2 | 16 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 880,750 |
| Am Dist Tel. N (4) | 73 1/2 | 73 1/2 | 73 1/2 | - 1/2 | 50 |
| Am Dist Tel. N J cv pf (7). | 112 1/2 | 102 | 112 | + 11 1/2 | 750 |
| *Am Equities (k10c). | 2 1/2 | 1 | 1 1/2 | + 1/2 | 8,000 |
| Am & For P war. | 9 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | - 2 1/2 | 62,700 |
| Am Founders | 1 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | - 1/2 | 107,000 |
| Am Found 1st pf. B. | 21 | 11 | 15 | + 6 | 2,900 |
| Am Found 1st pf. D. | 22 1/2 | 9 1/2 | 14 1/2 | + 5 1/2 | 7,000 |
| Am Gas & El (120). | 32 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 19 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 992,906 |
| Am G & El pf (6). | 91 | 72 1/2 | 84 | + 13 | 24,450 |
| Am Hard Rubber. | 10 | 4 | 4 1/2 | - 4 | 650 |
| Am Invest. Inc. | 4 1/2 | 2 | 3 1/2 | + 1/2 | 8,550 |
| Am Laundry Mch (40c). | 18 | 10 1/2 | 15 | + 4 1/2 | 31,400 |
| Am Lt & Tr (1.20). | 22 | 16 | 18 | - 1/2 | 3,900 |
| *Am Maize Prod (k2). | 36 1/2 | 20 | 24 | - 6 | 1,050 |
| Am Mfg Co. | 16 | 5 | 5 | - 4 | 800 |
| *Am Maracaibo | 1 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | - 1/2 | 167,700 |
| Am Meter Co. | 17 1/2 | 7 | 12 1/2 | + 5 1/2 | 8,744 |
| Am Pneumatic Service. | 3 1/2 | 3 | 3 | - 1 | 3,000 |
| Am Potash & Chem. | 19 1/2 | 11 | 16 1/2 | - 1/2 | 3,600 |
| Am Superpower | 4 1/2 | 1 | 1 1/2 | - 1/2 | 1,477,200 |
| Am Superpower 1st pf. | 70 | 49 | 53 1/2 | + 3 | 22,200 |
| Am Superpower pf. | 33 | 8 1/2 | 11 1/2 | - 1 | 27,600 |
| Am Thread pf (25c). | 4 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 4 | + 1/2 | 17,900 |
| *Amster Trad (k42c). | 13 1/2 | 12 | 12 1/2 | + 1/2 | 300 |
| Anchor Post Fence (r). | 2 1/2 | 2 | 2 1/2 | - 1/2 | 66,600 |
| Ang-Per Oil, Ltd (k28 1-5c). | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | + 3 1/2 | 216 |
| Appalach El Pwr pf (7). | 77 | 74 | 74 | - 3 | 700 |
| *Arcturus Radio Tube. | 1 | 1/2 | 1/2 | - 1/2 | 39,600 |
| Ark Nat Gas. | 2 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 11 1/2 | - 1/2 | 30,050 |
| Ark Nat Gas. A. | 2 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 7 1/2 | - 1/2 | 177,400 |
| Ark N G cu pf. | 3 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 3 1/2 | + 1/2 | 14,20 |

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—1934—Continued

| Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. | Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Chge. | Year's Sales. |
|---|-------|------|-------|-----------|---------------|---|-------|------|-------|-----------|---------------|--|-------|------|-------|-----------|---------------|
| EAGLE PITCHER LEAD. 7% 3% 5 23,375 | | | | | | Hygrade Food Prod. 5% 2% 2% - 1% 45,400 | | | | | | Moh H Pw 2d pf. 40 18 18 - 7 6,825 | | | | | |
| East Gas & F Asso. 10% 4% 5 26,250 | | | | | | Hygrade Sylvan (2). 26% 17 26% 1% 3,125 | | | | | | Molybdenum Corp. 9% 5 8% + 3% 458,600 | | | | | |
| East G & F Asso pf (6). 76 46 50 + 3% 12,025 | | | | | | ILL P & L 5% pf. 30 10% 12% + 2% 20,970 | | | | | | Montgom Ward, A (m10%) 133 88 125% + 39% 18,820 | | | | | |
| East G & F pr pf (4%). 79 56 60% + 3% 3,600 | | | | | | ILL P & L 6% pf. 28 12 13% + 3% 1,225 | | | | | | Mont'l L, H & P (1%). 39% 27% 30% - 2% 33,120 | | | | | |
| East States Power. 2% 3% 5% - 1% 49,500 | | | | | | Illum Shares, A (2). 40 40 40 - 1% 1,100 | | | | | | Moody's Inv S pt pf (3). 22% 16% 21 - 3% 625 | | | | | |
| East States Pw pf. A. 21 5% 5% + 1% 2,700 | | | | | | Imp' Ch Ind (19c). 10 7% 9% + 1% 13,800 | | | | | | Moore Corp, Ltd (k50c). 15 15 15 + 3% 300 | | | | | |
| East States Pw pf. B. 19% 1% 5% + 1% 2,650 | | | | | | Imp' Oil, Ltd. coup (+80c). 17% 12% 17 + 4% 702,600 | | | | | | Moore Corp pf, A (7). 105 105 105 + 15% 40 | | | | | |
| Easy Wash Mach. B (50c). 8% 2% 6% + 6% 25,400 | | | | | | Imp' Oil, Ltd. rg (+80c). 17% 13 17 + 4% 17,300 | | | | | | Moore Corp pf, B (7). 115 115 115 + 7% 30 | | | | | |
| Economy Grocery Strs. 20% 20% 20% - 2% 100 | | | | | | Imp' Tob, Can (152c). 13% 10% 13% + 2% 17,500 | | | | | | Moore Dr Forg, A (k150) 20 10 20 + 13% 1,600 | | | | | |
| Edison Bros Stores (k50c). 28% 8 24% + 17% 8,100 | | | | | | Imp' Tob, Gt Brit & Ir (k103 9-10c). 35% 28 35 + 6% 30,900 | | | | | | Mortgage Bk of Col (Am shares). 3% 2% 3% + 1% 1,700 | | | | | |
| Eisler Elec Corp. 1% 1% 1% - 1% 27,620 | | | | | | Indiana Pipe Line (135c). 6% 3% 4% - 1% 11,700 | | | | | | Mountain & Gulf (k10c). 5% 3% 4% + 1% 14,400 | | | | | |
| Electrical Secur pf (5). 80 80 80 - 88 | | | | | | Indianapolis Pw & Lt cum pf (6%). 72 57 57 + 9% 275 | | | | | | Mount Prod (60c). 5% 4 4% + 1% 74,600 | | | | | |
| Elec Bond & Share. 23% 6 7% - 4% 2,759,300 | | | | | | Indian Terr Ill Oil, A. 4% 1 1% + 1% 4,100 | | | | | | Mount States Pow. 1% 1% 1% - 13% 900 | | | | | |
| Elec Bond & Share pf (5). 50% 28% 35% + 5% 47,200 | | | | | | Indian Terr Ill Oil, B. 4% 1 1% - 1% 4,000 | | | | | | Mtn Sta Tel & T (8). 11% 100 103% + 2% 1,032 | | | | | |
| Elec Bond & Share pf (6). 60 31 40% + 8% 154,500 | | | | | | Indus Finance v t c. 3 3% 1% + 1% 3,900 | | | | | | Murphy Co (1.60). 73 39 72% + 40% 8,000 | | | | | |
| Elec Pw Associates (40c). 8% 3% 4% - 1% 43,500 | | | | | | Indus Finance 7% pf. 3 2% 2% 175 | | | | | | Murphy Co pf (8). 112 105 112 + 4% 50 | | | | | |
| Elec P & Lt opt var. 4% 1 1% - 1% 22,900 | | | | | | Ins Co of N Am (2). 57 38% 54 + 15% 61,700 | | | | | | NACHMAN SPRING. 8 6% 8 + 2% 400 | | | | | |
| *Elec Shareholding. 4% 1 1% - 1% 21,300 | | | | | | Inter Cigar Mach (2). 29% 19 29% + 10% 5,900 | | | | | | Nat Baking. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 1,000 | | | | | |
| *Elec Share pf, w w. 52% 34 40 + 3% 18,965 | | | | | | Intl Hold & Inv Co. 2% 1 1% - 1% 4,000 | | | | | | Nat Bellas Hess. 4% 2 2% + 1% 870,800 | | | | | |
| Elec Share pf, w w. 52% 34 40 + 3% 18,965 | | | | | | Intl Hyd El Sys cv pf. 31% 6% 7% - 7% 51,075 | | | | | | Nat Bd & Sh Corp (1). 36 28% 30% - 1% 17,750 | | | | | |
| Electrographic Corp. 7% 2 6% + 5% 3,400 | | | | | | Intl Mining (k15c). 14% 10% 14 + 3% 106,700 | | | | | | Nat Candy Co (1). 20 20 20 + 2% 100 | | | | | |
| Elgin Nat Watch. 14 7% 13% + 6% 1,100 | | | | | | Intl Mining war. 6% 3% 5% + 2% 189,800 | | | | | | Nat Container (k1). 40% 25 30 + 20% 38,950 | | | | | |
| Empire Dist El pf. 23% 12% 13% - 2% 3,100 | | | | | | Intl Petrol (72). 33% 19% 31 + 11% 897,500 | | | | | | Nat Dairy P pf, A (7). 109% 80 106% + 15% 7,250 | | | | | |
| Empire G & F 6% pf. 25% 10% 15 + 5% 2,700 | | | | | | Intl Petrol reg (12). 30 27 30 + 7% 300 | | | | | | Nat Fuel Gas (1). 12% 13% 13% + 2% 79,450 | | | | | |
| Empire G & F 6% pf. 25% 10% 15 + 5% 2,700 | | | | | | Intl Products. 3 1 2% + 1% 13,300 | | | | | | Nat Investors. 3 1 1% + 1% 47,100 | | | | | |
| *El Shovel Coal pt pf (r). 29% 12% 15% + 4% 10,250 | | | | | | Intl Safety R. B (25c). 2% 1 1% - 1% 2,850 | | | | | | Nat Investors pf (m2%). 83 40% 83 + 45% 2,475 | | | | | |
| Emp G & F 7% pf. 32% 15% 16 + 2% 4,200 | | | | | | Intl Util A. 6% 1% 1% - 1% 3,800 | | | | | | Nat Investors war. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 40,100 | | | | | |
| Empire Pw part (k1). 2% 1 1% - 1% 28,700 | | | | | | Intl Util B. 1% 1% - 1% 129,800 | | | | | | Nat Leather. 2% 3% 3% + 1% 30,700 | | | | | |
| *Equity Corp. 2% 1 1% - 1% 2,750 | | | | | | Intl Util war. 1% 1% - 1% 700 | | | | | | Nat Pw & Lt pf (6). 69% 35% 48% + 10% 64,550 | | | | | |
| Eureka Pipe Line (4). 31 30 32% + 1% 26,425 | | | | | | Intl Util war, new. 40 37% 37% - 17% 150 | | | | | | Nat Refining. 6 4% 4% + 1% 400 | | | | | |
| *Eur El, Ltd. A (60c). 12% 8% 9% - 1% 15,000 | | | | | | Interstate Equities. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 12,900 | | | | | | Nat Rubber Mach. 7% 3 5% + 2% 91,400 | | | | | |
| Eur El, Ltd, deb rts. 2% 1% 1% - 1% 24,200 | | | | | | Interstate Eq cv pf. 22 15% 16% - 1% 4,200 | | | | | | Nat Service Co. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 333,400 | | | | | |
| Evans Wallower Lead. 5% 2 2 - 2% 550 | | | | | | Interstate Hosy (2). 30% 19% 27% + 7% 17,600 | | | | | | Nat Service Co pf. 3% 1% 1% + 1% 3,900 | | | | | |
| Evans Wall Lead pf. 5% 2 2 - 2% 550 | | | | | | Int'l Pw, Del pf. 19 7 8% + 1% 2,490 | | | | | | Nat Steel Car, Ltd. 18% 13% 17% + 2% 3,500 | | | | | |
| *Ex-Cell-O Air & Tool. 8% 3% 7% + 3% 225,350 | | | | | | Iron Cap Copper. 1% 1% - 1% 4,200 | | | | | | Nat Sugar N J (2). 38 29 32 + 2% 24,000 | | | | | |
| FAIRCHILD AVIATION. 9% 5% 8% + 2% 161,900 | | | | | | Iron Fireman Mfg vtc (80c). 20 8% 13% + 8% 1,700 | | | | | | Nat Transit (70c). 9% 7 7 - 1% 16,300 | | | | | |
| *Fairey Av. Ltd. (k18c). 6% 5 6% + 2% 900 | | | | | | Irving Air Chute (k10c). 7% 2% 4% + 1% 32,100 | | | | | | Nat Union Radio. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 27,582 | | | | | |
| Fajardo Sugar. 105 65 71 + 1% 4,325 | | | | | | Isotta Fraschini. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 100 | | | | | | Natomas Co (75c). 10% 7% 96% - 8% 50 | | | | | |
| Falcon Lead. 1% 1% 1% - 1% 139,000 | | | | | | Italian Superpower, A. 3 1% 1% - 1% 60,500 | | | | | | Nehi Corp. 35 31 35 + 25% 150 | | | | | |
| Falstaff Brewing. 7% 24% 24% - 2% 85,550 | | | | | | Italian Superpower deb rts. 1% 1% 1% - 1% 17,900 | | | | | | Nelmer Bros pf (7). 101% 40 92 + 59% 3,375 | | | | | |
| Fanny Farm Cdy (311/4c). 9% 7% 9% - 1% 12,725 | | | | | | JER CENT P & L pf (5%). 53 42 42 - 18 250 | | | | | | Nelson (Herman) (k25c). 8 2 2% + 5% 2,850 | | | | | |
| Fansteel Products. 4% 1% 2 - 1% 3,400 | | | | | | Jonas & Naumburg. 1% 1% 1% - 1% 10,600 | | | | | | Neptune Met, A. 8% 3% 8% + 5% 4,100 | | | | | |
| F E D Corp. 8% 4 5 - 2% 2,300 | | | | | | Jonas & Naum cv pf. 7% 2% 2% + 2% 3,100 | | | | | | Nestle Le Mur (m20c). 3% 1% 1% + 1% 300 | | | | | |
| *Fedders Mfg. A. 10% 5 8 + 4% 4,700 | | | | | | Jones & Laughlin Steel. 48 15% 26% - 11% 10,020 | | | | | | Nevada Cal El. 16 6 6 + 4% 440 | | | | | |
| *Federal Bake Sh. Inc. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 2,600 | | | | | | KAN CITY P S pf v t c, A. 1% 1% 1% - 1% 500 | | | | | | Nevada Cal El pf (4). 52 60% 60% + 20% 1,000 | | | | | |
| Federated Capital. 1% 1% 1% - 1% 200 | | | | | | Kingsbury Brew. 9% 1% 1% - 1% 33,600 | | | | | | New Bradford Oil (20c). 2% 1% 2% + 1% 50,600 | | | | | |
| Federated Cap cum pf. 14% 14% 14% + 4% 48,700 | | | | | | Kingsbury Brew. 9% 1% 1% - 1% 33,600 | | | | | | New Haven Clock. 5 2 3% + 2% 2,100 | | | | | |
| Fiat rcts (k94c%). 25 18% 23% + 4% 8,400 | | | | | | Kirkland Lake Gold (k3c). 3 1% 2% + 1% 55,600 | | | | | | New Jersey Zinc (2). 63% 47% 55% + 19% 47,225 | | | | | |
| Fidelio Brew. Inc. 2% 1% 1% - 1% 100 | | | | | | Kirkland Lake Gold (k10c). 3 1% 2% + 1% 55,600 | | | | | | New Mex & Ariz Ld. 2% 1% + 3% 42,200 | | | | | |
| *Film Inspect Mach. 2% 1% 1% + 1% 2,925 | | | | | | Kirkland Lake Gold (k3c). 3 1% 2% + 1% 55,600 | | | | | | Newmont Mining (k1). 57% 35% 38 + 14% 135,100 | | | | | |
| Fire Aaso (Phila) (2). 56% 41 56% + 21% 2,925 | | | | | | Kleinert Co. 14% 10% 14% + 3% 3,000 | | | | | | New Process Co (k1.50). 10% 10% 10% + 3% 100 | | | | | |
| Fist Rubber. 20% 6% 11% + 1% 52,100 | | | | | | Kleinert Co. 8% 5% 6% - 1% 3,400 | | | | | | N Y A Auction. 1% 1% 1% + 1% 4,200 | | | | | |
| Fish Rubber pf (6). 83 58 82 + 13% 17,7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—1934—Continued

| Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Ch'ge. | Year's Sales. | Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Ch'ge. | Year's Sales. | Stock and Dividend Rate. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net Ch'ge. | Year's Sales. | |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|--------|------------|---------------|---|-------------|-------|-------|------------|---------------|---------|
| *Pierce Governor | 3% | 1 | 1 1/2 | — | 1,400 | *Starrett Corp. | 1% | 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 36,350 | *Wil-Low Cafeteria pf. | 10% | 5 1/2 | — | 2% | 1,925 | |
| Pines Winterfront | 1 | 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 400 | *Starrett Corp pf. | 3% | 2 | 1 1/2 | — | 22,900 | Wilson Jones (k50c) | 17% | 11 | 17 | — | 2,900 | |
| *Pioneer G M, Ltd (80c) | 14% | 10% | 11 | — | 571,400 | Steel Co of Can (x2024) | 42 | 32 | 42 | +15% | 950 | Wise P & L pf (3 1/2) | 28% | 26 | 26 | +37% | 50 | |
| Pitney Bowes P (20c) | 51/2 | 2 | 5 | — | 98,300 | *Stein (A) & Co (k25c) | 11 | 7 | 10 | +5% | 3,321 | *Woodley Petroleum (20c) | 5% | 2% | 3% | +% | 20,100 | |
| Pitts & L E (2 1/2) | 81 | 55 | 55% | + 5% | 9,295 | *Stein (A) cu pf (6%) | 105 | 84% | 105 | +25 | 490 | Woolworth (FW), Ltd (k74c) | 29% | 23% | 28% | + 4% | 32,700 | |
| Pitts, Ben & L E (1 1/2) | 35% | 30% | 35% | + 6% | 525 | *Stein Cosmetics, Inc. | 24 | 14 | 14 | — | 109,900 | Woolworth (F W), Ltd pf | (k21 3-10c) | 7 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | + 7% | 70 |
| Pitts Forgings Co | 5 | 2 | 2 | — | 600 | Stetson (J B) | 11/4 | 7 1/2 | 11 1/2 | + 3% | 1,825 | Wright Harg (t60c) | 10% | 6 1/2 | 9 | + 2% | 1,374,300 | |
| Pitts Plate Glass (1 60) | 57% | 39 | 54 | 54% | +15% | 870,675 | Stinnes (Hugo) | 3 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 7,500 | *YUKON GOLD | % | % | % | + 1/2 | 112,300 |
| Pond Creek Poca (2) | 26 | 14 | 26 | + 15% | 2,200 | *Strooch & Co. | 8 | 4 1/2 | 7 | + 2% | 1,500 | Dividend rates in dollars based on last quarterly semi-annual payment. ^t Extra. ^f Plus 4% in stock. ^b Payable in cash or stock. ^c Payable in stock. ^d Plus 5% in stock. ^g Plus 8% in stock. ^h Payable in scrip. ⁱ Plus 8% in stock. ^k Paid this year—no regular rate. ^m Accumulated dividends paid this year. ⁿ Plus 10% in stock. ^p Paid last year—no regular rate. ^r Companies reported in receivership or being reorganized. ^s Stocks fully listed on the Curb Exchange; others are dealt in as unlisted issues. ^x Ex dividend. | | | | | | |
| *Potrore Sugar | 31/2% | 3% | 3% | — | 39,150 | *Stutz Motor Car | 10% | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 2% | 64,000 | | | | | | | |
| Powdrell & Alex. | 24 | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | + 12% | 3,400 | *Sun Investing | 5 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 4 | — | 10,040 | | | | | | | |
| Pow Corp of Can. | 14% | 8 | 9 1/2 | — | 3,025 | *Sun Investing pf | 41% | 35 | 41 | + 6% | 6,700 | | | | | | | |
| Pow Corp of Can 1st pf (6) | 64% | 64% | 64% | + 4% | 20 | *Sunray Oil | 2 | 11 | 1 1/2 | + 5% | 188,800 | | | | | | | |
| *Pratt & Lambert (1) | 33 | 17 | 30 | + 12 1/2 | 7,600 | *Sunshine Mng (t68c) | 13% | 7 1/2 | 12 1/2 | — | 341,800 | | | | | | | |
| Premier Gold (12c) | 1% | 1 | 1 1/2 | — | 314,700 | Swan Finch Oil | 4 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 3 1/2 | + 1/2 | 3,700 | | | | | | | |
| Prent Hall, Inc (1.40) | 11 | 9 1/2 | 11 | + 1 1/2 | 425 | Swift Intl (2) | 40 1/2 | 23 | 35 | + 7% | 291,900 | | | | | | | |
| *Properties Real v t c. | 15 1/2 | 14 | 14 1/2 | — | 1,210 | Swift & Co (75c) | 20% | 13 | 19 | + 4% | 778,200 | | | | | | | |
| Prod Royalty Corp (2 1/2) | % | 1/2 | 1/2 | — | 338,300 | *Swiss Am El pf | 49% | 32 | 44 | + 8 | 8,050 | | | | | | | |
| *Proper McCallum | 2% | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 52,500 | Swiss Oil Corp (k10c) | 3% | 1 | 2 1/2 | + 5% | 13,000 | | | | | | | |
| Provident Gas (80c) | 13% | 11 | 11 | + 3 1/2 | 175 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Prudential Inv | 8% | 5 | 5 | + 5% | 78,200 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Prudential Inv pf (6) | 87% | 61% | 82 | + 22 | 3,850 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Serv Ind pf | 5 | 5 | 5 | + 50 | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Serv Ind pr pf | 19 | 8 | 8 | + 4% | 400 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Serv Nor Ill (no par) | 20 | 10 | 17 1/2 | + 12 1/2 | 1,850 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Serv Nor Ill \$60 par. | 22 | 13 | 15 1/2 | + 19 1/2 | 1,300 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Serv Nor Ill \$6 pf (6) | 60% | 54 | 60% | + 9 1/2 | 375 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Sv Okla 6% pr II (6) | 54 | 54 | 54 | + 37 | 25 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pub Util Sec pr pf | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | + 2 | 250 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Puget Sd P & L \$5 pf | 20 | 8 1/2 | 14 | + 3 1/2 | 14,810 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Puget Sd P & L \$6 pf | 15% | 5 1/2 | 8 1/2 | + 3 | 16,120 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pure Oil pf | 63 | 33 1/2 | 43 | + 5 | 13,860 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pyrene Mfg | 3 1/2% | 1% | 3 1/2% | + 1 1/2 | 4,700 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| QUAKER OATS (+6) | 129% | 108 | 129 | + 11 | 2,370 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Quaker Oats pf (6) | 134 | 113 | 132 1/2 | + 19 1/2 | 1,170 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RAILROAD SHRS CORP | % | 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 22,100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rwy & Lt Sec | 11 | 5 1/2 | 6 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 5,250 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Rainbow Lum P, A | % | 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 6,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Rainbow Lum P, B | % | 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 3,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Railway & Util Inv, A | 1 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 17,000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Raymond Con pf (3) | 21 | 17 | 21 | + 1 | 300 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Raytheon Mfg | 4 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 10,400 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Red Bank | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 2,150 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reeves (Dan) (50c) | 16 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 9 1/2 | + 4 1/2 | 8,400 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Reiter-Foster | 1 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 31,700 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Reliable Stores | 6 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 5 1/2 | + 3 1/2 | 14,400 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reliance Int Corp, A | 3 1/2% | 1 | 1 | — | 16,400 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Reliance Management | 2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 2,900 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reybank Co | 3 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 | + 1 | 46,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reynolds Investing | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 132,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rice Stix Dry Goods (2) | 12 1/2 | 10 | 12 1/2 | + 3 1/2 | 8,000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Richfield Oil, Cal pf (r) | 4 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 86,600 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Richmond Radiator | 1 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 400 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Richmond Rad cv pf | 3 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 200 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Rike Kumler (1) | 20 | 11 1/2 | 20 | + 8 1/2 | 1,000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Roch G & E pf, D (6) | 75 | 75 | 75 | + 10 | 100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rolls-Royce, Ltd, rets (k64 7-10c) | 23 | 23 | 23 | + 5 | 100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Roosevelt Field, Inc. | 2 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 28,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Root Refining Co | 11 1/2 | 4 | 4 | + 2 | 2,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Root Ref cv pf pf | 8 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 4 | + 2 | 7,100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rossia Int'l Corp. | 9 1/2 | 4 | 4 | + 1/2 | 34,600 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Royal Typewriter | 19 1/2 | 9 | 18 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 15,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ruberoid Co (14 1/2c) | 45% | 20 | 40 | + 14 1/2 | 4,825 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Russells Fifth Ave | 10 | 4 1/2 | 5 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 7,800 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ryan Consolidated | 3 1/2% | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 34,900 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SAFETY CAR H & L (k3) | 83 | 50 | 65 | + 13 | 14,275 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Savoy Oil | 1 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 3,600 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *St Anthony Gold | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 252,700 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| St Lawrence Corp | 2 1/2 | 2 | 2 1/2 | — | 200 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| St Regis Paper pf | 5 1/2% | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 360,700 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| St Regis Paper pf | 50 | 20 | 24 1/2 | + 4 | 7,780 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Salt Creek Cone (k10c) | 1 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 21,300 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Salt Creek Prod (80c) | 7 1/2% | 5 1/2 | 6 | + 2 | 7,800 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Schiff (The) Co (2) | 40% | 17 1/2 | 33 | + 16 | 77,525 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Schulte Real Estate | 3 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 14,000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scovill Mfg (1) | 27 | 17 | 20 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 5,625 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Seaboard Util | 5 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 4 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 36,900 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Secur Corp gen | 4 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 4 1/2 | + 2 1/2 | 9,300 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Seaman Bros (14 1/2c) | 48 | 36 | 49 | + 10 1/2 | 7,200 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Segal Lock & Hdw | 1 | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 22,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Seiberling Rubber | 5 | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 | + 1 1/2 | 1,250 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Selby Shoe (t185) | 27 | 20 | 27 | + 6 | 3,500 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Selected Ind | 3 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | — | 110,100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Sel Ind all cfs (3 1/2c) | 62 1/2 | 40 | 49 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 24,850 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Sel Ind prior (3 1/2c) | 61 1/2 | 40 | 49 1/2 | + 9 1/2 | 10,075 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Selfridge Prov Stk (k9 3-5c) | 2 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 | + 1 | 6,800 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Sentry Safety Control | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | — | 11,800 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Seton Leather | 10% | 3 1/2 | 5 1/2 | + 4 | 47,900</ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—1934—Continued

| | High. | Low. | Last. | Net | Year's Sales. | | High. | Low. | Last. | Net | Year's Sales. | | High. | Low. | Last. | Net | Year's Sales. | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|--|---|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------------------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------|
| Conn Lt & P 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. B. 1954. | 112 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 106 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 111 | + 6 | 57,000 | | Interstate P S 5s. D. '56. | 64 | 47 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 52 | + 4 | 1,059,000 | | PAC COAST PW 5s. '40. | 100 | 77 | 100 | + 25 | 615,000 |
| Conn Lt & P 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. C. 1956. | 108 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 100 | 108 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,530,000 | | Interstate P S 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. F. '58. | 61 | 42 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 48 | + 5 | 1,916,000 | | Pac G & E 6s. B. '41. | 114 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 101 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 111 | + 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,058,000 |
| Conn Lt & P 5s. D. 1956. | 111 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 104 | 109 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 140,000 | | Inv Co of A 5s. A. '47. w. w. | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 67 | 86 | + 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 56,000 | | Pac G & E 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. C. '52. | 108 | 95 | 107 | + 10 | 2,423,000 |
| Conn Riv Pw 5s. A. 1952. | 105 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 91 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 2,894,000 | | Inv Co of A 5s. A. '47, x. w. | 90 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 67 | 90 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 22 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 197,000 | | Pac G & E 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. D. '55. | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 92 | 105 | + 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,580,000 |
| Conn Gas. Balt. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. '54. | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 102 | 114 | + 13 | 293,000 | | Ja-Neb L & P 5s. A. '57. | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 63 | 88 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,860,000 | | Pac G & E 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. F. '60. | 103 | 85 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 100 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 4,251,000 |
| Conn Gas El L & P 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. '35. stp. | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 100 | 100 $\frac{1}{2}$ | - 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 969,000 | | Iowa P & L 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1958. | 75 | 100 | 84 | + 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,460,000 | | Pac Inc 5s. A. '48. | 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 70 | 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 23 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 497,000 |
| Conn Gas El L & P of Balt. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. G. 1969. | 109 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 105 | 109 | + 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 149,000 | | Iowa Pub Sv 5s. 1957. | 87 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 58 | 82 | + 24 | 1,443,000 | | Pac Lt & Pow 5s. '52. | 104 | 110 | 110 | + 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57,000 |
| Conn Gas El L & P of Balt. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. H. 1970. | 110 | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 108 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 201,000 | | JACKSONVILLE GAS 5s. 1942. | 54 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 32 | 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 3 | 2,298,000 | | Pac Pow & Lt 5s. '55. | 60 | 35 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 19 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 7,276,000 |
| Conn Gas El L & P of Balt. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. I. 1981. | 108 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 93 | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 2,548,000 | | Jamaica Wat 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1955. | 108 | 100 | 64 | - | 167,000 | | Palmer Corp La 6s. '38. | 103 | 85 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 102 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 342,000 |
| Conn Gas El L & P of Balt. 5s. 1939. | 111 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 111 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 182,000 | | Jersey C P & L 5s. B. '47. | 104 | 83 | 102 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,623,000 | | Park & Tilford 6s. 1936. | 94 | 77 | 94 | + 18 | 10,000 |
| Conn Gas El L & P of Balt. 5s. 1958. | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 99 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,899,000 | | Ja-Neb L & P 5s. B. '61. | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 64 | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 23 | 589,000 | | Penn C Lt & P 5s. '77. | 88 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 59 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 88 | + 25 | 3,075,000 |
| Conn G El L & P 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. '35. stp. | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 100 | 100 $\frac{1}{2}$ | - 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 202,000 | | Iowa P & L 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1958. | 102 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 75 | 100 | + 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,460,000 | | Penn C Lt & P 5s. '79. | 96 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 71 | 93 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 261,000 |
| Conn Gas El Meehan Co 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. 1945. cv. | 9 | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 123,000 | | Iowa Pub Sv 5s. 1957. | 87 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 58 | 82 | + 24 | 1,443,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 |
| Crane Co 5s. 1940. | 102 | 88 | 102 | + 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,819,000 | | JACKSONVILLE GAS 5s. 1942. | 54 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 32 | 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 3 | 2,298,000 | | Penn O Ed 5s. A. '50. xw. | 74 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 46 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 65 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 20 | 1,142,000 |
| Crucible Steel 5s. 1940. | 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 73 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 24 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 2,106,000 | | Jamaica Wat 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1955. | 108 | 100 | 64 | - | 167,000 | | Penn O P & L 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. '54. | 105 | 79 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 23 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,927,000 |
| Cudahy Pack 5s. 1946. | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 106 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 458,000 | | Jersey C P & L 5s. B. '47. | 104 | 83 | 102 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,623,000 | | Penn Power 5s. 1956. | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 95 | 106 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 685,000 |
| Cudahy Pack 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. 1937. | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 98 | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 2,296,000 | | Ja-Neb L & P 5s. B. '61. | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 64 | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 23 | 589,000 | | Penn Pub Serv 6s. '47. C. 101. | 75 | 95 | 95 | + 22 | 303,000 |
| Cumb C. P & L 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. '56. | 57 | 36 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 44 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 11,111,000 | | Iowa P & L 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1958. | 102 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 75 | 100 | + 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,460,000 | | Penn Tel 5s. A. '54. | 93 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 71 | 93 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 261,000 |
| Cosgrove Meehan Co 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. 1945. cv. | 9 | 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 123,000 | | Iowa Pub Sv 5s. 1957. | 87 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 58 | 82 | + 24 | 1,443,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 |
| DALLAS P & L 6s. A. '49. | 110 | 104 | 110 | + 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 108,000 | | JACKSONVILLE GAS 5s. 1942. | 54 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 32 | 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 3 | 2,298,000 | | Penn O Ed 5s. B. '59. | 70 | 41 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 60 | + 20 | 1,907,000 |
| Dallas P & L 5s. C. 1952. | 106 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 99 | 105 | + 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 148,000 | | Jamaica Wat 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1955. | 108 | 100 | 64 | - | 167,000 | | Penn O P & L 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. '54. | 105 | 79 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 23 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,925,000 |
| Dayton P & L 5s. A. 1941. | 109 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,108,000 | | Jersey C P & L 5s. B. '47. | 104 | 83 | 102 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,623,000 | | Penn Power 5s. 1956. | 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 95 | 106 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 685,000 |
| Det El Pow 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. 1959. | 91 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 65 | 87 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 20 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 867,000 | | Ja-Neb L & P 5s. B. '61. | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 64 | 89 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 23 | 589,000 | | Penn Pub Serv 6s. '47. C. 101. | 75 | 95 | 95 | + 22 | 303,000 |
| Denver G & E 5s. 1949. | 106 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 92 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 10 | 435,000 | | Iowa P & L 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1947. | 86 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 60 | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 19 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 406,000 | | Penn Pub Serv 6s. '47. C. 101. | 75 | 95 | 95 | + 22 | 303,000 |
| Derby G & E 5s. 1946. | 85 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 83 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 818,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 86 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 58 | 73 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 406,000 | | Penn Tel 5s. A. '54. | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 86 | 103 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 45,000 |
| Det City Gas 6s. A. 1947. | 101 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 94 | 104 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,39,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 91 | 74 | 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 2,027,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 | |
| Det City Gas 6s. B. 1950. | 93 | 73 | 101 | + 14 | 1,39,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 91 | 74 | 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 2,027,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 | |
| Det Int Bridge 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. 1952. | 7 | 2 | 1 | + 1 | 217,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 91 | 74 | 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 2,027,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 | |
| Det Int Bridge 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. 1952. | 2 | % | 1 | + % | 157,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 91 | 74 | 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 2,027,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 | |
| Dixie Gulf G 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1937. | 70 | 103 | 101 | + 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,366,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 91 | 74 | 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 2,027,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 | |
| Dixie Gulf G 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ s. A. 1967. | 80 | 56 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 84 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 407,000 | | Kansas G & E 6s. A. 1947. | 91 | 74 | 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 2,027,000 | | Penn Elec 4s. F. 1971. | 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 57 | 76 | + 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1,639,000 | |
| FAIRBANKS-M. 5s. 1942. | 98 | 63 | 96 $\frac{1}{2}$ | + 34 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 988,000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Friday, January 18, 1935

THE ANNALIST

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—1934—Continued

| High. | Low. | Last. | Net | Year's Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Net | Year's Sales. |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|------------------|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|------------------|
| Tide Water 5s. A. '79 | 77 | 50 | 76% | +26% 8,324,000 | SAAR BASIN CON 7s. '35. 164% | 108 | 164% | +55% | 360,000 |
| Toledo Edison 5s. '62 | 106% | 86% | 105% | +17% 6,857,000 | Santa Fe 7s. 1945 | 50 | 19% | +29 | 204,000 |
| Twin City R T 5s. A. '52 | 58 | 23% | 45% | +21% 1,894,000 | Santiago 7s. 1949 | 13 | 5% | +4% | 582,000 |
| ULEN & CO 6s. 1944. st. | 52% | 38% | 49% | +9% 1,171,000 | Santiago 7s. 1961 | 13 | 6% | +4% | 412,000 |
| Un Am Inv 5s. A. '48 | 91 | 85 | 91 | +12% 59,000 | Sauda Falls 5s. A. 1955 | 110% | 103% | 110% | 974,000 |
| Union Elec 4 1/2s. 1957 | 106% | 92 | 105% | +12% 1,204,000 | Saxon Pub Wks 6s. 1937 | 72% | 36 | -21% | 278,000 |
| Union Elec 5s. A. 1954 | 108 | 101 | 108 | +6% 58,000 | Stinnes (H) 7s. 1936. st. | 58 | 32 | +5% | 348,000 |
| Union Elec 5s. B. 1967 | 106% | 95% | 106% | +11% 472,000 | Stinnes (H) 7s. 1946. st. | 55 | 26 | +4% | 558,000 |
| Union Gulf 5s. 1950 | 106 | 101% | 13% | +1% 2,447,000 | Stinnes (H) 7s. 1946. stp. | 51 | 33 | +4% | 560,000 |
| United Elec N J 4s. '49 | 109 | 100 | 109% | +8% 488,000 | Stinnes (H) 7s. 1946. stp. | 50 | 25 | +34% | -6% 1,171,000 |
| United L & P 5 1/2s. 1959 | 80% | 50 | 78% | +28% 630,000 | STOCK. | | | | |
| United L & P 6s. 1975 | 52% | 27% | 32% | +4% 1,269,000 | DETROIT AIRCRAFT | 5/8 | 6 | 7/8 | +1/8 84,300 |
| United L & P 6 1/2s. 1974 | 58 | 31 | 35% | +4% 1,135,000 | Deisel-Wem-Gilbert | 12 1/2 | 10 | 12 1/2 | +4% 1,300 |
| United L & P Rys 5 1/2s. '52 | 56% | 35% | 42% | +6% 4,513,000 | Devonian Oil | 12 1/2 | 10 | 12 1/2 | +28% 200 |
| United L & P Rys 6s. A. '52 | 85 | 56 | 83 | +34% 1,298,000 | Dow Chemical old | 102 | 69% | 101 1/2 | +28% 28,900 |
| United L & P Rys 6s. A. '73 | 52 | 28% | 34% | +6% 710,000 | Dow Chemical pf | 110 | 107 | 110 | +5% 220 |
| U S Rubber 6s. 1936 | 103 | 90 | 102 | +12% 974,000 | EAST UTIL ASSO. | 21 | 14 | 19 | +4% 2,050 |
| U S Rubber 6s. 1935 | 101% | 89% | 100% | +13% 1,792,000 | East Util Asso conv. | 4% | 2% | 3% | +1% 5,500 |
| U S Rubber 6s. 1936 | 101 | 77 | 100% | +25% 1,355,000 | Electric House Util. | 9% | 9% | 9% | -2% 100 |
| U S Rubber 6 1/2s. 1937 | 100 | 70% | 99% | +30% 461,000 | Emerson's B S. Inc. A. nv | 21 | 19% | 20% | +1% 275 |
| U S Rubber 6 1/2s. 1938 | 99% | 69% | 98% | +30% 433,000 | Emerson's B S. Inc. B. | 19 1/2 | 17 | 18 1/2 | +1% 1,000 |
| U S Rubber 6 1/2s. 1939 | 99 | 69% | 99 | +30% 474,000 | FANNY FAR CAN old | 28 | 11 1/2 | 28 | +17% 200 |
| U S Rubber 6 1/2s. 1940 | 99% | 68 | 98% | +28% 534,000 | FEDERAL MOGUL | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | -% 400 |
| Utah Pw & L 4 1/2s. 1944 | 75 | 54% | 63 | +1% 414,000 | Fits Simons & Con D & D | 13 1/2 | 13 1/2 | 13 1/2 | -% 16,200 |
| Utah Pw & L 6s. A. 2022 | 67 1/2 | 46 1/2 | 54 1/2 | +7% 686,000 | Franklin Mfg | 2 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | +1% 2,450 |
| Utica G & E 5s. D. 1956 | 105 | 94 | 104% | +11% 202,000 | Franklin Mfg pf | 8 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | -% 50 |
| Utica G & E 5s. E. 1952 | 105 | 93 | 104% | +11% 158,000 | GOLD SEAL EL old | 3/8 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | +2% 136,900 |
| VALVOLINE OIL 7s. '37 | 92 | 75 | 92 | +17% 48,000 | Gorham Mfg v t c. | 19 | 12 1/2 | 15 1/2 | +2% 18,800 |
| Va El & Pw 5s. A. 1955 | 106% | 89 | 105% | +16% 1,443,000 | HACHMEISTER-LIND | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | +1/2 2,300 |
| Va Pub Svc 5 1/2s. 1946 | 70 | 47% | 57 | +10% 519,000 | Hart Schaffner & Marx | 20 | 17 | 20 | -% 190 |
| Va Pub Svc 5 1/2s. A. 1946 | 80 | 55% | 73% | +18% 1,792,000 | Humble Oil old | 100% | 100% | 100% | +1/2 100 |
| Va Pub Svc 5s. B. 1950 | 76 | 51 | 70 | +18% 1,021,000 | Hygrade Sylvan cv pf | 75 | 72 | 73 | -2% 50 |
| WALDORF-AST 7s. 1954 | 20 | 4% | 9 | -4% 625,000 | INDUS RAYON n. | 30 1/2 | 22 1/2 | 24 1/2 | -% 3,900 |
| Waldorf-Ast 7s. '54. c. d. | 16 | 2 | 10 | -4% 677,000 | Interlake S S. | 24 | 24 | 24 | -% 675 |
| Ward Baking 6s. 1937 | 105% | 96% | 105% | +8% 852,000 | Intl Prop. Ltd. A. | 34% | 34% | 34% | -% 100 |
| Wash Gas Lt 5s. 1958 | 101% | 79 | 101% | +24% 2,725,000 | Irving Air Chute war. | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | -15-64 12,500 |
| Wash Ry & El Co 4s. '51 | 100 | 83% | 99% | +16% 292,000 | Isle Royale Copper | 2 1/2 | 2 | 2 | -% 300 |
| Wash Wat Pow 5s. '60 | 90 | 66 | 11 | -11% 897,000 | KALAMAZOO STOVE | 23 | 23 | 23 | -% 50 |
| West Penn 5s. 2030 | 71 | 55 | 84 | +24% 64,000 | Katz Drug Co. | 32 1/2 | 22 | 32 | +10% 575 |
| West Penn Tr Co 5s. 60 | 87 | 61 | 88 | +17% 3,819,000 | LOS ANGELS G&E pf. | 93 | 93 | 93 | +7% 50 |
| West Tex Util 5s. A. '57 | 67% | 46 | 62% | +17% 752,000 | MANNING-BOWM. B. | 3/8 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -% 100 |
| West Un G & E 5 1/2s. '55 | 92% | 65 | 91% | +23% 2,028,000 | Mathieson Alkali 2d paid | 35 1/2 | 26 | 26 | -% 22,600 |
| Westvaco Chlo 5 1/2s. 1937 | 104% | 104% | 104% | -% 123,000 | Meadow Mfg | 3/4 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -% 100 |
| Wheeling Elec 5s. '41 | 107 | 102% | 107 | +6% 47,000 | Merchants & Min Trans. | 34 | 32 1/2 | 32 1/2 | +12% 225 |
| Wisc Elec Pow 5s. A. '54 | 106 | 90 | 106 | +6% 315,000 | Mergenthaler Lino | 27 | 25 | 27 | -% 125 |
| Wisc Minn L & P 5s. '44 | 94% | 64 | 94 | +29% 931,000 | Midland United | 1 | 1 | 1 | -% 200 |
| Wisc P & L 5s. A. '56 | 83% | 58 | 76 | +17% 526,000 | Minneapolis Honey pf. | 107 | 87 | 104 1/2 | +16% 600 |
| Wisc P & L 5s. F. 1958 | 83 | 53 | 79% | +15% 462,000 | Modine Mfg | 13 1/2 | 11 | 13 1/2 | -1/2 50 |
| Wisc Pub Svc 6s. A. 1952 | 99 | 78% | 97% | +15% 398,000 | Monongahela W P S pf. | 15 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 15 1/2 | +3% 300 |
| YADKIN RIV PW 5s. '41 | 98 | 66 | 94% | +27% 433,000 | NAT AMERICAN CO. | 3/8 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -% 34,300 |
| YORK Rys 5s. 1937 | 100 | 76 | 95 | +25% 1,628,000 | Nat Screen Service | 16 1/2 | 14 | 14 | +1% 300 |
| FOREIGN BONDS. | | | | | Nat Standard | 28 | 28 | 28 | +6% 100 |
| BADEN 7s. 1951 | 52% | 22 | 26% | -8% 471,000 | Nat Steel Corp warrants | 9 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -5% 50 |
| Bogota M B 7s. '47. M & N 27 | 15 | 23% | 15% | +8% 138,000 | Nat Tile | 2 1/2 | 1 | 2 | +1/2 600 |
| Bogota M B 7s. '47. A & O 25 | 16 | 23% | 16% | +8% 221,000 | Nat Toll "A" | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 | -1/2 40,475 |
| Buenos Aires 7s. 1952. st. | 64% | 56% | 64 | -1% | Natomas Corp (old) | 100 | 72 1/2 | 90 | -% 150 |
| Buenos Aires 7s. 1952. '47. st. | 68% | 29% | 67% | -1% | New Amsterdam Cas. | 13 | 11 | 11 | +1% 14,300 |
| CAUCA VAL COL 7s. 1948 | 16 | 8 | 11 1/2 | +3% 547,000 | Newberry (J J) pf. | 95 | 92 | 94 1/2 | +14% 500 |
| Cent B Gmy 6s. A. 1952 | 70 | 30 | 41% | -3% 1,023,000 | New England Grain | 28 | 22 | 28 | +2% 2,250 |
| Cent B Gmy 6s. B. 1951 | 73 | 30 | 48 | -5% 444,000 | New Orleans P Ser pf. | 18 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 9 1/2 | -% 190,100 |
| *Cent Ger Pow 6s. 1932 | 83 | 63% | 37 1/2 | 39 1/2 | Niag Hud Pw "C" war. | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -% 518,200 |
| Chile Mtg Bk 6s. 1931 | 16% | 85% | 12% | +4% 788,000 | Nitrate Corp of Chile "B" | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -% 5,440 |
| Col Ag M B 7s. 1933-1946 | 30% | 18% | 30 | +10% 41,000 | Novadev Agene (old) | 68 1/2 | 57 | 68 1/2 | +11% 40,000 |
| Col Ag M B 7s. 1934-1946 | 37% | 19% | 37 | +17% 117,000 | OHIO COPPER | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | -% 150,900 |
| Col Ag M B 7s. 1934-1947 | 37% | 19% | 37 | +17% 197,000 | Oklahoma Nat Gas pf. | 5 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 5 1/2 | +1% 200 |
| Comz & P Bk 5 1/2s. 1937 | 62 1/2 | 33 | 37 1/2 | -15% 2,687,000 | PATTERSON SARGENT | 19 1/2 | 15 | 17 1/2 | -% 650 |
| Cuban Tel 7 1/2s. A. 1941 | 80% | 50 | 69% | +4% 369,000 | Petroleum Corp warrants | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | -% 112,600 |
| Cuban Tobacco 5s. 1944 | 50 | 35 | 45 | +8% 49,000 | Philip Morris pf "A" | 28 1/2 | 19 | 25 1/2 | +5% 3,100 |
| DANISH MUN 5s. 1953 | 93 | 62% | 90% | +26% 287,000 | Prentice Hall pt conv. | 32 | 21 | 27 | +7% 1,100 |
| Danish Mun 5 1/2s. 1955 | 98% | 79% | 97% | +24% 493,000 | RELIANCE MFG. | 18 | 15 1/2 | 18 | +4% 900 |
| Danzig Pt & W 6 1/2s. 1952 | 75 | 44 | 67 | +21% 1,476,000 | Richman Bros. | 50 | 44 1/2 | 45 | +1% 475 |
| Denmark Mtg B 5s. 1972 | 92 | 75 | 91% | +18% 376,000 | Ryerson (J) | 18 | 16 | 18 | +3% 200 |
| ERCOLE MARELLI 6 1/2s. | 88 | 67 | 67 1/2 | +1/2 321,000 | SCOTTEN DILLON | 18 1/2 | 18 1/2 | 18 1/2 | +1% 400 |
| A. 1953 | 100% | 80 | 89 | +9% 1,250,000 | Silver King Coalition | 12 1/2 | 8 | 10 1/2 | +1% 800 |
| Euro El 6 1/2s. '65 xw. | 100% | 28 | 50% | +21% 833,000 | Sisto Financial Corp. | 9 | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | +1% 200 |
| Euro M & In 7s. C. 1957 | 54 | 28 | 50% | +21% 2,000 | So'west Bell Tel pf. | 117 1/2 | 117 1/2 | 117 1/2 | +1/4 20 |
| ERCOLE MARELLI 6 1/2s. | 88 | 67 | 67 1/2 | +1/2 321,000 | So'west Gas & Elec pf. | 56 1/2 | 45 1/2 | 56 1/2 | +16% 25 |
| A. 1953 | 100% | 80 | 89 | +9% 1,250,000 | So'west Lt & Pow pf. | 22 | 22 | 22 | -12% 691,900 |
| Euro M & In 7s. C. 1957 | 54 | 28 | 50% | +21% 2,000 | Stand Oil of Indiana | 32 1/2 | 25 | 27 | -5% 691,900 |
| FARMERS NAT M 7s. '63 | 55% | 42 | 54 1/2 | +13% 69,000 | TIME AXLE DETR pf. | 70 | 69 | 69 | -24% 100 |
| Finland R M B 5s. '61 | 86 | 99% | 97% | -1% 971,000 | Torrington Co. | 53 | 50 | 53 | +3% 375 |
| Finland R M B 5s. 1961 | 100 | 73% | 100 | +26% 1,046,000 | | | | | |

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets—1934

San Francisco

STOCK EXCHANGE.

STOCKS.

Sales High. Low. Last.

28,526 Alaska Juneau. 23% 17 18%
268 Alaska Packers 86% 70 86%

34,934 Ang Cal Nat Bt 14% 84 11%

22,716 Asoc Ins Fund. 2% 1 1%

92 Associated Off. 40% 35 40%

15,021 Atm Ind Co A 2% 2 5%

2,741 Bk of Cal N 12% 12 14%

122,365 Byron Jackson. 8 3% 7 14%

79,503 Calamba Sug. 25% 18 18%

11,472 Do 7% pf. 21 19 21 14%

1,063 Calaveras Cmt. 1 1 1 1%

61 Do 7% pf. 47% 30 32

37,961 Calif Copper. 12% 10 10%

9,111 Calif Co. Min. 12% 4% 10%

3,576 Calif Ink A. 30 20 24

341 Cal P T 7% pf. 45 26 26

154,761 Calif Packing. 43% 19 24%

482 Cal Wat Ser pf 74 59 63

3,082 Cal Ws L. In. 14 9 10

1,770 Di Giorgio Fr. 22% 16 22%

3,121 Emery Oil W. 12 12 18

26,192 Empor. Campbell. 5 6

2,461 Fireman's F Ind 30 18% 26

14,681 Fireman's F Ins 73 47% 72

309 First Nat Cpt. 20% 15 20%

110,330 Food Mach. 21% 10% 21%

1,332 Fost & Kieh. 3 4 1

2,147 Gall Mer Laun 36% 31% 36%

3,681 Gen Paint A. 16% 6% 16%

8,570 Ge B. 3 1 2

13,717 Golden C. 7% 4% 6

16,150 Haink Pine. 5% 5% 20%

5,945 Do pf. 22 4% 20

6,727 Hale Bros. St. 11% 8 10

5,679 Hawaiian C & S 52 40 42

3,647 Home F&M Ins 33% 25% 33%

27,180 Honolulu Oll. 15% 10% 15%

1,171 Hunt Plant. 28 23% 25%

718 Do pf. 50 50 50

24,165 Hunt Bros. A. 10% 9% 9%

5,658 Hutch Sugar Pl 11 7 81%

1,022 Investors Assoc. 7 4% 6%

5,653 Jantzen K Mills. 8 5% 5%

10,987 Langend U B A 14% 8 8

6,698 Do B. 5 2 2

10,401 Leslie-Cal Salt. 28 21 25

2,993 L & E & pf. 75 81 81

3,669 Lyons-Maga. A. 11 6% 7

3,259 Do pf. 4 1% 1%

100 Leighton Ind A. 14 7% 12

1,093 Do pf. 40 17 40

532 Do 54% pf. 30 17 30

43,533 N Am Oil Cons 10% 7% 9%

1,318 Occidental Ins. 22 14% 22

10,057 Oliver Un F A 14% 6 13

13,347 Do B. 4% 1% 2%

907 Paauhau Sug. 5 4 4%

39,414 Natomas 100 61 92%

28,177 Do new 10% 7% 8%

1,093 Do pf. 40 17 40

532 Do 54% pf. 30 17 30

43,533 N Am Oil Cons 10% 7% 9%

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1,318 Occidental Ins. 22 14% 22

10,057 Oliver Un F A 14% 6 13

13,347 Do B. 4% 1% 2%

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1,318 Occidental Ins. 22 14% 22

10,057 Oliver Un F A 14% 6 13

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532 Do 54% pf. 30 17 30

43,533 N Am Oil Cons 10% 7% 9%

1,318 Occidental Ins. 22 14% 22

10,057 Oliver Un F A 14% 6 13

13,347 Do B. 4% 1% 2%

907 Paauhau Sug. 5 4 4%

39,414 Natomas 100 61 92%

28,177 Do new 10% 7% 8%

1,093 Do pf. 40 17 40

532 Do 54% pf. 30 17 30

43,533 N Am Oil Cons 10% 7% 9%

1,318 Occidental Ins. 22 14% 22

10,057 Oliver Un F A 14% 6 13

13,347 Do B. 4% 1% 2%

907 Paauhau Sug. 5 4 4%

39,414 Natomas 100 61 92%

28,177 Do new 10% 7% 8%

1,093 Do pf. 40 17 40

532 Do 54% pf. 30 17 30

43,533 N Am Oil Cons 10% 7% 9%

1,318 Occidental Ins. 22 14% 22

10,057 Oliver Un F A

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets—1934—Continued

| Toronto | | | | Toronto—Cont'd | | | | Toronto—Cont'd | | | | Toronto—Cont'd | | | | Pittsburgh | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------|------|-------|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| STOCK EXCHANGE. STOCKS. | | | | STOCK EXCHANGE. STOCKS. | | | | MINING DIVISION STOCKS. | | | | MINING DIVISION CURB | | | | STOCKS. | | | |
| Sales | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales | High. | Low. | Last. |
| 97,553 Abitibi | 24 | 3 | 14 | 35 Wood A&J pf. | 24 | 24 | 24 | 26,255 Dome Exp | 14 | 6 | 7 | 1,087,909 Pawnee Kirk. | .06 | .01 | .02 | 80 A. M. Byers pf | 58 | 57 | 57 |
| 9,999 Do pf. | 11 | 3 | 4 ^{1/2} | 1,476 Zimmerknit | 64 | 5 | 4 | 2,567,159 Eldorado | .43 | .86 | .12 | 321,760 Dom Orelle. | 1.40 | .40 | .48 | 2,570 Allegh Steel. | 22% | 16 | 20 |
| 285 Alta Pac Gr. | 5 | 3 | 3 | 299 Do pf. | 77 | 32 | 77 | 648,000 Fabry P. | .01 ^{1/2} | .004 | .01 ^{1/2} | 2,475,422 Forc Crow. | .08 ^{1/2} | .01 ^{1/2} | .03 ^{1/2} | 135 Do pf. | 100 | 90 | 100 |
| 2,377 Do pf. | 15 | 14 | 15 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 317,235 Falc'nb gr. | .15 | 3.05 | .345 | 145,800 Forcup G. R. | .02 | .002 | .01 ^{1/2} | 725 Alum Gds Mfg. | 10 ^{1/2} | 9 ^{1/2} | 10 ^{1/2} |
| 440 Amax Ryanamid | 15 ^{1/2} | 15 ^{1/2} | 15 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 2,180,840 Ferk Kirk. | .11 ^{1/2} | .01 ^{1/2} | .02 | 1,318,400 Pottersol | .03 | .002 | .005 ^{1/2} | 525 Am. Fruit Grow. | 1 | 1 | 1 ^{1/2} |
| 269 Do B. | 15 | 14 | 15 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 323 Dom | | | | 323 Dom | | | |
| 200 Assoc Qual Can | 47 | 15 | 39 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 750 Am Wd Glass | .15 ^{1/2} | .11 | .13 | 750 Am Wd Glass | .15 ^{1/2} | .11 | .13 |
| 100 Asbestos | 57 | 54 | 54 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 608 Ark Nat Gas. | 3 | 1 | 1 | 608 Ark Nat Gas. | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 52 Barcelona | 16 ^{1/2} | 15 | 16 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 964 Do pf. | 3% | 2 | 2 ^{1/2} | 964 Do pf. | 3% | 2 | 2 ^{1/2} |
| 62,873 Beaumarnois | 9 | 3 | 5 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 26,873 Armstrong C. K. | 26% | 14 | 23 ^{1/2} | 1,700,100 Ribago. | .02% | .002 | .01 ^{1/2} |
| 2,459 Beatty Bros. | 10 | 6 | 10 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 1,20,150 Ritchie | .05 ^{1/2} | .01 ^{1/2} | .01 ^{1/2} | 1,20,150 Ritchie | .05 ^{1/2} | .01 ^{1/2} | .01 ^{1/2} |
| 556 Do pf. | 88 ^{1/2} | 88 | 86 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 50 Auto Finance. | 10 | 10 | 10 | 50 Auto Finance. | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 18,010 Bell Telephone | 12 | 11 | 12 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 30,167 Blaw Knox. | 18 ^{1/2} | 6 | 11 ^{1/2} | 30,167 Blaw Knox. | 18 ^{1/2} | 6 | 11 ^{1/2} |
| 3,822 Bell Robson | 6 | 3 | 3 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 31 Calorizing pf. | .3% | 3 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} | 31 Calorizing pf. | .3% | 3 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} |
| 2,710 Do f. | 22 | 22 | 26 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 183,213 Carnegie Met. | 3 | 0 | 0 ^{1/2} | 183,213 Carnegie Met. | 3 | 0 | 0 ^{1/2} |
| 5,470 Clark Corp pf. | 28 | 22 | 26 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 300 Cent On St Rd. | .25 | .24 | .24 | 300 Cent On St Rd. | .25 | .24 | .24 |
| 305,343 Brazilian Tract | 14 ^{1/2} | 7 ^{1/2} | 10 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 1,180,000 Tidewater | .12 ^{1/2} | .9 | .9 ^{1/2} | 1,180,000 Tidewater | .12 ^{1/2} | .9 | .9 ^{1/2} |
| 388,736 Brew & Distill. | 2,95 | .55 | .65 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 43,979 Col Gas & Elec. | 19 | 6 ^{1/2} | 6 ^{1/2} | 43,979 Col Gas & Elec. | 19 | 6 ^{1/2} | 6 ^{1/2} |
| 4,490 C B Power A. | 32 ^{1/2} | 23 ^{1/2} | 28 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 630 Crand. M'K & H | 4% | 4 | 4 ^{1/2} | 630 Crand. M'K & H | 4% | 4 | 4 ^{1/2} |
| 8,678 Build Products | 26 ^{1/2} | 16 | 26 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 3,820 D. L. Clark. | .6% | 3 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} | 3,820 D. L. Clark. | .6% | 3 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} |
| 11,043 Burt F. N. | 34 ^{1/2} | 21 | 34 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 19,080 Devonian Oil. | 18 | 9 | 10 ^{1/2} | 19,080 Devonian Oil. | 18 | 9 | 10 ^{1/2} |
| 37,342 Canada Bread. | 2 | 2 | 3 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 380 Duff Norton Mf. | 12 | 9 ^{1/2} | 10 ^{1/2} | 380 Duff Norton Mf. | 12 | 9 ^{1/2} | 10 ^{1/2} |
| 1,166 Do pf. | 66 | 23 | 66 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 11,441 Duquesne Brew. | 5 | 2 | 3 ^{1/2} | 11,441 Duquesne Brew. | 5 | 2 | 3 ^{1/2} |
| 1,231 Do pf. | 21 | 8 | 20 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 22,074 Do Class A. | .6% | 4 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 22,074 Do Class A. | .6% | 4 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} |
| 201,070 Can Cement. | 12 | 4 | 7 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 897 Elec Products. | .3% | 2 ^{1/2} | 3 | 897 Elec Products. | .3% | 2 ^{1/2} | 3 |
| 21,443 Do pf. | 61 | 33 | 58 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 4,045 Fol'bee Bra pf | 30 | 5 | 11 | 4,045 Fol'bee Bra pf | 30 | 5 | 11 |
| 760 Can Steamship. | 2,75 | 14 | 20 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 74,713 Fort Pitt Brew. | 2% | 1 ^{1/2} | 2 ^{1/2} | 74,713 Fort Pitt Brew. | 2% | 1 ^{1/2} | 2 ^{1/2} |
| 2,502 Do pf. | 9 | 3 | 7 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 10,888 Harb-Walk Ref. | 24 | 14 ^{1/2} | 17 ^{1/2} | 10,888 Harb-Walk Ref. | 24 | 14 ^{1/2} | 17 ^{1/2} |
| 417 Can Wire & C. | 25 ^{1/2} | 18 | 19 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 787 Jones & Lau pf | 75 | 47 ^{1/2} | 52 | 787 Jones & Lau pf | 75 | 47 ^{1/2} | 52 |
| 808 Do B. | 13 ^{1/2} | 9 | 13 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 8,607 Allen Indust. | .8% | 7 ^{1/2} | 8 ^{1/2} | 8,607 Allen Indust. | .8% | 7 ^{1/2} | 8 ^{1/2} |
| 55 Can Batteries. | 6 ^{1/2} | 5 | 6 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 4,382 Karp's G & E pf | 85 | 75 | 85 | 4,382 Karp's G & E pf | 85 | 75 | 85 |
| 746 Do f. | 18 | 8 | 18 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 5,679 Apex Elect. | .8% | 3 ^{1/2} | 4 ^{1/2} | 5,679 Apex Elect. | .8% | 3 ^{1/2} | 4 ^{1/2} |
| 10,360 Can Canners. | 9 | 5 | 7 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 2,185 McKinney Mfg. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2,185 McKinney Mfg. | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 3,359 Do 1st pf. | 94 | 75 | 94 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 15,796 Mesta Machine | 33 | 17 ^{1/2} | 25 ^{1/2} | 15,796 Mesta Machine | 33 | 17 ^{1/2} | 25 ^{1/2} |
| 20,654 Do 2d pf. | 105 | 5 | 87 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 1,215,000 Nat Fireproo | .1% | 1 ^{1/2} | 2 ^{1/2} | 1,215,000 Nat Fireproo | .1% | 1 ^{1/2} | 2 ^{1/2} |
| 25,623 Canad Car & F. | 98 | 34 | 100 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 1,200 Brown F&W | 3% | 2 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} | 1,200 Brown F&W | 3% | 2 ^{1/2} | 3 ^{1/2} |
| 5,114 Do pf. | 17 ^{1/2} | 11 | 16 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 61,600 Bulky Bldg pf | 2 | 1 | 1 | 61,600 Bulky Bldg pf | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 41,492 Canad Dredg. | 34 ^{1/2} | 17 | 23 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 395 Berys Mach. A. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 395 Berys Mach. A. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9 Do f. | 110 | 100 | 100 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 30 Canfield Oil. | .45 | .45 | .45 | 30 Canfield Oil. | .45 | .45 | .45 |
| 132 Canad Gen. Elec. | 124 ^{1/2} | 104 | 134 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 5,962 Pitt Brewing. | 5 | 4 | 4 ^{1/2} | 5,962 Pitt Brewing. | 5 | 4 | 4 ^{1/2} |
| 4,229 Canad Ind. Alco | 20 | 54 | 54 | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 1,282,876 Lone Star Gas. | .8% | 4 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} | 1,282,876 Lone Star Gas. | .8% | 4 ^{1/2} | 5 ^{1/2} |
| 4,411 Do B. | 19 ^{1/2} | 4 | 5 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 1,215,000 San Tel. Min. | .02 | .02 | .02 | 1,215,000 San Tel. Min. | .02 | .02 | .02 |
| 94 Canad Loco. | 12 | 1 | 1 ^{1/2} | 1,653 Canada | 584 | 53 | 55 | 1,918,925 Preston | | | | 14,200 San Tel. Min. | .02 | .02</td | | | | | |

Friday, January 18, 1935

THE ANNALIST

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets—1934—Continued

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Detroit STOCKS

Sales High. Low. Last.

184,388 Auto City Brew 4% 1% 1%

25,382 Auto Fan & B 2% 1% 1%

2,028 Bow. Rub. A. n. 6% 4% 6%

2,563 Do A. orig. 9% 3% 3%

19,065 Do B 1% 1% 1%

14,101 Do Bends Avia. 23 12% 12%

1,733 Bohn Alum. & B 65 51% 51% 51%

72,129 Bow Roll Bear 17% 9% 17%

87,836 Briggs Mfg 12% 12% 26%

11,185 Chrysler Add Mch 19% 11% 15%

1,582 Cans Paper 59% 30% 40%

12,138 Com. Motors 2% 1% 1%

872 Crown-McC 2% 1% 1%

14,554 Diesel W. Gl. 11% 4% 10%

15,604 Det. & Cl. Nav. 3% 1% 1%

9,072 Det. Edison 62% 62% 69%

34,747 Det. Gr Ir. Fdry 3% 1% 1%

33,868 Det. Mich. Stove 2% 1% 1%

450 Dolph P&V. A 3% 1% 1%

400 Do P. 3% 1% 1%

1,875 Eaton Mfg 2% 1% 1%

64,082 Eureka Vac. 14% 15% 18%

32,888 Fed. Mogul 7% 10% 10%

55,460 Fed. Mot. Truck 8% 3% 5%

9,381 Fed. Screw Wk 5% 2% 5%

19,171 Fed. M. Can. A 28% 15% 28%

5,039 Hoover Ball 3% 1% 1%

3,427 Hoskins Mfg. 21% 11% 21%

18,023 Hou. Hrd. A. 32 11% 32%

90,944 Huds. Mot. Car. 24 6% 24%

76,063 Kermath Mfg. 1% 1% 1%

11,497 Kittery Fdry Mfg. 22% 13% 21%

1,457 Maken. (R. C.) 1% 1% 1%

2,987 McLean Mfg. 6% 4% 5%

700 Mich. St. B. 2% 2% 2%

180 Mich. St. Tb. P. 3% 3% 3%

9,304 Do P. 2% 1% 1%

43,807 Motor Prod. 4% 2% 2%

41,922 Motor Wheel. 43 16% 28%

108,492 Murray Corp. 16% 7% 10%

3,556 Nat. Steel Investors 2% 1% 1%

630 Outboard Mot. A. 56% 46% 47%

1,625 Do B. 1% 2% 2%

186,435 Packard Mot. 6% 2% 2%

90,666 Pack. D. & Co. 33% 22% 4%

14,993 Parker Rust-P. 43 43% 55%

500 Do 52 gen imp. 1933-1975 106% 102% 105%

16,000 Ball. Sp. Pt. Ch. 1922-1946 104% 104% 104%

9,500 Do 45-52 sch. 1925-1948 103% 101% 103%

1,100 Do 45-52 sch. 1925-1948 105% 100% 105%

17,000 Do 45 coup. 1933-1968 105% 101% 105%

9,000 Do 52 gen imp. 1933-1975 106% 102% 105%

12,000 Do 55. 1925- 25 16% 25%

1,000 Cons. Gas 1925- 25 15 24%

7,000 Danville Tr. & Pr. 1925- 32 32 32

5,000 Davison Realty 1940 29% 27 29%

2,000 Fair & Clarks 1942 20 12% 20

12,800 Cent. Parkway 1942 15 11% 15

4,000 Cent. Ry. 1956 80 45 80

4,000 Cent. Ry. 1956 80 45 80

1,000 Cons. Gas 1943 12 14% 14%

5. 95. 1943 106 106 106

2,000 Cons. Coal 4% 2% 2%

183,866 Rickel & Co. 5% 2% 2%

53,435 Riv. Raisin Pap. 3% 2% 2%

25,383 Scotten Dist. 21% 17% 20%

5,545 Soc. Nat. Inv. 4% 1% 1%

107 Do p. 40% 37% 37%

8,497 Square D. A. 21 4% 20%

3,377 Young Sp. & W. 8 1% 1%

6,918 Stearns & Co. (Fred's) 11% 4% 8%

461 Third Nat. Inv. 19% 1% 1%

57,940 Timken-Det. Ax. 8% 4% 4%

169,184 Tisholz Brewing 9% 9% 9%

19,139 Truscon Steel. 9% 3% 4%

20,744 Unit. Shirk Dist. 4% 1% 1%

625 U S Radiator. 2% 1% 1%

105 Do p. 2% 1% 1%

20,219 Univ. Cooler. 8% 8% 8%

1,443 Univ. Prod. 9% 4% 5%

396 Walks & Co. units 7% 6% 7%

154,482 Whitman & Bas. 3% 2% 2%

3,088 Wolverine Port Cm. 3% 1% 1%

200 Wolverine Port Cm. 4% 4% 4%

16,257 Young Sp. & W. (La.) 21% 13% 20%

*UNLISTED

*Removed from list in 1934.

Baltimore STOCKS

Sales High. Low. Last.

91,826 Air & Tool. 8% 3% 7%

2,920 Appalachian 18% 13% 10%

34,893 Arundel 18% 13% 10%

2,163 At C. L. (Conn.) 45% 11% 15%

1,600 At C. L. Line RR 49 49 49

631 Ball. Tube 4% 24% 25%

320 Do p. 25 12% 25%

30,795 Blaw. & Deck. 8% 4% 8%

1,120 Chas. & P. T. 1940 24% 8%

13,158 Cons. G E L & F 11% 11% 11%

4,688 Do 5% 10% 8%

526 Do 6% pf. 11% 10% 10%

1,828 East Port Sug. 3 1% 1%

249 East Br. Salt. 22 10% 20%

2,213 Em. Fla. 1st pf. 12% 10% 12%

25 Gas & Fa. 1st pf. 12% 10% 12%

187 Do 2d pf. 2% 2% 2%

350 Gen. Realty 1% 1% 1%

11 Do 2d pf. 25 1% 25%

26,672 House Oil pf. 9% 4% 6%

36 Md. & Penn. 2 1% 2%

3,906 Merch. & Tr. 35 24% 25%

1,503 Mt. Vernon Wd. 6% 24% 5%

3,914 Do pf. 49 22 46

25 Nat. Sash. W. 8% 6% 6%

1,182 N. Cent. Ry. 89% 74% 89%

5,765 Owings M. Dist. 14% 14% 14%

7,326 Peabody P. 57 45% 52%

30 Real Estate Tr. 50 11% 11%

20 Rol. P. House 11% 11% 11%

5 Do p. pf. 22 23 23

12 Stand. Gas Eq. 50 30 30

66 Do pf. 24 8 8

100 Un Post Sug. pf. 76 70 70

488 West Md. Dy. pf. 85 65% 80

TRUST, SURETY AND CREDIT COMPANY STOCKS.

200 Balt. Trust. 10 0.09 0.09

30 Col. Trust. 30 25 25

St. Louis STOCKS

Sales High. Low. Last.

410 A S Aloes. 13 9 12%

966% Am. Credit Ind. 27 97% 97%

1,217 Am. Invest. B. 5% 4% 5%

50 Beck. pf. 75 75 75

10 Boyd-Rich Inst. pf. 92 92 92

141 Brown Shoe. 60 45% 45%

4192 Brown Shoe. pf. 125 119% 122%

1,165 Burkhardt Mfg. pf. 28 10% 24%

54 Century Elect. 35 20 20

3 Champion Sh. M. 1st pf. un. 4 4 4

1,455 Coca-Cola Bot. 24 12% 24

5,586 Columbia Brew. 4% 2% 2%

Baltimore—Cont'd

TRUST, SURETY AND CREDIT COMPANY STOCKS.

Sales High. Low. Last.

135 Comm. Credit. 38 25% 36%

1,746 Do 1% pf. 110 90 100

1,202 Do 1% pf. 30 24 30

8,157 Fid. & Dep. Md. 45 19 45

6,493 Fin. Guar. Fin. 24 10% 22%

1,815 Fin. Co. Am. A. 7% 6% 6%

1,667 Fin. Service. A. 5% 4% 4%

78 Fin. B. 4% 3% 3%

764 Fin. B. 4% 3% 3%

135 Home Cr. 7% pf. 92 92 92

2,454 Mfgs. Finance. 1% pf. 4% 3% 3%

4,555 Do pf. 1% 1% 1%

108 Fin. Mfg. 2% 1% 1%

95 Merc. Trust. 210 185 205

25,327 Nat. Am. Cas. 12% 10% 10%

1,404 Seab. & Comm. 6% 3% 6%

747 Do pf. 8% 6% 6%

103,339 U. Fid. & Guar. 7 3 5%

108 Hyd. & Power. 1% 1% 1%

1,405 Int. Shoe. 1% 1% 1%

8,555 Fulton Ir. Wks. 7% 6% 6%

5 Elder Mfg. 1st pf. 95% 95% 95%

78 Elder Mfg. 1st pf. 46% 46% 46%

2,382 Elly-Walker D. G. 21 14 17

426 Elly-Walker D. G. 1st pf. 103 92 103

93 Elly-Walker D. G. 2d pf. 4% 3% 3%

5 Emerson El. pf. 41 41 41

8,555 Fulton Ir. Wks. 7% 6% 6%

27,000 Fid. & Dep. 10% 10% 10%

11,202 Fin. Kenecott. 23% 30% 30%

1,401 Fin. Kenecott. 1% 1% 1%

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets—1934—Continued

| Denver | | | | Denver—Cont'd | | | | Cincinnati—Cont'd | | | | Cincinnati—Cont'd | | | | Milwaukee—Cont'd | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| STOCKS. | | | | STOCKS. | | | | STOCKS. | | | | STOCKS. | | | | STOCKS. | | | | |
| Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | |
| 582,877 *Al Lincoln. .19 .08% .18% | 20,402 Westbrk Th. .155 .55 .155 | 15 *Col Ry 1st pf .75 .75 .75 | 250 *Paragon. B. .4% .4% .4% | 29 Hipr H pi .1% .30 .29 | 8,827 P. Do B. .5% .4% .4% | 10 Johnson Serv. .12 .11% .11% | 913 Line Material. .5 .2% .3% | 29 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 29 Hipr H pi .1% .30 .29 | 60 Johnson Serv. .12 .11% .11% | 913 Line Material. .5 .2% .3% | 29 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 29 Hipr H pi .1% .30 .29 | 60 Johnson Serv. .12 .11% .11% | 913 Line Material. .5 .2% .3% | 29 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 29 Hipr H pi .1% .30 .29 | 60 Johnson Serv. .12 .11% .11% | 913 Line Material. .5 .2% .3% | 29 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% |
| 670,607 Amer Gyro. .02 .00% .00% | 41,865 World Oil .20 .03 .10 | 12,228 Croft Radio. .17% .8 .12 | 12,228 Croft Radio. .17% .8 .12 | 10 MII E pf .6% .19% .161 | 8,327 P. Do B. .5% .4% .4% | 10 MII E pf .6% .19% .161 | 10 MII E pf .6% .19% .161 | 8,327 P. Do B. .5% .4% .4% | 8,327 P. Do B. .5% .4% .4% |
| 23,135 Artemia M. .14% .05 .08% | *Listed; others not so designated are | 337 Crystal Tissue. .6% .6% .6% | 478 Do 5% .1% .115 | 10 Do 6% .21% .67 | 11,124 Do 5% .1% .115 | 10 Do 6% .21% .67 | 10 Do 6% .21% .67 | 11,124 Do 5% .1% .115 | |
| 5,700 Bonanza Gold .01% .01 .01% | 40 Dixie Ice Cr. .5 .5 .5 | 245 Pure Oil pf .60 .45% .49% | 156 Do pf .56% .24% .56% | |
| 72,366 Burnham Ch .14% .05 .08% | 3,929 Dow Drug .8% .2% .7% | 2,847 Randall. A. .21 .14 | 6,415 Do B. .9% .3% .5% | |
| 210,428 *Champ Gold .14 .04% .05% | 15,923 Eagle Pitcher. .7% .3% .4% | 1,096 Early & Daniel .18% .11% .14 | 3,073 Rapid Electr. .27% .2% .27% | |
| 2,244 Cities Serv. .4.00 .1.20 .1.40 | 6 Do pf .80 .70 .80 | 24 Sabin Rob pf. .80 .50 .80 | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | 8,105 Old Line L Ins. .12 .7% .11% | |
| 1,036,707 *Colorado G. .02% .01% .01% | 10 Egry Register. .15 .15 .15 | 24 Sabin Rob pf. .80 .50 .80 | 8,327 P. Do B. .5% .4% .4% | |
| 682,975 *Cimflex Gold .01% .00% .00% | 11 Egry Register. .15 .15 .15 | 24 Sabin Rob pf. .80 .50 .80 | 8,327 P. Do B. .5% .4% .4% | |
| 381 Cons Roy. .1.75 .1.12% .1.37% | 12,228 Croft Radio. .17% .8 .12 | 1,179 Formica. .7% .4 .6 | 20,360 G. P. Card .33% .1% .3% | |
| 75 Continen Oil .20% .17% .17% | 13 Crystal Tissue. .6% .6% .6% | 320 Found Invest. .7% .4 .6 | 51 United Milk. A. .17% .3% .3% | |
| 23,945 Cresson Cons. .1.22% .77 .1.15 | 40 Dixie Ice Cr. .5 .5 .5 | 320 Found Invest. .7% .4 .6 | 52 Second B. .1% .1% .1% | |
| 25,100 Do Jac. Pot. .02% .01% .02% | 1,411 Do pf .4% .1% .1% | 320 Found Invest. .7% .4 .6 | 53 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 149,975 *Emp Chief. .01% .00% .00% | 3,065 *Am Therm. A. .1% .5 .5 | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 54 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 400 Eureka Stan. 1.10 .90 .80 | 12 Do pf .32 .32 .32 | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 55 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | | |
| 2,743 Golden Cycle 40 .19 .1.20 .1.40 | 7 *Atlas Natl. .20% .20% .20% | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 56 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 925 Goldfinch Com. .30 .15 .16 | 1,411 Baldwin. .3 .2 .2 | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 57 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 400 Horn Silv. M. .85 .50 .50 | 142 Do pf .60% .49% .60% | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 58 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 10 Ideal Cement .36 .36 .36 | 152 Burger Bros. .2% .1% .1% | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 59 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 389,705 *Int'l Gold. .15% .03% .05% | 260 Burns Bros. .1% .1% .1% | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 60 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | |
| 700 J. Waite M. .39 .37 .37 | 7 *Atlas Natl. .20% .20% .20% | 122 Gen Mach pf. .7% .54% .7% | 61 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | 61 Do pf .5% .1% .1% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Friday, January 18, 1935

THE ANNALIST

149

Bond Transactions—New York Stock Exchange

For Week Ended Saturday, Jan. 12

For 1934 Annual Range See Page 133 of This Issue

Sales in 1000s. High. Low. Last. Chge.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BONDS
(Figures after decimal represent 32ds of 1 per cent.)

2403 1/40 Liberty 3 1/2%—32-47.105.14 103.17 105.14 + 1.28
325 Do Jst conv 4 1/2% 104.4 103.9 103.24 + .16

2 Do 1st conv 4 1/2% 104.4 103.9 103.24 + .16

1536 Do 4th conv 4 1/2% 103.20 103.5 103.20 + .6

4250 1/40 Do 4th conv 4 1/2% 103.20 103.5 103.20 104.4 + .13

38, 3d called... 102.16 101.25 102.8 + .14

5 Do 4th conv 4 1/2% 104.5 104.5 104.5 + .16

5 Do 4th conv 4 1/2% 104.5 104.5 104.5 + .16

329 Treas 4 1/2%—33-38.103.16 101.23 101.25 + .16

571 Do 4s, 1944—54... 109.31 108.34 108.20 + .24

6 Do 4s, reg... 108.24 108.24 108.24 + .16

332 Do 3 1/2%—54.106.5 107.00 106.00 + .29

471 Do 3 1/2%—54.103.43—105.13 105.13 105.13 + 1.12

2020 Do 3 1/2%—54.103.43—105.13 105.13 105.24 + 1.7

311 Do 3 1/2%—54.104.24 104.18 105.18 + 1.1

8633 Do 3 1/2%—54.104.43—105.26 105.26 105.18 + 1.1

169 Do 3 1/2%—54.104.43—105.14 102.6 103.18 + .19

1911 Do 3 1/2%—54.104.3 103.28 101.23 101.25 + .16

55 Do 4 1/2%—54.104.3 103.29 103.27 103.29 + .16

979 Do 3 1/2%—54.103.24 103.24 103.28 103.15 + 1.19

18224 Do 3s, 1951—55... 103.20 100.20 102.12 + 1.14

1851 Do 3s, 1949—54... 102.27 100.20 101.20 + .22

3112 Do 3s, 1949—54... 102.27 102.28 101.15 102.15 + .27

94 Fed Farm Mt 3 1/2%—

1964 Do 3s, 1949—54.102.6 101.16 101.16 — .2

21531 Do 3s, 1949—54.100.14 99.16 99.31 + .13

10722 Home Owners Loan 4s, 1951... 101.10 100.19 100.10 + .07

4187% Do 3s, 1952... 100.14 98.18 99.30 + .8

2951 Total sales, \$35,342,400

FOREIGN BONDS

190 ARIBITRI P&P 5s, '53—44 37% 39 + %

10 Adriatic Elec 7s, 1952... 98 98 + %

64 Akershus 5s, 1963... 94 91/4 94 + 2%

.. Alpine Mont S 7s, '55... 100 + %

9 Antioquia 7s, A—55... 101 101 101 + 1%

6 Do 7s, D—55... 101 101 101 + 1%

5 Do 7s, 1945... 100% 100% 100% + 1%

2 Do 7s, 1947... 100% 100% 100% + 1%

2 Do 7s, 1957... 10% 10 10 + 2%

10 Do 7s, 1957... 9% 9% 9% + 2%

143 Antwerp 5s, 1958... 117 110 118 — 8

5 Argentina 5s, 1945... 98/4 98/4 98/4 + %

39 Do 5s, 1962... 90 91/4 98/4 + %

62 Do 6s, A, 1957... 94/4 93/4 93/4 + %

51 Do 6s, 1958... 95/4 95/4 95/4 + %

51 Do 6s, June, 1959... 94/4 95/4 95/4 + %

60 Do 6s, Oct., 1959... 94/4 95/4 95/4 + %

55 Do 6s, May, 1960... 94/4 93/4 93/4 + %

90 Do 6s, Sept., 1960... 94/4 93/4 93/4 + %

40 Do 6s, Oct., 1960... 94/4 93/4 93/4 + %

78 Do 6s, Feb., 1961... 94/4 93/4 93/4 + %

69 Do 6s, May, 1961... 94/4 93/4 93/4 + %

155 Australia 4 1/2%—56... 97/4 96/4 96/4 + %

174 Australia 4 1/2%—56... 97/4 96/4 96/4 + %

270 Do 5s, 1955... 102/4 102/4 102/4 + 2%

98 Austrian 7s, 1943... 102/4 101/4 101/4 + 1%

56 Do 7s, 1957... 92 90/4 92 + 1%

5 BATAVIA P 4 1/2%—42... 113 110 113 — 1

19 Bavaria S 6 1/2%—45... 33/4 31/4 31/4 + 1%

22 Belgium 6s, '55... 103/2 102/4 103/2 + 1%

42 Do 6s, 1949... 105/4 104/5 105 + 1%

24 Do 7s, 1955... 111 110 111 — 1

27 Do 7s, 1957... 101/4 101/4 101 + 1%

21 Do 7s, 1960... 101/4 101/4 101 + 1%

125 JAPAN 5 1/2%—56... 84/4 81/4 81/4 — 11%

1 Do 6s, 1954... 97 93/4 93/4 — 2%

1 Jugo Mig Bk 7s, 1957... unrat coup on... 25 25 25 + %

14 KARSTADT 6s, 1943... 32/4 32 32/4 + 1%

162 Kreuger & Toll 5s, '59... ct. A, 100 + 1%

2 LEIPZIG 7s, 1947... 40 40 40 + 2

12 MEDELLIN 6 1/2%—54... 91/4 91/4 91/4 — %

42 Met Water 5 1/2%—50... 102/4 102/4 103 + 1

6 Mex Irr 4 1/2%—1943, aast... 81/4 78 78 + 1%

18 Mexico 5 1/2%—1945, aast... 11 11 11 + 1/2

6 Do 5s, 1945, asset 1... 11 11 11 + 1/2

6 Do 4 1/2%—1945, asset 1... 61/2 61/2 61/2 + 1/2

29 Do 4s, 1954, asset 1... 61/2 61/2 61/2 + 1/2

4 Do 6s, 1933, asset 1... 78 78 78 + 1/2

116 Milan 6 1/2%—1952... 83/4 80/4 80/4 — 2

3 Minas Geraes 6 1/2%—1958... Sept coup off... 25 25 25 + %

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

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15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '59, Sept coup off... 19 19 19 + 1%

15 Do 6s, '

Bond Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

| Sales in 1000s. | | Net High. Low. Last. Chge. | | | Sales in 1000s. | | Net High. Low. Last. Chge. | | | Sales in 1000s. | | Net High. Low. Last. Chge. | | | Sales in 1000s. | | Net High. Low. Last. Chge. | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|------|------|-----------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|------|------|-----------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------|------|-----------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------|------|------|
| 27 | Crown Will P. 6s. '51 | 102% | 102 | 102% | 18 | L. Erie & W. Int. 5s. '37 | 102% | 102% | 102% | 114 | NY. NH & H. Cv. 6s. '48 | 52 | 49 | - 1% | 11 | St. Paul & Du 4s. '68 | 102 | 101% | 102 | + 2 |
| 12 | Crown Zell 6s. '40. ww | 99% | 99% | 99% | 8 | Do 2d 5s. 1941 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 1 | Do Con Ry. 4s. '54 | 35 | 34% | - 3 | 43 | S. P. C. S. L. 4s. '58 | 41 | 17% | 17 | - 1% |
| 16 | Cube RR 1st 5s. '55 | 31% | 30% | 31 | 24 | Lake S. & S. So. 3s. '38 | 97 | 99 | 99 | - | Do Col trs. 4s. '54 | 63 | 61 | - 2 | 5 | S. P. C. S. L. 4s. '58 | 43 | ext. 10% | 102% | + 2 |
| 36 | Cube Nor RR 5s. '42 | 39 | 38 | 38 | 39 | Lancaster Nitro. 5s. '34 | 95% | 87% | 87% | - | NY. W. W. Gen. 4s. '58 | 55 | 47% | - 1% | 17 | Do Con Ry. 4s. '54 | 102 | 102% | 102 | - |
| 567 | Cuban Case P. 6s. '50 | 1% | % | % | 2 | Leh. Car. N. 6s. '54 | 103% | 103% | 103% | - | NY. ref. Putnam 4s. '42 | 93 | 57% | - 2% | 33 | S. P. U. D. Pac. 4s. '52 | 72 | 114% | 113 | 113% |
| 38 | Cumb T & T 5s. '37 | 106% | 106% | 106% | 4 | Do 4s. '54 | 103% | 103% | 103% | - | NY. ref Putnam 4s. '42 | 93 | 57% | - 2% | 15 | San A. & A. Pass. 4s. '43 | 84% | 87% | - 2% | - |
| 215 | DEL & H ref 4s. '43 | 94% | 93% | 93% | 5 | Do 5s. '54 | 105% | 104% | 104% | - | NY. Sys. Inc. 6s. '65 | 51 | 8% | - 1% | 16 | San An Pub. 6s. A. '51 | 101% | 108 | 108 | - |
| 51 | Do 5s. '54. 1937 | 102% | 102% | 102% | 7 | Do 5s. '54 | 104% | 104% | 104% | - | NY. Y. Rich. G. 6s. '51 | 108% | 108 | - | 10 | Seab. A. L. 4s. '50 | 101% | 18% | 18% | - |
| 51 | Det Pow & Lt 4s. '69 | 102% | 102% | 102% | 4 | Do 5s. '54 | 104% | 104% | 104% | - | Do 4s. '50 | 105% | 105% | - 1% | 19 | Do 4s. '50 | 105% | 105% | 105% | - |
| 1 | Denver G. & E. 5s. '51 | 102% | 102% | 102% | 38 | Leh. W. N. Ind. 4d. '42 | 40 | 95% | 95% | - | NY. Steam 1st 5s. '51 | 51 | 105% | - 1% | 5 | Do 4s. '50 | 105% | 105% | 105% | - |
| 2 | Do 5s. '55. 1951 | 102% | 102% | 102% | 143 | Leh. W. N. Ind. 4d. '42 | 2003 | 50% | 48% | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 42 | Do adj. 5s. '50 | 105% | 105% | 105% | - |
| 83 | Den & C. G. con 4s. '36 | 39% | 37% | 38 | 26 | Leh. W. N. Ind. 4d. '42 | 2003 | 50% | 48% | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 140 | Do adj. 5s. '50 | 105% | 105% | 105% | - |
| 19 | Do con 4s. '40 | 39% | 38% | 38 | 67 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 60 | 56 | 56 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 35 | Do 6s. A. 1945. cts. 10 | 8 | 9% | 9% | - |
| 74 | Do con 4s. '47 | 20% | 18% | 18 | 17 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 60 | 56 | 56 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 14 | Sea A. Fl. 4s. '35 | 9% | 4% | 3% | - |
| 18 | Denver & G. W. 5s. '55 | 11% | 10% | 10% | 5 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 91 | Sharon S. Hip. 5s. '48 | 88% | 84% | 84% | - |
| 20 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 11% | 10% | 10% | 18 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 27 | Shell Oil 5s. '47 | 102% | 102% | 102% | - |
| 20 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 11% | 10% | 10% | 11 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 108 | Sierra S. F. Fw. 5s. '49 | 106% | 105 | 105 | - |
| 20 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 11% | 10% | 10% | 18 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 110 | Stiles Am. 7s. '41 | 53% | 53% | 53% | - |
| 20 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 11% | 10% | 10% | 11 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 19 | Sho. C. Oil 6s. B. '38 | 101% | 101% | 101% | - |
| 20 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 11% | 10% | 10% | 18 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 109 | Sho. C. Oil 6s. B. '38 | 101% | 99% | 99% | - |
| 20 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 11% | 10% | 10% | 11 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 109 | Sea Bell T. & S. 1941 | 110 | 109 | 109 | - |
| 103 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 10% | 10% | 10% | 72 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 22 | Sea Col Fw. 8s. A. '47 | 87 | 82 | 86% | + 2 |
| 3 | Donner St. ref 7s. '42 | 10% | 10% | 10% | 5 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 165 | Sea Col pac. 4s. '49 | 72 | 68% | 68% | + 2 |
| 26 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 10% | 10% | 10% | 28 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 325 | Do ref 4s. '55 | 105% | 105% | 105% | - |
| 26 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 10% | 10% | 10% | 28 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 83 | Do 1s. 1945. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 26 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 10% | 10% | 10% | 28 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 156 | Do 4s. '55 | 105% | 105% | 105% | - |
| 3 | Do 5s. '55. asst. | 10% | 10% | 10% | 28 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 50 | Do 1s. 1942. cts. 48% | 47 | 47 | 47 | - 1% |
| 25 | E CUBA S. 7s. '37. 1% | 104% | 98% | 98% | 1 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 1 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 7 | Leh. Val. Cons. 5s. '00 | 70 | 73 | 73 | - | Do 1st 6s. '38 | 101% | 105% | - 1% | 105 | Do 1s. 1942. 6s. '68 | 69 | 68 | 67% | - 1% |
| 2 | E. Tens. 10s. II. 5s. '38. 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange

For 1934 Annual Range See Page 139 of This Issue

For Week Ended Saturday, Jan. 12

Stocks and bonds marked with an asterisk are fully listed on the Curb Exchange; others are dealt in as unlisted issues.

Net High. Low. Last. Chge. Sales.

| | High. | Low. | Last. | Chge. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Chge. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Chge. | Sales. | | |
|-------------------------|-------|------|-------|-------|--------|---------------------------|------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|-------|--------|------|-------|
| ADAMS M 1st pf (7) 106 | 105 | 105 | 105 | + 1 | 275 | *Derby Oil & Ref. | 116 | 116 | 116 | - 2% | 200 | Long Island Lgt. | 27 | 26 | 26 | - 2% | 500 |
| *Aero Supply Mfg. B | 27 | 24 | 24 | - 3% | 700 | Dictograph Prod. | 64 | 62 | 62 | - 2% | 700 | Lo pf A (7) | 49 | 48 | 48 | - 2% | 30 |
| Ains Mfg Corp (k14) 20 | 18 | 18 | 18 | - 1% | 1,200 | Distillers Corp. | 22 | 21 | 21 | - 1% | 500 | Do pf B (6) | 39 | 37 | 39 | - 5% | 8,100 |
| Aia Pwr pf (6) | 41 | 40 | 40 | - 3% | 220 | *Driver Die Casting. | 18 | 16 | 16 | - 11% | 3,200 | *Louisiana Ld. Ex. | 5 | 4% | 4% | - 5% | 1,100 |
| Ala Pwr pf (6) | 44 | 42 | 42 | - 2% | 110 | *Driver Die Casting. | 14 | 13 | 13 | - 4% | 1,300 | Lynch Corp (2) | 38 | 35 | 35 | - 1% | 1,100 |
| Ala Miles, Inc. | 13 | 12 | 12 | - 1% | 10,000 | *Driver Die Casting. | 10 | 9 | 9 | - 1% | 1,850 | | | | | | |
| Aluminum Co of A. | 52 | 47 | 47 | - 1% | 1,850 | *Driver Die Casting. | 38 | 35 | 35 | - 1% | 450 | *MANGEL STS pf wv 55 | 50 | 51 | 51 | + 1% | 140 |
| Alum Goods Mf (40c) 74 | 73 | 73 | 73 | - 1% | 300 | Dow Chemical (2) | 92 | 88 | 90 | - 1% | 50 | Do pf B (6) | 49 | 48 | 48 | - 2% | 550 |
| *Am Beverage Corp. | 13 | 12 | 12 | - 1% | 600 | Draper Corp (44c) 20 | 60 | 60 | 60 | - 8% | 50 | Mar Int Stm (k26 9-10c) | 81 | 81 | 81 | - 1% | 100 |
| *Am. Brit & Cont. | 12 | 10 | 10 | - 2% | 100 | Do pf (4) | 50 | 49 | 50 | - 1% | 200 | Marion Stm Shovel. | 3% | 2% | 2% | - 1% | 1,900 |
| Am Capital pf (40c) 20 | 19 | 19 | 19 | - 2% | 125 | *Driver Har Co (k50c) 16 | 16 | 15 | 16 | - 1% | 500 | Maryland Casualty | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 400 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 29 | 29 | 29 | - 1% | 700 | *Driver Har Co (k50c) 16 | 93 | 93 | 93 | - 4% | 10 | Massey-Harris | 5% | 5% | 5% | - 1% | 7,100 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 20,300 | Do pf (7) | 93 | 93 | 93 | - 4% | 500 | *Mavis Botti, A. (r) | 4% | 4% | 4% | - 1% | 1,300 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 2,200 | *Dubbilier Condenser | 3% | 3% | 3% | - 1% | 450 | McColl-Frost (80c) | 15 | 14 | 15 | + 1% | 2,025 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 500 | Duval Power (3) | 38 | 38 | 38 | - 1% | 450 | McColl-Frost (80c) | 15 | 14 | 15 | + 1% | 1,400 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 500 | Duval Texas Sulphur. | 9% | 9% | 9% | - 1% | 2,000 | *MWH Dredging (1) | 25 | 21 | 25 | + 2% | 400 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Easy Wash Mach. B. | 3% | 3% | 3% | - 1% | 100 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | East States Pow pf A | 6% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 100 | *Mock Nat Gas. | 2% | 2% | 2% | - 1% | 400 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Do pf B. | 6% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 600 | Mercantile Stm pf (7) | 65 | 65 | 65 | - 5% | 100 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Michigan Sugar. | 3% | 3% | 3% | - 1% | 300 | Merritt, Ch & Scott | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 100 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Mid West Utili (r) | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 2,400 | Mayflower Ass (2) | 44 | 43 | 43 | + 1% | 1,300 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | McGraw-Hill Dredging (1) | 21 | 21 | 21 | - 1% | 300 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | - 1% | 1,900 | Midwest Utili Share. | 7% | 6% | 6% | - 1% | 1,800 | Me John Johnson (44) | 63 | 62 | 62 | - 1% | 1,200 |
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| *Am Cit Pw (A) (3) 304 | 1% | 1% | 1% | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—Continued

APPROVED
LOW PRICE RECORD

The *Annalist*'s monthly publication giving low prices since July 1, 1933, of stocks and bonds listed or traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the New York Curb Exchange has been approved by the respective exchanges.

These prices will be published separately during the first week of each month in pamphlet form, and will be furnished without charge to *Annalist* subscribers of record upon request.

Subscription orders should be filed promptly to obtain current issue of the Low Price Record.

The ANNALIST

The ANNALIST

Week Ended

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

Saturday, Jan. 12

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets—Continued

| Chicago | | | | Chicago | | | | Toronto | | | | Toronto | | | | Toronto | | | | Toronto | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------|-----------|--------|--------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|---------|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|--|--|
| STOCK EXCHANGE. STOCKS. | | | | BOARD OF TRADE STOCKS. | | | | STOCK EXCHANGE. STOCKS. | | | | CURB EXCHANGE. STOCKS. | | | | CURB EXCHANGE. OILS. | | | | MINING DIVISION. STOCKS. | | | | STOCKS. | | | |
| Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | Sales. | High. | Low. | Last. | | | | |
| 90 Moss Leath | 16 1/2 | 16 | 16 | 457 Studebaker | 3 1/2 | 3 | 3 | 45 Pres'd Met | 15 | 14 | 14 | 535 North Star | 1.00 | .85 | 1.00 | 57,200 Roc'e L L | .08 | .06 | .07 | 90 Adams Exp | 7 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | | | |
| 100 Musk M SA | 16 | 16 | 16 | 100 Sundstrand | 3 1/4 | 3 1/4 | 3 1/4 | 5 P Rico 7pf | 90 | 90 | 90 | 1,120 Do pf | 2.50 | 2.00 | 2.45 | 3,855 Roya'e | 20.50 | 18.50 | 20.50 | 85 Am Ag C Di | 51 1/2 | 50 1/2 | 50 1/2 | 50 1/2 | | | |
| 450 Nachman S | 9 1/2 | 8 1/2 | 9 1/2 | | | | | 150 Riverside | A | 28 | 28 | 100 Prt Cil | Oil | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 6,256 Sam | Ant. 4.76 | 4.25 | 4.30 | 200 Am Pneum. | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | | |
| 120 Nat Batt pf | 22 1/2 | 20 1/2 | 22 1/2 | | | | | 114 Russell pf | 75 | 73 | 75 | 155 Sup Pet Ord | 23 | 23 | 23 | 12,455 Sherritt | .64 | .52 | .55 | 110 Do | 1.00 | .90 | .90 | .90 | | | |
| 2,500 Nat Leath. | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | | | | | 35 St. John, A. | 11 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 10 Super Pet | .26 | .26 | .26 | 3,745 Bisco | .275 | .26 | .26 | 65 Do Ist pf | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | | | |
| 150 Nat Stand | 28 | 28 | 28 | | | | | 5 Do B | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 10 Do pf | A. 11 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 3,235 Am Tel&T. | 108 1/2 | 103 1/2 | 104 1/2 | 104 1/2 | | | | | | | |
| 1,700 Noblit-Sp. | 15 1/2 | 14 | 14 | | | | | 629 Stan Stl | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 30 ThayersCom | 6 | 5 1/2 | 6 | 112 Am Wool | .86 | .82 | .82 | 215 Do pf | .44 | .40 | .40 | .40 | | | |
| 2,650 No AmL&P | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | | | | | 75 Do pf | 20 | 20 | 20 | | | | | 160 Amoskeag | 4 | 4 | 4 | 892 Anaconda | 12 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 10 1/2 | | | |
| 150 No West En | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | | | | | 489 Stl of Can | 45 | 45 | 45 | | | | | 5 Biltmore | 1.45 | 1.31 | 1.31 | 3,385 Sud Bras | 1.45 | 1.31 | 1.31 | 1.31 | | | |
| 1,100 No. Boro | 3 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 3 1/2 | | | | | 329 Do pf | 44 | 41 1/2 | 41 1/2 | 16,150 Acme Oli | .22 | .19 | .20 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 150 Okaikov Ox | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | | | | | 165 Tip Top | 9 | 9 | 9 | 4,800 Ajax Oil | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 100 Perf Circle | 33 | 32 1/2 | 32 1/2 | | | | | 265 Tropic City | 4 1/2 | 4 | 4 | 1,300 Alka Pac | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 200 Pines Wint. | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | | | | | 4,971 Union Gas | 5 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 4 1/2 | 17,750 Anglo-H | 4.00 | 3.96 | 4.00 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 750 Prime Co. | 3 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 3 1/2 | | | | | 580 United Stl | 4 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 3 1/2 | 18,710 Ashley | .25 | .25 | .25 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 200 Process Cp. | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 22,619 H Walkers | 3 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 91,700 Bagamac | 12 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 11 1/2 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 1,050 Pub Svc. | 20 | 16 1/2 | 20 | | | | | 2,190 W'kers pf | 17 1/2 | 16 1/2 | 16 1/2 | 11,700 Barry-H. | .08 | .06 | .06 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 2,450 Do pf | 16 1/2 | 15 1/2 | 16 1/2 | | | | | 1,020 W Can F'rs | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4,005 Base Met | .70 | .65 | .65 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 220 Do pf | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | | | | | 6,610 Brazilian | 10 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 10 1/2 | 56,450 B E R | .21 | .18 | .18 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 50 Do 75 pf | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | 7 1/2 | | | | | 1,772 Weston G | | | | 3,650 Beattie | 2.10 | 1.95 | 2.05 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 33,500 Brew&Dist. | .95 | .90 | .95 | | | | | (new) 46 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 376 Build Prod. | 29 1/2 | 28 1/2 | 28 1/2 | | | | | 41,500 Bobbie | 1.35 | 1.35 | 1.35 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 707 B'k F' N. | 34 1/2 | 33 1/2 | 33 1/2 | | | | | 3,890 Bradian | 2.35 | 2.00 | 2.20 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 100 Rath Pack | 29 | 29 | 30 | | | | | 130 Canada | 57 | 56 | 57 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 300 Rayth vtc. | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | 1 1/2 | | | | | 166 Commerce | 167 | 167 | 167 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 100 Relia Mtg. | 10 | 10 | 10 | | | | | 85 Dominion | 207 | 200 | 200 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 100 Rolling Hse | 21 | 21 | 21 | | | | | 31 Imperial | 204 | 204 | 204 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 250 Rutherford | 22 | 20 1/2 | 20 1/2 | | | | | 62 Montreal | 203 | 202 | 203 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 250 Dredg | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | | | | | 28 Nova Scot | 285 | 285 | 285 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 2,000 Do pf | 5 | 4 | 4 | | | | | 151 Royal | 170 | 169 | 170 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 100 Stutz Mot. | 25 | 25 | 25 | | | | | 67 Toronto | 222 | 222 | 222 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 2,100 Walgreen | 30 | 30 | 30 | | | | | 112,615 Cent Part | 1.17 | 1.17 | 1.17 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 450 Wauke Mot. | 30 | 30 | 32 | | | | | 10,000 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 2,850 Wisc Banks | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | 2 1/2 | | | | | 17,880 God's | .03 | .03 | .03 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 750 Zenith Rad. | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 500 BONDS. | | | | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 87,000 Ch C Ry 5s. | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 2,000 Do pf | 27 | 27 | 27 | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 9,000 La Sal S B | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | 5 1/2 | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 1,128 Allied M. | 13 1/2 | 12 1/2 | 12 1/2 | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | 10 Do C st. | .75 | .72 | .72 | .72 | | | |
| 100 Am Cyan.B | 16 1/2 | 16 1/2 | 16 1/2 | | | | | 10,500 Chibougam | .09 | .09 | .09 | 10,500 B'kfst | .30 | .30 | .35 | 10 Do | | | | | | | | | | | |

bilization is probably unachievable, there is not necessarily much harm in this, provided it is not allowed to go too far. But the present cheap money conditions in London are far from normal in this sense. They have been enhanced by causes peculiar to the present convulsion of things. They have been enhanced by the deliberate manipulation of the market by the government, partly for conversion purposes, partly under the influence of reflationist ideas. They have been enhanced further by the abnormal risk attending investment on the Continent of Europe and elsewhere. In spite of the instability of sterling London is still considered, and probably rightly so, a relatively safe centre for short-term investment. In the last few months funds have poured in—not for the sake of the return on short investment, for it is unprecedentedly low, but for the security.

Now it is obvious that a situation of this sort is highly unstable. The slightest shock, either by way of political alarm at home or economic change abroad, is liable to bring about changes in monetary conditions altogether disproportionate to its original magnitude. Moreover, if conditions elsewhere improve, it is not to be expected that money can remain anything like so cheap as it has been recently. No doubt some fall in the rate of interest was due. But only Mr. Keynes believes that, in a world approaching anything like normality, the rate of interest would be anything like so low as it is at present.

There exists, therefore, a twofold danger. On the one hand, that some check to confidence in sterling or some change in external conditions will produce a change in the condition of the money market which will rapidly bring an end to the present boom conditions and cause considerable difficulty to those financial institutions which are loaded up with gilt-edged securities. On the other hand, that if the ultra cheap money persists for a time, investments will be made which would be rendered unprofitable when the cheap money conditions came to an end. If this takes place to any considerable extent—and there is some reason to suppose that it is already beginning—then there is a further danger, by no means to be ignored in the present political situation, namely, that in order to prolong the period of prosperity, the government may be led to take steps of an inflationary character, leading us away from any equilibrium with the rest of the world and tending to a still further depreciation of sterling, with the possible consequences elsewhere which we have already examined.

Prospects of Stabilization

In such a situation there is a strong case for the view that some approach to monetary stabilization would be a valuable steady influence. It would give a stimulus to confidence the world over. It would give encouragement to the members of the Gold Bloc not to relax their

efforts to get into equilibrium without running the risks of competitive depreciation. It would provide a better medium for international trade than the present fluctuating exchanges. It would provide a firm basis for tariff negotiation and the abolition of exchange restrictions. It would open the way to that resumption of cautious, well directed, international lending without which full recovery is impossible. At the same time it would tend to make the incidents of the risk factor less abnormal. With the easing of the strain on the currencies of the Gold Bloc, funds which have come to London for reasons of safety would be withdrawn to centres where the rate of return is higher. The excessively cheap money conditions would disappear pari passu with the opening of new opportunities for profit sufficient to maintain and even to augment the present rate of active investment. It is not likely that any British Government would be willing to commit itself for some time to come to a final *de jure* stabilization. But even the beginnings of an approach to a *de facto* stabilization would have highly beneficial effects.

Unfortunately there are obstacles in the way even to such modest beginnings, which it is important not to minimize. The very uncertainty with regard to the position of the Gold Bloc is a factor which with some is conducive to hesitation. We cannot do anything until we know where we are with them, they say. To diagnose this attitude is naturally not to endorse

it. There can be no doubt that it is the attitude of many now responsible for policy.

Conclusion

On any level view of the situation, therefore, it is difficult to say that the outlook for 1935 is very rosy. The position of Continental Europe is still desperate. In the United States the situation is poised perilously between renewed stagnation and an inflationary uprush. In Great Britain recovery goes on, but limited on the one hand, by a stagnation of world trade which British policy does nothing to revive, and endangered, on the other, by the peculiar risks attendant upon the policy of ultra cheap money. Owing partly to the state of public opinion and partly to what may be real dangers implicit in the legacy of past experiments in monetary policy, the path to stabilization is not clear. It may be that these various dangers may in some way cancel out and that the strong tendencies to recovery still inherent in what remains of the capitalist system may have room to reassert themselves. But it would be self-deceptive to pretend that the prospects are bright. There is no doubt that we are still in a dangerous state; and only the most resolute determination to see things as they are and not deceive ourselves with vague phrases and high-sounding clichés will enable us to make the many adjustments which are necessary if we are once more to arrive at relatively stable conditions.

Dividends Declared

Since Previous Issue
of The Annalist

and Awaiting Payment

| Company. | Rate. | Pay-Holders of Company. | Pe- riod. | Pay- able. | Hldrs. of Company. | Rate. | Pay- able. | Hldrs. of Company. | Rate. | Pay- able. | Hldrs. of Company. | Rate. | Pay- able. | Hldrs. of Company. | |
|---|---------|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|----------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------|
| Fidelity Un Tr Co of New- ark | 60c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 | | | NY & Hon Rosario Min. | 25c | Q Jan. 26 | Jan. 15 | | | Wmco-Rich, A | 62½c | Q Mar. 31 | Mar. 20 |
| First All-Can Tr Shrs 1945 fund | 7½c | Q Jan. 15 | Jan. 15 | | | Rey R. N. Hampshire | \$1.50 | Q Jan. 31 | Jan. 8 | | | D B | 7½c | Feb. 12 | Feb. 1 |
| First Nati Bank (Medford, Mass.), 4% pf. | 32 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 2 | | | No. NY Util Inc 7% pf. | 15c | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 8 | | | Willimantic Tr Co (Conn.) | 51 | Q Feb. 2 | Jan. 15 |
| First Natl Bank (Galveston, Texas) | 34 | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 | | | Noyer (CF) Co, Inc. | 45c | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 30 | | | Woolworth (F W) Co. | .60c | Q Mar. 1 | Feb. 11 |
| Food Mach Corp 6½% pf. | 50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Ouha R & Land | 15c | M Feb. 15 | Feb. 30 | | | York Rys 5% pf. | .62½c | Q Jan. 31 | Jan. 21 |
| Food Mach Corp 6½% pf. | 50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Ohio Pb Ser Co 7% pf. | 58 1-3c | M Mar. 15 | Mar. 12 | | | Accumulated | | | |
| Food Mach Corp 6½% pf. | 50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Do 6% pf. | 50c | M Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 | | | Am S & Ref 2d pf. | .83 | Mar. 1 | Feb. 8 |
| Food Mach Corp 6½% pf. | 50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Do 5% pf. | 41 2-3c | M Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 | | | Dennison Mfg deb | .82 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 10 |
| Food Mach Corp 6½% pf. | 50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Old Colony Insur | 32 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Hutchins Inv Corp | \$7 pf. | Mar. 1 | Feb. 15 |
| Food Mach Corp 6½% pf. | 50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Do | 32 | Q May 1 | Apr. 20 | | | Natl Automotive Fibre | .37 | | |
| Franklin Fire Ins. | 25c | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 18 | | | Oil Ind Oil Co | 7½c | Q Jan. 19 | Jan. 5 | | | Pacific Pwr & Lt \$6 pf. | \$1.50 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 |
| Gardner-Denq pf. | 31.75 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 19 | | | Oilinda Land | 15c | M Jan. 19 | Jan. 5 | | | Do 7% pf. | \$1.75 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 18 |
| Genesee Brew. A. | 12½c | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 24 | | | Orange & Rockland El Co | 32 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Reliable S 1st pf. | .87 | Jan. 2 | Jan. 2 |
| Genesee Brew. A. | 12½c | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 24 | | | Pack Mch Co 7% 1st pf. | 31.75 | S Mar. 1 | Feb. 19 | | | Reserve Resources Co \$6 pf. | \$1.25 | Jan. 15 | Jan. 10 |
| Gen Hs Co 7% pf. | 31.75 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Phoenix Fin Corp 8% pf. | 50c | S July 10 | June 30 | | | Simpson's Ltd. 6½% pf. | .51 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 22 |
| Gen Hs Co 7% pf. | 31.75 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Do 8% pf. | 50c | S Oct. 10 | Sept. 30 | | | Tung-Sol Lamp Wks \$3 pf. | .25c | Feb. 1 | Jan. 19 |
| Gen Hs Co 7% pf. | 31.75 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Do 8% pf. | 50c | S Jan. 10 | Dec. 20 | | | Walker Mfg 33 pf. | \$1.50 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 |
| Gen Hs Co 7% pf. | 31.75 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | Photo Eng & El. Ltd. | .50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 12 | | | Whiting Corp 6½% pf. | .81.62½% | Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 |
| Hallie Bros pf. | 51.50 | Q Jan. 31 | Jan. 24 | | | Pitney-Bowes Post Meter | 5c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Extra | | | |
| Hallie Bros pf. | 51.50 | Q Jan. 31 | Jan. 24 | | | Plym Rub Co Inc 7% pf. | \$1.75 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 2 | | | Augusta & Sav R. | .25c | Jan. 7 | Jan. 7 |
| Hannover Tr Co (Paterson, N. J.) 60c | 50c | Q Jan. 31 | Jan. 24 | | | Prov Tr Co (Phila.) | .50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Badger Pt & Hardware St | .70c | Jan. 10 | Jan. 5 |
| Hardesty (R) Mfg 7% pf. | 31.75 | Q Mar. 1 | Feb. 15 | | | Pitney-Bowes Post Meter | .50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 | | | Bon Am. B | .50c | Jan. 24 | Jan. 18 |
| Hardesty (R) Mfg 7% pf. | 31.75 | Q Mar. 1 | Feb. 15 | | | Prov Tr Co (Phila.) | .50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 | | | Boston Safe D & T. | .54 | Jan. 20 | Jan. 8 |
| Harvesters, Inc (1c). | 2c | Q Jan. 15 | Jan. 5 | | | Pitney-Bowes Post Meter | .50c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 | | | Briggs Mfg | .50c | Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 |
| Atlantic Macaroni Co. Inc. | 1 | Q Feb. 1 | Feb. 1 | | | Raymond C Pipe Co pf. | 75c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Capital Mgt Corp | .5c | Jan. 2 | Jan. 21 |
| Augusta & Savannah R. R. | 12.50 | S Jan. 7 | Jan. 7 | | | Realeas R Co (Phil. Pa.) | 15c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Coca-Cola Bottling Co of St. Louis | .51 | Jan. 20 | Jan. 10 |
| Badger Pt & Hardware Store, Inc. | 20c | S Jan. 10 | Jan. 5 | | | Relia Eng Co (Phila.) | 15c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Cmwlth Life Ins (Ky.) | .10c | Jan. 7 | Jan. 3 |
| Badger Pt & Hardware Store, Inc. | 20c | S Jan. 10 | Jan. 5 | | | Reliance Life Co (Pitts.) | 36 | A Jan. 9 | Jan. 9 | | | Empire Capital Corp. | .5c | Feb. 28 | Feb. 20 |
| Bangor Ind-Elec. | 30c | Q Mar. 1 | Feb. 15 | | | Reliance Mfg Co Ill. | 15c | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 22 | | | Ford Tr Ins. | .5c | Feb. 1 | Jan. 19 |
| Bank of Tiverton | 10c | Q Mar. 1 | Feb. 15 | | | Rep Inv Fund Inc 6% pf. | A 15c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 | | | Home Insurance Co | .25c | Feb. 15 | Feb. 15 |
| Basic Ins Shrs | 1.3-10c | S Jan. 15 | | | | Republic Pet Co. Ltd. | 32 | M Jan. 19 | Jan. 10 | | | Minn-Honeywell Regtr. | .25c | Feb. 15 | Feb. 4 |
| Beatty Bros, Ltd. | .05 | 1st | | | | Rock Capital Corp | 2c | A Jan. 10 | Jan. 5 | | | Morris Pl. of Sav. | .310 | Dec. 31 | Dec. 21 |
| Beatty Bros, Ltd. | .05 | 1st | | | | Do 10c Tr (Prov. RI) | .320 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 | | | N. Eng. Steel | .12½c | Jan. 31 | Jan. 21 |
| Best & Co pf. | 3% | Q Jan. 31 | Jan. 31 | | | Rose's 5-10½c Stores | 75c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 | | | New England Trust (Boston, Mass.) | .55 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 1 |
| Bloch Bros. Tobs. | 37½c | Q Feb. 1 | Feb. 10 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | N Y & Hon Rosario Min. | .50c | Jan. 26 | Jan. 15 |
| Bloch Bros. Tobs. | 37½c | Q Feb. 1 | Feb. 10 | | | Sheaffer (W A) Pen Co | .58 | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 | | | N H & St L R R. | .50c | Feb. 1 | Jan. 20 |
| Do 6% pf. | 31.50 | Q Mar. 30 | Mar. 25 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Reduced. | | | |
| Do 6% pf. | 31.50 | Q Mar. 30 | Mar. 25 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Atlan Safe Dep Co (NY) \$1.50 | Q | Jan. 15 | Jan. 9 |
| Do 6% pf. | 31.50 | Q Mar. 30 | Mar. 25 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Central Tube | .5c | Q Jan. 25 | Jan. 15 |
| Bon Am. A. | .05 | Q Jan. 24 | Jan. 14 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Farley Aviation, Ltd (Am. Shares) | .9c | Jan. 24 | Jan. 17 |
| Bon Am. B. | .05 | Q Jan. 24 | Jan. 14 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | First Nat Bk (Medford, Mass.) | .52 | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 2 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Mhwa & Hud Pw pf. | .31 | Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Phila-Bourse 6% pf. | .60c | A Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Increased. | | | |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Allegheny Steel | .25 | Mar. 18 | Feb. 20 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Bon Am. Co | .50c | Mar. 15 | Feb. 15 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Quibb (E R) & Sons | .25c | Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Peer & Bur Val RR | .75c | Feb. 15 | Feb. 4 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Upson Co. A | .43½c | Feb. 15 | Feb. 1 |
| Boston Saf. & T. | 12.50 | S Jan. 15 | Jan. 8 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Do 43½c | .43½c | Feb. 15 | Feb. 1 |
| Consolidated Rendg Co 8% pf. | 32 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 21 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Initial. | | | |
| Consolidated Oil pf. | 32 | Q Feb. 1 | Jan. 25 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | First Boston Corp. | .50c | Jan. 21 | Jan. 11 |
| Continental Can Co. | .60c | Q Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Shawin Water Pw. | .13c | S Feb. 15 | Jan. 25 | | | Hibernia Nat Bk (N. O.) | .40c | S Feb. 1 | Jan. 15 |
| Cincinnatii Inter-Term RR Co | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

OPEN MARKET FOR UNLISTED SECURITIES

These quotations are for bankers, brokers and dealers and are accepted for publication as actual markets. The number at the left of a quotation identifies it with the name of the firm in the index making the market. Prices are as of close of business on Tuesday; South and Mid-West Monday.

FOREIGN SECURITIES

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|---|--------|--------|
| 18 Alpine Montan Steel 7s, 1925-55. | 95 | 96 |
| 18 Alpine Montan Steel 7s, 1925-55. | 95 | 96 |
| 18 Austrian int. & ext. coupons. | OW | 50 |
| 18 Austrian Government 7s, 1957. | 92 | 93 |
| 18 Austrian dollar bond coupons. | OW | BW |
| 18 Brazil dollar bond coupons. | OW | BW |
| 18 Brazil 4s, 1910. | OW | .. |
| 18 Brazil 5s, 1895. | OW | .. |
| 18 British Cons. Bond 5s, 1951. | 56 | .. |
| 18 British Cons. Bond 7 1/2s, 1962. | OW | .. |
| 18 British & Hung. Bank 7 1/2s, 1962. | 61 | 63 |
| 18 British & Hung. Bank 7 1/2s, 1962. | 61 | 63 |
| 18 Budapest 4s, 1962. | 49 | 51 |
| 18 Buenos Aires, scrip. | 56 | 59 |
| 18 City Savings Bk. (Budapest) 7s, 53 | 43 | 45 |
| 18 City Savings Bank 7s, 1953. | 48 | 50 |
| 18 City Sav. Bk. (Budapest) Am.shrs. | 3 1/4 | .. |
| 18 Colonial Corp. 5s, 52 | 51 | 52 |
| 18 European Migr. & Investment 7 1/2s. | .. | .. |
| 18 1966, Series B. | 66 | 68 |
| 18 Farmers Natl. Mig. 7s, 1963. | 56 | 58 |
| 18 Ford Motors of France. | 2 1/2 | 3 |
| 18 French 4s, 1917. | OW | BW |
| 18 French 4s, 1932, A. | OW | BW |
| 18 French Premium 5s, 1920. | OW | BW |
| 18 French 5 1/2s, 1937. | OW | BW |
| 18 French 5 1/2s, 1954. | 91 | 94 |
| 18 Hungarian int. & ext. coupons. | OW | .. |
| 18 Hungarian dollar bond coupons. | OW | .. |
| 18 Hungarian Central Mutual Credit 7s, 1937. | 47 1/2 | 49 |
| 18 Hung. Cent. Mut. Credit 7s, 37. | 56 | 59 |
| 18 Hungarian Consol. Municipal 7 1/2s, 1945. | 43 | 47 |
| 18 Hung. Disc. & Export Bk. 7s, 1932. | 47 | 49 |
| 18 Hungarian Italian Bank 7 1/2s, 1932. | 75 | 80 |
| 18 Hungarian Italian Bank 7 1/2s, 1963. | 56 | .. |
| 18 Hungarian Land Mig. Ina. 7 1/2s, 61. | 47 | 50 |
| 42 Italian Consolidated Loan. | 65 | 67 |
| 18 Italian Consolidated 5s. | 65 | 67 |
| 18 Jugoslavian int. & ext. coupons. | OW | .. |
| 42 Lithuanian Liberty Loan 5s, 1935. | 92 | 96 |
| 18 Lithuanian Liberty Loan 5s, 1935. | 92 | .. |
| 18 Lower Austrian Hydro Elec. Pwr. | .. | .. |
| 18 Natl. Cent. Sav. Bank of Hungary 7 1/2s, 1962. | 53 | 55 |
| 18 National Central Savings Bank of Hungary 7 1/2s, 1962. | 57 | 60 |
| 3 Natl. Hungarian Indus. Mtge. Inst. 7s, 1948. | 60 | .. |
| 18 National Hungarian Indus. Mtge. 7s, 1948. | 61 | 64 |
| 18 Poland 6s, 1920-40, small. | OW | .. |
| 18 Poland 7s, 1947, small. | OW | .. |
| 18 Rime Steel Corp. 7s, 1955. | 66 | .. |
| 42 Russian Imp. & loan 5 1/2s, 6 1/2s, c/d | 3 1/2 | 4 |
| 42 Russian Kerensky Rubl. L. 5s, 17 | 2 | 2 1/2 |
| 18 Russian Kerenky 5s, 1917. | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 |
| 18 Russian War Loan 5 1/2s, 1915-16. | 1 1/2 | 2 1/2 |
| 18 Serbia 5s, 1920, bond coupons. | OW | BW |
| 18 Syria 7s, 1946. | 85 | 90 |
| 18 Tyrol Hydro Elec. Pow. 7s, 1952. | 86 | 88 |
| 18 Upper Austria 8 1/2s, 1957. | 82 | 86 |
| 18 Upper Austria 8 1/2s, 1945. | 90 | 93 |
| 18 Vienna 6s, 1962. | 87 | 89 |

GERMAN DOLLAR BONDS

| | |
|--|------|
| 3 Coupons, part paid, German, 7s, '49 (Dawes) | \$10 |
| 3 Coupons, part paid, German 5 1/2s, 1965 (Young) | \$13 |
| 3 Coupons, all German Dollar Bonds, 1/1-34/6-30/34 | 30% |
| 3 Coupons, all German Dollar Bonds, due after 6/30/34. | 20% |
| 18 German 5s, 1937. | OW |
| 18 German Dollar Bonds. | OW |
| 18 German Dollar Bonds coupons. | BW |

GERMAN INTERNAL SECURITIES

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| 3 L. G. Farbenindustrie. | 22 |
| 1. G. Farbenindustrie Shares. | 21 1/2 |
| 2 Reichsbank. | 25 |
| 15 Reichsbank shares. | 24 1/2 |
| 3 Reichsbahn 7s, p.f. | 18 1/2 |
| 157 Reichsbahn shares. | 19 |
| 3 German Redemption, with rights. | OW |
| 157 German redemption bonds w. rts. | OW |
| 157 German red. bonds without rights. | OW |

CANADIAN SECURITIES DOMINION ISSUES

| | | |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|
| 41 Canada 5s, 1937. | 108 | 108 1/2 |
| 88 Canada 5s, 3/1/37. | 108 | 108 1/2 |
| 88 Canada 5s, 11/15/36. | 106 1/2 | .. |

CANADIAN SECURITIES (Cont.) PROVINCIAL ISSUES

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|---|---------|---------|
| 41 Prov. of Alberta 4 1/2s, 1935. | 100 | 100% |
| 88 Prov. of Alberta 5s, 9/15/42. | 100 1/2 | .. |
| 88 Prov. of Brit. Col. 4 1/2s, 1/15/21. | 100 1/2 | .. |
| 41 Prov. of Brit. Col. 4 1/2s, 1941. | 103 | 104 |
| 88 Prov. of Manitoba 4 1/2s, 8/1/41. | 100% | .. |
| 88 Prov. of Manitoba 5s, 12/2/50. | 107 1/2 | .. |
| 41 Prov. of Manitoba 6s, 1946. | 108 | 109 |
| 88 Prov. of Ontario 4 1/2s, 9/1/44. | 110 1/2 | 111 1/2 |
| 41 Prov. of Ontario 5s, 9/4/44. | 112 | .. |
| 88 Prov. of Ontario 5s, 12/2/60. | 119 1/2 | .. |

CORPORATION ISSUES

| | |
|---|------|
| 41 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |
| 147 British Columbia Power 5s, 1960. | 102 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 6s. | .. |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 77 |
| 147 British Columbia Pulp & Paper 7s, 1950. | 76 |

| | |
| --- | --- |
| 147 Bell Tele. of Canada 5s, 1955. | 110% |

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ADVERTISEMENTS.

GOVT. AND MUNICIPAL BONDS (Cont.)

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|--|--------------|--------|
| LOUISIANA (Cont.). | | |
| 118 Orleans Levee Dist. Rep. 4½% 1940-50 90 | 90 | |
| 119 Orleans Par. Schools 5s. aver. 96 | 96 | |
| 119 Ouachita Par. Rd. D. 1st 6s. '40-'55 100 | | |
| 119 Plaquemine Parish Road Dist. 6s. 190 F | | |
| 119 St. Charles Parish Rd. Dis. 3 5s. any 91 | | |
| 120 St. Tammany Par. Parishwide 5s. av 70 | 75 | |
| MICHIGAN: | | |
| 132 Michigan 5s. | OW | |
| 132 Michigan 5½s. | OW | |
| 132 Michigan 5¾s. | OW | |
| 45 Detroit St. Ry. 4½s. 4½s med. | 91-93 | |
| 45 Detroit Water 4s. 1856. | 98½ | 99½ |
| 45 Detroit Water 4½s. 1962. | 97 | |
| 132 Detroit G. O. 4s. | 97 | |
| 132 Detroit G. O. 4½s. | 98 | |
| 132 Detroit G. O. 4¾s. | 90 | |
| 132 Detroit G. O. 4½s. | 91 | 93 |
| 132 Detroit G. O. 5s. | 94 | 97 |
| MISSISSIPPI: | | |
| 123 Mississippi 4½s. | 4.00-1½ | |
| 131 Mississippi Ref. 4½s. 5/1/47. | 3.90-1½ | |
| 123 Mississippi Drainage Districts 5s. | OW | |
| 120 (Mississippi City) all issues. | 75 | 75 |
| 120 (Clarkdale) all issues. | 75 | |
| 120 Coahoma Co. D. O.s. | 4.40-1 | |
| 120 Greenville, all issues. | 4.75-2 | |
| 120 Harrison Co. Rd. & Bge. 5½s. | 92 | 94 |
| 120 Harrison Co. Road Prot. 5½s. aver. 101 | | |
| 120 Vicksburg, all issues. | 4.20-2 | |
| 123 Yazoo Levee District 5s. | 4.00-1 | |
| MISSOURI: | | |
| 83 Bollinger Co. Rd. 5s. 1937-38. | 96 | |
| 83 New Madrid Co. D. D. No. 28 c/ds 32F | | |
| 83 New Madrid Co. D. D. No. 38. 5½s 32F | | |
| 85 Pemiscot Co. Court's 5s. past due 75F | | |
| 85 Pemiscot Co. Drge. No. 6 6s. past due 68F | | |
| NEW JERSEY: | | |
| 6 Asbury Park 4½s. 6s. | OW | |
| 6 Atlantic City 1½s. | 69½ | 71 |
| 132 Atlantic City 4½s. | 70 | 73 |
| 132 Camden, past due 4s. | OW | |
| 132 Ocean City, past due 4s. | OW | |
| 132 Wildwood, past due 4s. | OW | |
| 132 Wildwood Crest, past due 4s. | OW | |
| NEW YORK: | | |
| 151 New York State cpn. 4s. 1960-61. | OW | |
| 151 Port of New York Authority Terminal 4½s. 1940-60. | OW | |
| 151 Port of New York Authority Tunnel 4½s. 1940-60. | OW | |
| 151 Port of New York Authority Geo. Washington Bridge 4s. 1940. | OW | |
| 4 Mt. Vernon reg. 4½s. 5/1/40. | 101 | |
| 151 New York City 4s. 1977-80. | OW | |
| 151 New York City 4½s. 1960-81. | OW | |
| 151 N. Y. City 4½s. 1957-63-67-71-79. | OW | |
| 151 New York City 6s. 1/25/1935-38-37. | OW | |
| OKLAHOMA: | | |
| 86 Oklahoma Cities and Bds. of Education 5s. | OW | |
| 86 Oklahoma Counties 5s. | OW | |
| 86 Oklahoma School Districts 5s. | OW | |
| 86 Oklahoma Townships 5s. | OW | |
| 86 Oklahoma County 5s. | OW | |
| 86 Custer Co. 4.50 | | |
| 86 Garfield County 4.50 | | |
| 86 Garvin County 4.50 | | |
| 86 Oklahoma City 4s. 1940-50. | OW | |
| 86 Tulsa County 4s. 1940. | OW | |
| SOUTH CAROLINA: | | |
| 5 South Carolina, all issues. | OW | |
| 98 South Carolina 4½s. | 4.00-1 | |
| 98 Greenville County 4½s. | 4.10-1 | |
| 98 Spartanburg (City of), any. | 4.75-1 | |
| 98 York County 4½s. | 4.10-1 | |
| TENNESSEE: | | |
| 75 Tennessee 4s. any. | 3.70-1 | |
| 124 Tennessee 4½s. and 4¾s. | 39 | OW |
| 125 Tennessee 6s. 1943. | 110 | 115½ |
| 125 Tennessee 6s. 1943. | OW | |
| 53 Alcoa, any issue. | 4.75-1½ | |
| 25 Blount Co. 5s. any. | 4.35-1 | |
| 25 Campbell County, any issue. | OW | |
| 25 Carter County (100% Reimb.) any. | 90 | |
| 33 Claiborne Co. 5s. 1935. | 90 | |
| 33 Cleveland 5½s. | 99 | |
| 33 Clinton, any issue. | OW | |
| 33 Clinton, any issue. | 5.50 | |
| 33 Elizabethan c/d any. | 38F | |
| 33 Gibson County Hwy. 5s. any. | 98½ | |
| 125 Gibson County 5s. | OW | |
| 125 Hamilton County 5s. | OW | |
| 125 Jackson 5s. | OW | |
| 33 Johnson City, any issue. | 73 | |
| 33 Johnson City, any issue. | OW | |
| 121 Johnson City, any issue. | 5.25-½ | |
| 121 LaFollette, any issue. | OW | |
| 121 Lawrenceburg Str. Imp. 6s. 4/1/41 (5M) | 5.00-½ | |
| 75 Lebanon 5s. medium. | 100 | |
| 131 Lenoir City Street 6s. 6/1/41. | 8.50-½ | |
| 21 McMinn County, any issue. | OW | |
| 25 McNairy 5½s. any. | 75 | |
| 33 Maryville 5s. | 5.75 | |
| 33 Memphis Hwy. 5s. any. | OW | |
| 123 Memphis 4s. 4½s. 4¾s. & 4½s. | 4.00-1 | |
| 53 Morgan Co. 6s. 1922 issue. | 75 | |
| 33 Morristown, any issue. | OW | |
| 124 Nashville (City of), all issues. | OW | |
| 75 Polk County (100% Reimb.) 5s. | OW | |
| 33 Sevier County 6s. 1941. | 6.00-2 | |
| 33 Sevier County, any issue. | 93 | |
| 21 Sullivan County, any issue. | OW | |
| 21 Sweetwater, any issue. | OW | |
| 21 Tipton County 5s. | OW | |
| 33 Washington County 5s. | 92 | |
| 75 Washington County (100% Reimb.) 5s. | 5s. 1948 100 | |
| 131 Washington Co. Fdg. 5s. 1/1/53. | 5.15-½ | |
| TEXAS: | | |
| 151 Texas Relief 3s. 10/15/39 (475M). | 2.50-½ | |
| 151 Texas School bonds (misc.). | OW | |
| 151 Abilene (City of) 5s. | 68 | |
| 151 Abilene 5s. | 68 | |
| 78 Amarillo Water Works. | 6.50-1½ | |
| 115 Amarillo 1. S. D. 5s. | 94 | |
| 115 Amarillo (City of) 5s. | OW | |
| 78 Angelina County Road 5½s. | 88 | |

1916-1935

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ADVERTISEMENTS.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

GOVT. AND MUNICIPAL BONDS (Cont.)

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|--|--------|--------|
| TEXAS (Cont.): | | |
| 76 Beaumont (City of) 4½s. and 5s. | 5.50-1 | |
| 117 Beaumont (City of) | 5.25% | |
| 76 Brazos County, any. | 98 | |
| 76 Breckenridge (City of) | OW | |
| 112 Brown Co. W. I. D. No. 1 5½s. | 40 | |
| 112 Cameron County Road 5s. A-G. | 61 | |
| 112 Cameron Co. Rd. 5s. 12/10/24. | 55 | |
| 76 Chamber Co. County. | 90 | |
| 112 Corpus Christi Funding 5s. any. | 56 | |
| 60 Dallas (City of) 4½s. 1948. | 3.85-½ | |
| 117 Dallas (City of) | 3.90-½ | |
| 111 Dallas Funding 4½s. 1946. | 4.15-1 | |
| 110 Dallas Co. Rd. Dist. No. 1. 1936. 2.50-½ | | |
| 78 Dallas County 5s. | 82 | |
| 78 Duval County Road 5½s. | 92 | |
| 78 Eastland County 5s. | OW | |
| 78 Edinburgh (City of) 4½s. | 62 | |
| 112 Eddie Clegg Cons. I. S. D. 6s. | 18 | |
| 112 Edinburg Cons. I. S. D. 6s. | 25 | |
| 122 Fort Worth 4½s. 1940-51. | 99 | |
| 115 Fort Worth. | OW | |
| 60 Galveston Wharf 5s. 1940. | 101 | |
| 117 Galveston (City of) | 4.75% | |
| 69 Harris Co. Special Rd. 5½s. 1947. | 96 | |
| 76 Liberty County Road 5s. | 90 | |
| 76 Liberty County Road 5½s. | 93 | |
| 112 McAllen (City) 1933. A. | 37½ | 45 |
| 117 McLennan Co. | 4.05% | |
| 78 Mission (City) | 42 | |
| 76 Nacogdoches County 5½s. | 93 | |
| 115 Navasota 5s. | 53 | |
| 115 New Haven 5s. Show. | 73 | |
| 60 Polk Co. Rd. & Br. 5½s. 1969. | 87½ | |
| 119 Potton County Road 5s. Short. | 99 | |
| 115 Rotan G. O. | 42 | |
| 116 Sherman (City of) 5s. | 4.75-1 | |
| 115 Stamford. | 60 | |
| 78 Stephenville County 5½s. | 74 | |
| 122 Tarrant County WCID 5s. 1955-65. | 98½ | |
| 115 Texarkana I. S. D. 4½s. | 73 | |
| 115 Toms Green County 5s. | OW | |
| 76 Trinity Co. Rds. 5½s. | 55 | |
| 78 Vernon (City of) | OW | |
| 112 Wealco. | 32 | |
| 60 Wharton Co. Rd. 5s. 1940-48. | 4.50-½ | |
| 117 Wharton Co. | 4.65% | |
| WASHINGTON: | | |
| 6 Port of Seattle reg. 5s. 1960. | 109 | |

WATER COMPANY BONDS

| | | |
|--|-----|------|
| 15 Alabama Wat. Serv. Co. 5s. 1957. | 83 | 85 |
| 150 Alabama Water Co. 5s. | 76½ | 77½ |
| 150 Chester Water Co. 4½s. | 98½ | 99 |
| 77 Community Water Service Co. 5½s. | 88 | 1946 |
| 150 Monmouth Cons. Water Co. 5s. | 86½ | 87½ |
| 150 New York Water Co. 5s. | 93 | 94 |
| 150 Scranton Gas & Water 4½s. | 97 | 98 |
| 150 Scranton Springbrook Wat. Serv. Co. 5s. | 84 | 86 |
| 150 Scranton Springbrook Water 6s. | 67½ | 77½ |
| 150 West Virginia Water 5s. | 86½ | 87½ |
| PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS | | |
| 9 American Pub. Util. 5s. 1942. | 58 | |
| 152 American States Pub. Serv. 5½s. 1948 42½ | 43½ | |
| 1 Arizona Pr. 6s. 1933. | 62 | |
| 1 Associated Public Utilities 5s. 1947. | 48 | |
| 1 Atlantic City 5s. 1936. | 13 | |
| 1 Atlantic City 5s. 1942. | 18 | |
| 9 Burlington Ry. & Lt. Rs. 1938. | 96 | |
| 152 Central Gas & Elec. 5½s. 1946. | 49 | 50 |
| 152 Central Gas & Elec. 6s. 1946. | 50½ | 51½ |
| 152 Central States Pr. & Lt. 5s. 1944. | 25 | 29 |
| 152 Central States Utilities 6s. 1938. | 12 | 13 |
| 125 Chattanooga 5s. | 72½ | |
| 152 Cincinnati Power & Light 5s. 1941. | 104 | |
| 125 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1938. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1942. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1943. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1944. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1945. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1946. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1947. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1948. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1949. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1950. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1951. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1952. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1953. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1954. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1955. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1956. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1957. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1958. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1959. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1960. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1961. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1962. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1963. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1964. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1965. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1966. | 104 | |
| 152 Cincinnati Util. 5s. 1967. | | |

GUAR. RAILROAD STOCKS (Cont.)
(Guarantor in Parentheses)

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|----------------------------------|------|--------|
| 2 Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & Chi. pf. | 172 | 175 |
| 2 Rensselaer & Saratoga | 117 | 120 |
| 2 St. Louis Bridge Co. 1st pf. | 139 | 142 |
| 2 St. Louis Bridge Co. 2d pf. | 69 | 72 |
| 2 Southwestern R. R. (C. of Ga.) | 68 | 73 |
| 2 Tunnel R. R. of St. Louis | 139 | 142 |
| 2 United N. J. R. & Canal | 242 | 244½ |
| 2 West. Maryland 1st pf. | 58 | 64 |

PUBLIC UTILITY STOCKS

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|---------------------------------------|------|--------|
| 15 Alabama Water Co. \$6 pf. | 41 | 45 |
| 33 Associated Tel. & Tel. 7% pf. B. | OW | BW |
| 132 Central States Pr. & Lt. 7% pf. | 11/4 | 2½ |
| 138 Cincinnati Gas & Elec. 5% pf. | 73 | 74½ |
| 138 Cleveland Elec. Illum. 6% pf. | 111 | 111 |
| 138 Columbus Ry. Pr. & Lt. 6½% pf. | 55 | 57 |
| 36 Continental Gas & Elec. Co. 7% pf. | 38 | 39½ |
| 110 Dallas Power & Light 8% pf. | 92½ | — |
| 110 Dallas Power & Light 7% pf. | 102 | — |
| 138 Dayton Pr. & Lt. 6% pf. | 87 | 90 |
| 132 Derby Gas & Elec. 7% pf. | 53 | 55 |
| 36 East Coast Pub. Serv. com. v.t.c. | 4 | 5½ |
| 132 El. Util. Assn. com. 1% 1½% | 68 | 68 |
| 22 El Paso Electric \$6 pf. | 62 | 62 |
| 42 El Paso Nat'l Gas 7% pf. | 13 | 18 |
| 15 Gas Utilities Co. | OW | BW |
| 142 General Water & Elec. com. 1% 1½% | 18 | 17½ |
| 36 General Water, Gas & Elec. \$3 pf. | 18 | 19 |
| 152 Gulf States Util. 8% pf. | 54 | 56 |
| 111 Houston Lig. & Power 7% pf. | 101 | 103 |
| 132 Indianapolis Pow. & Lt. 8% pf. | 57½ | 58½ |

PUBLIC UTILITY STOCKS (Cont.)

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|--|------|--------|
| 22 Int'l. Util. Corp. \$3.50 pr. pf. | 14½ | 15½ |
| 152 Interstate Power \$6 pf. | 5 | 7 |
| 152 Interstate Power 7% pf. | 7½ | 8½ |
| 96 Louisville Gas & Elec. 6% pf. | 52 | — |
| 152 Mass. Util. & Light 6% pf. | 18½ | 20½ |
| 152 Mass. Util. Assn. pf. | 52 | — |
| 152 Milw. E. R. & L. 6% pf. | 59 | 62 |
| 142 Mountain States Power com. | ½ | 1 |
| 152 New England Gas & Elec. \$5.50 pf. 19% 20% | — | — |
| 24 New England Power Assn. pf. | 26 | 30 |
| 152 New England Power Ass'ts. 6% pf. | 26½ | 26% |
| 152 Northern States Power 6% pf. | 42 | 42 |
| 152 Ohio Power 7% pf. | 47 | 48 |
| 158 Ohio-Arizona Corp. | — | — |
| 138 Ohio Edison \$6 pf. | 60 | 63 |
| 138 Ohio Edison 7% pf. | 68 | 70 |
| 138 Ohio Power 6% pf. | 84 | 86 |
| 138 Ohio Public Service 5% pf. | 55 | 58 |
| 138 Ohio Public Service 6% pf. | 60 | 62 |
| 138 Ohio Public Service 7% pf. | 68 | 70 |
| 138 Oklahoma Gas & Elec. 5% pf. | 52 | 52 |
| 138 Oklahoma Gas & Elec. 7% pf. | 72 | 74 |
| 152 Oregon Wash. Wat. Serv. Co. \$6 pf. OW | BW | |
| 152 Public Service of Colo. 6% pf. | 69 | 71 |
| 152 Public Service of Colo. 7% pf. | 79 | 81 |
| 152 Public Service of Okla. 6% pf. Iren. 50 | 52 | — |
| 152 Public Service of Okla. 7% pf. Iren. 58 | 60 | — |
| 24 Rockland Light & Power | 6 | 8 |
| 24 Rockland Lig. & Pr. com. | 5½ | 6½ |
| 142 Seattle Gas 7% pf. | 4 | 4 |
| 152 Southern Indiana Gas & El. 6% pf. | 52 | 54 |
| 152 Southern Indiana Gas & El. 7% pf. | 56½ | 60 |
| 132 Southwest Gas & Elec. 7% pf. | 54 | 56 |
| 124 Tenn. Elec. Pr. 6% pf. | 40½ | 41½ |

PUBLIC UTILITY STOCKS (Cont.)

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|--|------|--------|
| 124 Tenn. Elec. Pr. 7% pf. | 45 | 46½ |
| 110 Texas Electric Service Co. \$6 pf. | 64 | 66 |
| 122 Texas Elec. Serv. \$6 pf. | 67½ | 70 |
| 110 Texas Power & Light 6% pf. | 78 | — |
| 152 Texas Power & Light 7% pf. | 77 | 82 |
| 111 Texas Pr. & Lt. 6% pf. | 67 | 70 |
| 111 Texas Pr. & Lt. 7% pf. | 78 | 81 |
| 138 Toledo Edison 5% pf. | 58 | 60 |
| 138 Toledo Edison Co. 6% pf. | 62½ | 70½ |
| 152 Toledo Edison Co. 7% pf. | 81 | 83 |
| 152 Utilities P. & L. 7% pf. | 84 | 87 |
| 152 Texas Util. 6% pf. | 87 | 88 |
| 152 West Va. Water Serv. Co. \$6 pf. | 52 | 55 |
| 65 Wisconsin Electric Power 6% pf. | 90 | 93 |
| 65 Wisconsin Gas & Elec. 6% pf. | 77 | 80 |
| 65 Wisconsin Tel. Co. 7% pf. | 112 | 114½ |

INVESTMENT TRUST SECURITIES

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|---|------|--------|
| 1 Consolidated Inv. Tr. | 22 | 23½ |
| 24 Incorporated Investors, ex. div. 25c reg. and 10c extra. | — | 16.88 |
| 24 Investors Trading, Class A. | 5½ | 6½ |
| 65 Wisconsin Investment Co. com. | 1½ | 1½ |
| 65 Wta. Inv. Co. \$10 par 6% pf. | 5½ | 6½ |

INDUSTRIAL STOCKS

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|---------------------------------------|------|--------|
| 77 American Thermos Bottle Co. pf. | 39 | 42½ |
| 77 American Thermos Bottl. Co. A com. | 6½ | 7½ |
| 25 Augusta Riverside Mills (Ga.) pf. | OW | — |
| 33 Calhoun-Rumsey Bridge Co. pf. | 18 | — |
| 33 Columbia Baking | OW | BW |
| 33 Columbia Broadcasting, A. | 25 | 25½ |
| 33 Columbia Broadcasting, B. | 24½ | 24½ |
| 1 Dennison Mfg. 7% pf. | 38 | — |

INDUSTRIAL STOCKS (Cont.)

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|------------------------------------|------|--------|
| 36 Doehler Die Casting \$50 par. | OW | BW |
| 36 Doehler Die Casting no par pf. | 90 | 100 |
| 35 Florida Portland Cement, units. | OW | — |
| 35 Florida Portland Co. com. | 35 | 60 |
| 35 Great Lakes S. S. Co. com. | OW | BW |
| 35 Great Northern Paper. | 25 | 26 |
| 35 Hannibal Bridge | 7½ | 78 |
| 35 Jefferson Corp. com. | 4½ | 5 |
| 35 Jefferson Lake Oil common | 4 | 5 |
| 35 Jefferson Lake Oil pf. | 5 | 6 |
| 35 John Deere Service Co. com. | 10 | 12 |
| 35 Ludlow Mfg. Ass'ts. | 27½ | 30 |
| 35 Smith (E. L.) Oil. | 2.50 | 3.00 |
| 35 Southeastern Express Co. | 72 | 78 |
| 35 United Cigar Stores com. | 22 | 28 |
| 35 United Cigar Stores 6% pf. | 7½ | 8½ |
| 35 United Cigar Stores pf. | 8½ | 9½ |
| 35 United States Envelope pf. | 112 | 112 |
| 55 York Ice Machinery pf. | OW | — |

BREWING AND DISTILLING STOCKS

| Key. | Bid. | Offer. |
|---|------|--------|
| 33 Brewing & Distillers, Ltd. | 7½ | 8½ |
| 33 Cummings Distilling | — | — |
| 33 Harvard Brewing | 2½ | 2½ |
| 33 Oldetime Distilling | 2½ | 2½ |
| 33 Weibel Brewing | OW | BW |
| 33 Wiedemann Brewing & Distilling Corp. conv. part. pf. | 1½ | 2½ |

1934 Monthly High and Low Price of 100 Most Active Stocks—New York Stock Exchange

| | January. | February. | March. | April. | May. | June. | July. | August. | September. | October. | November. | December. |
|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|------|-------|-------|---------|------------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Stocks. | Sales. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. |
| General Motors Corp. | 7,506,900 | 40% | 33½ | 42 | 37½ | 39% | 35 | 39½ | 29½ | 32½ | 28½ | 34½ |
| Chrysler Corp. | 7,297,300 | 59½ | 49% | 60% | 53½ | 57½ | 49% | 55% | 45% | 52½ | 35% | 30½ |
| Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. | 5,513,500 | 28% | 21 | 35½ | 28½ | 34 | 29 | 32 | 22½ | 29½ | 25% | 37½ |
| Radio Corp. | 4,064,400 | 8% | 6½ | 9% | 7½ | 8½ | 7½ | 8½ | 6% | 7½ | 5½ | 7½ |
| Nat. Distillers Products Corp. | 3,961,800 | 30% | 23½ | 31% | 25% | 26% | 21 | 23½ | 24% | 24 | 16 | 22½ |
| General Electric Co. | 3,879,990 | 23½ | 18½ | 20% | 20½ | 23½ | 21½ | 21½ | 19½ | 20½ | 17½ | 17½ |
| U. S. Steel Corp. | 3,770,410 | 58% | 46 | 59½ | 56½ | 48½ | 53½ | 46½ | 47½ | 41½ | 33½ | 29½ |
| New York Central. | 3,368,600 | 40% | 31½ | 45% | 37½ | 39 | 30½ | 31½ | 25½ | 27½ | 22½ | 36½ |
| International Nickel (Canada). | 3,355,300 | 23% | 21 | 24 | 21½ | 28½ | 23½ | 28½ | 25% | 27½ | 22½ | 23½ |
| Commonwealth & Southern. | 2,960,500 | 3% | 1% | 3% | 2% | 2½ | 2 | 2½ | 2 | 2½ | 1½ | 1½ |
| Loew's, Inc. | 2,910,300 | 30% | 25% | 34½ | 38% | 33% | 30% | 35% | 29½ | 32½ | 22½ | 33½ |
| United Aircraft & Transport. | 2,885,300 | 36½ | 30% | 37½ | 37½ | 25% | 21½ | 23½ | 21½ | 23½ | 17½ | 21½ |
| United Corp. | 2,778,050 | 7½ | 4½ | 8½ | 7½ | 6½ | 5½ | 5½ | 3½ | 4½ | 3½ | 3½ |
| International Tel. & Tel. | 2,756,500 | 16½ | 13½ | 17½ | 13½ | 15½ | 13½ | 13½ | 11½ | 13½ | 10½ | 12½ |
| Consolidated Gas of N. Y. | 2,653,250 | 44% | 35% | 47% | 39 | 35% | 31½ | 35% | 28½ | 30½ | 25 | 25½ |
| Paramount-Publix ctfs. | 2,639,560 | 3% | 13 | 5½ | 3 | 4½ | 4½ | 5 | 2% | 4½ | 2½ | 4½ |
| Commercial Solvents Corp. | 2,605,400 | 36% | 30% | 26 | 30% | 28½ | 26% | 24½ | 20% | 20½ | 18½ | 22½ |
| Southern-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. | 2,509,000 | 19 | 15½ | 16½ | 17½ | 15½ | 17½ | 17½ | 15½ | 17½ | 15½ | 13½ |
| Acadonia Copper. | 2,424,290 | 17 | 13½ | 14½ | 14½ | 14 | 14½ | 14½ | 13½ | 14½ | 13½ | 12½ |
| Consolidated Oil Corp. | 2,423,068 | 12½ | 9½ | 11½ | 11½ | 11½ | 11½ | 11½ | 10½ | 11½ | 10½ | |

The Week in the Commodities; Gold Case Depresses



UNCERTAINTY regarding the gold value of the dollar as a result of the case before the Supreme Court weakened commodity-price levels last week. The Annalist Weekly Index of Wholesale Commodity prices declining to 121.9 on Jan. 15 from 122.1 (revised) the Tuesday previous. The decline would have been much greater had it not been for the persisting strength in cattle and the meats. The chief losses were in the grains and flour, cotton, cocoa, coffee and tin—commodities the prices of which are more or less made in world markets and are, therefore, very sensitive to possible changes in foreign-exchange rates.

THE ANNALIST WEEKLY INDEX OF WHOLESALE COMMODITY PRICES

Unadjusted for Seasonal Variation

| (1913 = 100) | | |
|---|---------|----------|
| Jan. 15, | Jan. 8, | Jan. 16, |
| 1935. 116.4 | 117.6 | 117.5 |
| Food products. 125.0 | 124.1 | 102.8 |
| Textile products. 107.0 | 107.2 | 120.2 |
| Fuels. 160.9 | 161.9 | 155.1 |
| Metals. 109.7 | 109.7 | 105.0 |
| Building materials. 112.1 | 112.1 | 112.1 |
| Chemicals. 98.6 | 98.6 | 99.0 |
| Miscellaneous. 79.5 | 78.9 | 84.9 |
| All commodities. 121.9 | 122.1 | 104.9 |
| All commodities on old-dollar basis. 72.7 | 72.4 | 65.2 |

*Preliminary. [†]Revised. [‡]Based on exchange quotations for France, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium.

DAILY SPOT PRICES

Moody's
—Index—
U. S. Old

| | Cotton. | Wheat. | Corn. | Hogs. | \$ |
|----------------|---------|--------|-------|-------|------|
| Jan. 8. 12.90 | 1.16% | 1.07% | 7.72 | 159.1 | 94.3 |
| Jan. 9. 12.85 | 1.16% | 1.07% | 7.88 | 160.0 | 94.9 |
| Jan. 10. 12.80 | 1.16% | 1.08% | 7.89 | 159.4 | 94.4 |
| Jan. 11. 12.70 | 1.14% | 1.05% | 7.78 | 158.2 | 94.0 |
| Jan. 12. 12.60 | 1.14% | 1.06% | 7.78 | 157.5 | 93.6 |
| Jan. 13. 12.65 | 1.13 | 1.05% | 7.80 | 157.1 | 93.5 |
| Jan. 15. 12.55 | 1.10% | 1.01% | 7.61 | 155.0 | 92.4 |

Cotton—Middling upland, New York. Wheat—No. 2 red, new, c. i. f., domestic, New York. Corn—No. 2 yellow, New York. Hogs—Day's average, good and choice, Chicago. Moody's Index—Daily index of fifteen staple commodities Dec. 31, 1931=100; March 1, 1933=80.

THE GRAINS

The wheat markets turned weak last Friday, as the country awoke to the realization that the Gold Clause case now before the Supreme Court might not be decided in the government's favor. Prices declined steadily thereafter, culminating in a 3-cent drop Tuesday, May closed Tuesday at 95, against \$1.01 a week before. Although the uncertainty regarding the Supreme Court's decision presumably only affected the United States, foreign prices weakened in sympathy, May Winnipeg closing at 80%, against 84%, and May Liverpool at 5s 0 1/4d, against 5s 1 1/4d.

UNITED STATES WHEAT MOVEMENT

(Thousands; exports as reported by the Department of Commerce, visible supplies as reported by the Chicago Board of Trade)

| Wk Ended Saturday— | | |
|---------------------------------|---------|----------|
| Jan. 12, | Jan. 5, | Jan. 13, |
| 1935. 0 | 341 | 341 |
| Wheat exports (bus.) | 2,950 | 5,960 |
| Flour exports (bus.) | 29 | 18 |
| Since July 1. 2,170 | 2,087 | 52 |
| Total (bus.) | 136 | 585 |
| Since July 1. 13,149 | 15,769 | |
| Visible supply at wk-end (bus.) | 78,257 | 81,329 |
| 119,114 | | |

^aIncluding flour milled in bond from Canadian wheat. ^bFlour converted to wheat at 4.7 bushels to the barrel. ^cRevised.

CANADIAN WHEAT MOVEMENT

(Thousands of bushels, wheat only; as reported by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics)

| Week Ended Friday— | | |
|--|----------|---------|
| Jan. 4, | Dec. 28, | Jan. 5, |
| 1935. 1,175 | 806 | 2,285 |
| Exports, inc. from U. S. ports | 60,412 | 79,323 |
| Elevator stocks and | | |
| atfot at week-end | 257,749 | 258,093 |
| ^a Including also exports into U. S. for U. S. consumption. ^b Since July 28, 1934, and July 29, 1933. ^c Including stocks at U. S. ports. ^d Revised. | 239,817 | |

Farm wheat stocks as of Jan. 1 were estimated at only 136,044,000 bushels, compared with 196,508,000 last year, 273,-

012,000 on Jan. 1, 1933, and 322,517,000 on Jan. 1, 1932. The current figure was the lowest for the date for the nine years for which records are available.

WORLD WHEAT MOVEMENT

(Thousands of bushels, wheat only as reported by Broomhall)

| Wk Ended Saturday— | | |
|---------------------|---------|----------|
| Jan. 12, | Jan. 5, | Jan. 13, |
| From: North America | 1,766 | 1,378 |
| Argentine | 4,235 | 2,945 |
| Australia | 2,188 | 2,204 |
| India | 8 | 208 |
| Black Sea | 1,160 | 720 |
| Other | 9,357 | 7,455 |
| Total | 236,034 | 237,462 |

production of manufactured goods in this country, according to a report issued recently by the New York Cotton Exchange Service. The stock of all kinds of cotton in the United States at the end of December was considerably smaller than on the corresponding date

DOMESTIC COTTON ACTIVITY

(Thousands of running bales, counting round as half, linters excluded, as reported by the Bureau of the Census)

| Year's | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|--------|
| Dec., Nov., | Dec., | Chg. |
| 1934. 1934. | 1933. 1934. | P. C. |
| Consumption: | | |
| Month | 414 | 477 |
| Adjusted | 18.0 | 18.4 |
| Aug.-Dec. | 2,128 | 2,405 |
| Month-End Stocks: | | |
| In consuming establishments | 1,300 | 1,294 |
| In public storage | 9,641 | 9,795 |
| and warehouses | 10,941 | 11,089 |
| Total | 10,941 | 11,089 |

Exports:

| Month | 504 | 572 | 820 | -38.5 |
|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Adjusted | 10.5 | 10.3 | 17.1 | ... |
| Aug.-Dec. | 2,439 | 4,182 | 4,177 | -41.7 |

Spindles (Thousands):

| Active | 25,057 | 25,051 | 24,841 | + 0.8 |
|----------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Adjusted | 25,057 | 24,926 | 24,841 | ... |

^aRevised. ^bDaily average, adjusted for seasonal variation. ^cAdjusted for seasonal variation.

MOVEMENT OF AMERICAN COTTON

(Thousands of running bales, counting round as half, linters excluded, as reported by the New York Cotton Exchange)

| Wk's Ending Thursday, Yr's | | |
|----------------------------|---------|----------|
| Jan. 10. | Jan. 3. | Jan. 11. |
| 1935. 1,255 | 1,255 | 9,098 |
| Deliveries During Week: | | |
| To domestic mills 101 | 77 | 107 |
| To foreign mills 97 | 102 | 224 |
| Total to all mills 198 | 179 | 331 |

To all mills 198

Deliveries Since Aug. 1:

To domestic mills 2,424

To foreign mills 2,489

To all mills 4,913

Exports:

During week 86

Since Aug. 1, 2,584

World Visible Supply (Thursday):

World total 6,660

Week's change -98

U. S. A. only 4,781

Certified Stocks: Thursday 107

in recent previous seasons, but was somewhat larger than the average stock prior to the depression. While supplies

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COMMODITY FUTURE PRICES
(Grains at Chicago; Others at New York)

Daily Range

| Cotton: | January | | March | | May | | July | | October | | December | |
|----------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. |
| Jan. 7 | 12.51 | 12.42 | 12.66 | 12.54 | 12.74 | 12.61 | 12.77 | 12.65 | 12.63 | 12.52 | 12.68 | 12.58 |
| Jan. 8 | 12.60 | 12.58 | 12.71 | 12.62 | 12.80 | 12.70 | 12.80 | 12.74 | 12.65 | 12.60 | 12.68 | 12.63 |
| Jan. 9 | 12.62 | 12.55 | 12.71 | 12.63 | 12.79 | 12.70 | 12.85 | 12.74 | 12.65 | 12.59 | 12.70 | 12.63 |
| Jan. 10 | 12.57 | 12.53 | 12.66 | 12.61 | 12.71 | 12.67 | 12.75 | 12.70 | 12.60 | 12.57 | 12.66 | 12.61 |
| Jan. 11 | 12.51 | 12.41 | 12.63 | 12.69 | 12.71 | 12.54 | 12.58 | 12.42 | 12.42 | 12.42 | 12.62 | 12.47 |
| Jan. 12 | 12.39 | 12.35 | 12.51 | 12.44 | 12.57 | 12.51 | 12.57 | 12.44 | 12.35 | 12.50 | 12.43 | |
| Week's range | 12.62 | 12.35 | 12.71 | 12.44 | 12.80 | 12.51 | 12.85 | 12.74 | 12.65 | 12.35 | 12.70 | 12.43 |
| Jan. 14 | 12.40 | 12.38 | 12.54 | 12.47 | 12.62 | 12.54 | 12.62 | 12.55 | 12.45 | 12.38 | 12.50 | 12.45 |
| Jan. 15 | 12.27 | 12.25 | 12.51 | 12.27 | 12.58 | 12.33 | 12.57 | 12.32 | 12.44 | 12.18 | 12.49 | 12.22 |
| Jan. 15 close | 12.29n | 12.38t | 12.39 | 12.43t | 12.41t | 12.29t | 12.30 | 12.35t | | | | |
| Contract range | 14.03 | 11.02 | 14.15 | 11.13 | 14.23 | 11.79 | 14.21 | 12.03 | 12.71 | 11.74 | 12.76 | 12.22 |
| | Ag. 9 | My. 1 | Ag. 9 | My. 1 | Ag. 9 | My. 1 | Ag. 9 | Nv. 1 | Ja. 2 | Nv. 1 | Ja. 15 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wheat: | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. |
| Jan. 7 | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% |
| Jan. 8 | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% |
| Jan. 9 | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% |
| Jan. 10 | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% |
| Jan. 11 | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% | 1.01% | 1.00% |
| Jan. 12 | 1.00% | 99% | 1.00% | 98% | 1.00% | 98% | 1.00% | 98% | 1.00% | 98% | 1.00% | 98% |
| Week's range | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% | 1.02% | 1.01% |
| Jan. 14 | 99% | 98% | 99% | 98% | 99% | 98% | 99% | 98% | 99% | 98% | 99% | 98% |
| Jan. 15 | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% |
| Jan. 15 close | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% | 98% | 97% |
| Contract range | 1.17 | 93% | 1.17 | 98% | 1.17 | 86% | 1.17 | 92% | 1.17 | 84% | 1.17 | 84% |
| | Aug. 10 | Oct. 31 | Dec. 7 | Jan. 15 | Jan. 7 | Jan. 15 | Jan. 7 | Jan. 15 | Jan. 7 | Jan. 15 | Jan. 7 | Jan. 15 |

Traded week ended Friday, Jan. 11, 100,468,000 bushels; last year, 67,442,000.

Weekly Range

| Corn: | Week Ended | | Week Ended | | Week Ended | | Contract Range | | | | |
|-----------------|------------|------|------------|------------|------------|-------|----------------|-------|--------|-------|---------|
| | High. | Low. | Close. | High. | Low. | High. | Low. | Date. | Low. | Date. | |
| May | .91% | .84% | .84% | .91% | .87% | .90% | .88% | .93% | Dec. 5 | .75 | Oct. 4 |
| July | .86% | .79% | .79% | .86% | .82% | .86% | .84% | .90% | Dec. 5 | .75 | Oct. 4 |
| Sept. | .84% | .75% | .75% | .84% | .79% | .82% | .80% | .84% | Jan. 9 | .75% | Jan. 15 |
| Bushels traded* | 57,531,000 | | | 47,859,000 | | | | | | | |

Oats:

| May | .55% | .50% | .50% | t | .55% | .52% | .54% | .52% | .59% | Aug. 10 | .45% | Oct. 4 |
|-----------------|------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------|--------|
| July | .48% | .43% | .43% | t | .48% | .45% | .48% | .46% | .51% | Dec. 5 | .41 | Oct. 4 |
| Sept. | .44% | .41% | .41% | t | .44% | .41% | .44% | .44% | .41% | Jan. 8 | .41 | Jan. 2 |
| Bushels traded* | 12,225,000 | | | 7,756,000 | | | | | | | | |

Rye:

| May | .76% | .66% | .66% | t | .76% | .72% | .76% | .73% | .95% | Aug. 9 | .66% | Jan. 15 |
|-----------------|-----------|------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|------|---------|
| July | .76% | .67% | .67% | t | .76% | .72% | .76% | .73% | .80% | Dec. 5 | .67 | Jan. 15 |
| Sept. | .75% | .66% | .66% | t | .75% | .72% | .76% | .74% | .76% | Jan. 4 | .66% | Jan. 15 |
| Bushels traded* | 4,246,000 | | | 4,800,000 | | | | | | | | |

Coffee-D (Santos No. 4):

| Mar. | 10.10 | 9.89 | 9.89 | t | 10.58 | 10.20 | 10.62 | 10.41 | 11.65 | May 28 | 9.89 | Jan. 15 |
|------------------|-------|------|------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|------|---------|
| May | 10.08 | 9.83 | 9.83 | t | 10.57 | 10.19 | 10.60 | 10.40 | 11.66 | June 1 | 9.83 | Jan. 15 |
| July | 10.07 | 9.83 | 9.83 | t | 10.57 | 10.17 | 10.59 | 10.45 | 11.35 | Aug. 13 | 9.82 | Jan. 15 |
| Sept. | 10.06 | 9.83 | 9.86 | t | 10.55 | 10.20 | 10.60 | 10.50 | 11.63 | Oct. 9 | 9.83 | Jan. 15 |
| Dec. | 10.05 | 9.88 | 9.89 | t | 10.60 | 10.19 | 10.60 | 10.50 | 11.66 | Jan. 7 | 9.88 | Jan. 15 |
| Contracts traded | 224 | | | 168 | | | | | | | | |

Coffee-A (No. 7):

| Mar. | 6.85 | 6.61 | 6.63 | n | 7.15 | 6.94 | 7.34 | 7.25 | 8.84 | June 1 | 6.61 | Jan. 15 |
|------------------|------|------|------|----|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------|---------|
| May | 6.92 | 6.76 | 6.76 | n | 7.44 | 7.05 | 7.50 | 7.28 | 8.81 | June 4 | 6.76 | Jan. 15 |
| July | 7.07 | 6.85 | 6.86 | n | 7.45 | 7.19 | 7.64 | 7.38 | 8.87 | Aug. 16 | 6.85 | Jan. 15 |
| Sept. | 7.15 | 6.94 | 6.95 | n | 7.34 | 7.26 | 7.72 | 7.70 | 7.75 | Oct. 9 | 6.94 | Jan. 15 |
| Dec. | 7.25 | 7.04 | 7.04 | n | 7.65 | 7.32 | 7.69 | 7.55 | 7.69 | Jan. 3 | 7.04 | Jan. 15 |
| Contracts traded | 108 | | | 57 | | | | | | | | |

Contracts traded.

| Mar. | 1.85 | 1.83 | 1.86 | @1.88 | 1.89 | 1.82 | 1.88 | 1.80 | 1.89 | Jan. 7 | 1.80 | Jan. 2 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|------|--------|
| May | 1.91 | 1.91 | 1.92 | 1.94 | 1.86 | 1.92 | 1.84 | 1.84 | 1.94 | Jan. 7 | 1.84 | Jan. 2 |
| July | 1.96 | 1.97 | 1.98 | 1.99 | 1.90 | 1.96 | 1.87 | 1.86 | 1.98 | Jan. 7 | 1.87 | Jan. 2 |
| Sept. | 2.01 | 1.95 | 2.01 | 2.02 | 1.95 | 2.00 | 1.93 | 1.92 | 2.02 | Jan. 7 | 1.93 | Jan. 2 |
| Dec. | 2.06 | 2.01 | 2.06 | 2.05 | 2.01 | 2.06 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 2.06 | Jan. 3 | 1.95 | Jan. 2 |
| Contracts traded. | 747 | | | 1,549 | | | | | | | | |

7
RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1923-25=100)

| | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | May. | June. | July. | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1919. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 83 | 80 | 77 | 78 | 77 | 83 | 87 | 89 | 87 | 86 | 85 | 85 |
| Department store sales | 66 | 71 | 72 | 72 | 69 | 76 | 80 | 80 | 83 | 81 | 86 | 86 |
| Employment | 107.0 | 102.3 | 101.7 | 102.4 | 103.4 | 104.9 | 108.6 | 109.8 | 109.5 | 109.2 | 112.2 | 115.3 |
| Payrolls | 98.7 | 88.1 | 87.1 | 88.2 | 88.3 | 92.9 | 99.9 | 100.9 | 104.9 | 99.6 | 106.3 | 113.1 |
| Wholesale prices | 133.5 | 129.0 | 130.5 | 132.2 | 134.4 | 134.7 | 140.2 | 143.4 | 140.2 | 140.7 | 143.6 | 149.5 |
| Cost of living | 96.1 | ... | 102.8 | ... | 109.1 | ... | 109.1 | ... | 109.1 | ... | 109.1 | ... |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 21.0 | 40.4 | 33.4 | 45.5 | 55.3 | 73.9 | 91.2 | 89.2 | 74.9 | 89.3 | 75.9 | 81.6 |
| Moving average | 31.6 | 39.4 | 44.7 | 58.2 | 73.3 | 84.8 | 85.1 | 84.5 | 80.0 | 82.3 | 81.9 | 81.9 |
| 1920. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 95 | 95 | 94 | 88 | 90 | 88 | 88 | 85 | 82 | 75 | 70 | 70 |
| Department store sales | 92 | 89 | 93 | 93 | 96 | 96 | 98 | 97 | 95 | 92 | 96 | 92 |
| Employment | 121.3 | 113.6 | 119.7 | 119.6 | 121.4 | 125.5 | 125.7 | 122.8 | 120.0 | 112.9 | 106.8 | 97.2 |
| Payrolls | 156.7 | 156.1 | 157.6 | 164.5 | 166.1 | 165.5 | 164.7 | 160.4 | 154.2 | 143.3 | 122.6 | 119.9 |
| Cost of living | 114.5 | 115.1 | 116.4 | 119.9 | 120.9 | 121.3 | 121.5 | 118.1 | 117.8 | 116.5 | 115.3 | 110.3 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 88.2 | 83.3 | 79.7 | 72.7 | 63.8 | 63.4 | 57.4 | 58.1 | 57.7 | 52.2 | 44.6 | 35.4 |
| Moving average | 84.4 | 83.7 | 78.6 | 72.1 | 66.7 | 61.5 | 59.6 | 57.7 | 56.0 | 51.5 | 44.1 | 41.2 |
| 1921. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 67 | 66 | 65 | 66 | 65 | 64 | 66 | 67 | 71 | 71 | 70 | 70 |
| Department store sales | 92 | 92 | 88 | 88 | 87 | 87 | 84 | 82 | 86 | 83 | 84 | 84 |
| Employment | 82.3 | 82.7 | 82.6 | 82.0 | 82.1 | 81.5 | 81.1 | 81.3 | 81.8 | 82.5 | 83.9 | 84.0 |
| Payrolls | 85.7 | 79.9 | 79.1 | 78.1 | 76.7 | 76.2 | 75.8 | 74.6 | 73.5 | 70.8 | 71.4 | 72.7 |
| Wholesale prices | 113.3 | 104.2 | 101.7 | 98.3 | 96.5 | 92.8 | 92.0 | 92.8 | 93.5 | 92.3 | 92.3 | 92.3 |
| Cost of living | 107.7 | 103.4 | 102.4 | 100.9 | 99.3 | 98.7 | 98.6 | 100.6 | 100.0 | 99.8 | 99.5 | 99.8 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 43.5 | 40.2 | 42.1 | 51.7 | 55.1 | 53.2 | 59.5 | 54.6 | 76.1 | 62.7 | 61.3 | 66.7 |
| Moving average | 39.7 | 41.9 | 44.7 | 49.6 | 53.3 | 56.0 | 55.9 | 63.5 | 64.5 | 66.7 | 63.6 | 64.1 |
| 1922. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 74 | 76 | 81 | 77 | 81 | 85 | 84 | 83 | 88 | 94 | 97 | 100 |
| Department store sales | 83 | 83 | 84 | 87 | 87 | 86 | 86 | 88 | 91 | 93 | 92 | 93 |
| Employment | 83.8 | 84.7 | 85.5 | 85.7 | 88.2 | 90.3 | 89.6 | 91.5 | 92.6 | 92.5 | 98.6 | 101.3 |
| Payrolls | 72.0 | 71.2 | 72.5 | 73.0 | 76.6 | 81.3 | 82.7 | 83.8 | 87.2 | 87.2 | 93.0 | 94.9 |
| Wholesale prices | 96.8 | 92.3 | 92.2 | 92.6 | 95.5 | 97.5 | 98.8 | 98.0 | 97.9 | 99.0 | 99.0 | 100.1 |
| Cost of living | 96.9 | 96.7 | 94.7 | 94.8 | 94.9 | 95.1 | 95.2 | 94.6 | 95.1 | 95.9 | 96.5 | 96.7 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 64.3 | 65.1 | 73.0 | 83.6 | 80.2 | 81.1 | 86.8 | 88.8 | 84.8 | 70.5 | 79.9 | 76.4 |
| Moving average | 65.4 | 67.5 | 73.9 | 78.9 | 81.6 | 86.6 | 89.5 | 90.7 | 81.4 | 78.4 | 75.6 | 78.8 |
| 1923. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 100 | 100 | 104 | 107 | 107 | 105 | 103 | 102 | 100 | 99 | 97 | 96 |
| Department store sales | 91 | 93 | 95 | 100 | 98 | 101 | 98 | 101 | 100 | 101 | 100 | 99 |
| Employment | 102.3 | 102.6 | 103.9 | 104.9 | 105.6 | 106.6 | 105.3 | 105.3 | 102.6 | 102.8 | 102.2 | 102.2 |
| Payrolls | 97.9 | 96.3 | 99.2 | 102.7 | 104.6 | 108.6 | 108.9 | 104.8 | 104.5 | 103.9 | 104.1 | 102.1 |
| Wholesale prices | 101.3 | 102.6 | 103.8 | 103.2 | 101.3 | 99.7 | 97.8 | 97.2 | 99.1 | 98.8 | 97.8 | 97.5 |
| Cost of living | 96.3 | 96.0 | 97.1 | 97.1 | 97.5 | 97.6 | 98.5 | 99.4 | 97.9 | 100.5 | 100.3 | 100.3 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 80.1 | 93.8 | 82.3 | 86.4 | 93.6 | 78.5 | 73.7 | 67.7 | 72.9 | 89.8 | 94.9 | 93.6 |
| Moving average | 83.4 | 85.4 | 87.5 | 87.4 | 86.2 | 81.9 | 73.3 | 71.4 | 76.8 | 85.5 | 92.8 | 95.6 |
| 1924. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 98 | 102 | 101 | 95 | 89 | 85 | 83 | 89 | 94 | 95 | 97 | 100 |
| Department store sales | 99 | 101 | 99 | 98 | 97 | 100 | 96 | 96 | 101 | 96 | 100 | 99 |
| Employment | 101.8 | 101.6 | 101.0 | 99.8 | 97.1 | 94.4 | 92.5 | 92.2 | 93.5 | 94.4 | 96.9 | 96.9 |
| Payrolls | 102.3 | 102.4 | 100.8 | 100.7 | 96.7 | 93.2 | 90.3 | 90.2 | 92.7 | 92.7 | 93.3 | 96.8 |
| Wholesale prices | 99.0 | 98.1 | 96.7 | 96.7 | 95.3 | 94.3 | 95.0 | 96.4 | 96.5 | 97.6 | 98.5 | 100.9 |
| Cash farm income | 93.5 | 97.0 | 85.5 | 91.5 | 91.5 | 94.0 | 94.0 | 94.5 | 98.5 | 102.0 | 102.0 | 103.5 |
| Cost of living | 100.2 | 99.8 | 99.5 | 98.9 | 98.9 | 98.9 | 99.4 | 99.8 | 100.5 | 100.7 | 101.2 | 101.2 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 98.2 | 96.6 | 98.5 | 99.3 | 96.0 | 85.4 | 77.5 | 83.5 | 83.4 | 101.8 | 117.5 | 98.6 |
| Moving average | 95.8 | 97.4 | 97.8 | 96.1 | 91.8 | 84.5 | 82.1 | 81.5 | 89.6 | 100.9 | 106.0 | 104.9 |
| 1925. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 105 | 105 | 105 | 103 | 101 | 103 | 103 | 102 | 105 | 106 | 108 | 108 |
| Department store sales | 99 | 103 | 103 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 101 | 101 | 101 | 111 | 104 | 104 |
| Employment | 97.9 | 98.2 | 98.1 | 98.6 | 98.4 | 98.6 | 99.4 | 99.6 | 99.5 | 100.3 | 101.4 | 102.3 |
| Payrolls | 98.8 | 99.1 | 99.1 | 99.9 | 99.7 | 102.0 | 100.3 | 99.0 | 101.9 | 104.2 | 104.4 | 104.4 |
| Wholesale prices | 102.3 | 103.3 | 103.5 | 101.3 | 101.0 | 102.3 | 103.6 | 102.7 | 102.9 | 103.8 | 102.7 | 102.7 |
| Cash farm income | 110.0 | 105.5 | 104.0 | 91.0 | 91.5 | 94.0 | 94.0 | 107.0 | 103.5 | 97.0 | 102.5 | 109.5 |
| Cost of living | 101.7 | 100.8 | 100.8 | 100.5 | 100.7 | 101.1 | 102.5 | 102.4 | 102.2 | 102.9 | 104.1 | 103.9 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 98.5 | 100.5 | 101.3 | 112.9 | 110.8 | 115.2 | 119.2 | 139.7 | 137.7 | 128.4 | 142.7 | 154.0 |
| Moving average | 99.2 | 102.4 | 107.2 | 107.2 | 107.2 | 124.7 | 130.5 | 133.6 | 134.6 | 141.7 | 149.3 | 193.3 |
| 1926. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 106 | 107 | 108 | 108 | 107 | 107 | 111 | 111 | 111 | 108 | 105 | 105 |
| Department store sales | 106 | 105 | 101 | 105 | 109 | 105 | 106 | 108 | 106 | 108 | 106 | 108 |
| Employment | 102.1 | 101.6 | 101.4 | 103.3 | 107.3 | 100.7 | 100.1 | 101.5 | 101.4 | 101.2 | 101.0 | 100.8 |
| Payrolls | 104.5 | 103.2 | 103.1 | 103.3 | 102.3 | 104.3 | 104.4 | 104.4 | 104.6 | 104.9 | 103.7 | 102.7 |
| Wholesale prices | 102.5 | 101.3 | 100.0 | 99.7 | 99.9 | 98.8 | 98.5 | 99.1 | 98.8 | 97.8 | 97.3 | 97.3 |
| Cash farm income | 102.0 | 100.5 | 100.0 | 104.5 | 101.0 | 117.5 | 112.0 | 95.0 | 97.0 | 91.5 | 96.0 | 90.5 |
| Cost of living | 103.4 | 102.9 | 102.3 | 102.4 | 102.1 | 101.7 | 100.9 | 106.1 | 101.4 | 101.6 | 102.2 | 102.1 |
| Construction contracts: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monthly index | 151.3 | 131.9 | 132.4 | 113.6 | 119.7 | 111.8 | 121.9 | 138.4 | 132.1 | 121.2 | 140.5 | 156.4 |
| Moving average | 145.7 | 138.5 | 126.0 | 121.9 | 115.0 | 114.8 | 121.0 | 127.8 | 133.4 | 134.1 | 142.2 | 141.4 |
| 1927. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Industrial production | 107 | 109 | 111 | 109 | 111 | 108 | 106 | 107 | 105 | 10 | | |

WORLD COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY—1929-33

(1928 = 100.0)

Industrial Production, Int'l. Commodities, Prices, Com-
Except Trade, Gold posite
Russia, Russia, Value, Stks, Values, Gold.

| 1929. | 106.0 | 107.1 | 108.2 | 109 | 97.4 | 99.4 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|------|
| Jan. | 106.0 | 107.1 | 108.2 | 109 | 97.4 | 99.4 |
| Feb. | 105.1 | 104.1 | 102.2 | 108 | 99.6 | 99.5 |
| March | 106.0 | 104.9 | 100.6 | 109 | 102.5 | 99.8 |
| April | 107.7 | 104.1 | 108.3 | 108 | 97.4 | 98.7 |
| May | 108.6 | 104.9 | 106.0 | 112 | 93.1 | 97.2 |
| June | 109.8 | 105.2 | 102.8 | 112 | 91.3 | 97.1 |
| July | 108.5 | 103.6 | 103.4 | 112 | 96.7 | 98.5 |
| Aug. | 107.1 | 101.5 | 101.7 | 114 | 96.5 | 97.8 |
| Sept. | 106.5 | 102.7 | 98.0 | 102 | 97 | 97.7 |
| Oct. | 106.4 | 106.8 | 98.3 | 124 | 95.4 | 97.1 |
| Nov. | 102.6 | 109.8 | 97.4 | 125 | 87.8 | 95.5 |
| Dec. | 98.2 | 107.1 | 92.3 | 128 | 88.8 | 94.6 |

1930.

| Jan. | 99.4 | 105.3 | 97.7 | 130 | 88.0 | 93.2 |
|-------|------|-------|------|-----|------|------|
| Feb. | 98.8 | 100.8 | 93.2 | 130 | 82.4 | 91.3 |
| March | 96.5 | 99.2 | 89.4 | 135 | 81.2 | 89.2 |
| April | 95.7 | 95.4 | 87.5 | 138 | 80.4 | 88.7 |
| May | 94.5 | 95.1 | 88.7 | 144 | 75.3 | 87.6 |
| June | 91.0 | 91.0 | 83.5 | 152 | 69.5 | 86.1 |
| July | 87.9 | 91.1 | 80.7 | 152 | 64.9 | 84.8 |
| Aug. | 86.2 | 89.7 | 76.6 | 156 | 61.8 | 84.3 |
| Sept. | 85.9 | 89.1 | 76.4 | 158 | 57.0 | 83.3 |
| Oct. | 85.1 | 91.8 | 75.1 | 152 | 56.9 | 81.8 |
| Nov. | 83.6 | 91.9 | 70.2 | 154 | 56.6 | 80.8 |
| Dec. | 81.9 | 90.5 | 69.0 | 156 | 55.9 | 79.0 |

1931.

| Jan. | 80.1 | 86.8 | 66.1 | 160 | 52.5 | 77.8 |
|-------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|
| Feb. | 81.7 | 85.7 | 65.0 | 162 | 52.5 | 76.8 |
| March | 82.5 | 86.3 | 65.3 | 166 | 51.4 | 76.4 |
| April | 87.6 | 95.9 | 64.0 | 164 | 50.2 | 75.7 |
| May | 81.8 | 84.9 | 62.9 | 173 | 48.0 | 74.3 |
| June | 79.2 | 83.8 | 62.0 | 174 | 47.2 | 73.4 |
| July | 78.4 | 83.2 | 60.8 | 175 | 47.5 | 72.8 |
| Aug. | 75.9 | 81.2 | 56.5 | 174 | 42.9 | 71.6 |
| Sept. | 74.7 | 80.9 | 54.8 | 167 | 41.2 | 69.2 |
| Oct. | 73.4 | 81.5 | 50.7 | 173 | 41.2 | 66.9 |
| Nov. | 73.0 | 80.6 | 49.9 | 176 | 41.3 | 66.5 |
| Dec. | 71.5 | 76.4 | 47.1 | 176 | 38.1 | 63.2 |

1932.

| Jan. | 70.8 | 77.1 | 43.4 | 178 | 38.6 | 61.9 |
|-------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|
| Feb. | 69.2 | 76.0 | 44.0 | 175 | 37.6 | 61.7 |
| March | 68.2 | 76.0 | 42.9 | 184 | 36.6 | 61.9 |
| April | 65.3 | 74.4 | 43.7 | 182 | 34.9 | 61.5 |
| May | 64.0 | 74.9 | 40.9 | 190 | 33.3 | 60.2 |
| June | 63.2 | 73.2 | 40.8 | 190 | 31.9 | 58.9 |
| July | 61.5 | 70.8 | 36.4 | 182 | 34.2 | 58.8 |
| Aug. | 62.4 | 71.6 | 35.9 | 178 | 39.3 | 58.8 |
| Sept. | 65.9 | 72.3 | 36.6 | 174 | 42.0 | 59.5 |
| Oct. | 67.1 | 74.8 | 36.5 | 170 | 38.7 | 58.2 |
| Nov. | 67.2 | 76.2 | 37.0 | 173 | 35.8 | 57.1 |
| Dec. | 67.8 | 76.3 | 37.0 | 174 | 33.1 | 56.4 |

Adjusted for seasonal variations.

10 FOREIGN WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES—1929-33

(1913 = 100.0; measured in currency of country)

| 1929. | 76.2 | 76.2 | 36.4 | 175 | 32.3 | 55.8 |
|-------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|
| Jan. | 66.7 | 76.2 | 36.4 | 172 | 32.0 | 55.0 |
| March | 65.8 | 79.6 | 37.0 | 174 | 34.8 | 54.8 |
| April | 68.8 | 78.9 | 34.2 | 178 | 35.3 | 54.4 |
| May | 75.5 | 82.2 | 36.7 | 179 | 37.6 | 53.7 |
| June | 82.7 | 83.4 | 36.5 | 178 | 39.5 | 54.6 |
| July | 86.1 | 82.7 | 36.1 | 177 | 39.4 | 54.0 |
| Sept. | 79.3 | 83.2 | 35.1 | 170 | 35.9 | 52.5 |
| Oct. | 76.4 | 85.1 | 34.0 | 165 | 32.6 | 52.4 |
| Nov. | 74.8 | 85.6 | 35.2 | 168 | 31.5 | 51.9 |
| Dec. | 76.3 | 85.8 | 34.9 | 165 | 32.3 | 52.5 |

Adjusted for seasonal variations.

11 BRITISH STOCK PRICES—1929-33

(Dec. 1921=100.0; "Bankers' Magazine" index)

1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933.

Adjusted weights: 25, 25, 20, 10, 10, 10, 100.

Week Ended: 22, 11, .51, .04, .05, .07, 1.0.

1934.

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1934.

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20

FREIGHT CAR LOADINGS (19)

| | Jan. 5. | Dec. 29. | Jan. 6. |
|--|---------|----------|---------|
| 1935. | 1934. | 1934. | 1934. |
| Grain and grain prod. | 22,009 | 17,946 | 23,338 |
| Livestock | 13,820 | 11,358 | 15,617 |
| Coal | 127,545 | 107,478 | 131,336 |
| Coke | 7,157 | 5,993 | 7,615 |
| Forest products | 16,153 | 11,782 | 14,865 |
| Ore | 2,448 | 2,196 | 2,813 |
| Merchandise, l. c. l. | 126,951 | 119,963 | 134,388 |
| Miscellaneous freight | 181,990 | 148,404 | 170,841 |
| Car loadings (total) | 498,073 | 425,120 | 500,813 |
| Week ended Jan. 12, 1935—Estimated total \$52,000; corresponding week in 1934, 555,827. | | | |

21

COTTON CLOTH PRODUCTION (31)

(Thousands of Yards)

| Week Ended: | 1935. | Week Ended: | 1934. | Total |
|-------------|---------|-------------|---------|-------|
| Sep. 29. | 95,991 | Nov. 24. | 125,093 | |
| Oct. 6. | 117,495 | Dec. 1. | 111,426 | |
| Oct. 13. | 120,543 | Dec. 8. | 120,727 | |
| Oct. 20. | 124,127 | Dec. 15. | 125,598 | |
| Oct. 27. | 124,900 | Dec. 22. | 126,175 | |
| Nov. 3. | 126,663 | Dec. 29. | 123,694 | |
| Nov. 10. | 125,348 | 1935: | | |
| Nov. 17. | 119,282 | Jan. 5. | 120,000 | |

22

ESTIMATED AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION (10)

| Week Ended: | 1935. | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. |
|-------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Jan. 5. | 42,003 | 20,307 | 25,479 | 38,223 |
| Jan. 12. | 59,825 | 30,239 | 29,096 | 31,722 |
| Dec. 14. | 24,801 | 16,762 | 30,404 | |
| Dec. 21. | 21,000 | 34,697 | 18,008 | 27,179 |
| Dec. 28. | 36,084 | 13,896 | 25,291 | |

23

ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION (7)

(Includes only power generated by the electric light and power industry proper and imports. Does not include power generated by traction companies.)

(Thousands of kilowatt hours)

| Week Ended: | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Jan. 5. | 1,668,731 | 1,563,678 | 1,425,639 |
| Jan. 12. | 1,772,609 | 1,646,271 | 1,495,116 |
| Dec. 21. | 1,650,467 | 1,539,002 | 1,414,710 |
| Dec. 28. | 1,530,222 | 1,523,652 | |

Back figures—See THE ANNALIST of May 11, 1934, page 756.

24

THE ANNALIST WEEKLY INDEX OF SENSITIVE COMMODITY PRICES

| Steel | Scrap. | Zinc. | Aver. | Sensitive Price Index. |
|----------|--------|-------|-------|------------------------------|
| 1934. | | | | |
| Jan. 16. | 97.7 | 78.5 | 88.1 | 103.6 |
| Dec. 24. | 96.4 | 67.8 | 82.1 | 110.5 |
| Dec. 31. | 96.1 | 67.1 | 82.6 | 111.6 |
| 1935. | | | | |
| Jan. 8. | 101.5 | 68.6 | 85.0 | 112.6 |
| Jan. 15. | 101.7 | 69.1 | 85.4 | 112.4 |
| Dec. 21. | 100.0 | 68.0 | 84.0 | 107.0 |
| Dec. 28. | 99.0 | 67.0 | 83.0 | 105.0 |

*U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Index (1926=100) converted to 1913 base, by multiplying by 1.4327.

For figures from Jan. 5, 1932, to Dec. 11, 1934, see THE ANNALIST of Nov. 30, 1934, page 758, and Dec. 14, 1934, page 827.

25

PER CENT CHANGES IN ELECTRIC POWER OUTPUT FROM CORRESPONDING WEEKS OF PREVIOUS YEAR (7)

| | 1935. | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| New Eng. | + 7.7 | + 5.9 | + 6.4 | + 5.7 |
| Mid Atl. | + 5.4 | + 2.9 | + 4.7 | + 6.5 |
| Cen Ind Reg. | + 8.7 | + 6.9 | + 7.5 | + 8.7 |
| West Cen. | + 4.1 | + 1.0 | + 5.3 | + 6.1 |
| South States | + 9.4 | + 15.9 | + 13.8 | + 12.3 |
| Rocky Mts. | + 12.6 | + 10.0 | + 9.6 | + 11.1 |
| Pac Coast | + 6.0 | + 5.8 | + 2.9 | + 4.7 |
| Entire U. S. | + 7.7 | + 6.7 | + 7.2 | + 7.9 |
| | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |

26

BOOT AND SHOE PRODUCTION (5)

(Thousands of Pairs)

| | 1934. | 1933. | 1932. |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------|
| January | 25,787 | 22,717 | 21,225 |
| February | 30,120 | 26,384 | 25,958 |
| March | 35,357 | 28,576 | 30,676 |
| April | 34,152 | 27,630 | 25,946 |
| May | 33,874 | 32,965 | 22,497 |
| June | 26,379 | 34,861 | 23,562 |
| July | 26,247 | 33,749 | 20,442 |
| August | 35,469 | 37,019 | 30,785 |
| September | 27,794 | 31,234 | 33,885 |
| October | 28,506 | 31,455 | 33,070 |
| November | *23,556 | 23,695 | 25,149 |
| December | — | 20,095 | 19,556 |
| Total | 350,382 | 313,290 | 316,240 |

27

COAL AND COKE PRODUCTION (5)

(Thousands of net tons)

| | Week Ended: | Jan. 5. | Dec. 29. | Jan. 6. |
|--------------------|-------------|---------|----------|---------|
| Bituminous coal | 7,188 | 6,210 | 7,005 | |
| Daily average | 1,423 | 1,242 | 1,242 | |
| Anthracite (Penn.) | 1,115 | 908 | 1,393 | |
| Daily average | 223 | 182 | 279 | |
| Beechite coke | 15 | 17 | 22 | |
| Daily average | 2 | 3 | 4 | |

28

CONSTRUCTION COSTS (17)

(Quarter Ended—Dec. 31, Dec. 31,

1934. 1933.)

| | 1934. | 1933. |
|--------------------|-------|-------|
| The Aberthaw Index | 176% | 175 |

29

NEW PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES


| | Nov. | Oct. | Nov. |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| General Motors (total) | 51,114 | 55,163 | 33,981 |
| Chevrolet | 36,807 | 38,076 | 25,587 |
| Oldsmobile | 8,189 | 6,625 | 1,485 |
| Buick | 7,448 | 5,166 | 1,682 |
| Pontiac | 3,985 | 4,891 | 4,452 |
| Cadillac | 395 | 330 | 191 |
| Ford (total) | 23,482 | 38,823 | 20,858 |
| Ford | 23,295 | 38,641 | 20,771 |
| Lincoln | 187 | 182 | 87 |
| Chrysler (total) | 22,134 | 32,966 | 27,977 |
| Plymouth | 13,482 | 22,240 | 18,996 |
| Dodge | 5,496 | 6,918 | 4,445 |
| Chrysler | 2,435 | 2,841 | 1,330 |
| De Soto | 721 | 967 | 1,206 |
| Hudson (total) | 3,242 | 4,817 | 1,982 |
| Terraplane | 2,212 | 3,293 | 1,843 |
| Hudson | 1,030 | 1,524 | 139 |
| Studebaker | 2,512 | 3,093 | 4,218 |
| Nash (total) | 1,969 | 2,198 | 1,112 |
| Nash | 1,022 | 1,132 | 1,112 |
| La Fayette | 947 | 1,066 | |
| Hupp | 675 | 616 | 445 |
| Graham | 656 | 1,003 | 587 |
| Packard | 599 | 635 | 624 |
| Auburn | 450 | 651 | 204 |
| Willys | 308 | 420 | 775 |
| Reo | 262 | 310 | 342 |
| Pierce-Arrow | 110 | 90 | 265 |
| Austin | 94 | 61 | 171 |
| Continental | 6 | 7 | 451 |
| Franklin | 3 | 5 | 97 |
| Miscellaneous | 32 | 22 | 56 |

30

NEW COMMERCIAL CAR REGISTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

| | Nov. | Oct. | Nov. |
|------------------------|--------|--------|-------|
| General Motors (total) | 12,200 | 16,839 | 5,425 |
| Chevrolet | 11,296 | 15,723 | 4,849 |
| G. M. C. | 886 | 1,106 | 576 |
| Buick | 18 | 10 | |
| Ford | 8,060 | 13,544 | 5,521 |
| Chrysler (total) | 3,877 | 4,680 | 3,675 |
| Dodge | 3,868 | 4,669 | 3,675 |
| Plymouth | 9 | 11 | |
| International | 2,626 | 3,238 | 2,222 |
| Reo | 393 | 364 | 267 |
| Diamond-T | 305 | 35 | |

Stock and Bond Market Averages and Volume of Trading



AVERAGE NET YIELD ON TEN HIGH GRADE RAILROAD BONDS

1935. 1934. 1933. 1932. 1931. 1930.
Jan. 5. 3.82 4.72 4.66 5.04 4.21 4.44
Jan. 12. 3.81 4.56 4.60 5.03 4.20 4.43
Jan. 19. 4.44 4.62 5.05 4.18 4.42
Jan. 26. 4.42 4.57 5.16 4.24 4.46

For monthly data from January, 1857, to January, 1934, see THE ANNALIST of Feb. 9, 1934, page 274, and Feb. 23, 1934, page 349. For chart governing this period see THE ANNALIST of Jan. 19, 1934, pages 96 and 97.

AVERAGE PRICE OF 10 HIGH-GRADE RAILROAD BONDS

1935. 1934.
Jan. Dec. Nov. Oct. Sept. Aug. July.
10. 106.85 104.01 102.02 100.69 99.61 100.54 102.45
11. 106.62 104.08 100.99 99.12 99.50 102.74
12. 106.42 104.11 98.54 103.02
13. 104.44 102.21 101.31 98.58 99.05 103.11
14. 106.24 104.62 103.32 97.96 98.84 103.12
15. 106.96 104.78 102.51 101.51 97.89 100.34
16. 106.06 102.62 101.80 100.54 103.8

For complete daily figures from Nov. 2, 1931, to April 4, 1934, see THE ANNALIST issues of May 6, 1932, page 777; Dec. 2, 1932, page 745; June 23, 1933, page 864; Dec. 29, 1933, page 840; April 6, 1934, page 565.

BONDS SOLD ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (Par Value)

| Week Ended | Same Week |
|----------------|---------------|
| Jan. 12, 1935. | 1934. |
| \$15,885,400 | \$15,736,100 |
| 13,784,700 | 16,213,200 |
| 15,286,500 | 24,305,000 |
| 17,046,800 | 20,094,500 |
| 21,148,700 | 18,223,000 |
| 12,822,300 | 8,333,000 |
| Total week | \$101,474,400 |
| Year to date | 153,946,900 |
| Monday | 12,490,500 |
| Wednesday | 13,711,800 |
| Friday | 10,442,000 |
| Saturday | 21,983,000 |

BONDS SOLD ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (Par Value)

| Week Ended | Same Week |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| Jan. 12, 1935. | 1934. |
| \$52,281,000 | \$52,044,000 |
| U. S. Government | 38,542,400 |
| Foreign | 10,651,000 |
| Total | \$101,474,400 |
| NEW BOND ISSUES (Thousands) | \$102,910,800 |

NEW BOND ISSUES (Thousands)

| Week Ended | Same Week |
|----------------|-----------|
| Jan. 11, 1935. | 1934. |
| \$36,000 | \$28,000 |
| 19,190 | 4,310 |
| 444 | 125 |
| Total | \$55,634 |
| Year to date | 59,944 |

NEW YORK TIMES BOND MARKET AVERAGE (40 BONDS)

| Date | Indus. | Util. | Com. | Net |
|---|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Rails. | Rails. | Util. | bined. | Chge. |
| Jan. 7. 77.19 | 93.26 | 84.47 | 83.03 | + 16 |
| Jan. 8. 77.38 | 93.42 | 84.41 | 83.15 | + .12 |
| Jan. 10. 77.26 | 93.54 | 84.54 | 83.15 | + .24 |
| Jan. 11. 77.45 | 93.79 | 85.02 | 83.43 | + .24 |
| Jan. 12. 76.84 | 93.91 | 84.74 | 83.22 | - .21 |
| Wk's rge. 40 bonds-High 83.43, low 82.99. | | | | |
| Jan. 14. 76.77 | 94.02 | 84.76 | 83.08 | + .09 |
| Jan. 15. 76.31 | 93.50 | 84.31 | 82.61 | - .47 |
| Jan. 16. 76.44 | 93.30 | 84.57 | 82.69 | + .08 |


DOW-JONES BOND AVERAGES

| 10 | 10 | | | |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| High | Second | 10 | | |
| Grade | Grade | Public | 10 | 40 |
| Rails. | Rails. | Util. | Indus. | Bonds. |
| Jan. 10. 105.40 | 79.54 | 100.84 | 101.52 | 96.77 |
| Jan. 11. 105.42 | 78.82 | 100.64 | 101.61 | 96.62 |
| Jan. 12. 104.97 | 78.31 | 100.46 | 101.58 | 96.33 |
| Jan. 14. 104.94 | 78.60 | 100.46 | 101.55 | 96.39 |
| Jan. 15. 104.85 | 78.01 | 100.30 | 101.20 | 96.09 |
| Jan. 16. 104.77 | 78.27 | 100.34 | 100.99 | 96.09 |

TEN MOST ACTIVE STOCKS

| Week ended Jan. 12, 1935. | Net | | |
|---------------------------|---------|------|------|
| Volume | Close | Chge | |
| Packard Motor | 131,200 | 4% | - 1% |
| Consolidated Gas | 115,100 | 21% | + 1% |
| General Electric | 107,800 | 21% | - 1% |
| General Motors | 104,900 | 31% | - 2% |
| Westinghouse E. & M. | 94,500 | 38% | + 3% |
| Chrysler Corporation | 84,500 | 38% | - 3% |
| United States Steel | 68,500 | 37% | - 1% |
| Montgomery Ward | 67,600 | 27% | - 2% |
| Studebaker Corporation | 61,000 | 20% | - 2% |
| Commercial Solvents | 58,200 | 21% | - 1% |

For monthly data on the Axe-Houghton Weighted Average of Industrial Stocks from 1883 to 1929, see THE ANNALIST of Jan. 16, 1931, page 177. For corresponding figures on the Axe-Houghton Adjusted Index of Industrial Stocks, see THE ANNALIST of Jan. 16, 1931, page 163.



THE ANNALIST WEIGHTED AVERAGES OF GROUP LEADERS

| 43 Stocks | Combined | 4 Standard Oil |
|------------|----------|----------------|
| Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
| 10. 35.9 | 34.5 | 34.7 |
| 11. 34.9 | 33.4 | 33.8 |
| 12. 33.7 | 33.0 | 33.4 |
| 13. 33.8 | 33.3 | 33.5 |
| 14. 33.8 | 32.1 | 32.6 |
| 15. 33.8 | 32.6 | 33.2 |
| 16. 33.3 | 32.6 | 33.2 |

| 33 Industrial Stocks | 5 Independent Oil | 5 Utility Stocks |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
| 10. 128.5 | 127.1 | 127.4 |
| 11. 127.7 | 124.3 | 125.4 |
| 12. 125.1 | 123.5 | 124.6 |
| 13. 125.4 | 124.3 | 124.9 |
| 14. 125.4 | 121.5 | 122.6 |
| 15. 124.8 | 122.6 | 124.0 |
| 16. 124.8 | 122.6 | 124.0 |

| 2 Electrical Equipment Stocks | 3 Merchandise | 5 Miscellaneous |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
| 10. 25.3 | 24.8 | 25.0 |
| 11. 25.1 | 24.6 | 24.7 |
| 12. 23.7 | 22.8 | 23.4 |
| 13. 23.7 | 22.2 | 23.4 |
| 14. 23.7 | 21.9 | 23.4 |
| 15. 24.0 | 22.8 | 22.8 |
| 16. 23.6 | 22.8 | 23.6 |

| 5 Motor Stocks | 3 Rubber Stocks | 5 Railroad Stocks |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
| 10. 60.5 | 59.4 | 59.6 |
| 11. 59.7 | 57.9 | 58.3 |
| 12. 58.2 | 57.3 | 57.9 |
| 13. 58.6 | 57.8 | 58.2 |
| 14. 58.7 | 56.1 | 56.8 |
| 15. 57.6 | 56.8 | 57.4 |
| 16. 57.6 | 56.8 | 57.4 |

| 3 Copper Stocks | 5 Utility Stocks | |
|-----------------|------------------|-------|
| Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
| 10. 40.9 | 34.5 | 34.6 |
| 11. 46.6 | 45.3 | 45.8 |
| 12. 45.6 | 44.9 | 45.3 |
| 13. 45.6 | 45.3 | 45.4 |
| 14. 45.8 | 44.0 | 44.4 |
| 15. 45.2 | 44.4 | 45.0 |
| 16. 45.2 | 44.4 | 45.0 |


| 5 Railroad Stocks | Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
|-------------------|------------|------|-------|
| 10. 40.4 | 39.8 | 40.1 | |
| 11. 40.0 | 38.8 | 38.9 | |
| 12. 39.7 | 39.2 | 39.4 | |
| 13. 38.5 | 38.0 | 38.4 | |
| 14. 38.8 | 36.4 | 37.0 | |
| 15. 38.0 | 37.5 | 38.0 | |
| 16. 38.0 | 37.5 | 38.0 | |

| 9 Oil Stocks | 1935 | Number of Issues Traded |
|--------------|------|-------------------------|
| Jan. High. | Low. | Last. |
| 10. 50.2 | 50.5 | 50.6 |
| 11. 51.2 | 49.9 | 50.4 |
| 12. 50.4 | 49.7 | 50.1 |
| 13. 50.9 | 50.1 | 50.5 |
| 14. 50.8 | 49.3 | 49.4 |
| 15. 50.5 | 49.4 | 50.3 |
| 16. 50.5 | 49.4 | 50.3 |

| 1935 | Week Ended | Ad- vances. | De- clines. | Un- changed. | Total. |
|----------|------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|--------|
| Dec. 15. | 289 | 628 | 122 | 1,039 | |
| Dec. 22. | 248 | 659 | 130 | 1,037 | |
| Dec. 29. | 697 | 214 | 214 | 1,038 | |

| 1935 | Week Ended | Ad- vances. | De- clines. | Un- changed. | Total. |
|----------|------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|--------|
| Jan. 5. | 664 | 216 | 131 | 1,011 | |
| Jan. 12. | 227 | 711 | 104 | 1,042 | |

| 1935 | Week Ended | Ad- vances. | De- clines. | Un- changed. | Total. |
|----------|------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|--------|
| Jan. 10. | 249 | 264 | 198 | 711 | |
| Jan. 11. | 90 | 619 | 120 | 829 | |
| Jan. 12. | 97 | 429 | 145 | 671 | |
| Jan. 14. | 291 | 194 | 171 | 656 | |
| Jan. 15. | 92 | 608 | 137 | 837 | |
| Jan. 16. | 389 | 115 | 153 | 657 | |



Dow-Jones Stock Market Averages

WEEKLY HIGH, LOW AND LAST

| 1935. | 25 Railroads | 25 Industrials | 50 Stocks | | |
|----------------|--------------|----------------|-----------|--------|--------|
| High. | Low. | Last. | High. | Low. | Last. |
| Jan. 5. 105.67 | 103.05 | 105.56 | 147.86 | 143.77 | 146.68 |
| Dec. 29. 29.05 | 27.63 | 30.37 | 144.72 | 138.75 | 144.13 |

| 1935. | 20 Railroads | 20 Utilities | 70 Stocks | | |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|--------|--------|
| High. | Low. | Last. | High. | Low. | Last. |
| Jan. 5. 29.29 | 28.88 | 29.13 | 146.80 | 145.12 | 145.80 |
| Jan. 11. 28.99 | 28.03 | 28.22 | 146.14 | 142.68 | 143.61 |
| Jan. 12. 28.06 | 27.48 | 27.76 | 143.10 | 141.53 | 142.33 |
| Jan. 14. 27.97 | 27.69 | 27.88 | 143.44 | 142.39 | 142.76 |
| Jan. 15. 28.15 | 26.54 | 26.88 | 143.58 | 139.70 | 140.46 |
| Jan. 16. 27.50 | 27.10 | 27.34 | 142.72 | 140.56 | 142.03 |

| 1935. | 30 Industrials | 20 Railroads | 20 Utilities | 70 Stocks | |
|-----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|-------|
| High. | Low. | Last. | High. | Low. | Last. |
| Jan. 10. 105.65 | 104.41 | 104.87 | 37.21 | 36.67 | 37.01 |
| Jan. 11. 105.49 | 102.50 | 103.35 | 36.83 | 35.65 | 35.86 |
| Jan. 12. 103.17 | 101.70 | 102.30 | 35.65 | 34.89 | 35.27 |
| Jan. 14. 103.37 | 102.39 | 102.76 | 35.55 | 35.17 | 35.44 |
| Jan. 15. 103.20 | 99.54 | 100.49 | 35.80 | 33.71 | 34.14 |
| Jan. 16. 101.95 | 100.40 | 101.54 | 34.95 | 34.45 | 34.77 |

| 1935. | 30 Industrials | 20 Railroads | 20 Utilities | 70 Stocks |
|-------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
|-------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|

Banking Statistics—Brokers' Loans—Gold Reserves

Statement of Member Banks

PRINCIPAL RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF REPORTING MEMBER BANKS IN 91 LEADING CITIES
(Millions of dollars)

| LOANS— | | All Reporting | Chicago | New York | City | |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| On securities: | Jan. 9, 1935. | Jan. 2, 1935. | Jan. 2, 1935. | Jan. 10, 1935. | Jan. 16, 1935. | Jan. 17, 1935. |
| To brokers & dealers: | 1935. | 1935. | 1934. | 1935. | 1935. | 1934. |
| In New York | \$715 | \$741 | \$653 | \$2,076 | \$47 | \$603 |
| Outside New York | 161 | 169 | 43 | 24 | 25 | 29 |
| To others | 2,149 | 2,171 | 2,701 | 180 | 180 | 236 |
| Total | \$3,025 | \$3,081 | \$3,497 | \$231 | \$282 | \$1,465 |
| Acceptances and commercial paper | \$440 | \$436 | — | \$61 | \$61 | \$227 |
| Loans on real estate | 975 | 977 | — | 19 | 19 | 131 |
| Other loans | 3,138 | 3,152 | — | 211 | 214 | 1,181 |
| Total | \$4,553 | \$4,565 | \$4,712 | \$291 | \$294 | \$1,539 |
| Total all loans | \$7,578 | \$7,646 | \$8,209 | \$522 | \$525 | \$3,279 |
| INVESTMENTS— | | | | | | |
| U.S. Govt. obligations | \$7,192 | \$7,192 | \$5,210 | \$734 | \$750 | \$435 |
| Oblig'sn fully guaranteed by U.S. Gov. | 588 | 583 | — | 78 | 78 | 268 |
| Other securities | 2,800 | 2,800 | 2,969 | 220 | 223 | 259 |
| Total investments | \$10,580 | \$10,575 | \$8,179 | \$1,032 | \$1,051 | \$694 |
| TOTAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS | \$18,158 | \$18,221 | \$16,388 | \$1,554 | \$1,576 | \$1,273 |
| Reserve with F.R. Bk. | \$3,208 | \$3,063 | \$1,983 | \$452 | \$413 | \$307 |
| Cash in vault | 284 | 292 | 248 | 38 | 40 | 43 |
| Net demand deposits | 13,665 | 13,685 | 10,951 | 1,469 | 1,454 | 1,096 |
| Time deposits | 4,397 | 4,388 | 4,343 | 383 | 383 | 337 |
| Government deposits | 1,336 | 1,344 | 571 | 46 | 46 | 28 |
| Due from banks | 1,706 | 1,770 | 1,210 | 179 | 198 | 184 |
| Due to banks | 4,129 | 4,133 | 2,804 | 449 | 447 | 280 |
| Borrowed from F.R. Bk. | — | — | — | — | — | — |

*Not available. [†]Included in "Other Securities."

Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks

| | | Combined Fed. Res. Banks— | N. Y. Federal Res. Bank— | | | |
|--|----------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| | Jan. 16, 1935. | Jan. 9, 1935. | Jan. 17, 1934. | Jan. 16, 1935. | Jan. 9, 1935. | Jan. 17, 1934. |
| ASSETS. | | | | | | |
| Gold certificates on hand and due from U. S. Treasury | \$5,237,503 | \$5,162,076 | \$947,682 | \$1,851,708 | \$1,848,589 | \$268,628 |
| Gold | — | — | 2,568,648 | — | — | 681,333 |
| Redemption fund—F. R. notes | 17,398 | 19,060 | 43,974 | 1,059 | 1,499 | 10,025 |
| Other cash | 287,444 | 287,644 | 244,870 | 68,964 | 71,163 | 58,087 |
| Total reserves | \$5,542,345 | \$5,468,780 | \$3,805,174 | \$1,921,731 | \$1,921,251 | \$1,018,073 |
| Redemption fund—F. R. Bank notes | 1,752 | 1,964 | 12,527 | 1,502 | 1,714 | 3,058 |
| Bills discounted: | | | | | | |
| Secured by U. S. Govt. obligations, direct and/or fully guaranteed | 13,604 | 3,588 | 35,553 | 3,253 | 1,838 | 21,321 |
| Other bills discounted | 3,617 | 3,406 | 65,762 | 2,519 | 2,550 | 26,284 |
| Total bills discounted | \$17,221 | \$6,994 | \$101,315 | \$5,772 | \$4,388 | \$47,605 |
| Bills bought in open market | 5,562 | 5,611 | 111,939 | 2,102 | 1,982 | 3,811 |
| Industrial advances | 14,826 | 14,744 | — | 850 | 846 | — |
| U. S. Government securities: | | | | | | |
| Bonds | 395,627 | 395,662 | 442,807 | 141,018 | 141,018 | 170,047 |
| Treasury notes | 1,508,667 | 1,507,117 | 1,053,163 | 475,691 | 475,234 | 361,239 |
| Certificates and bills | 525,925 | 527,475 | 935,820 | 161,109 | 161,566 | 300,469 |
| Total U. S. Govt. securities | \$2,430,219 | \$2,430,254 | \$2,431,790 | \$777,818 | \$777,818 | \$831,755 |
| Other securities | — | — | 1,413 | — | — | 903 |
| Total bills and securities | \$2,467,828 | \$2,457,603 | \$2,646,457 | \$786,542 | \$785,034 | \$884,074 |
| Gold held abroad | — | — | 4,319 | — | — | 4,319 |
| Due from foreign banks | 806 | 805 | 3,390 | 317 | 300 | 1,287 |
| F. R. notes of other banks | 24,226 | 24,489 | 20,512 | 6,355 | 5,423 | 6,545 |
| Uncollected items | 505,729 | 428,403 | 416,335 | 126,961 | 104,738 | 100,387 |
| Bank premises | 49,296 | 49,190 | 51,980 | 11,498 | 11,438 | 11,066 |
| All other assets | 45,589 | 44,850 | 116,980 | 31,849 | 31,015 | 48,315 |
| Total assets | \$8,637,571 | \$8,476,084 | \$7,077,984 | \$2,886,755 | \$2,860,913 | \$2,083,124 |
| LIABILITIES. | | | | | | |
| Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation | \$3,099,050 | \$3,136,987 | \$2,959,556 | \$647,943 | \$655,466 | \$609,680 |
| Federal Reserve Bank note circulation—net | 25,869 | 26,185 | 204,536 | 24,964 | 25,136 | 52,637 |
| Deposits: | | | | | | |
| Member bank—reserve account | 4,387,560 | 4,282,546 | 2,788,073 | 1,793,666 | 1,782,744 | 1,032,879 |
| U. S. Treasurer—gen. acct. | 67,227 | 80,137 | 105,356 | 33,608 | 45,163 | 87,701 |
| Foreign bank | 18,339 | 19,114 | 3,955 | 6,235 | 6,588 | 1,519 |
| Other deposits | 196,677 | 174,725 | 159,506 | 134,921 | 123,937 | 38,847 |
| Total deposits | \$4,669,803 | \$4,556,522 | \$3,036,890 | \$1,968,430 | \$1,958,412 | \$1,160,946 |
| Deferred availability items | 506,428 | 419,920 | 420,675 | 126,077 | 102,620 | 101,743 |
| Capital paid in | 146,839 | 146,844 | 145,078 | 59,606 | 59,606 | 58,649 |
| Surplus (Section 7) | 144,893 | 144,893 | 138,383 | 49,964 | 49,964 | 45,217 |
| Surplus (Section 13b) | 10,526 | 10,496 | — | 773 | 773 | — |
| Reserve for contingencies | 30,908 | 30,816 | 22,523 | 7,501 | 7,510 | 4,737 |
| All other liabilities | 3,355 | 3,421 | 150,343 | 1,497 | 1,426 | 49,515 |
| Total liabilities | \$8,637,571 | \$8,476,084 | \$7,077,984 | \$2,886,755 | \$2,860,913 | \$2,083,124 |
| Ratio of total reserves to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined | 71.3% | 71.1% | 63.5% | 73.5% | 73.5% | 57.5% |
| Contingent liability on bills purchased for foreign correspondents | \$567 | \$878 | \$4,477 | \$209 | \$450 | \$1,594 |
| Commitments to make industrial advances | 10,846 | 10,375 | — | 4,502 | 3,948 | — |

Comparative Statement of Federal Reserve Banks

| District. | Total | Condition Jan. 16, 1935. | Total Bills | Total U. S. F. R. Notes | Due Mem'r's | *Ratio. |
|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------|
| Boston | \$439,499,000 | \$451,000 | \$157,671,000 | \$259,585,000 | \$314,146,000 | 75.8 |
| New York | 1,921,731,000 | 5,772,000 | 777,818,000 | 647,943,000 | 1,793,666,000 | 73.4 |
| Philadelphia | 309,794,000 | 948,000 | 167,120,000 | 230,112,000 | 222,547,000 | 67.3 |
| Cleveland | 395,523,000 | 310,000 | 213,024,000 | 297,338,000 | 279,855,000 | 67.1 |
| Richmond | 190,729,000 | 303,000 | 103,562,000 | 160,614,000 | 128,518,000 | 65.2 |
| Atlanta | 131,868,000 | 163,000 | 94,233,000 | 128,610,000 | 82,166,000 | 60.2 |
| Chicago | 1,103,734,000 | 9,010,000 | 428,343,000 | 768,167,000 | 726,184,000 | 73.2 |
| St. Louis | 221,325,000 | 28,000 | 93,200,000 | 138,373,000 | 152,548,000 | 72.1 |
| Minneapolis | 155,240,000 | — | 65,598,000 | 103,628,000 | 105,535,000 | 71.6 |
| Kansas City | 208,369,000 | 103,000 | 91,844,000 | 114,050,000 | 177,303,000 | 70.2 |
| Dallas | 119,386,000 | 32,000 | 71,475,000 | 50,242,000 | 128,373,000 | 65.4 |
| San Francisco | 345,147,000 | 101,000 | 166,331,000 | 199,888,000 | 276,719,000 | 69.0 |

*Ratio of total reserves to deposit and F. R. note liabilities combined.

| (Thousands of Reichsmarks) | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Gold coin and bullion | 79,156 | 79,122 | 70,101 | 78,762 | 78,711 | 383,474 |
| Reserve in foreign currencies | 1,481 | 4,653 | 4,607 | 4,434 | 4,250 | 8,041 |
| Bills of exchange and checks | 3,496,553 | 3,651,032 | 4,020,566 | 3,605,306 | 3,594,980 | 2,765,002 |
| Silver and other coins | 279,159 | 227,951 | 162,164 | 205,611 | 194,093 | 288,981 |
| Notes on other banks | 13,593 | 11,724 | 6,112 | 9,060 | 9,484 | 6,412 |
| Advances | 56,244 | 70,591 | 145,689 | 101,608 | 97,494 | 145,689 |
| Investments | 762,638 | 766,335 | 765,451 | 755,230 | 754,919 | 320,518 |
| Other assets | 691,540 | 714,137 | 658,619 | 666,185 | 678,765 | 527,961 |
| Notes in circulation | 3,563,192 | 3,684,522 | 3,900,609 | 3,724,299 | 3,719,616 | 3,354,083 |
| Other maturing obligations | 933,610 | 934,358 | 983,572 | 764,263 | 759,520 | 456,970 |
| Other liabilities | 267,795 | 297,896 | 378,271 | 331,777 | 317,299 | 226,281 |
| Bank rate | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% |

*Cable report; subject to revision. [†]As reported in the official Reichsbank statement.

Debits to Individual Accounts by Banks in Reporting Centres

(Thousands)

| No. of Centres Included | Week Ended |
| --- | --- |
<tbl_info cols="2

Leadership in 1934

The New York Times for a quarter of a century has held universal recognition for its complete and trustworthy service in financial and business news.

In 1934, The New York Times published 874,369 agate lines of financial advertising, more than any other New York newspaper by 289,619 lines. Adding significance to this volume is an inflexible enforcement of high standards of acceptability that each year prompt The Times to decline thousands of lines of proffered advertising deemed unworthy.

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
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
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9:00 p.m. C.S.T.
8:00 p.m. M.S.T.
7:00 p.m. P.S.T.

THURSDAY
9:00 p.m. E.S.T.
8:00 p.m. C.S.T.
9:30 p.m. M.S.T.
8:30 p.m. P.S.T.

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